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Ontological Foundations For 
Structural Conceptual Models
Giancarlo Guizzardi
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute 
to the theory of Conceptual Modeling by 
proposing ontological foundations for structural 
conceptual models. 
Conceptual Modeling is a discipline of great 
importance to several areas in Computer Science. 
Its main objective is concerned with identifying, 
analyzing and describing the essential concepts 
and constraints of a universe of discourse, with 
the help of a (diagrammatic) modeling language 
that is based on a set of basic modeling concepts 
(forming a metamodel). 
In this thesis, we show how conceptual modeling 
languages can be evaluated and (re)designed 
with the purpose of improving their ontological 
adequacy. In simple terms, ontological adequacy 
is a measure of how close the models produced 
using a modeling language are to the situations 
in the reality they are supposed to represent. The 
thesis starts by proposing a systematic evaluation 
method for comparing a metamodel of the 
concepts underlying a language to a reference 
ontology of the corresponding domain in reality. 
The focus of this thesis is on general conceptual 
modeling languages (as opposed to domain 
specific ones). Hence, the proposed reference 
ontology is a foundational (or upper-level) 
ontology. Moreover, since, it focuses on structural 
modeling aspects (as opposed to dynamic ones), 
this foundational ontology is an ontology of 
objects, their properties and relations, their 
parts, the roles they play, and the types they 
instantiate. 
The proposed ontology was developed by 
adapting and extending a number of theories 
coming, primarily, from formal ontology in 
philosophy, but also from cognitive science 
and linguistics. Once developed, every sub-
theory of the ontology is used in the creation 
of methodological tools (e.g., modeling 
profiles, guidelines and design patterns). The 
expressiveness and relevance of these tools are 
shown throughout the thesis to solve some 
classical and recurrent conceptual modeling 
problems. 
Finally, the thesis demonstrates the applicability 
and usefulness of both the method and the 
proposed ontology by analyzing and extending 
a fragment of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) which deals with the construction of 
structural conceptual models. 
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As Coisas (Arnaldo Antunes, 1993) 
 
As coisas têm peso, 
massa, volume, tamanho, 
tempo, forma, cor, 
posição, textura, duração, 
densidade, cheiro, valor, 
consistência, profundidade, 
contorno, temperatura, 
função, aparência, preço, 
destino, idade, sentido. 
As coisas não têm paz. 
 
 
The Things (Arnaldo Antunes, 1993) 
 
The things have weight, 
mass, volume, size, 
time, shape, color, 
position, texture, duration, 
density, smell, value, 
consistency, depth, 
boundaries, temperature, 
function, appearance, price, 
fate, age, significance. 
The things have no peace. 
   
 
 
   
Preface 
 The idea came to me as one switches on a light, one day  
when by chance there fell into my hands an old dusty diagram,  
the work of some unknown predecessor of mine 
Since a chemist does not think, indeed does not live without models,  
I idly went about representing them for myself, 
drawing on paper the long chains of silicon, oxygen, 
 iron and magnesium, with the nickel caught between their links 
and I did not feel much different  from the remote  
 hunter of Altamira who painted an antilope 
 on the rock wall so that the next days hunt would be lucky. 
Primo Levi, The Periodic Table, 1975  
 
A model is an abstraction of reality according to a certain conceptualization. 
Once represented as a concrete artifact, a model can support 
communication, learning and analysis about relevant aspects of the 
underlying domain. As in the passage above by the brilliant Italian writer 
Primo Levi, a represented model (a dusty diagram) created by an unknown 
predecessor is a medium to preserve and communicate a certain view of the 
world, and can serve as a vehicle for reasoning and problem solving, and for 
acquiring new knowledge (maybe having striking new ideas!) about this view 
of the world.   
As a concrete artifact, a represented model must be expressed in some 
suitable language. For instance, in the chemical domain evoked by Levi, a 
language that we would consider suitable would include features such as: 
comprise constructs that represent concepts such as atoms, molecules and 
their links; be clear and intuitive for chemists to use; not allow for the 
construction of diagrams that represent situations that are deemed 
impossible by the laws of chemistry, etc... In summary, we could say that 
XII  PREFACE 
 
such a language should be truthful to the domain in reality it is supposed to 
represent. 
In the work presented in this thesis, we systematically study some of 
the relations between a modeling language and a set of real-world 
phenomena in a given domain. Thus, one of the questions which are 
addressed here is: how can we assess the ontology adequacy of a given 
modeling language? In simple terms, ontological adequacy is a measure of 
how close the models produced using a modeling language are to the 
situations in reality they are supposed to represent.  
In this thesis, we show how modeling languages can be evaluated and 
(re)designed with the purpose of improving their ontological adequacy, by   
proposing a systematic evaluation method for comparing a metamodel of 
the concepts underlying a language to a reference ontology of the 
corresponding domain in reality.  
However, unlike Levi, the languages in which we have interest here are 
not the ones of chemistry, but the general conceptual modeling languages that 
are used in computer science to create domain models in areas such as 
artificial intelligence, software engineering, domain engineering, database 
design and integration, enterprise modeling, information systems 
engineering, among many others. Accordingly, the reference ontology which is 
needed is not one of a specific domain such as chemistry, but a formal (i.e., 
domain independent) system of categories and their ties that can be used to 
construct models of specific domain in realities, i.e., a Foundational Ontology. 
Moreover, since conceptual modeling languages are intended to support 
human activities such as communication, domain learning and problem 
solving, this foundational ontology must be one that takes human cognition 
explicitly into account.         
  The main objective of this work is, thus, to contribute to the theory of 
conceptual modeling by proposing a reference ontology that can be used to 
provide ontological foundations for general conceptual modeling concepts, and 
to analyze, (re) design and provide real-world semantics for general 
conceptual modeling languages. In particular, we focus here on structural 
conceptual models (also named domain models, information models, semantic 
data models). Consequently, the corresponding foundational ontology 
developed here is an ontology of endurants (objects), as opposed to perdurants 
(events, processes). More specifically, this ontology addresses issues such as: 
(i) the general notions of types and their instances; (ii) objects, their 
intrinsic properties and property-value spaces; (iii) the relation between 
identity and classification; (iii) distinctions among sorts of types (e.g., kinds, 
roles, phases, mixins) and their admissible relations; (iv) distinctions among 
sorts of relational properties; (v) Part-whole relations.             
This ontology has been developed by adapting and extending a number 
of theories coming from the areas of formal ontology in philosophy. The 
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chosen theories have been corroborated by thought experiments in 
philosophy and/or are supported by empirical evidence in cognitive 
psychology. Once developed, every sub-theory of the ontology is used in the 
creation of methodological tools (e.g., modeling profiles, guidelines and 
design patterns). The expressiveness and relevance of these tools are shown 
throughout the thesis to solve some classical recurrent problems found in 
the conceptual modeling and ontological engineering literature.  
The thesis demonstrates the applicability and usefulness of both the 
language evaluation and re-engineering method, and of the foundational 
ontology proposed by developing a case study. The target of this case study 
is the fragment of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) that deals with 
the construction of structural models. In this case study we (i) evaluate the 
ontological correctness of current conceptual representations produced 
using the language; (ii) provide guidelines for how the UML constructs 
should be used in conceptual modeling; (iii) justify extensions to the 
language in order to capture important ontological distinctions.  
As a result of this process, we manage to produce a conceptually 
cleaner, semantically unambiguous and ontologically well-founded version 
of the UML fragment that is mostly used for conceptual modeling, namely, 
the UML class diagrams. 
 After that, we also carry out a second case study which uses this UML 
version proposed to analyze and integrate several semantic web ontologies 
in the scope of a context-aware services platform. 
The subject of this thesis is of an inherently complex, abstract and 
interdisciplinary nature. For this reason, we felt obliged to carefully justify 
our ontological choices and, in many passages, to construct a minimum 
theoretical background for the argumentation that would follow. As a 
result, the text of this dissertation is longer than the average PhD thesis in 
computer science. Nonetheless, we think this disadvantage is compensated 
by the benefits of having a detailed and precise understanding of the issues 
discussed here. 
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 Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
This thesis contributes to the definition of general ontological foundations 
for the area of conceptual modeling. This chapter presents the background 
of the thesis (section 1.1) and motivates the relevance of the work reported 
here (section 1.2). It also defines the main objectives of our research 
(section 1.3) and its scope (section 1.4). The chapter concludes by 
presenting the approach we follow to accomplish these objectives together 
with an overview of the thesis structure (section 1.5). 
1.1 Background 
Telematics is an area concerned with the support of the interactions 
between people or automated processes or both, by applying information 
and communication technology (ICT). In general terms, information and 
communication technology has a radical impact on its users, their work, 
and their working environments. In its various manifestations, ICT 
processes data, gathers information, stores collected materials, accumulates 
knowledge, and expedites communication. In fact, it plays a role in many, if 
not most, of the everyday operations of today's business world (Chen, 
2000). 
Telematic Systems are developed to support the enaction of telematic 
services. Users of telematic services are placed in a social context and, in 
order to satisfy the needs of these users, telematic services have to be 
strongly related to the design of the activities in the social context that these 
services support (Vissers et al., 2000).  
An important constituent of the context in which a telematics service is 
embedded is the so-called subject domain (or universe of discourse) of this 
service. For instance, a medical treatment reservation service refers to concepts in 
a universe of discourse comprising entities such as patients, treatments, 
medical insurance, physicians, medical units, among others. The correct 
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operation of this service, thus, depends on the correct representation of this 
subject domain. In particular, the representations of situations in reality 
used by a given system should stand for actual state of affairs of its subject 
domain. For example, if two people are said to be married in a system, or if 
a student is said to have graduated by a given university, these should reflect 
the actual state of affairs holding in reality.  
Abstractions of a given portion of reality are constructed in terms of 
concepts, i.e., abstract representations of certain aspects of entities that 
exist in that domain. We name here a conceptualization the set of concepts 
used to articulate abstractions of state of affairs in a given domain. The 
abstraction of a given portion of reality articulated according to a domain 
conceptualization is termed here a model.  
Conceptualizations and models are abstract entities that only exist in 
the mind of the user or a community of users of a language. In order to be 
documented, communicated and analyzed, these entities must be captured 
in terms of some concrete artifact. The representation of a conceptual 
model is named here a model specification. Moreover, in order to represent a 
specification, a specification (or modeling) language is necessary. The relation 
between conceptualizations, models, specifications and modeling languages 
is depicted in figure 1.1 below. 
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A language can be seen as determining all possible specifications (i.e., all 
grammatically valid specifications) that can be constructed using that 
language. Likewise, a conceptualization can be seen as determining all 
possible models (standing for state of affairs) admissible in that domain 
(Guarino, 1998). Therefore, for example, in a conceptualization describing 
genealogical relations, there cannot be a model in which a person is his own 
biological parent, because such a state of affairs cannot obtain in reality. 
In this thesis, we are interested in the so-called class of conceptual 
modeling languages, as opposed to, for instance, languages aimed primarily at 
Figure 1-1  Relations 
between 
conceptualization, 
Model, Modeling 
Language and 
Specification 
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systems design and implementation. In a seminal paper, John Mylopoulos 
(Mylopoulos, 1992) defines the discipline of conceptual modeling as 
 
the activity of formally describing some aspects of the physical and social world 
around us for purposes of understanding and communicationConceptual 
modelling supports structuring and inferential facilities that are psychologically 
grounded. After all, the descriptions that arise from conceptual modelling activities 
are intended to be used by humans, not machines... The adequacy of a conceptual 
modelling notation rests on its contribution to the construction of models of reality 
that promote a common understanding of that reality among their human users. 
 
The specification of a conceptual model is, hence, a description of a 
given subject domain independent of specific design or technological 
choices that should influence particular telematics systems based on that 
model. Conceptual specifications are used to support understanding 
(learning), problem-solving, and communication, among stakeholders about a 
given subject domain. Once a sufficient level of understanding and 
agreement about a domain is accomplished, then the conceptual 
specification is used as a blueprint for the subsequent phases of a systems 
development process.  
The quality of a telematics system and services, therefore, depend to a 
large extent on the quality of the conceptual specifications on which their 
development is based. The latter, in turn, is strongly dependent of the 
quality of the conceptual modeling language used in its description. For 
instance, if a modeling language is imprecise and coarse in the description 
of a given domain, then there can be specifications of the language which, 
although grammatically valid, do not represent admissible state of affairs. 
This situation is depicted in figure 1.2. 
 
Situations represented by 
the valid specifications of 
language L
Admissible state of affairs 
according to a 
conceptualization C
 
The difference between the two sets illustrated in figure 1.2 gives us a 
measure of the truthfulness to reality, or the so-called domain appropriateness 
of a given conceptual modeling language (Krogstie, 2000). In summary, we 
can state that the more we know about a given domain and the more 
precise we are on representing it, the bigger the chance that we have of 
Figure 1-2  
Consequences of a 
Modeling Language as 
an imprecise 
representation of a 
domain 
conceptualization 
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constructing computational systems and services that are consistent with the 
reality of that domain. 
Having a precise representation of a given conceptualization becomes 
even more critical when we want to integrate different independently 
developed models (or systems based on those models). Suppose the 
situation in which we want to have the interaction between two 
independently developed systems, which commit to two different 
conceptualizations. In order for these systems to function properly 
together, we must guarantee that they ascribe compatible meanings to real-
world entities of their shared subject domain. In particular, we want to 
reinforce that they have compatible sets of admissible situations, whose 
union (in the ideal case) equals the admissible state of affairs delimited by 
the conceptualization of their shared subject domain. The ability of systems 
to interoperate (i.e., operate together), while having compatible real-world 
semantics is known as semantic interoperatibility (Vermeer, 1997).  
Now, suppose we have the situation depicted in figure 1.3. CA and CB 
represent the conceptualizations of the subject domains of systems A and B, 
respectively. As illustrated in figure 1.3, these conceptualizations are not 
compatible. However, because these systems are based on poor 
representations of these conceptualizations, their sets of possible situations 
considered overlap. As a result, systems A and B agree exactly on situations 
that are neither admitted by CA nor by CB. To put it simply, although these 
systems seem to have a shared view of reality, the portions of reality that 
each of them aims at representing are not compatible together. This 
problem, termed The False Agreement Problem was first highlighted in 
(Guarino, 1998). 
 
Admissible state of affairs 
according to  
conceptualization CA 
Admissible State of Affairs 
according to System A
Admissible State of Affairs 
according to System B
FALSE AGREEMENT
Admissible state of affairs 
according to  
conceptualization CB 
CA CB
 
Another important quality criterion for conceptual specifications is 
pragmatic efficiency. Since these specifications are meant to be used by 
humans, their conceptual clarity and ability to support communication, 
understanding and reasoning about the domain plays a fundamental role. 
This quality criterion of conceptual specifications is also termed 
comprehensibility appropriateness (Krogstie, 2000).      
Figure 1-3  False 
Semantic Agreement 
between two 
Communicating Entities 
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Thus, on one hand, a modeling language should be sufficiently 
expressive to suitably characterize the conceptualization of its subject 
domain, on the other hand, the semantics of the produced specifications 
should be clear, i.e., it should be easy for a specification designer to 
recognize what language constructs mean in terms of domain concepts. 
Moreover, the specification produced using the language should facilitate 
the user in understanding and reasoning about the represented state of 
affairs.  
In this thesis we defend that the suitability of a conceptual modeling 
language to represent a set of real-world phenomena in a given domain 
(i.e., its domain and comprehensibility appropriateness) can be 
systematically evaluated by comparing the level of homomorphism between 
a concrete representation of the world view underlying the language 
(captured in a specification of the language metamodel), with an explicit and 
formal representation of a conceptualization of that domain, which is 
termed here a reference ontology.  
In philosophy, ontology is the most fundamental branch of 
metaphysics. It is a mature discipline, which has been systematically 
developed in western philosophy at least since Aristotle. The business of 
ontology is to study the most general features of reality (Peirce, 1935), 
as opposed to the several specific scientific disciplines (e.g., physics, 
chemistry, biology), which deal only with entities that fall within their 
respective domain. However, there are many ontological principles that are 
utilized in scientific research, for instance, in the selection of concepts and 
hypothesis, in the axiomatic reconstruction of scientific theories, in the 
design of techniques, and in the evaluation of scientific results (Bunge, 
1977, p.19). Thus, to quote the physicist and philosopher of science Mario 
Bunge: every science presupposes some metaphysics. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl coined the term Formal Ontology as an analogy to Formal Logic. 
Whilst Formal Logic deals with formal1 logical structures (e.g., truth, 
validity, consistency) independently of their veracity, Formal Ontology deals 
with formal ontological structures (e.g., theory of parts, theory of wholes, 
types and instantiation, identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal 
aspects of objects irrespective of their particular nature. The unfolding of 
Formal Ontology as a philosophical discipline aims at developing a system 
of general categories and their ties, which can be used in the development 
of scientific theories and domain-specific common sense theories of reality. 
                                                      
1The adjective Formal here refers to its more ancient meaning, namely, referring only to 
Form, in the sense of independent of Content. The use of formal as synonym for precise or 
mathematical originates from the fact that mathematical theories are typically Formal in the 
first sense.   
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More recently, ontology has been applied in a multitude of areas in 
computer science. In many cases, however, the term is employed with a 
more liberal meaning and, instead of referring to a general (i.e., domain-
independent) system of categories, it is also used to refer to specific 
theories about material domains (e.g., law, medicine, archeology, molecular 
biology, etc.), named domain ontologies. Thus, if in the philosophical sense, 
ontology is the study of existence and modes of existence in a general sense, in 
computer science, a domain ontology is the study of what exists in a given 
domain or universe of discourse.  
The activity of constructing domain ontologies is known in the 
literature as Ontological Engineering. An ontological engineering process 
typically comprises activities such as: Purpose Identification and Requirements 
Specification, Ontology Modeling, Ontology Codification, Reuse and Integration, 
Evaluation and Documentation (see, for instance, Falbo & Guizzardi & Duarte, 
2002; Gómez-Pérez & Fernández-López & Corcho, 2004). Here, we 
consider a domain ontology as a special type of conceptual specification 
and, hence, ontology modeling as a special type of conceptual modeling.     
Therefore, in figure 1.1, if by a conceptualization we mean a 
conceptualization of a material domain, then by modeling language we 
mean a domain-specific modeling language. In contrast, if in figure 1.1 by a 
conceptualization we mean a formal (i.e., domain- independent) 
conceptualization, then by a modeling language we mean a general conceptual 
modeling language (or ontology representation language). 
The design of domain-specific modeling languages is a current and 
important research topic (Kelly & Tolvanen, 2000; Tolvanen, Gray & Rossi, 
2004; Bottoni & Minas, 2003) in conceptual modelling and, as we show on 
chapter 2, some results of this thesis also contribute to the area of domain-
specific language evaluation and design. Nonetheless, the focus of this work 
is not on domain-specific languages and domain ontologies but, conversely, 
on general conceptual modeling languages and their underlying formal 
conceptualizations, if only because (as we demonstrate in chapters 2 and 3), 
the design of the former presupposes the existence of a suitable general 
conceptual modeling language. Thus, henceforth we simply use the term 
conceptual modeling language when referring to a general conceptual modeling 
language. 
Conceptual (Ontology) Modeling is a fundamental discipline in 
computer science, playing an essential role in areas such as database and 
information systems design, software and domain engineering, design of 
knowledge-based systems, requirements engineering, information 
integration, semantic interoperability, natural language processing, 
enterprise modeling, among many others. In particular, domain ontologies 
have a central position in the so-called Semantic Web vision (Berners-Lee, 
Hendler, Lassila, 2001). In this context, web resources (information nodes 
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and computational services) have their semantics informed by association 
with one or more domain ontologies. For example, the systems A and B in 
the pattern of figure 1.3 could correspond to two independently developed 
semantically annotated web services (McIlraith & Son & Zeng, 2001). Since 
web services can be considered as special kinds of telematics services 
(Ferreira Pires et al., 2004), the results developed throughout this thesis 
amount to a contribution to the general area of telematic services. 
However, more generally, the systems A and B in the pattern of figure 1.3 
could also correspond to two interacting software agents, social 
organizations, or human stakeholders. Therefore, the results presented here 
contribute more broadly to all the areas aforementioned in computer 
science in which conceptual modeling play an essential role.     
In summary, we defend in this thesis that the truthfulness to reality of a 
given system, as well as the semantic interoperability of concurrently 
developed systems, strongly depend on the availability of conceptual 
modeling languages that are able of making explicit and precise 
representations of the conceptualizations of their underlying subject 
domains. Therefore, two central research questions are: How can we define 
a suitable formal conceptualization (and consequently a formal ontology) that a 
conceptual modeling language should commit to? How can we (re)design a 
conceptual modeling language that conforms to this formal conceptualization 
(ontology)? These questions are answered throughout this thesis. 
1.2 Motivation 
Nowadays, many languages exist that are used for the purpose of creating 
representations of real-world conceptualizations. These languages are 
sometimes named domain modeling languages2 (e.g., LINGO), ontology 
representation languages (e.g., OWL), semantic data modeling languages (e.g., 
ER), among other terms. We shall refer to these languages as conceptual 
modeling languages henceforth. 
Although these languages are employed in practice for conceptual 
modeling, they are not designed with the specific purpose of being truthful 
to reality. For instance, LINGO (Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 1998; Falbo & 
Guizzardi & Duarte, 2002) was designed with the specific objective of 
achieving a positive trade-off between expression power of the language and 
the ability to facilitate bridging the gap between the conceptual and 
                                                      
2 The term domain modeling language is used in this sense to refer to domain-independent 
languages which can be used to create specifications of different material domain 
conceptualizations, not to refer to domain-specific modeling languages as previously 
discussed.    
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implementation levels. This preoccupation also seems to be present in Peter 
Chens original proposal for ER diagrams (Chen, 1976). OWL (Horrocks & 
Patel-Schneider & van Harmelen, 2003) has been designed with the main 
purpose of achieving computational efficiency in an automatic reasoning 
process. Some other languages, such as Z (Spivey, 1988) and CC Technique 
(Dijkman & Ferreira Pires & Joosten, 2001), take advantage of the 
simplicity of the well-defined mathematical framework of set theory. 
Finally, some of the languages used nowadays for conceptual modeling were 
created for different purposes, the most notorious example being the UML 
(OMG, 2003c), which initially focused on software design.  
As we show in this thesis, the worldviews underlying these languages 
(their ontological metamodels), cannot be considered as adequate 
conceptualizations of reality. As a consequence, they fall short in offering 
their users suitable sets of modeling concepts for constructing precise and 
explicitly characterized representations of their subject domains of interest.    
We defend here that the focus of a conceptual modeling language 
should be on representation adequacy (i.e., truthfulness to reality and 
pragmatic efficiency). Conceptual modeling is primarily about describing some 
aspects of the physical and social world around us for purposes of understanding and 
communication, not systems design. Moreover, conceptual modeling 
languages should be highly-expressive, even at the cost of sacrificing 
computational efficiency and tractability. After all, although conceptual 
modeling can greatly benefit from efficient tool support in activities such as 
model manipulation and visualization, storage, syntactic verification and 
reasoning, among others, the descriptions that arise from conceptual modelling 
activities are intended to be used [primarily] by humans, not machines.  
Currently, there is no commonly agreed language for describing real-
world phenomena in computer science. For this reason, in order to 
overcome the deficiencies of existing modeling languages for this purpose, a 
number of recent research efforts have investigated the use of Formal 
Ontological theories to evaluate and redesign these languages, as well as 
equip them with adequate real-world semantics. Examples include (Shanks 
& Tansley & Weber, 2003; Evermann & Wand, 2001b; Bodart et al., 2001; 
Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers, 2001; Green & Rosemann, 2000). 
The approach proposed here differs from the ones mentioned above in 
two main characteristics: First, each of the approaches presented focus on 
specific sets of concepts. For example, the ontological analysis presented in 
(Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers, 2001) is targeted at part-whole relations, the 
one of (Bodart et al, 2001) is targeted at properties, and the one of 
(Evermann & Wand, 2001b) analyses classes, class hierarchies and properties 
(among other non-structural concepts, such as interaction). Our approach 
is broader in scope and, hence, can be considered in this sense an extension 
of these efforts. Consequently, it provides a comprehensive set of 
 OBJECTIVES 9 
ontological theories, which covers all fundamental conceptual modeling 
concepts, and tackles a number of conceptual modeling problems that have 
not yet been satisfactorily addressed by any of the existing approaches in the 
conceptual modeling literature.  
Second, the type of ontological investigation carried out here is 
different from the investigation in these other approaches. One 
characteristic common to all the efforts aforementioned is that they employ 
the same ontological theory, namely an ontology named BWW (Bunge-
Wand-Weber) based on the original methaphysics proposed in (Bunge, 
1977, 1979). Mario Bunge is a physicist and a philosopher of science and 
his theory is meant to serve as a foundation for specific scientific disciplines. 
As a consequence, it subscribes to an approach of ontological investigation 
that is committed to capture the intrinsic nature of the world in a way that 
is independent of conceptualizing agents and, consequently, an approach in 
which cognition and human language play a minor or non-existent role. 
As we demonstrate in the development of this thesis, an ontology that 
can be used for providing foundations for conceptual modeling should be a 
philosophically well-founded one, but also one that aims at capturing the 
ontological distinctions underlying human cognition and common sense. 
Nonetheless, this ontology should not be regarded as less scientific, in the 
sense that the very existence of its constituting categories can be empirically 
uncovered by research in cognitive sciences (Keil, 1979; Xu & Carey, 1996; 
Mcnamara, 1986) in a manner that is analogous to the way philosophers of 
science have attempted to elicit the ontological commitments of the natural 
sciences.    
  In summary, the position defended here subscribes to Mylopoulos 
dictum (Mylopoulos, 1992) that [t]he adequacy of a conceptual modelling 
notation rests on its contribution to the construction of models of reality that promote 
a common understanding of that reality among their human users. 
1.3 Objectives 
In this thesis, we aim at contributing to the theory of conceptual modeling 
and ontology representation. Our main objective here is to provide 
ontological foundations for the most fundamental concepts in conceptual 
modeling. These foundations comprise a number of ontological theories, 
which are built on established work on philosophical ontology, cognitive 
psychology, philosophy of language and linguistics. Together these theories 
amount to a system of categories and formal relations known as a 
foundational ontology (Masolo et al., 2003a).  
Besides philosophical and cognitive adequacy, we intend our 
foundational ontology to be precise. Therefore, we make use of some 
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modal logics concepts to formally characterize the entities that constitute 
our ontology. In case the ontological distinctions proposed cannot be 
properly characterized by standard formal approaches, we have proposed 
some extensions to these standard formal approaches to accomplish the 
characterization required.      
Once constructed, we have used this foundational ontology as a reference 
model prescribing the concepts that should be countenanced by a well-
founded conceptual modeling language, and providing real-world semantics 
for the language constructs representing these concepts.  
In the reference ontology proposed, we have focused on providing 
foundations for the most fundamental and widespread constructs for 
conceptual modeling, namely, types and type taxonomies, roles, attributes, 
attribute values and attribute value spaces, relationships, and part-whole 
relations.  
Besides the theoretical work, we have addressed existing conceptual 
modeling problems, and contributed to the creation of sound engineering 
tools that can be used in the conceptual modeling practice. These have been 
realized in the form of ontological design patterns, capturing standard 
solutions to recurrent conceptual modeling problems, and methodological 
directives. However, more importantly, we have instantiated the approach 
defended here, by proposing a concrete conceptual modeling language that 
incorporates the foundations captured in our reference ontology. 
The ontology proposed serves as a reference for designing new 
conceptual modeling language, but also for analyzing the ontological 
adequacy of existing ones. However, to conduct these activities in a 
principled manner, we have established a systematic relation between a 
modeling language and the ontology representing the real-world 
conceptualization of a given domain. Once this relationship has been 
precisely understood, we have analyzed and redesigned a specific modeling 
language, namely, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) (OMG, 2003c). 
The objective has been to propose an ontologically well-founded version of 
UML that can be used as an appropriate conceptual modeling language. 
The choice for UML lies on two main points: (i) the current status of UML 
as de facto standard modeling language; (ii) the growing interest in its 
adoption as a language for conceptual modelling and ontology 
representation (OMG, 2003a; Kogut, 2002). Because of these reasons, the 
re-designed version of UML is in itself an important research contribution 
of this thesis. 
Finally, in order to demonstrate the suitability of the conceptual 
modeling language proposed we have developed a case study in a domain 
where we can exercise both (i) the capabilities of the language in precisely 
characterising the domain elements; (ii) the use of the language in 
supporting the semantic integration of different domain models. In 
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particular, in (ii), we have shown the importance of a suitable conceptual 
modelling language in making explicit the ontological commitments of the 
conceptualizations underlying the individual models and, consequently, in 
helping to prevent false agreement in their integration.   
In summary, the objectives of this thesis have been:  
 
1. To establish a systematic relation between a modeling language and a 
reference ontology, and to propose a methodological approach to analyze 
and (re)design modeling languages to reinforce representation adequacy 
exploiting this relation; 
 
2. To construct philosophical and cognitive foundational ontology for 
conceptual modeling and to formally characterize the elements 
constituting this ontology; 
 
3. To demonstrate the usefulness of the ontological categories and theories 
that were proposed to address existing conceptual modeling problems; 
 
4. To demonstrate the adequacy of the approach proposed in (1) and of 
the foundational ontology constructed in (2) by analyzing and 
redesigning an existing conceptual modeling language for representation 
adequacy;   
 
5. To demonstrate the adequacy of the ontologically well-founded 
conceptual modeling language produced in (4) in the activity of 
improving the domain representation of existing conceptual 
specifications, and supporting their semantic integration. 
1.4 Scope 
The focus of this thesis is on general (i.e., domain independent) conceptual 
modeling languages. For this reason, we focus here on the construction of 
formal ontological theories instead of (domain-specific) material ones.  
Our objective is to provide foundations for structural (i.e., static) aspects 
of conceptual modeling languages, as opposed to dynamic ones. This class 
of languages includes languages known as data modeling frameworks, ontology 
representation languages, knowledge representation languages, semantic data 
modeling languages, among others. To put it in simple terms, we restrict 
ourselves here to objects, the types they instantiate, the roles they play in 
certain contexts, their constituent parts, their intrinsic and relational properties, 
and the structures in which their features are valued, among other things. In 
contrast, we do not elaborate on processes and events. To put it in 
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philosophical terms, the foundational ontology developed here is an ontology 
of Endurants (continuants) not one of Perdurants (occurents) (van Leeuwen, 
1991; Masolo et al., 2003a). This is far from denying to the latter the status 
of ontological entities. Actually, in (Guizzardi & Wagner, 2005a), we 
elaborate on the role of an ontology of perdurants as an extension of the work 
presented in this thesis. In summary, the restriction of the discussion 
promoted here to the ontological category of endurants is merely a matter 
of scope.   
The objective of this thesis is also to evaluate the suitability of languages 
to represent phenomena in a given domain. In terms of quality criteria for 
modeling languages, our scope is on expressiveness and clarity. Thus, it is not 
the objective here to discuss specific language technologies related to the 
definition of metamodel specifications, concrete syntax or formal 
semantics. Moreover, we do not discuss aspects related to systems design 
and, in particular, we do not address the impact on design choices of the 
modeling concepts proposed here. Finally, the target of our work is on 
conceptual modeling concepts and languages conceived for representation 
adequacy, aimed at being employed by human users in activities such as 
communication, domain understanding (learning) and analysis. Therefore, 
the study of properties such as computational efficiency and tractability of 
these languages fall outside the scope of this work. 
1.5 Approach and Structure 
The structure of this thesis reflects the successive elaboration of the 
objectives identified in section 1.4. The approach followed here to 
accomplish these objectives is detailed in the sequel. 
 
(O1). Objective 1: To establish a systematic relation between a modeling 
language and a reference ontology, and to propose a methodological 
approach to analyze and (re)design modeling languages to reinforce 
representation adequacy exploiting this relation 
 
This objective is accomplished in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. We start 
chapter 2 by discussing the various aspects that comprise a system of 
representations, or simply, a language. After briefly discussing the issues of 
(abstract and concrete) syntax, (formal and real-world) semantics and 
pragmatics, we concentrate on the definition of an evaluation framework 
that can be used to precisely evaluate the suitability of a language to 
represent phenomena according to a given real-world conceptualization. In 
our approach, this property can be systematically evaluated by comparing 
the level of homomorphism between a concrete representation of the world 
 APPROACH AND STRUCTURE 13 
view underlying the language (captured in the specification of a metamodel of 
the language), and an explicit and formal representation of a 
conceptualization of that domain, or a reference ontology. The framework 
proposed comprises a number of properties (lucidity, soundness, laconicity, 
completeness) that must be reinforced for an isomorphism to take place 
between these two entities.  
Although the focus of our work is on general conceptual modeling 
languages, the framework and the principles presented can be applied to 
the design of conceptual modeling languages irrespective of the 
generalization level to which they belong. In particular, they can also be 
used for the design of domain-specific modeling languages. In chapter 2, 
the approach presented is illustrated with a small case study in the design of 
a domain-specific visual modeling language for the domain of genealogy. 
The evaluation and redesign of a general conceptual modeling language is 
the main case study of this thesis, which is presented in chapter 8.   
In chapter 3, we elaborate on some of the concepts of this framework 
by presenting a formal characterization of a conceptualization and its intended 
models (the models standing for admissible state of affairs), the ontological 
commitment of a language, and of the role of an ontology to approximate the 
valid specifications of a language to the intended models of its underlying 
conceptualization.  
The main objective of chapter 3 is, however, to discuss the topic of 
ontologies both from philosophical and computer science points of view. 
We first give a historical perspective on ontology from a philosophical 
perspective, and discuss the importance of ontological investigations for 
science, in general, and for conceptual modeling, in particular. The formal 
characterization aforementioned is also used in this chapter to harmonize 
the original uses of ontology in philosophy with the several senses the term 
is employed in computer science. By doing this, we offer a precise 
definition of the meaning of the term, which is assumed for the remaining 
of this work. 
 
(O2). Objective 2: To construct a philosophical and cognitive foundational 
ontology for conceptual modeling and to formally characterize the 
elements constituting this ontology. 
 
(O3). Objective 3: To demonstrate the usefulness of the ontological 
categories and theories that are proposed to address existing conceptual 
modeling problems. 
 
The accomplishment of these objectives constitutes the core of this thesis. 
The construction of the foundation ontology proposed here is organized in 
four complementary chapters in the following manner: 
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(a). In Chapter 4, we provide a theory for defining ontological distinctions 
on the category of conceptual modeling object universals, as well as 
constraints on the construction of taxonomic structures using these 
distinctions. By using a number of formally defined meta-properties, 
we can generate a typology of universals, which in turn can be used to give 
real-world semantics for important conceptual modeling concepts such 
as types, roles, phases and mixins. Besides providing unambiguous 
definition for these concepts, the elements of our theory function as a 
methodological support for helping the user of the language to decide 
how to represent elements that denote universal properties in a given 
domain. The usefulness of this approach is demonstrated in this 
chapter by showing how the theory can be used to evaluate and 
improve the conceptual quality of class hierarchies and concept 
taxonomies. Finally, in order to provide a suitable formal 
characterization of the ontological distinctions and postulates present 
in this theory, we present some extensions to a traditional system of 
modal logics; 
 
(b). In Chapter 5, we concentrate on the topic of part-whole relations. First, 
we extend the insufficient axiomatization offered for these relations in 
present conceptual modeling languages, by considering a number of 
theories of parts from formal ontology in philosophy 
(Mereologies)(Simons, 1987). Thus, by building on the literature of 
meronymic3 relations on linguistics and cognitive sciences, we extend 
the formal notion of parthood to a typology composed of four different 
conceptual part-whole relations. The elements in this typology are also 
characterized by additional formal meta-properties (e.g., essentiality, 
exclusiveness, separability, transitivity); 
 
(c). In Chapter 6, we present the core of the foundational ontology 
proposed here, by addressing the categories of attributes, attribute values 
and attribute value spaces, relationships and weak entities.  This fragment of 
our ontology is presented in a parsimonious theory, which is used to 
provide unambiguous real-world semantics for these concepts. In 
particular, this chapter offers a simple, precise and ontologically well-
founded semantics for the problematic concept of relations, but also 
one that can accommodate more subtle linguistic distinctions. As it is 
demonstrated, this foundation for relations has a direct impact in 
                                                      
3Meronym: a word that names a part of a larger whole; brim and crown are meronyms of 
hat. The contrary idea is that of Holonym, i.e., a word that names a whole of which a given 
word is part. In this example, hat is a holonym for brim and crown (WordNet, 2005).   
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improving the representation of these entities in conceptual 
specifications. Additionally, it provides a principled basis for an 
ontological interpretation and for the specification of structured 
datatypes;   
 
(d). In Chapter 7, we employ some of the results of Chapter 6 to fully 
describe the modeling concept of roles. The chapter also serves as an 
exemplification of the usefulness of the categories proposed in our 
foundational ontology. Firstly, by employing the categories and 
postulates of the theory of universals constructed in Chapter 4, we 
propose an ontological design pattern capturing a solution to a recurrent 
and much discussed problem in role modeling. Secondly, with some 
definitions offered in Chapter 6, we have investigated the link between 
some of the formal meta-properties defined for part-whole relations 
and those meta-properties by which roles are characterized. Thirdly, by 
borrowing some results from Chapters 4 and 6, we have managed to 
harmonize some different conceptions of roles used in the literature. 
Finally, by building on an existing theory of transitivity of linguistic 
functional parthood relations, and on some material from Chapter 6, we 
have proposed a number of visual patterns that can be used as 
methodological support for the identification of the scope of transitivity 
for the most common type of part-whole relations in conceptual 
modeling. 
     
(O4). Objective 4: To demonstrate the adequacy of the approach proposed 
to fulfil (O1) and of the foundational ontology constructed to fulfil (O2) 
by analyzing and redesigning an existing conceptual modeling language 
for representation adequacy.   
 
(O5). Objective 5: To demonstrate the adequacy of the ontologically well-
founded conceptual modeling language produced to accomplish (O4) in 
the activity of improving the domain representation of existing 
conceptual specifications, and supporting their semantic integration.        
 
In Chapter 8, we present the two major case studies of this thesis. As a first 
case study to exemplify the adequacy of the framework and foundation 
ontology proposed, we use the latter as a reference for analyzing the 
ontological appropriateness of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for 
the purpose of conceptual modeling. Moreover, by employing the 
systematic evaluation method comprising the framework, we have identified 
a number of deficiencies and recommended modifications to the UML 
metamodel specification accordingly. As a result of this process, we have 
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managed to produce a conceptually cleaner, semantically unambiguous and 
ontologically well-founded version of the language.  
As an attempt to shield as much as possible the user of a conceptual 
modeling language from the complexity of the underlying ontological 
theory, we take the approach of (whenever possible) representing the 
ontological principles underlying a language in terms of syntactical 
constraints of this language. As a consequence, we manage to produce a 
modeling language whose grammatically valid specifications approximate as 
much as possible the intended models of its underlyimg conceptualization. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, we also carry out a second case study, which uses 
the version of UML proposed in that chapter to analyze and integrate 
several semantic web ontologies in the scope of a context-aware service 
platform. This case study aims at demonstrating the adequacy of this 
version of UML as a conceptual modeling language and as a tool to support 
minimizing the false agreement problem previously discussed. Accordingly, 
it has also demonstrated the suitability of the ontological foundations 
underpinning this language for these purposes.   
An overview of structure of this thesis is presented in figure 1.4 below. 
 
Introduction Chapter 1
Theoretical Background
Language Evaluation and (Re)Design           Chapter 2
Ontology           Chapter 3
Ontological Foundations of Conceptual Modeling
Universals and Taxonomic Structures           Chapter 4
Part-Whole Relations           Chapter 5
Properties           Chapter 6
Roles           Chapter 7
Case Studies
UML: A Case Study on Ontology Based           Chapter 8
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Conclusion  Chapter 9
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Objective 2
Objective 3
Objective 4
Objective 5
Figure 1-4  Overview of 
the thesis structure 
relating the objectives of 
this thesis with the 
chapters in which they 
are accomplished 
  
Chapter 2 
2. Language Evaluation and Design 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the relation between a modeling 
language and a set of real-world phenomena that this language is supposed 
to represent. By exploring this relation, we propose a systematic way to 
design and evaluate modeling languages with the objective of reinforcing 
truthfulness to the corresponding domain in reality and conceptual clarity 
of the specifications produced using those languages. 
In section 2.1, we discuss the various aspects that comprise a system of 
representations, or simply, a language. In that background section, we 
briefly discuss the issues of (abstract and concrete) syntax, (formal and real-
world) semantics and pragmatics. 
In section 2.2, we concentrate on the definition of an evaluation 
framework that can be used to systematically assess the real-world semantics of 
an artificial modeling language, i.e. how suitable a modeling language is to 
model phenomena according to a given real-world conceptualization.  
       Since conceptualizations are abstract entities, in order to precisely 
conduct the evaluation framework advocated in section 2.2, a concrete 
representation of a conceptualization must be made available. In this thesis, 
a domain conceptualization is expressed in terms of a shared conceptual 
specification of the domain, named here a domain ontology. In section 2.3, 
we discuss the role that ontologies of material domains (such as law, 
medicine, archaeology, genetics) play in formalizing the semantic domain of 
domain-specific languages and informing properties that can be exploited in 
the design of efficient visual pragmatics for these languages. In particular, 
we illustrate our approach with an example in the domain of genealogy. 
Since one of our main objectives in this thesis is to evaluate and improve 
the quality of general conceptual modeling languages, in section 2.3 we also 
discuss the characteristics that are required for a domain independent 
meta-conceptualization that to which a general conceptual modeling 
language should commit. 
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In section 2.4, we discuss the role that explicit represented domain 
ontologies can play in semantically interoperating (e.g., integrating, 
comparing, translating) models produced in languages that diverge in syntax 
and semantics but whose underlying real-world conceptualizations overlap. 
This topic, albeit related, falls outside the central concern of this thesis. For 
this reason, it is only briefly discussed. 
In section 2.5, we present some final considerations. 
2.1 Elements of Language Design 
According to (Morris, 1938) a language comprises three parts: syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics. Syntax is devoted to the formal relation of signs to 
one another, semantics to the relation of signs to real world entities they 
represent and pragmatics to the relation of signs to (human) interpreters. In the 
following subsections we elaborate upon these three definitions.  
2.1.1 Syntax  
In (Harel & Rumpe, 2000), the authors discuss the distinction between the 
purist notion of information and its syntactical representation as data, 
which is the medium used to communicate and store information. Data is 
essential to give a concrete and persistent status to some information, but it 
is in itself, however, vacuous in terms of meaning. Thus, to extract the 
information behind a piece of data, an interpretation is necessary that 
assigns meaning to it. The same piece of information may be represented as 
different data (e.g., December 31st, 2002 and the last day of the year 2002 
refer to the same entity). Likewise, the same piece of data may serve as a 
representation for different things for different people at different points in 
time. The difference between data and information resembles the 
difference between a language syntax and semantics, respectively. 
       In order to communicate, agents must agree on a common 
communication language. This fixes the sets of signs that can be exchanged 
(syntax) and how these signs can be combined in order to form valid 
expressions in the language (syntactical rules). In sentential languages, the 
syntax is first defined in terms of an alphabet (set of characters) that can be 
grouped into valid sequences forming words. This is called a lexical layer 
and it is typically defined using regular expressions. Words can be grouped 
into sentences according to precisely defined rules defined in a context-free 
grammar, resulting in an abstract syntax tree. Finally, these sentences are 
constrained by given context conditions. The list of valid words of a 
language is called its vocabulary. 
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In diagrammatic (graphical) languages, conversely, the vocabulary of 
the language is not defined in terms of linear sequence of characters but in 
terms of pictorial signs. The set of available graphic modeling primitives 
forms the lexical layer (the concrete syntax) and the languages abstract 
syntax is typically defined in terms of an abstract visual graph (Erwig, 1999) 
or a metamodel specification. The latter alternative applies to the OMGs 
Model Driven Architecture (MDA) initiative (Bézivin & Gerbé, 2001) and it 
is the one that is considered in this thesis. Finally, the language metamodel 
specification is enriched by context conditions given in some constraint 
description language, such as, OCL or first-order logic (FOL). In either 
case, context conditions are intended to constrain the language syntax by 
defining the set of correct (well-formed) sentences of the language. Some of 
these constraints are motivated by semantic considerations (laws of the 
domain being modeled) while others can be motivated by pragmatic issues 
(discussed in section 2.1.3). 
In summary, in the context of this thesis, a language metamodel 
specification (defining the abstract syntax of a language) defines the rules for 
the creation of well-formed models in that language. In other words, it 
defines the set of grammatically correct models that can be constructed 
using that language. In contrast, the vocabulary, or concrete syntax of that 
language, provides a concrete representational system for expressing the 
elements of that metamodel. 
2.1.2 Semantics  
Besides agreeing on a common vocabulary, participants in a communication 
process must share the same meaning for the syntactical constructs being 
communicated, i.e., they must interpret in a compatible way the 
expressions of the communication language being used. Without a proper 
way to extract information, the data being exchanged is worthless. 
Semantics deals with the meaning of signs and symbols or, in other words, 
with the information behind a piece of data.  
Although most authors agree that semantics concern the relation 
between the expressions of a language and their meanings, opinions diverge 
when explaining the nature of this relation. As a consequence, there is a 
long-standing philosophical dispute concerning the meaning of meaning 
(Gärdenfors, 2000). A major divergence on the ontological status of the 
semantic relation concerns whether semantics is referential or not. In 
referential semantics, there are some kinds of objects (things in the world 
or mental entities) that are the meanings of linguistic expressions. Within 
the area of philosophy of language there is also a functionalist tradition of 
meaning which is non-referential. According to (Gärdenfors, ibid.), the 
most well-known proponent of this view is the later Wittgenstein, who 
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defended the view that is often summarized by the slogan meaning is use, 
i.e., that the (linguistic) meaning of a linguistic expression is its (canonical, 
proper) communicative function, i.e., its potential contribution to the 
communicative function of utterances of which it forms part. To put it 
simply, in a functionalist approach the meaning of a word is not given by a 
reference to an extra-linguistic entity, but by a set of circumstances and 
intentions in which the word is used. 
From now on we concentrate on the referential approach, due to its 
suitability to the enterprise pursued in this thesis and its compatibility with 
the semantic tradition of fact-based conceptual modeling languages 
(Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen, 1995), which are the focus of this work.  
In general terms, a semantic definition for a language L consists of two 
parts: (i) a semantic domain D; (ii) a semantic mapping (or interpretation 
function) from the syntax to the semantic domain, formally I: L → D 
(Harel & Rumpe, 2000). The semantic mapping tells us about the meaning 
of each of the languages expressions in terms of an element of the semantic 
domain. 
In computer science, the relation between the semantic domain and 
the domain conceptualization can be interpreted according to two different 
stances to semantics. In AI research, semantics denote some form of 
correspondence specified between a surrogate and its intended referent in the world; the 
correspondence is the semantics for the representation (Davis & Shrobe & 
Szolovits, 1993). In other words, semantics is a mapping (interpretation) 
from the language vocabulary to concepts that stand for entities in the real 
world. Conversely, approaches with heritage in other traditions of 
programming consider semantics without a commitment to a specific real-
world conceptualization. In these approaches, the term semantics is used 
to denote rules for program compilation or automated interpretation. 
According to these approaches, the semantic domain is a mathematical 
domain not necessarily related to a real-world conceptualization. In the AI 
approach, conversely, the semantic domain is typically a material domain, 
such as, engineering, business, medicine or telematics. In (Ferreira Pires, 
1994; Vissers & van Sinderen & Ferreira Pires, 1993), these are called 
formal and architectural semantics, respectively. From now on, we use the term 
domain conceptualization when referring to a real-world conceptualization and 
the term mathematical conceptualization when referring to purely 
mathematical one. Architectural semantics, under the term real-world 
semantics (Partridge, 2002; Sheth & Kashyap, 1992; Vermeer, 1997; 
Vermeer & Apers, 1996), have been perceived as fundamental for 
semantically interoperability and semantic integration of information 
sources. In (Partridge, 2002), for instance, it is claimed that: Underlying the 
variety of forms of integrating data and applications there is a common semantic task - 
what can be called the semantic matching. There is a reasonably clear recognition 
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that the analysis stage of this task needs to focus on identifying the entities that the 
data describes, i.e. the real-world semantics.  
In (Ferreira Pires, 1994; Vissers & van Sinderen & Ferreira Pires, 1993), 
it is argued that designers should concentrate on the elaboration of models, 
using the modeling language merely as a vehicle for the representation of 
design characteristics. A modeling language can only be useful for its 
community of users, if its vocabulary, syntax, semantic and pragmatics, are 
defined based on the needs of this community for the elaboration of 
specifications. This view, supported here, emphasizes the precedence of 
real-world concepts over mathematical concepts in the design and 
evaluation of modeling languages or, in other words, the precedence of 
real-world semantics over purely mathematical semantics.  
In section 2.2 we discuss in detail the relation between a language (as a 
set of interrelated modeling primitives) and a domain conceptualization, in 
the definition of the real-world semantics of this language.             
2.1.3 Pragmatics 
Following Morris definition (Morris, 1938), pragmatics concerns the 
relation of signs to (human) interpreters. Human users have contact with a 
modeling language (and with specifications produced in this language) via 
the languages concrete syntax.    
A system of concrete syntax may be considered to be a collection of 
objects and some relations between these objects. The type (visual or 
otherwise) of a particular representation, and more generally of a language, 
is determined by the characteristics of the symbols used to express these 
objects and relations (Gurr, 1999). Throughout this discussion we use the 
term symbol in a broad sense. Thus, our symbol definition includes visual 
features (e.g., morphological, geometric, spatial and topological relations) 
used by diagrammatic languages to represent objects and relations. 
In sentential languages, there is a clear separation between vocabulary, 
syntax and semantics. The syntactic rules which permit construction of 
sentences, may be completely independent of the chosen vocabulary, and 
may be clearly distinguished from a definition of semantics. For example, 
let P be a propositional logic whose vocabulary consists of the propositions 
p and q, and the symbols ∧ and ¬ representing the logical connectives and 
and not, respectively. The syntactic and semantic rules for P tell us, 
respectively, how to construct and interpret formulas using this vocabulary. 
However, we may substitute the symbols {p,q, ∧,¬} for {X,Y,&,~} 
throughout P to produce a logic which is effectively equivalent to P. 
Alternatively, we could retain the vocabulary and syntax of P, while altering 
the semantics to produce a vastly different logic (ibid.). 
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The same does not hold for graphical languages, in which vocabulary, 
syntax and semantics are not clearly separable. For example, a graphical 
vocabulary may include shapes such as circles, squares, arcs and arrows, all 
of differing sizes and colors. These objects often fall naturally into a 
hierarchical typing which almost certainly constrains the syntax and, 
furthermore, informs about the semantics of the system. Likewise, spatial 
relations, such as inclusion, are part of the vocabulary but clearly constrain 
the construction of potential diagrams and are likely to be mapped onto 
semantic relations with similar logical properties (ibid.). This idea is 
illustrated by Figure 2.1 below, in which two different languages are used to 
express logical syllogisms. The sentential language of (Figure 2.1.a) and the 
visual language of (Figure 2.1.b) are semantically equivalent. Despite that, 
the inference step that culminates with conclusion (iii) is performed in a 
much more straightforward way in the language of Eulers circles (figure 
2.1.b). This classic example shows how semantic information can be 
directly captured in a visual symbol. Here a sequence of valid operations is 
performed which cause some consequence to become manifest in a 
diagram, where that consequence is not explicitly insisted upon by the 
operations. This is because the partial order properties of the set inclusion 
relation are expressed via the similarly transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric 
visual properties of proper spatial inclusion in the plane, i.e. the 
representing relation has the same semantic properties as the represented 
relation. This argument is given a formal account by (Shimojima, 1996) 
where immediate inferences like in (Figure 2.1.b) are termed free-rides. 
A
B
A
B
C
(i) All A are B
(ii) All B are C
(iii) Ergo, All A are C
(a) (b)  
In sentential languages, the relationships between symbols are necessarily 
captured in terms of the concatenation relation, which must then be 
interpreted by some intermediate abstract syntax (Gurr, 1999). In visual 
languages, intrinsic properties of the representation system can be 
systematically used to directly correspond to properties in the represented 
domain. Gurr uses the term directness to denote the correspondence 
between properties of representations and the properties of which they 
represent, and the term systematicity to denote the systematic application of 
directness in the design of systems of concrete syntax.  
Figure 2-1  Logical 
Syllogism represented 
in a sentential language 
(a) and in the visual 
language of Eulers 
Circles (b) 
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A notion of key importance to the discussion promoted here is the one 
of implicature proposed by the philosopher of language H. P. Grice (Grice, 
1975, 1978). An implicature is anything that is inferred from an utterance 
but that is not a condition for the truth of the utterance. Grice distinguishes 
between the meaning of a sentence and what is implied by it. For instance, 
the utterance John has 14 children commonly implicates John has precisely 
14 children, even though it would be compatible with John having 20 
children. Likewise, the sentences You should work as well as study and You 
should study as well as work, despite of perhaps being semantically equivalent, 
can implicate different things. A conversational implicature is founded on 
the assumption that conversational participants will adhere to, what Grice 
names, a cooperative principle. According to Grice, the cooperative principle 
governs informative conversational discourse and is based upon the 
assumption that conversational participants adhere to certain rules, named 
conversational  maxims, and, as consequence, that they will construct and 
recognize utterances as carrying intended implied information and, avoiding 
unwanted implications. Conversational maxims state that a speaker is 
assumed to make contributions in a dialogue which are relevant, clear, 
unambiguous, brief, not overly informative and true according to the speakers 
knowledge.  When a statement breaches any one of these maxims, additional 
meaning is inferred. To illustrate this idea the following dialogue is 
presented:  
 
A. How are you doing?          
B. Still alive. 
 
In this example, the conversational maxim of relevance is broken. This 
leads to the interpretation by implicature  in addition to the obvious 
interpretation that the person is alive  that the person is not in good health 
or is experiencing some difficulties. 
The relevance of notion such as systematicity, implicatures, and 
conversational maxims to the design of (visual) modeling languages can be 
motivated as follows. When correctly employed, systematicity can result in 
major increases in the effectiveness of the diagram for performing specific 
tasks. For instance, in (Hahn & Kim, 1999), the authors show how three 
semantically equivalent languages, namely, UML activity, sequence and 
collaboration diagrams can differ drastically in terms of effectiveness when 
employed for model integration. In contrast, whenever misused or 
neglected, implicatures can communicate incorrect information and induce 
the user to make incorrect inferences about the semantics of the domain. 
To illustrate this idea, we show in figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 three versions of 
the same diagram. This example is cited by (Gurr, 1999) and has been 
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taken from (Marks & Reiter, 1990). Figure 2.2 represents a computers 
disk subsystem. The visual concrete syntax also expresses relations and 
intrinsic properties of represented domain entities via either icons or other 
visual features such as the use of spatial inclusion within a box drawn with a 
dotted line denoting membership of a subsystem. In figure 2.3, the 
inherent ordering of graphical symbols used to represent the nodes can be 
incorrectly interpreted that all nodes in the represented network fall into a 
single conceptual category, in which they are similarly ordered. In figure 
2.4 we can find several examples of directly inferred incorrect information: 
(i) one of the device queues in the upper section of the diagram has been 
laid out irregularly which can be interpreted that this queue must be 
different than the others somehow; (ii) in the lower section of the diagram 
the disk-symbols are organized as two separated groups, wrongly 
implicating that this division reflects some grouping in the domain; (iii) the 
line-width used for the lower queue in the channel facility differs  from the 
one used for all other queues in the diagram; (iv) a different font has been 
used for the channel facilitys text label, wrongly implying that it must have 
different subsystem status. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 
Representation of a 
computers disk 
subsystem 
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\  
 
All three diagrams of Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 faithfully portray all the 
features of the assumed network model, i.e., diagrams 2.3 and 2.4 cannot 
be considered misleading through purely semantic considerations. The 
problematic implications of these diagrams do not follow from the 
incorrect use of the symbols but rather by various aspects of its semantics 
which are not explicitly specified, but that can be misleading (Gurr, 1999). 
While examples of Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the potential traps of 
ignoring pragmatic aspects of diagrams, other research has shown that the 
efficacy of diagrams for communicating information can be increased by the 
correct usage of such aspects. Studies by Petre and Green (Petre & Green, 
1992) of engineers using CAD systems for designing computer circuits, 
demonstrated that the most significant difference between novices and 
experts is in the use of layout to capture domain information. In such 
circuit diagrams, the layout of components is not specified as being 
Figure 2-3 Semantically 
equivalent alternative 
representation of the 
model depicted in figure 
2-2 
Figure 2-4  Semantically 
equivalent alternative 
representation of the 
model depicted in figure 
2-2 
26 CHAPTER 2 LANGUAGE EVALUATION AND DESIGN 
semantically significant. Nevertheless, experienced designers exploit layout 
to carry important information, e.g. by grouping together components that 
are functionally related. By contrast, certain diagrams produced by novices 
were considered poor because they either failed to use layout or, in 
particularly awful examples, were especially confusing through the misuse 
of common layout conventions informally adopted by experienced 
engineers (Gurr, 1999). 
2.1.4 Real-World Semantics 
One of the main success factors behind the use of a modeling language is its 
ability to provide to its target users a set of modeling primitives that can 
directly express relevant domain abstractions. Domain abstractions are 
constructed in terms of concepts, i.e., abstract representations of certain 
aspects of entities that exist in a given domain that we name here a domain 
conceptualization. An abstraction of a certain state of affairs expressed in terms 
of a set of domain concepts, i.e., according to a certain conceptualization, is 
termed a model in this work (Ferreira Pires, 1994; van Sinderen, 1995). 
Take as an example the domain of genealogical relations in reality. A certain 
conceptualization of this domain can be constructed by considering 
concepts such as Person, Man, Woman, Father, Mother, Offspring, being the father 
of, being the mother of, among others. By using these concepts, we can 
articulate a conceptual model of certain facts in reality such as, for instance, 
that a man named John is the father of another man named Paul. 
Conceptualizations and Models are abstract entities that only exist in the 
mind of the user or a community of users of a language. In order to be 
documented, communicated and analyzed they must be captured, i.e. 
represented in terms of some concrete artifact. This implies that a language 
is necessary for representing them in a concise, complete and unambiguous 
way. 
Figure 2.5 represents the relation between a language, a 
conceptualization and the portion of reality that this conceptualization 
abstracts. This picture depicts the well-known Ullmanns triangle (Ullmann, 
1972). This triangle derives from that of Ogden and Richards (Ogden & 
Richards, 1923) and from Ferdinand de Saussure (de Saussure, 1986), on 
whose theories practically the whole modern science of language is based. 
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Symbol
(language)
Concept
(conceptualization)
Thing
(reality)
represents abstracts
refers to
 
The represents relation concerns the definition of language L real-world 
semantics. The dotted line between language and reality in this figure 
highlights the fact that the relation between language and reality is always 
intermediated by a certain conceptualization (Baldinger, 1980). This 
relation is elaborated in Figure 2.6 that depicts the distinction between a 
model and its representation, and their relationship with the 
conceptualization and representation language. In the scope of this work 
the representation of a model in terms of a representation language L is 
called a model specification (simply specification, or representation) and the 
language L used for its creation is called a modeling (or specification) language. 
  
  
SpecificationModel
interpreted as
represented by
 
Modeling
Language
 
Conceptualization
interpreted as
represented by
used to 
compose instance of
used to 
composeinstance of
 
As previously mentioned, we defend the precedence of real-world concepts 
over formal concepts and implementational issues in the design of 
conceptual modeling languages. In particular, this thesis is not concerned 
with specific aspects of language technology such as formal syntax and 
semantics but with the so-called domain appropriateness and comprehensibility 
appropriateness of a given language (Krogstie, 2000; Halpin, 1998). In order 
for a specification S to faithfully represent a model M, the modelling 
primitives of the language L used to produce S should faithfully represent 
the domain conceptualization C used to articulate the represented model 
Figure 2-5  Ullmanns 
Triangle: the relations 
between a thing in 
reality, its 
conceptualization and a 
symbolic representation 
of this conceptualization 
Figure 2-6  Relations 
between 
conceptualization, 
Model, Modeling 
Language and 
Specification 
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M. The domain Appropriateness of language is a measure of the suitability of a 
language to model phenomena in a given domain, or in other words, of its 
truthfulness of a language to a given domain reality. On a different aspect, 
different languages and specifications have different measures of pragmatic 
adequacy. Comprehensibility appropriateness refers to how easy is for a user a 
given language to recognize what that languages constructs mean in terms 
of domain concepts and, how easy is to understand, communicate and 
reason with the specifications produced in that language.  
The measures of these two quality criteria for a given language and 
domain are aspects of the represents relation depicted in figure 2.6. In the 
following section we elaborate on these aspects and present a framework to 
systematically evaluate the domain and comprehensibility appropriateness 
in accordance with a domain conceptualization. The abstract relation in 
figure 2.5 is discussed in chapter 3. 
2.2 A Framework for Language Evaluation 
The purpose of the current chapter is to discuss the design and evaluation 
of artificial modeling languages for capturing phenomena in a given material 
domain according to a conceptualization of this domain. Before we aim at 
this target at a language level, i.e., at a level of a system of representations, 
we start discussing the simpler relation between a particular specification 
and a particular abstraction of a portion of reality, i.e., a particular model.  
In (Gurr, 1998, 1999), the author presents a framework to formally 
evaluate the relation between the properties of a representation system and 
the properties of the domain entities they represent. According to him, 
representations are more or less effective depending on the level of 
homomorphism between the algebras used to represent what he terms the 
representing and the represented world, which correspond to the specification 
and model in our vocabulary, respectively. 
Isomorphism is defined in mathematics as follows. Let A and B be two 
algebras, we say that a mapping between A and B is homomorphic iff the 
structure of relations over the elements of A is preserved by the relations 
which hold over the corresponding elements in B. However, if a 
homomorphism exists from A to B it does not mean that they are identical. 
It may be, for instance, that there are elements in B which are not mapped 
onto any element in A. Alternatively there can be individual elements in B 
which are mapped by to more than one element of A. If there is a 
homomorphic mapping between A and B and every element of B is mapped 
to by a unique element of A then the two algebras are identical and are said 
to be isomorphic (Gurr, 1999).  
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For example, consider the diagram depicted in figure 2.7 as a 
representation of four integers (e.g., from 1 to 4) and their ordering, where 
integers are represented by squares labeled with capital letters and the less-
than relation is represented by the transitive closure of is-arrow-connected. In 
this case we may use the algebras ({1, 2, 3, 4},{<}) and ({A, B, C, 
D},{transitive closure of is-arrow-connected}) to describe the model and 
specification (diagram), respectively. One possible representational 
mapping between these entities maps 1-4 to A-D, respectively, and < to 
the transitive closure of is-arrow-connected. The individuals in the model 
which are represented by each of the symbols A-D are shown between 
brackets in the picture 2.7. This kind of semantic correspondence (that also 
appears in figure 2.9, 2.11, 2.13, 2.14 and 2.16) is not part of the language 
itself and is shown in the pictures with the only purpose of enhancing 
clarity of our explanations. 
A B C D
{1} {2} {3} {4}  
Gurr argues at length that the stronger the match between a model and its 
representing diagram, the easier is to reason with the latter. The easiest case 
is when these matches are isomorphisms. The implication of this for the 
human agent who interprets the diagram is that his interpretation correlates 
precisely and uniquely with an abstraction being represented. By contrast, 
where the correlation is not an isomorphism then there may potentially be 
a number of different models which would match the interpretation.  
The evaluation framework proposed by Gurr focuses on evaluating the 
match between individual diagrams and the state of affairs they represent. 
In (Wand & Weber, 1989, 1990; Weber, 1997), another framework is 
defined for evaluating expressiveness and clarity of modeling grammars, i.e., 
with the focus on the system of representations as a whole. In our work, 
these two proposals are merged in one single evaluation framework. We 
focus our evaluation on the level of the system of representations. 
Nevertheless, as it will be shown in the following subsections, by 
considering desirable properties of the mapping of individual diagrams onto 
what they represent, we are able to account for desirable properties of the 
modeling languages used to produce these diagrams, extending in this way 
Wand & Webers original proposal. 
In (Gurr, 1999), four properties are defined, which are required to 
hold for a homomorphic correlation to be an isomorphism: lucidity, 
soundness, laconicity and completeness. These properties are discussed as 
follows. 
Figure 2-7  A 
representation for the 
numbers domain 
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2.2.1 Lucidity and Construct Overload 
A specification S is called lucid with respect to (w.r.t.) a model M if a 
(representation) mapping from M to S is injective. A mapping between M 
and S is injective iff every entity in the specification S represents at most 
one (although perhaps none) entity of the model M. An example of an 
injective mapping is depicted in figure 2.8. 
Model Specification
 
The notion of lucidity at the level of individual diagrams is strongly related 
to the notion of ontological clarity at the language level as discussed in 
(Weber, 1997; Wand & Wang, 1996; Wand & Weber, 1989). In (Weber, 
1997), the author states that the ontological clarity of a modeling grammar 
is undermined by what they call construct overload: construct overload occurs 
when a single grammatical construct can stand for two or more ontological constructs, 
The grammatical construct is overloaded because it is being used to do more than one 
job. 
The notions of lucidity and ontological clarity albeit related are not 
identical. A construct can be overloaded in the language level, i.e. it can be 
used to represent different concepts, but every manifestation of this 
construct in individual specifications is used to represent only one of the 
possible concepts. An example of construct overload w.r.t. the 
conceptualization proposed in chapters 4 to 7 occurs in the relation 
construct in the relational data model (Codd, 1970), which is used both to 
represent object types (e.g. Person, Car, Student) and types whose instances are 
mutual properties shared by individual objects (e.g., enrolment, marriage). 
However, it is not the case that in a particular model the relation construct 
is used to represent a type whose instances are both objects and mutual 
properties. Figure 2.9 exemplifies a non-lucid representation. In this case, 
the construct X is used to represent two entities of the model, namely the 
numbers 2 and 3. In this case, although the representation system does not 
have a case of construct overload (since labeled boxes only represent 
numbers and arcs only represent the less-than relation between numbers) 
the resulting specification is non-lucid. In summary, the absence of 
construct overload in a language does not directly prevent the construction 
Figure 2-8  Example of a 
Lucid representation 
mapping from Model to 
Specification 
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of non-lucid representations in this language. Additionally, construct 
overload does not entail non-lucidity.  
Nevertheless, non-lucidity can also be manifested at a language level. 
We say that a language (system of representation) is non-lucid according to 
a conceptualization if there is a construct of the language which is non-
lucid, i.e., a construct that when used in a specification of a model 
(instantiation of this conceptualization) stands for more than one entity of 
the represented model. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the UML construct 
of an association class can be seen as a non-lucid construct (according to 
the conceptualization presented in that chapter) since it represents 
simultaneously a mutual property shared by a multitude of entities (e.g., 
marriage) and a relation4 (e.g., being-the-husband-of, being-the-wife-of, being-
married-to) induced by this property. Non-lucidity at the language level can 
be considered as a special case of construct overload that does entail non-
lucidity at the level of individual specifications.    
Construct overload is considered an undesirable property of a modeling 
language since it causes ambiguity and, hence, undermines clarity. When a 
construct overload exists, users have to bring additional knowledge not 
contained in the specification to understand the phenomena which are 
being represented. For instance, in the relational data model example given 
above, users have to examine the relations to determine whether an object 
type or a mutual property type is being represented. A non-lucid 
representation language entails non-lucid representations which clearly 
violate the Gricean conversational maxim that requires contributions to be 
neither ambiguous nor obscure. In summary, a modeling language should 
not contain construct overload and every instance of a modeling construct 
of this language should represent only one individual of the represented 
domain abstraction. 
A X D
{1} {2,3} {4}  
2.2.2 Soundness and Construct Excess 
A specification S is called sound w.r.t. a model M if a (representation) 
mapping from M to S is surjective. A representation mapping from M to S is 
surjective iff the corresponding interpretation mapping from S and M is 
total, i.e. iff every entity in the specification S represents at least one entity 
                                                      
4 The notions of object type, mutual property (relator type) and relation among others are 
defined and discussed in depth in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Figure 2-9  Example of a 
Non-Lucid diagram 
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of the model M (although perhaps several). An example of a surjective 
representation mapping is depicted in figure 2.10. 
Model Specification
 
An example of an unsound diagram is illustrated in figure 2.11. The arc 
connecting the labeled boxes D and A does not stand for any relation in the 
represented world.  
Unsoundness at the level of individual specifications is strongly related 
to unsoundness at language level, a property that is termed construct excess 
by Weber: construct excess occurs when a grammatical construct does not map onto 
an ontological construct (Weber, 1997). 
In analyzing information system grammars in terms of an ontological 
theory, Weber advocates that the common notion of an optional attribute can 
be considered a case of construct excess. He claims that according to the 
theory used, there is no such a thing as an optional property. For instance, 
it is not the case that a person has the optional property of having children 
but, instead that there is a subtype of Person, say Parent, whose instances 
all have this property. Although construct excess can result in the creation 
of unsound specifications, soundness at the language level does not prohibit 
the creation of unsound specifications. For example, there is no construct 
excess in the language used to produce the specification of figure 2.11.     
An unsound diagram violates the Gricean cooperative principle since any 
represented construct will be assumed to be meaningful by users of the 
language. Since no mapping is defined for the exceeding construct, its 
meaning becomes uncertain, hence, undermining the clarity of the 
specification. According to (Weber, 1997), users of a modeling language 
must be able to make a clear link between a modeling construct and its 
interpretation in terms of domain concepts. Otherwise, they will be unable 
to articulate precisely the meaning of the specifications they generate using 
the language. Therefore, a modeling language should not contain construct 
excess and every instance of its modeling constructs must represent an 
individual in the domain. 
Figure 2-10  Example of 
a Sound representation 
mapping from Model to 
Specification 
 A FRAMEWORK FOR LANGUAGE EVALUATION 33 
A B C D
{1} {2} {3} {4}
 
2.2.3 Laconicity and Construct Redundancy 
A specification S is called laconic w.r.t. a model M if the interpretation 
mapping from S to M is injective, i.e. iff every entity in the model M is 
represented by at most one (although perhaps none) entity in the 
representation S. An example of an injective interpretation mapping is 
depicted in figure 2.12. The notion of laconicity in the level of individual 
specifications is related to the notion of construct redundancy in the 
language level in (Weber, 1997): construct redundancy occurs when more than 
one grammatical construct can be used to represent the same ontological construct. 
SpecificationModel
 
Once again, despite of being related, laconicity and construct excess are two 
different (even opposite) notions. On one hand, construct redundancy does 
not entail non-laconicity. For example, a language can have two different 
constructs to represent the same concept. However, in every situation the 
construct is used in particular specifications it only represents a single 
domain element. On the other hand, the lack of construct redundancy in a 
language does not prevent the creation of non-laconic specifications in that 
language. An example of a non-laconic diagram is illustrated in figure 2.13. 
In this picture, the same domain entity (the number 3) is represented by 
two different elements (C1 and C2) although the representation language 
used does not contain construct redundancy. 
Figure 2-11  Example of 
an Unsound diagram 
Figure 2-12  Example of 
a Laconic Interpretation 
mapping from 
Specification to Model 
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A B
C1
D
C2
{1} {2}
{3}
{3}
{4}
 
Non-laconicity can also be manifested at the language level. We say that a 
language is non-laconic if it has a non-laconic modeling construct, i.e. a 
construct that when used in a specification of a model causes an entity of 
this model to be represented more than once. For instance, take a version 
of the labeled boxes language used so far and let the less-than relation 
between numbers be represented both as the transitive closure of the is-arrow-
connected and by the is-smaller-than relation between labeled boxes. All 
specifications using this representation (e.g. figure 2.14) are deemed non-
laconic. Non-laconicity at the language level can be considered as a special 
case of construct redundancy that does entail non-laconicity at the level of 
individual diagrams. 
A B
C
D
{1} {2} {3} {4}  
In (Weber, 1997), the authors claim that construct redundancy adds 
unnecessarily to the complexity of the modeling language and that unless users have 
in-depth knowledge of the grammar, they may be confused by the redundant construct. 
They might assume for example that the construct somehow stands for some other type 
of phenomenon. Therefore, construct redundancy can also be considered to 
undermine representation clarity. Non-laconicity also violates the Gricean 
principle, since redundant representations can be interpreted as standing 
for a different domain element. In summary, a modeling language should 
not contain construct redundancy, and elements in the represented domain 
should be represented by at most one instance of the language modeling 
constructs. 
2.2.4 Completeness 
A specification S is called complete w.r.t. a model M if an interpretation 
mapping from S to M is surjective. An interpretation mapping from S to M is 
surjective iff the corresponding representation mapping from M to S is 
Figure 2-13  Example of 
a Non-Laconic diagram 
Figure 2-14  Example of 
a Non-Laconic diagram 
generated by a Non-
Laconic language 
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total, i.e., iff every entity in a model (instance of the domain 
conceptualization) is represented by at least one (although perhaps many) 
entity in the representation S. An example of a surjective interpretation 
mapping is depicted in figure 2.15. 
SpecificationModel
 
The notion of completeness at the level of individual specifications is 
related to the notion of ontological expressiveness and, more specifically, 
completeness at the language level, which is perhaps the most important 
property that should hold for a representation system. A modeling language 
is said to be complete if every concept in a domain conceptualization is 
covered by at least one modeling construct of the language. Language 
incompleteness entails lack of expressivity, i.e., that there are phenomena in 
the considered domain (according to a domain conceptualization) that 
cannot be represented by the language. Alternatively, users of the language 
can choose to overload an existing construct, thus, undermining clarity.  
In chapter 8 of this thesis, when evaluating the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) in terms of the conceptualization proposed in chapters 4 
to 7, examples of incompleteness abound. To mention two cases, there are 
several different sorts of object types and part-whole relations in the 
conceptualizations proposed in chapter 4 and 5, respectively, which are not 
directly represented by any construct of the language. In both cases, the 
distinct concepts present in the conceptualization are overloaded by the 
language constructs of class and aggregation/composition, respectively. 
An incomplete modeling language is bound to produce incomplete 
specifications unless some existing construct is overloaded. However, the 
converse is not true, i.e. a complete modeling language can still be used to 
produce incomplete specifications. An example of the latter is shown in 
figure 2.16. In this picture, a domain element (the 3 < 4 relation) is not 
present in the representation. In accordance with the detailed account of 
Grices cooperative principle (specifically, that all necessary information is 
included), specification and language designers should attempt to ensure 
completeness as most readers assume this to be true. In summary, a 
modeling language should be complete w.r.t. a domain conceptualization 
and every element in a domain abstraction (instance of this domain 
Figure 2-15  Example of 
a Complete 
Interpretation mapping 
from Specification to 
Model 
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conceptualization) must be represented by an element of a specification 
built using this language. 
A B C D
{1} {2} {3} {4}  
2.3 Conceptualization and Ontology 
In section 2.2, we advocate that the suitability of a language to create 
specifications in a given domain depends on how close the structure of the 
specifications constructed using that language resemble the structure of the 
models (domain abstractions) they are supposed to represent. To put it 
more technically, a specification S produced in a language L should be, at 
least, a homomorphism of the model M that S represents.  
The framework presented in section 2.2 is ultimately based on the 
analysis of the relation between the structure of a modeling language and 
the structure of a domain conceptualization.  
What is referred by structure of a language can be accessed via the 
description of the specification of conceptual model underlying the language, 
i.e., a description of worldview embedded in the languages modeling 
primitives. In (Milton & Kamierczak, 2004), this is called the ontological 
metamodel of the language, or simply, the ontology of the language. From a 
philosophical standpoint, this view is strongly associated with Quine 
(Quine, 1969), who proposes that an ontology can be found in the 
ontological commitments of a given language, that is, the entities the primitives 
of a language commit to the existence of. For example, Peter Chens Entity 
Relationship model (Chen, 1976) commits to a worldview that accounts for 
the existence of three types of things: entity, relationship and attribute.  
This idea can be understood in analogy to the distinction between a 
conceptual model and design model in information systems and software 
engineering. Whilst the former is only concerned with modeling a view of 
the domain according to a given application, the latter is committed to 
translating the model of this view on the most suitable implementation 
according to the underlying implementational environment and also 
considering a number of non-functional requirements (e.g., security, fault-
tolerance, adaptability, reusability, etc.). Likewise, the specification of the 
conceptual model underlying a language is the description of what the 
primitives of a language are able to represent in terms of real-world 
phenomena. In some sense (formally characterized in chapter 3), it is the 
representation of a conceptualization of the domain in terms of the 
Figure 2-16  Example of 
an Incomplete diagram 
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languages vocabulary. In the design of a language, these conceptual 
primitives can be translated into a different set of primitives. For example, 
it can be the case that a conceptual primitive is not directly represented in 
the actual abstract syntax of a language, but its modeling capabilities (the 
real world concept underlying it) can be translated to several different 
elements in the languages abstract syntax due to non-functional 
requirements (e.g., pragmatics, efficiency). Nonetheless, the design of a 
language is responsible for guaranteeing that the languages syntax, formal 
semantics and pragmatics are conformant with this conceptual model. 
From now on, the Modeling Language icon depicted in figure 2.6 represents 
the specification of the conceptual model underlying the language, or what 
we shall name the language metamodel specification. 
The structure of domain conceptualization must also be made accessible 
through an explicit and formal description of the corresponding portion of 
reality in terms of a concrete artifact, which is termed here a domain reference 
ontology, or simply, a domain ontology. The idea is that a reference ontology 
should be constructed with the sole objective of making the best possible 
description of the domain in reality w.r.t. to a certain level of granularity 
and viewpoint. Additionally, it should be constructed using formal and 
methodological tools which have been developed by the area of formal 
ontology (Husserl, 1970) in philosophy. Finally, it should be application 
independent and not be biased towards a specific mathematical model or 
formal theory. 
The notion of ontology as well as its role in the explicit representation 
of conceptualizations is discussed in depth and given a formal 
characterization in chapter 3.       
2.3.1 Designing a Visual Modeling Language for the Domain of 
Genealogy: An Example    
In the sequel we illustrate these rather abstract notions discussed so far 
with an example in the domain of genealogical relations. This domain is 
simple and familiar and, hence, can be useful for illustration purposes. 
Nonetheless, it is still not a completely artificial example since there are, 
in practice, standard modeling languages to represent genealogical 
relations and a number of applications that make use of these standards 
(Howells, 1998). A certain conceptualization of this domain can be 
articulated by considering concepts such as person, living person, deceased 
person, father, mother, offspring, fatherOf and motherOf. These concepts are 
related to each other and have their interpretation constrained by 
axioms imposed on their definitions. Figure 2.17 depicts a domain 
ontology representing a possible conceptualization in this domain. The 
modeling primitives of the UML profile (OMG, 2003b) used to represent 
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this ontology are part of the ontology representation language proposed 
throughout this work. The class stereotypes present in this specification 
(kind, subkind, role and phase), in particular, are discussed in depth in 
chapter 4. 
The diagram in this picture is complemented by the following axioms: 
 A person x is a parentOf person y iff x is fatherOf y or x is motherOf y; 
 A person x is a ancestorOf person y iff x is parentOf y or there is a person z 
such that z is an parentOf y and x is ancestorOf z; 
 A person cannot be its own ancestor (i.e., the ancestorOf relation is 
irreflexive); 
 If a person x is an ancestorOf person y then y cannot be an ancestorOf x 
(i.e., the ancestorOf relation is asymmetric); 
 If a person x is an ancestorOf person y and y is an ancestorOf person z then 
x is an ancestorOf z (i.e., the ancestorOf relation is transitive).    
«kind»
Person
«subKind»
Man
«subKind»
Woman
«role»
Mother
«role»
Father
«role»
Offspring
«role»
Parent
«phase»
LivingPerson
«phase»
DeceasedPerson
{disjoint,complete}
{disjoint,complete}
0..1
motherOf
0..1
fatherOf
/parentOf
{disjoint,complete}
«role»
Ancestor
1..2 1..*
1..*
1..*
/ancestorOf
«role»
Descendent1..*
 
By representing a conceptualization of this domain in terms of this concrete 
artifact we can design a language to express phenomena in this domain 
capturing characteristics that this conceptualization deems relevant. For 
instance, according to this domain ontology, Person is an abstract type, i.e., 
one that cannot have direct instances. This is represented in this notation 
Figure 2-17  An 
Ontology for the 
Genealogy Domain 
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by depicting the name of type in italics. The abstract type Person is 
partitioned in two independent suptyping structures:  
 
1. Man, Woman: this partition represents that every individual person 
(instance of type Person) in the universe of discourse is either a man (an 
instance of Man) or woman (instance of Woman). Moreover, due to the 
«subKind» stereotype, it states that every man is necessarily a man (in the 
modal logics sense), i.e., every instance of the type man is a man in 
every possible situation considered by the model. We say in this case 
that Man is a rigid classifier (see chapter 4). Mutatis Mutandis the same 
applies to instances of the type Woman. Finally, it states that both 
individual man and woman obey a principle of identity supplied by the type 
Person (due to the presence of the «kind» stereotype). The notion of a 
principle of identity is discussed in depth in chapter 4. For now, we can 
say that every instance of Person maintains its identity (i.e., it is the same 
Person) in every circumstance considered by the model; 
 
2. LivingPerson, DeceasedPerson: this partition represents that every 
individual person in the universe of discourse is either a living person or 
a deceased one. However, in contrast to the 〈Man,Woman〉 partition, 
an instance of LivingPerson is not necessarily so (in the modal sense), 
i.e., LivingPerson is a anti-rigid classifier (see chapter 4). Every instance 
of LivingPerson is only contingently an instance of LivingPerson (again in the 
modal sense). That is to say that for every x such that x is LivingPerson 
there is a counterfactual situation in which x is not a LivingPerson, which 
in this case, implies that x is a DeceasedPerson in this counterfactual 
situation. One more, Mutatis Mutandis, the same applies to instances of 
DeceasedPerson. These facts are implied by the presence of «phase» 
stereotyped classifiers and the associated constraint that they must be 
defined in a partition. 
 
A cross-relation of these two partitions give us four concrete classifiers, i.e., 
classifiers that can have direct instances, let us name them LivingMan, 
DeceasedMan, LivingWoman and DeceasedWoman. Every instance of person in a 
given situation is necessarily an instance of one of these classifiers. A 
suitable modeling language must have modeling primitives that conform to 
these constraints. Other constraints of the possible models according to this 
ontology include: that every offspring can have at maximum one father and 
one mother; the ancestorOf relation (defined to hold between instances of 
Person) is irreflexive, antisymmetric and antitransitive. The set of constraints 
captured in this ontology represents part of the conceptualized structure of 
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the domain. This structure must be taken into account in the design (an 
evaluation) of a language to model genealogical relations.    
By having a conceptualization (abstract entity) represented in terms of a 
domain ontology, and by applying the framework discussed in section 2.2, 
one can, in a precise manner, design a suitable modeling language for that 
given domain. In this particular case, we are able to design a language L1 
whose metamodel specification SL1 is isomorphic to the ontology of figure 
2.17. The primitives of this language are presented in figure 2.18 below. 
Living
Man
Deceased
Man
Living
Woman
Deceased
Woman
(is-arrow-
directly-
connected)
ParentOf Father
or or
Mother
or
or
or
Offspring
composition of 
is-arrow-path-connected 
with the above 
relation in the plane, 
e.g.
AncestorOf
Ontology
Language
L1
 
A number of characteristics should be observed about language L1. To start 
with, the language contains modeling primitives that represent all concrete 
classifiers (LivingMan, DeceasedMan, LivingWoman, DeceasedWoman) and non-
derived relations present in the ontology (fatherOf, motherOf). Consequently, 
we can say that the language is expressive enough to represent all 
characteristics of the domain that are considered relevant by the underlying 
ontology. Moreover, in the mapping from ontology O of figure 2.17 to the 
metamodel specification SL1 (of language L1) there is no case of construct 
redundancy, construct overload or construct excess. 
In regards to the property of completeness, when mapping the 
elements of a domain ontology to a language metamodel specification we 
must guarantee that these elements are represented in their full formal 
descriptions. In other words, the language metamodel specification SL1 
representing the domain ontology O of figure 2.17 must also represent in 
its well-formedness rules this ontologys full axiomatization. In formal, 
model-theoretic terms, this means that these entities should have the same 
set of logical models. In chapter 3, we discuss this topic in depth and 
present a formal treatment of this idea. The set of logical models of O 
represent the state of affairs in reality deemed possible by a given domain 
conceptualization. In contrast, the set of logical models of S stand for the 
Figure 2-18  Domain 
Concepts and their 
representing modelling 
primitives in L1 
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world structures which can be represented by the grammatically correct 
specifications of language L1. In summary, we can state that if a domain 
ontology O is fully represented in a language metamodel specification SL1 of 
L1, then the only grammatically correct models of L1 will be those which 
represent state of affairs in reality deemed possible by the domain 
conceptualization represented by O.  
In this example, since we assume that O is fully represented in SL1, as a 
consequence, the specifications depicted in figures 2.19.a, 2.19.b and 
2.19.c cannot be considered syntactically valid specification of language L1. 
Jack
Ross
BenBen Ben
Carol Susan
(a) (b) (c)  
In contrast, a valid specification in language L1 is depicted in 2.20 below. 
Jack
Ross
Ben
Monica
Judy
Althea
Emma
RachelCarol
 
Figure 2-19  Examples 
of grammatically invalid 
models in language L1  
Figure 2-20  Example of 
a valid model in 
language L1 
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Another aspect that should be noticed is how the ontology of figure 2.17 
contributes for improving pragmatic efficiency in the concrete syntax of L1. 
In (Gurr, 1999), when introducing the framework that has been adapted in 
section 2.2, the author uses regular algebraic structures to model a domain 
conceptualization. We claim that many additional benefits arise from a 
more complete representation of the domain conceptualization than the 
algebra used in his work. We defend the idea that the more we know about 
a domain the better we can design pragmatically effective languages. In 
particular, there are important meta-properties of domain entities (e.g., 
rigidity, relational dependency) that are not captured by ontologically-neutral 
mathematical languages (see chapter 3, section 3.4.2). The failure to 
consider these meta-properties hinders the possibility of accounting for 
other direct aspects of visual syntaxes. In the case of language L1, one can 
observe that:  
 
1. The types Man and Woman are kinds and, thus, rigid types, which means 
that instances of these types will continue to be so as long as they exist 
in the model. In contrast, an individual man (or woman) can have the 
(intrinsic) properties of begin alive or being dead in different situations. In 
any case, the man which is alive in one circumstance and dead in 
another is the same man, i.e., he maintains his identity across situations. 
In language L1, the icons5 used to represent instances of Person 
maintain the stable visual percept, which represents the dichotomy of 
the rigid types Man and Woman. The phases living and deceased are 
represented as variations of this visual percept, that is, the same visual 
percept can appear in different situations as one of the two variations; 
 
2. The types modeled as concrete Roles in the ontology are Father, Mother 
and Offspring. These types are not only anti-rigid but also relationally 
dependent, i.e., the same instance x of Father can exist in another situation 
in the model without being a Father. Moreover, to be a Father is to be a 
Man who has (at least) one Offspring, i.e., for x to be a Father he must 
share a relational property with another individual who is an instance of 
Offspring. In L1, the Parent role is represented by the adjacency relation 
between the icon representing a Person and the arrow-head of the 
symbol representing the parentOf relation. Additionally, the Offspring 
role is represented by the adjacency relation between the icon 
representing a Person and the arrow-tail of the symbol representing the 
parentOf relation. This representation choice highlights the dependency 
of these roles on relations, which in turn, stand for mutual properties 
                                                      
5 Icon is used here in the Peircean sense, i.e. as a sign that physically resembles what it stands 
for (Peirce, 1960).    
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shared by their relata. Moreover, it allows for the representation that x 
qua Man maintains its identity in the scope of different relations and 
across different situations.  
 
3. The ancestorOf relation is represented by the above relation in the plane 
associated with the arrow-path-connectedness, i.e., if x and y are two 
persons that are path-connected and x is above y in the plane then x is 
an ancestorOf y. The composed relation above-path-connect is also 
irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive, i.e., a strict partial order relation. 
These are exactly the same meta-properties as enjoyed by the 
ancestorOf relation. For this reason, the conclusion that (x ancestorOf 
z) if (x ancestorOf y) and (y ancestorOf z) is directly inferred from (x is 
above-path-connected-to z) if (x above-path-connected-to y) and (y 
above-path-connected-to z).                       
 
By instantiating the pattern of figure 2.6 to this domain we obtain the 
correspondence depicted in figure 2.21. The ontology O of figure 2.17 is a 
concrete representation of a given conceptualization of the genealogy 
domain. In this case, we have the ideal situation that the metamodel of 
language L1 is identical to this ontology. The genealogy concepts 
represented in O are used to articulate models of individual state of affairs 
in reality. A specification in language L1 (such as the one of figure 2.20) is a 
concrete artifact representing one of these models. 
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In this example, the suitability of language L1 is evaluated w.r.t. a specific 
conceptualization and, more precisely, w.r.t. a specification of this 
conceptualization captured in the domain ontology of figure 2.17. A 
question that one may ask is how to evaluate the adequacy of a 
conceptualization and the corresponding ontology? In other words, how 
good is a conceptualization as an abstraction of a given universe of discourse 
or portion of reality (see abstracts relation in figure 2.5) and how good is an 
ontology as a representation of this conceptualization. The construction of a 
Figure 2-21 Instantiating 
the pattern of figure 2.6 
for the domain of 
genealogy 
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particular conceptualization, i.e. a particular shared abstraction of reality, 
should be based on the consensus of a community of domain experts, and 
could be supported by both theoretical and empirical evidence. An 
ontology, conversely, is a concrete artifact which is developed by an 
engineering process (Gómez-Pérez, Fernández-López, & Corcho, 2004), 
which includes the activities of requirements specification and evaluation 
(among others). We shall resume the discussion about these issues in 
chapter 3. 
2.3.2 Meta-Conceptualization and General Conceptual 
Modeling Languages 
A domain such as the genealogy discussed in previous section is what we 
have previously named a material domain (Smith, 1989; Little, 2003) and a 
language, such as L1, designed to model phenomena in this domain is called 
a domain-specific language. The design of domain-specific languages is a 
current and important research topic (Kelly & Tolvanen, 2000; Tolvanen, 
Gray & Rossi, 2004; Bottoni & Minas, 2003) whose main benefits can be 
summarized by the following quote from Tolvanen, Gray and Rossi (ibid.): 
A [domain-specific language] raises the level of abstraction, while at the same time 
narrowing down the design space. The language follows the domain abstractions and 
semantics, allowing developers to perceive themselves as working directly with domain 
concepts. Industrial experiences of this approach show major improvements in 
productivity, time-to-market responsiveness and training time. 
In this work, however, the focus is not on designing or evaluating 
domain-specific languages. Contrariwise, one of the objectives is to propose 
a domain independent language, such as the UML profile used in figure 
2.17, which can be used to represent domain ontologies in different 
material domains. Since a domain ontology is also a concrete artifact, it 
must be represented in some specification language L0. To be consistent 
with the position defended here, the language L0 used to represent 
individual domain ontologies should also be based on a domain 
conceptualization, in this case, a meta-conceptualization. This idea is 
depicted in figure 2.22. 
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Since we consider here a domain ontology as a special type of conceptual 
model specification, we also consider an ontology representation language as a 
special type of general conceptual modeling language. From now on, we simply 
use the term conceptual modeling languages to refer to the class of domain-
independent languages that are used to create conceptual specifications in 
material domains. 
With regard to figure 2.22 some questions that come to the mind are: 
What kinds of entities compose a meta-conceptualization? How to 
construct a suitable meta-conceptualization that a general conceptual 
modeling language should commit to? As we discuss in chapter 3 of this 
thesis, in the specific case of existing conceptual modeling and ontology 
representation languages, their design has been strongly influenced by goals 
other than domain appropriateness. Some of these languages have been 
created in an ad hoc way, in a manner which is governed much more by 
intuition and generalization of specific practical cases than based on a deep 
analysis of the underlying reality. Others have been purposefully biased by 
design and implementation issues or in favor of mathematical models that 
simplify the definition of the formal semantics of the language. Examples 
include conceptual modeling languages that only account for concepts that 
can be represented in current database of programming technology or, like 
most knowledge representation languages, which only consider concepts 
that can be treated efficiently in automatic inference process. 
The position strongly advocated here is that a suitable conceptual 
modeling language should commit to a general (i.e., domain independent) 
theory of real-world categories that account for the ontological distinctions 
underlying language and cognition. This is exactly the business of the 
branch of philosophy called Formal Ontology and, in particular, descriptive 
metaphysics. The term Formal Ontology has been coined by Edmund 
Husserl (Husserl, 1970) as an analogy to Formal Logic. Whilst Formal 
Logic deals with formal logical structures (e.g. truth, validity, consistency), 
Formal Ontology deals with formal ontological structures (e.g. theory of 
parts, theory of wholes, types and instantiation, identity, dependence, 
Figure 2-22  Relations 
between a Material 
Domain 
Conceptualization, 
Domain Ontology, 
General Meta-
Conceptualization and 
Ontology Representation 
Language 
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unity) which apply to all domains. The term Formal here is, thus, less 
related to the sense of precise, mathematical and more related to its more 
ancient meaning, namely, of something that obtains in all material spheres 
of reality.  
In summary, while domain conceptualizations and, consequently, domain 
ontologies are established by the consensus of a community of users w.r.t. a 
material domain, a conceptual modeling language that can be used to 
express these domain ontologies must be rooted in a domain independent 
philosophically and cognitively well-founded system of real-world 
categories, i.e. a foundational (upper-level) ontology (Schneider, 2003a; 
Masolo et al., 2003a; Heller & Herre, 2004). 
These issues are discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
2.4 Ontology-Based Semantics and Language 
Comparability 
In the discussions carried out so far we have considered just one aspect of 
the relation between ontology and language. We have proposed that a 
reference ontology should be constructed as the best possible representation of 
a conceptualization, with the sole purpose of being a truthful representation 
of the domain in reality.  Therefore, a modeling language in a domain can 
be designed (or evaluated) for domain appropriateness and 
comprehensibility appropriateness via the harmonization of the worldview 
underlying the language (i.e, the ontological metamodel of the language) 
with the one described by the domain ontology.  
However, there is another scenario in which reference ontologies can 
play an important role, namely, when comparing models produced by 
different languages whose domain conceptualizations overlap. Suppose we 
have two languages L1 and L2 that commit to the conceptualizations C1 and 
C2, respectively. Now supposed that C1 and C2 can be combined in a more 
general conceptualization C. Assume the two languages have been developed 
to be used in different problem-solving tasks and intend to represent 
different (aspects of) entities of the domain conceptualization C. As a 
consequence, the languages have different syntaxes and semantics. One 
question that arises is: how to relate (compare, translate) specifications 
written in L1 and L2?  
Since they have different syntaxes and semantics, L1 and L2 should not 
be compared only in syntactical terms. Languages can have equal syntaxes 
with radically different semantics as much as they can have different 
syntaxes with equivalent mappings to a common semantic domain. For the 
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case of automatic translation, the formal semantics of L1 and L2 cannot 
guarantee consistency in the results either. For example, if C is a 
(alternative) conceptualization that refers to a domain of family relations, 
the expression (x related-to y) in L1 can be wrongly translated to an 
expression brother(a,b) in L2, since the related-to relation satisfies all the 
formal axioms of brotherhood (irreflexive, symmetric, transitive). 
Semantic comparability is a challenge in enterprise engineering due to 
the lack of interoperability among different (yet coexistent) process models. 
Many manufacturing engineering and business software applications use 
process information, including manufacturing simulation, production 
scheduling, manufacturing process planning, workflow, business process 
reengineering, product realization process modeling, and project 
management.  Since each of these applications utilizes process information 
in a different way, process information is also represented differently in 
each application. This problem is even more critical, since enterprise 
systems must manage the heterogeneity inherent to its various sub-
domains, by integrating different models into coherent frameworks (e.g., 
enterprise models for processes, structure, goals, deontic assignments). 
This problem has been currently addressed by the NIST PSL (Process 
Specification Language) Project6 and the community working on the 
Semantic Web (Euzenat, 2001). For instance, (Ciocoiu & Nau, 2000) 
provide a formal definition of what they term ontology-based semantics for 
enabling automated model translation between different first-order 
declarative languages. Their proposal is that, for a domain-specific language 
L, a domain ontology O can serve as a specification of the implicit 
assumptions of the conceptualization underlying L. If a mapping from the 
constructs of L to formulas in O can be defined, this mapping can, in turn, 
be used to derive the (ontology-based) semantics of L. In simple terms, the 
ontology-based semantics of a specification S in language L is defined in 
terms of a set of logical models U of S such that U has the desired property 
of obeying the constraints imposed by ontology O.  Finally, the notion of 
ontology-based models is used to define translations between a specification 
S1 in language L1 and a specification S2 in language L2, namely, S2 is an 
ontology-based partial translation of S1 iff every ontology-based model of S1 is 
also an ontology-based model model of S2. Then, a specification S2 in 
language L2 is an ontology-based translation of specification S1 in language L1 
iff S2 is an ontology-based partial translation of S1 and S1 is an ontology-
based partial translation of S2. 
                                                      
6 http://ats.nist.gov/psl/ 
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In (Ciocoiu & Gruninger, 2000), this approach is exemplified via the 
translation between process models written in ILOG and IDEF3. This idea 
is illustrated in Figure 2.23. The solution creates logical interpretations i1 
and i2 that relate the constructs of L1 and L2 to a common domain ontology 
O. The assumption here is that O is general enough so that its underlying 
conceptualization subsumes the parts of a conceptualization C targeted by 
L1 and L2. More than that, O is a formal logic theory through which the 
semantics of the conceptualization shared by L1 and L2 can be defined. 
Unlike the conceptual metamodels of L1 and L2, O is not biased towards a 
selection of concepts in C for the solution of specific tasks. It is a 
specification of domain-knowledge perceived as important by a community 
in order to address the needs of possibly several different applications. 
We shall no longer discuss the topic of ontology-based translations in 
this thesis. The reader should refer to (Ciocoiu & Nau, 2000) for formal 
definitions of the approach just described, and to (Ciocoiu & Gruninger, 
2000) for an interesting exemplification of these ideas. 
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2.5 Final Considerations 
In this chapter we discuss the relation between a conceptual modeling 
language and the domain in reality that this language is supposed to 
Figure 2-23 Defining the 
Semantics of two 
Domain-Specific 
Languages via a shared 
Domain Ontology 
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represent. We propose that the domain appropriateness and comprehensibility 
appropriateness of a modeling language can be systematically evaluated by 
comparing a concrete representation of the worldview underlying the 
language captured in the language metamodel specification, with an explicit and 
formal representation of a conceptualization, or a reference ontology. We 
advocate that in the best case, these two models are isomorphic and, hence, 
we propose a framework comprising of a number of properties (lucidity, 
soundness, laconicity, completeness) that must be reinforced for this 
isomorphism to take place. This framework combines the proposals of 
(Wand & Weber, 1989, 1990; Weber, 1997), which aim at the evaluation 
of representation systems, and (Gurr, 1998, 1999), which focus on the 
evaluation of individual representations. 
If described formally, ontologies can also be beneficial as axiomatized 
theories through which the semantics of modeling languages can be defined 
for the purpose of semantic model interoperation (e.g., integration, 
comparison, translation). Additionally, if described in a language that 
commits to a suitable meta-conceptualization, ontologies can play an 
important role in informing properties that support the design of 
pragmatically efficient systems of visual concrete syntax.                 
The discussion carried out in this chapter encompasses both the level 
of material domains and corresponding domain-specific modeling 
languages, and the (meta) level of a domain-independent (meta) 
conceptualization that underpins a general conceptual (ontology) modeling 
language. The idea of maintaining a discussion in general terms was 
intended to show that the evaluation framework and the principles 
discussed here can be applied to the design of conceptual modeling 
languages irrespective of the generalization level to which they belong.  
Nevertheless, due to the objectives and scope of this thesis, in the 
following chapters our discussion will focus on the level of meta-
conceptualizations and of general conceptual modeling languages. Although 
the proposals made here contribute to the area of domain-specific 
languages design methodologies (as acknowledged, for instance, in Girardi 
& Serra, 2004), the focus of this thesis is certainly not on the design of this 
class of languages, neither with domain conceptualizations nor domain 
ontologies.             
 

 Chapter 3 
3. Ontology 
In this chapter we discuss the topic of ontologies, which is a cornerstone of 
the work developed throughout this thesis.  
       We start, in section 3.1, by giving a historical perspective on ontology 
from a philosophical point of view. First, we present the different 
definitions of the term ontology in philosophy, and, subsequently, discuss 
the importance of ontological investigations for science, in general, and for 
conceptual modeling, in particular. 
 The past decades have observed an increasing interest in ontologies in a 
wide range of computer-related applications. Section 3.2 discusses four 
areas that, historically, have been prominently responsible for creating the 
demand for the use of ontologies in computer science, namely, information 
systems, domain engineering, artificial intelligence and the semantic web. 
For each of these areas we briefly discuss the expected benefits and provide 
examples of ontologies and ontology-based applications that have been 
developed along the years. In addition, we discuss the characteristics of 
ontology modeling languages that are typically used in some of these areas.   
 Although ontology has a clear definition in philosophy, there is a 
substantial terminological confusion in the different areas of computer 
science regarding what the term is supposed to denote. Section 3.3 is the 
most important section of this chapter and aims at a terminological 
clarification and at establishing a formal characterization of the way the 
term is used in the remaining of this work. Furthermore, the section 
elaborates on the relation between the definition provided and the notions 
of conceptualization and language as discussed in chapter 2.    
       In section 3.4, we present some final considerations.   
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3.1 Ontology in Philosophy 
The Webster dictionary (Merriam-Webster, 2004) defines the word 
ontology as: 
 
(D1). a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of 
being; 
(D2). a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of 
existents; 
(D3). a theory concerning the kinds of entities and specifically the kinds of 
abstract entities that are to be admitted to a language system. 
 
The term ontology was coined in the 17th century in parallel by the 
philosophers Rudolf Göckel in his Lexicon philosophicum and by Jacob 
Lorhard in his Ogdoas Scholastica (figure 3.1). The term Ontologia, however, 
was popularized in philosophical circles only in 18th century by the 
publication in 1730 of the Philosophia prima sive Ontologia  by Christian Wolff 
(figure 3.2).  
Etymologically, ont- comes from the present participle of the Greek 
verb einai (to be) and, thus, the latin word Ontologia (ont- + logia) can be 
translated as the study of existence. 
 
Figure 3-1  Cover of 
Jacob Lorhards book 
Ogdoas Scholastica from 
1606 
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In the sense (D1) of the aforementioned Webster definition, ontology is the 
most fundamental branch of metaphysics. Aristotle was the first western 
philosopher to study metaphysics systematically and to lie out a rigorous 
account of ontology. He described (in his Metaphysics and Categories) 
ontology as the science of being qua being (Corazzon, 2004). According to this 
view, the business of ontology is to study the most general features of 
reality and real objects (Peirce, 1935), i.e., the study of the generic traits 
of every mode of being. As opposed to the several specific scientific 
disciplines (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology), which deal only with entities 
that fall within their respective domain, ontology deals with transcategorical 
relations, including those relations holding between entities belonging to 
distinct domains of science, and also by entities recognized by common 
sense.  
Ontology aims to develop theories about, for example, persistence and 
change, identity, classification and instantiation, causality, among others. 
Ontological questions include questions such as: what kinds of entities 
exist? What differentiates objects from events and how are they related? 
What are the properties of a thing and how are they related to the thing 
itself? What is the essence of an object? Does essence precede existence? 
Are things bundles of properties? Is an object equal to the sum of its parts? 
Are there Natural Kinds? Is change possible without a changing thing? 
These are general but factual questions, only comprehensive rather than 
specific. They are also fundamental to science regardless if we are to talk 
about properties of atoms, human organs or insurance claims, if we are to 
develop theories of physical, mental or social events, or if we are to theorize 
Figure 3-2  Cover of 
Christian Wolffs book 
Philosophia prima sive 
Ontologia from 1730  
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on the parthood relations between an individual and a society, a heart and a 
human body and the first half and an entire football game.  
There are many ontological principles that are utilized in scientific 
research, for instance, in the selection of concepts and hypothesis, in the 
axiomatic reconstruction of scientific theories, in the design of techniques, 
and in the evaluation of scientific results. Examples of scientific questions 
that are actually metaphysical ones include (Bunge, 1977, p.19): 
 
 Is there an ultimate matter? This question triggered Heisenbergs 1956 
theory of elementary particles; 
 Is society anything beyond and above individuals that compose it or are 
there special societal laws in addition to laws governing individual 
behavior? This is a central dispute in the methodology and philosophy of 
social sciences; 
 Are biological species embodiments of Platonic archetypes, or just 
concrete populations? Or perhaps a single individual scattered in space 
and time? This question is asked everyday by taxonomists (Ereshefsky, 
2002). 
 
Examples of metaphysical hypothesis underlying scientific research 
include (Bunge, 1977, p.16): 
 
 There is a world external to the cognitive subject; 
 The world is composed of things that are grouped into systems or 
aggregates; 
 Every system except the universe, interacts with other systems in certain 
respects and is isolated from other systems in other respects; 
 Nothing comes out of nothing and no thing reduces to nothingness; 
 Everything changes; 
 There are laws and everything abides by laws (otherwise, the 
experimental scientific method would not be possible); 
 There are levels of organization: physical, chemical, social, psychological, 
biological, etc. The so-called higher levels emerge from other levels in 
the course of processes; but, once formed they enjoy a certain stability 
with laws of their own. Otherwise we would have to know everything 
about physics and chemistry before knowing about organisms and 
societies. 
 
Moreover, recent scientific theories that make explicit use of 
metaphysical concepts abound. To cite one example, in (Penrose, 2000), 
the author uses a Platonic theory of Universals to explain the minds ability 
to execute non-computable processes.  
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Finally, in the axiomatization of scientific theories, some of the 
following concepts are to occur in an explicit fashion: part, composition, 
system, state of affairs, relations, boundary, causality, state, event, change, 
property, law, possibility, process, space and time. However, the specific 
axioms of these theories will usually not tell us anything about these 
fundamental and generic concepts. Science just borrows them, leaving them 
in an intuitive and pre-systematic state. In other words, these generic 
concepts are common to a number of sciences, so that no single scientific 
discipline takes the trouble to regiment them (Bunge, 1977). The same 
holds from concepts in computer science and, in particular, in conceptual 
modeling. Concepts such as part and whole, instantiation and classification, 
attribution and relationships, causality, interaction, among others, are 
represented in the modeling primitives of several conceptual modeling 
language or, at minimum, are used in discourse of the computer science 
literature. Nonetheless, there is a lack of theoretical support in the area for 
precisely defining the meaning of these concepts. To quote Ron Weber, in 
his Ontological Foundations of Information Systems (Weber, 1997): A discipline 
that calls itself the information systems discipline ought to know what the term 
information systems means[, and for that to take place,] its members need to be 
able to explain precisely what they mean by the term system.      
In summary, every science presupposes some metaphysics. However, 
metaphysics and science can be distinguished by the scope of their 
problems. Whereas the scientist deals with rather specific questions of fact, 
the ontologist is concerned with all the factual domains.  
In the beginning of the 20th century the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl coined the term Formal Ontology as an analogy to Formal Logic. 
Whilst Formal Logic deals with formal logical structures (e.g., truth, 
validity, consistency) independently of their veracity, Formal Ontology deals 
with formal ontological structures (e.g., theory of parts, theory of wholes, 
types and instantiation, identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal 
aspects of objects irrespective of their particular nature. The unfolding of 
Formal Ontology as a philosophical discipline aims at developing a system 
of general categories and their ties, which can be used in the development 
of scientific theories and domain-specific common sense theories of reality. 
In other words, ontology in the first sense of Websters definition 
aforementioned contributes to the development of ontologies in the second 
sense. 
The first ontology developed in sense (D2) is the set of theories of 
Substance and Accidents developed by Aristotle in his Methaphysics and 
Categories7. Since then, ontological theories have been developed by 
                                                      
7 We refer to (Aristotle, 1984) for a modern edition of Aristotles complete works.  
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innumerous philosophers such as G.W. Leibniz (Leibniz, 1981), C.S. Peirce 
(Peirce, 1935), Alfred North Whitehead (Whitehead, 1929), Bertrand 
Russel (Russel, 1940), Willen Van Orman Quine (Quine, 1953, 1969), 
Nelson Goodman (Goodman, 1951), Peter Strawson (Strawson, 1959), 
Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 1970), and Saul Kripke, (Kripke, 1982) to 
name just a few whose theories appear latter in this thesis. Moreover, 
philosophical ontology is currently an active area in philosophy, and formal 
ontologies have been built by contemporary philosophers such as Mario 
Bunge (Bunge, 1977), Eli Hirsch (Hirsch, 1982), Anil Gupta (Gupta, 
1980), Jacques van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen, 1991), Rodderick Chisholm 
(Chisholm, 1996), David Armstrong (Armstrong, 1989, 97), E.J. Lowe 
(Lowe, 2001), Peter Simons (Simons, 1987), Peter Gärdenfors 
(Gärdenfors, 2000), David Wiggins (Wiggins, 2001),  Kevin Mulligan 
(Mulligan & Simons & Smith, 1984), Barry Smith (Smith, 1998), Achille 
Varzi and Roberto Casati (Casati & Varzi, 1994). Finally, more recently a 
number of ontological systems in the sense (D2) have been constructed in 
projects related to computer science (Masolo et.al, 2003a; Heller & Herre, 
2004), and under the auspices of a new discipline called Applied Ontology 
(Masolo et.al, 2003b). It is with this last kind of ontologies that this thesis is 
mainly concerned, i.e., with formal ontological theories that can be 
developed and applied in the solution to problems in the fields of computer 
and information sciences and, in particular, of conceptual modeling. 
3.2 Ontology in Computer and Information Sciences 
Since the word ontology has been mentioned in a computer related 
discipline for the first time (Mealy, 1967), ontologies have been applied in a 
multitude of areas in computer science. The first noticeable growth of 
interest in the subject in mid 1990s was motivated by the need to create 
principled representations of domain knowledge in the knowledge sharing 
and reuse community in AI, which motivated the creation of forums such as 
the conference series FOIS (Formal Ontology and Information Systems)8. 
Nonetheless, an explosion of works related to the subject only happened in 
the past two years. Just to illustrate this point, the paper submission rate 
from the first International Semantic Web Working (SWWS) Symposium 
in 2001 (Cruz, 2001) to the third edition of the International Semantic 
Web Conference (ICSW) (Fensel & Sycara & Mylopoulos, 2003) has 
increased by almost 400%. 
                                                      
8 http://www.fois.org/ 
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According to (Smith & Welty, 2001), historically there are three areas 
mainly responsible for creating a demand for the application of ontologies 
in computer science, namely, (i) database and information systems; (ii) 
software engineering (in particular, domain engineering); (iii) artificial 
intelligence. In the sequel, we discuss the use of ontologies in these areas. 
Additionally, we also include a discussion of the topic in the context of the 
Semantic Web, due to the important role played by this area in the current 
popularization of the term. 
3.2.1 Ontology in Information Systems 
According to (Smith, 2004), the term ontology in the computer and 
information science literature appeared for the first time in 1967, in a work 
on the foundations of data modeling by S. H. Mealy, in a passage where he 
distinguishes three distinct realms in the field of data processing, namely: 
(i) the real world itself; (ii) ideas about it existing in the minds of men; (iii) 
symbols on paper or some other storage medium. Mealy concludes the passage 
arguing about the existence of things in the world regardless of their 
(possibly) multiple representations and claiming that This is an issue of 
ontology, or the question of what exists (Mealy 1967. p. 525.). In the end of 
this passage, Mealy includes a reference to Quines essay On What There Is 
(Quine, 1953).   
The fields of data and information modeling have been a fruitful 
ground for the applications of ontological theories, either implicitly or 
explicitly. In the 1970s, the so-called three schema architecture has been 
proposed in the database field (Jardine, 1976). The architecture suggests 
the distinction between implementation schemas (describing physical ways of 
storing data and procedures), presentation schemas (concerned with external 
interfaces to the user), and conceptual schemas (focusing of the description of 
the characteristics of the elements in the universe of discourse). In order to 
address the problem of how to create these conceptual schemas, different 
set of modeling concepts have been proposed.  
First, the so-called logical models were proposed in early 1970s. 
Examples include the relational and network models. These models offered 
a set of abstract modeling primitives that were independent of physical 
modeling concepts but which, unfortunately, were deemed flat (i.e., lacking 
structure9) and unintuitive as how they should be used for modeling 
purposes (Mylopoulos, 1998).   
Soon after logical models were proposed, different meta-
conceptualizations were proposed which offered more expressive facilities 
                                                      
9 See discussion on section 3.4.2 of this chapter. 
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for modeling applications and structuring information bases. The semantic 
model proposed by Jean-Raymond Abrial in 1974 (Abrial, 1974) and Peter 
Chens entity-relationship model (Chen, 1976) are included in the category of 
languages that are now known as conceptual modeling (or semantic data 
modeling) languages.  
The creation of both logical and conceptual models by the database and 
information modeling community was solely motivated by the search for 
better concepts that could be used for creating representations of a certain 
portion of reality. Both the Semantic model and the ER model were 
committed to a world view and based on the ontological assumption that the 
structural aspects of the world could be articulated by using the concepts of 
entity and relationship. However, none of these efforts took ontology 
seriously, in the sense that the choices of categories that are part of the 
conceptualization underlying these languages were not based on Ontology 
in the philosophical sense. 
As pointed by (Smith & Welty, 2001), the ad hoc and inconsistent 
modeling that marked the early days of conceptual modeling led to many of 
the practical database integration problems that we face today. In order to 
tackle some of these problems and to provide a sound basis for the 
selection of modeling concepts that should underpin information system 
grammars, several researchers started to found their work on philosophical 
ontologies. Examples include the use of philosophical ontologies for analysis 
and evaluation of: (i) information systems grammars (Milton & Kamierczak, 
2004; Shanks & Tansley & Weber, 2003; Evermann and Wand, 2001a,b; 
Gemino, 1999; Green and Rosemann, 2000; Opdahl and Henderson-
Sellers, 2001; Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 1999; Parsons and 
Wand, 1991; Wand and Weber, 1989, 1993; Wand & Storey & Weber, 
1999); (ii) reference models (Fettke and Loos, 2003); (iii) data quality (Wand 
and Wang, 1996); (iv) off-the-shelf system (COTS) (Soffer et. al, 2001).  
Along the years, there has been an increasing interest in the use of 
philosophical ontology in the conceptual modeling and information systems 
community as a foundation for their discipline. Research results following 
this idea are strongly related to the objectives of this work and will be 
thoroughly discussed in the development of this dissertation. 
3.2.2 Ontology in Domain Engineering 
Independently of these developments in the information systems 
community, yet another sub-field of computer science, namely software 
engineering, began to recognize the importance of what came to be known 
as domain engineering (Arango & Williams & Iscoe, 1991). This was mainly 
motivated by the need to reduce the disproportional costs in software 
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maintenance and the need to reinforce software reuse in a higher level of 
abstraction than merely programming code (Arango, 1994).  
In general, a domain engineering process is composed of the following 
subactivities: domain analysis and domain design, the latter being further 
decomposed in infrastructure specification, infrastructure implementation. 
Intuitively, domain engineering can be considered analogous to software 
engineering (software application engineering), however, operating in a 
meta-level (see table 3.1), i.e., instead of uncovering requirements, 
designing and implementing a specific application, the target is on a family 
of applications in a given domain (Arango & Prieto-Diaz, 1994). 
 
Application Engineering Domain Engineering 
Requirements Analysis  Domain Analysis 
Application Design Infrastructure Specification 
Application Implementation Infrastructure Implementation 
 
The term Domain Analysis appears for the first time in (Neighbors, 1981) 
with the following definition: Domain Analysis is an attempt to identify objects, 
operations and relations that domain experts perceive as important in a given 
domain.  
The product of a domain analysis phase is a domain model. A domain 
model defines objects, events and relations that capture similarities and 
regularities in a given domain of discourse. The resulting model is an 
architecture comprised of conceptual components that are common to a 
family of applications (reuse). It can be used to identify, explain and predict 
facts in a given domain, which can hardly be observed directly (problem-
solving). Moreover, it serves the purposes of a unified reference model to be 
used when ambiguities arise in discussions about the domain 
(communication) and a source of knowledge that can be used in a learning 
process about that domain. In summary, the specification produced by the  
domain modelling activity is a shared representation of entities that domain 
experts deem relevant in a universe of discourse, which can be used to promote 
problem-solving, communication, learning and reuse in a higher level of abstraction 
(Arango, 1994). 
Actually, more than a mere analogy, domain and application engineering 
are complementary disciplines and can be interrelated in a process that 
contemplates both development to reuse and development with reuse. Figure 
3.3 depicts schematically how these disciplines are integrated in the so-
called two-level life cycle (Falbo et. al, 2002a). Some of these relations are 
briefly elaborated below. 
Table 3-1  A comparison 
between Domain 
Engineering and 
Application Engineering 
activities (based Arango 
& Prieto-Diaz, 1994) 
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Domain Analysis
Domain 
Model
Infrastructure 
Specification
Infrastructure 
Implementation
Infrastructure 
Specification
Repository 
of Reusable 
Artifacts
Requirements 
Analysis
 Analysis 
Model
Design 
Model
Application Design
Application 
Implementation
Software 
Application
Domain 
Engineering 
Track
Application 
Engineering 
Track
 
The result of a domain engineering process is a reusable infrastructure or 
framework (development for reuse). A framework can be (re)utilized in 
instances of software engineering processes for the construction of a several 
specific applications (development with reuse) whose requirements have 
been defined during the requirements analysis phase of each specific 
application.  
In addition to being the basis for the development of framework, a 
domain model can also be used in the application requirements analysis 
phase to improve communication and understanding of the domain and to 
help in the requirements elicitation process (Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 
1998).  
For a framework to be representative and, therefore, useful for 
potential applications in a domain, it must embed a correct 
conceptualization of the entities perceived as important by domain experts. 
The same must be true for a domain model to be useful as a shared 
reference for communication and problem-solving in application 
requirements analysis. Analogous to the problem faced by conceptual 
modelers in the database community, the challenge in domain modeling is 
again finding the best concepts that can used to create representations of phenomena 
Figure 3-3  Domain 
Engineering and 
Application Engineering 
(based on Falbo et al., 
2002a) 
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in a universe of discourse that are both as reusable as possible and still truthful to 
reality.  
This field, too, was severely debilitated by a lack of concrete and 
consistent formal bases for making modeling decisions (Smith & Welty, 
2001). Despite the strong correspondence between domain models and 
what is named domain ontologies in AI (see section 3.2.3), only very recently 
ontologies started being used as a foundation for domain engineering. For 
instance, (Falbo et. al, 2002a) presents an ontology-based approach for 
software reuse and discusses how ontologies can support several tasks of a 
reuse-based software process. In (Falbo & Guizzardi & Duarte, 2002), an 
ontological approach for domain engineering (named ODE) is advocated 
and a systematic approach for ontological engineering is proposed. 
(Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001a), (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira 
Filho, 2001b) and (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2002) propose a 
modeling language for building ontology-based domain models and a 
systematic approach for deriving object-oriented frameworks from them. 
The framework derivation methodology proposed comprises a spectrum of 
techniques, namely, mapping directives, design patterns and formal 
translation rules. In particular, (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001b) 
introduces a design pattern for guaranteeing the preservation of some 
ontological properties of part-whole relations (irreflexivity, asymmetry, 
transitivity and shareability) in object-oriented implementations.    
(Falbo & Guizzardi & Duarte, 2002) and (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira 
Filho, 2002) exemplify the approaches proposed by constructing ontologies 
and deriving the corresponding object-oriented frameworks for the 
domains of software process and software quality, respectively.  Fragments 
of these ontologies are depicted in figure 3.4 and 3.5, in that order. The 
representation language LINGO used in the picture is a set-theoretical 
language proposed in (Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 1998) and (Guizzardi & 
Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001a). The complete boxes represent concepts, 
boxes with open sides represent (material) relations, arrows represent 
subsumption relations (the arrow head pointing to the most general 
concept) and (hollow) circles represent shareable part-whole relations (the 
circle being connected to the whole. The cardinality constraints adjacent to 
a concept constrain the opposed navigational end of the relation. For 
example, in figure 3.4, a Measurable Quality Characteristic can be measured by 
one-to-many Metrics. Moreover, whenever omitted, cardinality constraints 
should be interpreted as zero-to-many. Finally, grey boxes represent 
concepts imported from other ontologies. For example, in the ontology of 
figure 3.5, the concept Software Process is imported from the Software 
Process ontology of figure 3.4. This picture also shows an axiom in this 
ontology which states that: the resources allocated to a compound software activity 
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A are those (and only those) which are allocated to the (sub)activities that are proper-
parts of A. 
 
 
The ontology of figure 3.4 is used to generate the framework shown in 
figure 3.6. One can observe that, by using the transformation rules 
proposed by the methodology, the axioms in the domain ontology are 
systematically and explicitly mapped onto methods in the target framework. 
In the case exemplified, an invocation of the method usage in an Activity 
object returns the solution set of the corresponding axiom in the ontology, 
i.e., the set of resources used in by that specific Activity. This solution 
increases the reusability of the produced framework by representing 
explicitly the methods that address the ontology competence questions 
Figure 3-4  Excerpts of a 
Software Process 
Ontology developed 
using ODE and LINGO 
Figure 3-5  Excerpt of a 
Software Quality 
Ontology developed 
using ODE and LINGO 
 ONTOLOGY IN COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCES 63 
(Gruninger & Fox, 1994a), as opposed to have domain knowledge hidden 
inside the code. 
Part
input():Set
output():Set
usage():Set
superActivity():Activity
subActivity():Set
Activity
ManagementActivity ConstructionActivity
QualityAssuranceActivity
input():Set
output():Activity
Artifact
*
input
*output
1 1..*part() : Part
«interface»
IPart
resource() : Set
Resource
* *
usage
whole() : Whole
«interface»
IWhole
Whole
public class Activity
{
   public Set usage()
   {
       return Set.Im(this.subactivity(),”usage”); 
   }
} 
* *
Aggregation
 
This framework can be reused and extended in a software engineering 
development with reuse process to address the needs of specific applications. 
For example, in (Falbo et. al, 2002b), the frameworks derived from the 
ontologies in figure 3.4 and 3.5 are used in the development of tools that 
are integrated in a software engineering environment. In particular, the 
process framework is used in the development of process definition (figure 3.7) 
and project tracking tools and the quality framework in the development of a 
quality control application (figure 3.8). 
 
Figure 3-6  Fragment of 
a Software Process 
Framework derived from 
a Software Process 
Ontology  
Figure 3-7 Process 
Definition Tool 
developed by (re)using 
a Software Process 
Framework 
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A number of other domain ontologies and frameworks have been developed 
using ODE and LINGO in domains such as resource allocation (Guizzardi & 
Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001a), Software Risk (Falbo et. al, 2004), Knowledge 
Management (Natali & Falbo, 2002), Organizational Modeling (Cota & 
Menezes & Falbo, 2004), Steel Factoring (Mian et. al, 2002), among others. 
Moreover, the domain engineering methodology proposed has been used as 
a foundation for the construction of an ontology editor (Mian & Falbo, 
2002) and a domain-oriented software engineering environment (Mian & 
Falbo, 2003). An extension of this approach for enterprise engineering has 
been proposed as part of the AGILA project (Caplinkas, 2003).  
LINGO was designed with the specific objective of achieving a positive 
trade-off between expression power of the language and the ability to 
facilitate bridging the gap between the conceptual and implementation 
levels (a preoccupation that also seem to be present in Peter Chens original 
proposal for ER diagrams). The language succeeds in offering abstractions 
that conform to the object-oriented paradigm, which, hence, enable a 
systematic translation approach. Moreover, it contains some important 
ontological distinctions, for example, the distinction between sortal and 
non-sortal concepts (see chapter 4 of this work). Nonetheless, its purely 
extensional semantics and ontological incompleteness (in the technical 
sense proposed in chapter 2) make it inappropriate as a general conceptual 
modeling language.   
Figure 3-8 Quality 
Control Tool (Control Q) 
developed by (re)using 
a Software Quality 
Framework 
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An important point that should be emphasized is the difference in the 
senses of the word ontology used by the information systems and domain 
engineering communities. In information systems, the term ontology has 
been used in ways that conform to its definitions in philosophy (in both 
senses D1 and D2). As a system of categories, an ontology is independent of 
language: Aristotles ontology is the same whether it is represented in 
English, Greek or First-Order Logic. In contrast, in most of other areas of 
computer science (including domain engineering and artificial intelligence), 
the term ontology is, in general, used as a concrete engineering artifact 
designed for a specific purpose. In section 3.4, we provide a precise 
account for this latter use of the term and elaborate on its relation to 
conceptualization and language as discussed in chapter 2.     
Finally, as a concrete artifact, an ontology should be constructed in a 
systematic process analogous to those of traditional software engineering. 
An ontological engineering process model typically comprises activities such 
as: Purpose Identification and Requirements Specification, Ontology Capture, 
Formalization, Reuse and Integration, Evaluation and Documentation (Falbo & 
Guizzardi & Duarte, 2002). For a more elaborated discussion on 
ontological engineering methodologies one should refer to (Gruninger & 
Fox, 1994b; Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 1998; Fernández-López et. al, 
1999; Gomez-Perez & Corcho & Fernandez-Lopez, 2002; Devedić, 2002). 
3.2.3 Ontology and Artificial Intelligence 
The work of (Clancy, 1993) was of great importance for laying the 
groundwork for the establishment of ontology in artificial intelligence. In 
the tradition of AI, up to that moment, knowledge in artificial systems used 
to be defined in a strictly functional way aiming to incorporate in a 
knowledge base the steps that domain experts typically use in the solution 
of a given problem. Clancy proposed a shift in such a perspective, arguing 
that the primary concern of knowledge engineering is modeling systems in the world, 
not replicating how people think (ibid.). Clancy is a proponent of the modeling 
view of knowledge acquisition, according to which a knowledge base is not a 
repository of knowledge extracted from an experts mind (as in the so-
called transfer view), but it refers to an objective reality that is much more 
related to the classical notion of truth intended as a correspondence to the 
real-world10. More exactly, the modeling activity must establish a 
                                                      
10 In the correspondence theory of the truth advocated by philosophers such as (Russel, 
1918) and (Wittgenstein, 1922), the truth of a proposition is determined by its 
correspondence to the existence of an entity or fact in reality, the so-called Truthmaker of a 
proposition (Mulligan & Simons & Smith, 1984). Here, by objective reality, we mean a task-
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correspondence between a knowledge base and two separate subsystems: 
the behavior of the intelligent system (i.e., the problem-solving expertise) 
and its environment (the problem domain) (Guarino, 1995). 
Guarino strongly defends the view that the modeling of domain 
knowledge should be pursued in a way that is as independent as possible of 
the problem-solving task. The argument is based on two important points:  
 
1. If the represented knowledge is not considered as part of the objective 
reality of the domain, the very basic assumptions of the modeling view 
are contradicted: if a domain theory does not describe (partially) an 
inherent structure in the domain, what is it supposed to represent? 
Arguably, the agent's mind, which was exactly what the modeling view 
aimed to avoid (Guarino, 1995, p.2). This reasoning can also be applied 
when directed to domain models and schemas used in domain 
engineering and information systems, respectively. How can we make 
systems with different conceptual models but overlapping semantics 
work together, if not by referring to the common world to which they 
all relate? 
 
2. Knowledge acquisition (domain analysis, requirements engineering, etc.) 
is a notoriously expensive process and, hence, reuse of domain 
knowledge and domain representations should be maximized across 
different applications. With such a perspective, knowledge specifications 
can acquire a value per se, and as much as we approximate to the truth as 
classically conceived the potential for reuse should increase. As put in 
(Smith, 1995), truth in classical sense is a sort of infinite reusability.      
  
For these reasons, it becomes clear how the study of ontology (in sense 
D1) can be of great benefit to the knowledge-construction process of 
intelligent systems, which is a position that finds strong support in 
(Guarino, 1995, 1997, 1998; Smith, 2004). Nonetheless, as in the case of 
information systems and domain engineering, the initial approaches to 
tackle domain modeling in AI suffered from a relative narrow perspective, 
concentrating on the immediate needs of the AI practice, and refusing to 
take into account the philosophical achievements coming from the study of 
common-sense reality (Guarino, 1995).  
Based on these considerations, in (Guarino, 1998), the author 
proposes a classification of ontology kinds based on their level of 
dependence on a particular task or point of view: 
                                                                                                                     
independent conceptualization that is truthful to reality in the sense discussed in depth in 
section 3.4.1.  
 ONTOLOGY IN COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCES 67 
 Top-level ontologies describe very general concepts like space, time, 
matter, object, event, action, etc., which are independent of a particular 
problem or domain; 
 
 Domain ontologies and task ontologies describe, respectively, the vocabulary 
related to a generic domain (like medicine, or automobiles) or a generic 
task or activity (like diagnosing or selling), by specializing the terms 
introduced in a top-level ontology; 
 
 Application ontologies describe concepts that depend both on a particular 
domain and task, and often combine specializations of both the 
corresponding domain and task ontologies. These concepts often 
correspond to roles played by domain entities while performing a certain 
task, like replaceable unit or spare component. 
 
In this definition, an application ontology is not considered as a synonym to a 
knowledge base. An ontology can be considered as a particular knowledge base, 
describing facts assumed, by a community of users, to hold necessarily, in 
virtue of the agreed-upon meaning of the vocabulary used. A generic 
knowledge base, instead, may also describe facts and assertions related to 
particular state of affairs or particular epistemic state. Consequently, within 
a generic knowledge base two components can be distinguished: the 
ontology (containing situation-independent information) and the core 
knowledge base (containing situation-dependent information) (Guarino & 
Giaretta, 1995). The idea of application ontologies is analogous to that of 
specializations of knowledge frameworks (Falbo et. al, 2002a,b; Falbo & Guizzardi 
& Duarte, 2002; Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 1999). Specializations of 
knowledge frameworks are created to incorporate task and application 
knowledge that are dependent of a particular purpose and functionality that 
should be performed by a specific system or narrower class of systems.  
application ontology
domain ontology task ontology
top-level ontology
 
Figure 3-9  A 
classification of different 
types of ontology. 
Arrows represent 
specialization relations 
(from Guarino, 1998) 
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The instances of all these different types of ontologies depicted in figure 3.9 
are concrete engineering artifacts. Since the first time the word ontology 
was used in AI by Hayes (Hayes, 1978) and since the development of his 
naïve physics ontology of liguids (Hayes, 1985), a large amount of 
ontologies (mostly domain ontologies) have been developed. In the sequel, 
we briefly discuss some examples of domain ontologies that have been 
constructed over the years: 
 
Engineering and Technical Applications 
 
The YMIR ontology (Alberts, 1994) is a domain independent, sharable 
ontology for the formal representation of engineering design knowledge, 
based on systems theory. EngMath (Gruber & Olsen, 1994) is an ontology 
for mathematical modeling in engineering. It includes representations for 
scalar, vector, and tensor quantities, physical dimensions, units of measure, 
functions of quantities, and dimension quantities. PHYSSYS ontology (Borst, 
1997) is an ontology for modeling, simulating and designing physical 
systems. It consists of three engineering ontologies that formalize the three 
viewpoints on physical devices, namely, system layout, physical process 
behavior and descriptive mathematical relations. DORPA (Varejão et. al, 
2000) is an ontology for the design of reprographic machines developed in 
collaboration with the XEROX Palo Alto Research Center.  
 
Enterprise Modeling and Manufacturing   
 
The TOVE (Toronto Virtual Enterprise) ontology (Gruninger & Atefi & Fox, 
2000), formalizes knowledge about production/communication processes, 
activities, causality, resources, quality and cost in business enterprises. 
Another example includes the Enterprise Ontology developed in a project 
supported by the UKs department of Trade and Industry and led by the AI 
Applications Institute at the University of Edinburgh (see Uschold et. al, 
1998). It defines a collection of terms (e.g., activities and processes, 
organization, strategy, marketing) that are considered relevant for business 
enterprises. Once represented, these enterprise ontologies have been used 
as a basis for the development of methods and tools for enterprise 
modeling. The Process Specification Language (PSL) (Schlenoff et al., 2000; 
Ciocoiu & Gruninger, 2000) defines a neutral representation for 
manufacturing processes, which can be used to integrate modeling 
languages and tools that are used throughout the life cycle of a product, 
from early design of manufacturing process, through process planning, 
validation, production scheduling and control.       
 
 
 ONTOLOGY IN COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCES 69 
Chemistry, Biology and Ceramic Materials 
 
CHEMICALS (Fernández-López et. al, 1999) is an ontology that contains 
knowledge within the domain of chemical elements and crystalline 
structures. The Gene Ontology (GO)11 project is a collaborative effort to 
address the need for consistent descriptions of gene products among several 
of the worlds largest repositories for plant, animal and microbial genomes. 
It is composed of three structured, controlled vocabularies that describe 
gene products in terms of their associated biological processes, cellular 
components and molecular functions in a species-independent manner. 
The Fishery Core Ontology (Gangemi et. al, 2002) was developed to support 
semantic interoperability among existing fishery information systems. Other 
examples include the PLINIUS (van der Vet & Mars, 1994) ontology of 
ceramic materials and the ontology of pure substances (van der Vet & Mars, 
1995).   
 
Medicine 
 
The GALEN project aims at developing a terminological server for medical 
concepts (Rector at. al, 1995). It is based on a semantically sound model of 
clinical terminology: the GALEN Coding reference (CORE) model. This model 
comprises elementary clinical concepts (e.g., fracture, bone, and humerus), 
and relationships (e.g., fractures can occur in bones) that control how these 
may be combined. Moreover, it includes complex concepts (such as fracture 
of the left humerus) composed from simpler ones. The ON9 is a large-scale 
ontology library for medical terminology developed in the context of the 
ONIONS (ONtological Integration of Naïve Sources) project (Gangemi & 
Pisanelli & Steve, 1999). One of terminological sources that are formalized 
and integrated in ON9 is the UMLS Metathesaurus developed by the 
American National Library of Medicine (Pisanelli & Gangemi & Steve, 
1998). Additionally, (Pisanelli et. al, 2003) describes an ontology 
representing the concepts involved in evidence-based medicine and meta-
analysis 
 
Law 
 
The Core Legal Ontology (CLO) (Gangemi et. al, 2003) is used to organize 
juridical concepts and to represent the assessment of legal regulatory 
compliance across different legal systems or between norms and cases. In 
(Sagri & Tiscornia & Gangemi, 2004) CLO is used as a foundation for the 
development of JurWordNet (a semantic lexicon to support legal information 
                                                      
11 http://www.geneontology.org/ 
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searching) (Sagri, 2003), and for the representation of click-on licenses in 
the field of Intellectual Property Right (IPR).     
3.2.4 Ontology and the Semantic Web 
The World Wide Web has been made possible due to the availability of a 
set of well established standards that guarantee interoperability at various 
levels, like, for instance, the transport and application level (with the TCP12 
and HTTP13 standards, respectively), and the presentation level (with the 
HTML standard14). After Tim Berners-Lees seminal paper (Berners-Lee, 
1989-1990), the web started to be collectively created as a hypermedia 
network of information nodes. Along these years, it suffered a 
transformation from a medium for information exchange to a medium for 
service deployment. Nonetheless, its current structure is still directed for 
human processing and interpretation. Regardless if the user is booking a 
flight, searching for news or analysing catalogues of Volvo parts made by 
different manufactures, the interpretation of the content of each web node 
relies totally on the users ability to give real-world semantics to symbols 
written in a certain language.  
The next developmental step for the web has been characterized by the 
so-called Semantic Web vision (Berners-Lee, Hendler, Lassila, 2001), which 
stipulates a change in the web from being machine-readable (but only human-
understandable) to machine-understandable. By machine-understandability, 
Berners-Lee and colleagues mean the following: web resources 
(information nodes and computational services) are annotated by meta-data 
written in a formal knowledge representation language, i.e., in a language 
with precisely defined formal semantics and with associated highly 
optimized inference procedures and engines. As a consequence, techniques 
developed by the knowledge representation community over the years 
could be exploited in the development of intelligent services, such as 
intelligent search engines (Mayfield & Finin, 2003), information brokering 
and filtering (Klien et. al, 2004; Vögele & Hübner & Schuster, 2003), web 
service annotation and automatic service composition/orchestration 
(Majithia & Walker & Gray, 2004; Paolucci & Sycara & Kawamura, 2003), 
knowledge management architectures (Davies & Fensel & van Harmelen, 
2003; Guizzardi & Aroyo & Wagner, 2003), among many others.   
In this scenario, ontologies are expected to play a fundamental role by 
interweaving human understanding of symbols with machine processability. 
The idea is that, firstly, ontologies representing shared conceptualizations of 
                                                      
12 Transmission Control Protocol (http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html) 
13 HyperText Transfer Protocol (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/) 
14 http://www.w3.org/MarkUp/ 
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reality are constructed and specified in a machine-understandable language. 
Then, as formal specifications, they can be used as semantic domains for 
the definition of formal and real-world semantics for syntactic symbols 
present in web resources.  
In the sequel, we discussed the most relevant semantic web 
technologies from the point of view of domain representation.  
 
3.2.4.1 An architecture for the Semantic Web 
 
One of the main architectural premises of the Semantic web is the stack of 
languages, often drawn in a figure firstly presented by Berners-Lee in his 
XML 2000 keynote address15 and replicated in figure 3.10. In the sequel 
we briefly discuss some layers in this stack leading up to the ontology 
representation languages. For a more detailed discussion one should refer 
to (Koivunen & Miller, 2001).   
 
In the bottom language layer of the stack we have the eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML)16. As opposed to HTML documents, which have a 
predefined syntactic structure, XML was designed as a markup-language for 
arbitrary document structures. By using XML Schema Definitions (XSDs), one 
can define a grammar (an abstract syntax definition) for a class of XML 
documents, defining vocabulary and syntactic rules that are specific to a 
class of applications. For this reason, it can be used as serialization syntax 
for other markup languages. For example, the Synchronized Multimedia 
Integration Language (SMIL)17 is syntactically just a particular XSD.  
For a processing application, any symbol in a HTML document that is 
not a member of the predefined markup primitives is seen as a meaningless 
                                                      
15 Available at http://www.w3.org/2000/talks/1206-xml2k-tbl/. 
16 http://www.w3.org/XML/ 
17 http://www.w3.org/AudioVideo/ 
Figure 3-10  The 
Semantic Web Layered 
Architecture  
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string of characters. In contrast, XML provides some structuring and a 
standard way for defining the abstract syntax for a class of documents that 
can be shared by other applications. Nonetheless, a XSD only specifies 
syntactic rules, and any intended semantics for the syntactic elements is 
totally left outside the realm of the XML specification. Hence, for a 
processing application, the tags used to structure a XML document are as 
devoid of meaning as a variable label in a Java program, regardless of the 
natural language term that we give to it.     
On top of the XML layer, the W3C18 defines the Resource Description 
Framework (RDF)19, which standardizes the definition and use of meta-data 
descriptions about web resources. A web resource, from a RDF point of 
view, is anything that can be given a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)20, such 
as a web page, a computer device, a multimedia file, etc. Examples of 
applications of metadata descriptions are:  
 
 Website map (the metadata structure can describe the content of the 
web pages as well as their interrelationships); 
 Descriptions of resources privacy policies; 
 Description of advisory rating for multimedia content; 
 Description of device capabilities; 
 Description of users preferences and characteristics; 
 Digital Signatures; 
 Content classification systems (in particular, its ability to describe 
taxonomic relationships can be exploited, for example, for books, films, 
articles, etc.). 
 
RDF data is made up of statements, where each statement expresses the 
values of the properties of a resource. The basic RDF data model consists of 
an object-attribute-value triple commonly written as Attribute(Object,Value). 
For example, in figure 3.11, we present a RDF description in the notation 
of labelled directed graphs. In this figure, the property title (predicate) 
relates the http://www.example.org/ resource (subject) with a literal 
(object). 
                                                      
18 W3C stands for World Wide Web Consortium which is the entity responsible for the 
standardization of WWW-related technologies (http://www.w3.org/).   
19 http://www.w3.org/RDF/ 
20 http://www.gbiv.com/protocols/uri/rfc/rfc3986.html/ 
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http://www.example.org/ mailto:john@example.org
mailto:paul@example,org
worksWith
creator
creator
Wellcome to the Example 
Web Site
title
 
In principle, RDF could also be used to represent any ordinary data model. 
However, it comprises only a minimalist model containing primitives such 
as description, resource, property, and does not provide any means for the 
definition of the terms used in resource annotation, such as creator, workswith 
and title in figure 3.11. For this reason, a schema language named RDF 
Schema (RDFS)21 has been proposed. In contrast with XML, the RDF/RDFS 
model is able to define the semantics of its specifications (in case, for 
instance, a semantics such as the one proposed in (Pan & Horrocks, 
2003)22 is adopted). 
In the semantic web community, RDFS is regarded as a simple ontology 
representation language, since it incorporates the simplest parts of frame-
based languages such as OKBC (Grosso, 1999) (i.e., classes, properties, domain 
and range restrictions, instance-of, subclass-of and subproperty-of relationships). 
Nonetheless, there are many useful types of formulas that cannot be 
expressed in the language. A few examples are:   
 
 In a RDFS specification, one cannot state that two subconcepts of a 
common concept form a partition, i.e., that they are disjoint and 
complete; 
 although restrictions can be posed on the type of resources that form 
the domain and range of a property, cardinality constraints cannot be 
represented in a RDFS specification.  
 
In order to overcome the deficiencies of RDFS as an ontology 
representation language, two different languages were proposed, offering a 
                                                      
21 http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-schema/ 
22 An interesting aspect of the non-standard model theoretical semantics defined in this 
paper is its ability to solve some ambiguity problems with the RDF model as well as its 
compatibility with layering of a description logic based ontology modelling language (e.g. 
OWL) on top of it. 
Figure 3-11  Example of 
a simple RDF 
description 
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richer set of modelling primitives: DAML-ONT (McGuiness et al., 2002a) 
and OIL (Fensel et. al, 2001). Later, these languages converged in a single 
proposal named DAML+OIL (McGuiness et al., 2002b), which was further 
refined to become the W3C recommendation OWL (Ontology Web Language) 
(Bechhofer et. al, 2004). These (logical layer) ontology modelling languages 
have been carefully designed for the best possible trade-off between 
expressiveness and computational efficiency, the latter property having 
precedence. The language inherits from a specific type of family of description 
logics (SHIQ) (Baader & Horrocks & Sattler, 2003; Horrocks & Patel-
Schneider & van Harmelen, 2003) its formal semantics and reasoning 
support, which ensure logical completeness, correctness and efficiency.  
Another design requirement for the language was related to the need 
for maintaining compatibility with other languages in the stack of figure 
3.10. Consequently, OWL has been provided with both XML and RDF 
serializations. On one hand, an OWL specification is a valid XML document 
whose syntax is property defined in XSD. On the other hand, OWL reuses 
many of the RDFS primitives (e.g., class, domain, range, property), which 
makes its specifications partially available to RDFS-only software.       
Finally, the language was also designed aiming at being intuitive to the 
human user. For this reason its modelling primitives are based on the 
popular paradigm of frame-based and object-based languages. A related 
(but nonetheless diverse) point, which has not been considered by the 
designers of the language, is the pragmatic effectiveness of the languages 
concrete syntax. Although mainly targeted for machine-processing (as 
opposed to human problem-solving and communication), OWL 
specifications are, in general, created and manipulated by humans. In order 
to tackle this problem some proposals towards a UML syntax for OWL 
have been pursued (see, for example, Baclawski et. al, 2001). 
 
3.2.4.2 Context-Aware Services: An application Scenario 
 
An application area in which Semantic web ontologies have been employed 
successfully is the subfield of ubiquitous computing named context-aware 
computing (Ríos, et. al, 2003; Chen & Finin & Joshi, 2003; Strang & 
Linnhoff-Popien & Korbinian, 2003). Context-aware computing is a new 
computing paradigm that has brought the possibility of exploring the 
dynamic context of the user in order to provide more adaptable, complex 
and personalized services. A context is a situation involving the user or its 
environment, which can be considered of interest for an application. 
Examples of contexts include: 
 
 Physical contexts (such as location and time, etc.); 
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 Environmental contexts (weather, altitude, velocity, humidity, light, 
etc.); 
 Informational contexts (stock quotes, sports scores, etc.); 
 Personal contexts (health, mood, schedule, activity, etc.); 
 Social contexts (group activity, social relationships, vicinity of people, 
etc.); 
 Application contexts (email received, websites visited, etc.); 
 System contexts (network traffic, status of printers, device battery 
charge load, etc.). 
   
In (Ríos et. al, 2003; Ríos, 2003), ontologies are used for improving the 
modeling and handling of contextual information in a context-aware 
services platform named WASP (Web Architecture for Services Platform) (Costa et 
al., 2004a). This approach, illustrated in figure 3.12, is summarized in the 
sequel. 
SP
WASP Platform
CP
SP
Service Providers
Context Providers
WASP Applications
Set of ontologies
CP
CP
R
R
defined in
terms of
defined in
terms of
accesses
 
The objective of the WASP platform is to serve as broker between four 
different types of entities, namely, context providers, service providers, WASP 
applications and semantic web ontologies.  
Context Providers (CP) are responsible for making contextual information 
available to the other entities interaction with the platform. Examples of 
Context Providers include physical sensors and software agents. The 
architecture must be open to new kinds of third-party providers. These 
providers may supply information using different protocols and/or 
languages using different syntaxes. An example of a message sent to the 
platform by a CP would be: The visitor John Smith is inside the Chiaroscuro 
Figure 3-12  The 
ontology-based version 
of the WASP platform 
(from Ríos, 2003) 
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gallery of the Rijksmuseum. This message can be considered a description 
relating the resource John Smith (identified via a URI as a record in some 
database) to another resource (the Chiaroscuro gallery) via the property inside.    
The platform is open to third-party Service Providers (SP) interested in 
offering services to the users of the platform. Depending on the user 
requirements and context, the platform must support discovery and 
publishing of services. An example of a simple service is an instant 
messenger/SMS service provided by a third party SP.  
Another objective of the platform is to provide to WASP applications 
facilities for reacting to their dynamic environment. This is accomplished by 
allowing the applications to describe to the platform what actions should be 
taken (e.g., execute a service) in case a situation associated with a context 
holds. An example of a WASP subscription would be if a visitor enters the 
Chiaroscuro gallery in the Rijksmuseum then he should be notified via a SMS service 
about the free Rembrandt Calendar Gift, or if a visitor enters a museum, cinema or 
theatre then a silent mode instruction must be sent to his mobile phone via a mobile 
phone control service.      
Ontologies in this case are logical theories that play the role of semantic 
domains. In this way, context providers and WASP applications can 
interoperate because they use the same set of interrelated ontologies to 
define the semantics of both contextual information messages and 
application subscriptions. For instance, the meaning of visitor, museum, 
museum gallery, and of the predicate inside can be defined in terms of: (a) 
more general ontologies that, for instance, define the properties of physical 
objects and places; (b) domain-specific ontologies that define characteristics 
of museums, galleries and works of art. By reasoning on these ontologies, 
the platform can detect inconsistencies (e.g., a person cannot be in two 
disjoint places at the same time), and exhibit a more intelligent behavior, by 
deriving knowledge from the factual knowledge available (e.g., a visitor is in 
a place if he is in any part of that place).           
In (Ríos, 2003), some applications of context-aware services using the 
ontology-based version of the WASP platform are presented. These include: 
(i) an airport information application offering services related to flight 
information; (ii) an event advisors which notifies users about upcoming events 
that match their personal interests; (iii) a friend finder application that 
notifies an user when he is close to or inside the same place as one of his 
friends. Both (ii) and (iii) make use of a Tourism Ontology, depicted in figure 
3.1323.     
                                                      
23 This picture is an exactly copy from (Rios, 2003), in which a case tool is used to generate 
a UML syntax for the original OWL representation. The notation p:X in this specification 
symbolizes that X is a property in the OWL sense of the term. 
 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS AND FORMAL CHARACTERIZATIONS 77 
The sense of the term ontology adopted in the Semantic web vision is 
similar to the one adopted by the AI and domain engineering communities, 
i.e., ontology as an engineering artifact consisting of a formal structure of 
concepts and relations among concepts, and a set of axioms that both 
constrains the interpretation of this structure and affords the derivation of 
knowledge from the factual knowledge represented in the structure. 
Poi
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Container
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p:hasLongitude
Location
p:hasLocation
p:isPerformed
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p:isInside
p:isLocated
p:isFriendOf
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Park
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Movie
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p:Watches
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Films
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3.3 Terminological Clarifications and Formal 
Characterizations 
In the information systems community, the term ontology has a clear 
meaning, which is akin to the original definition (D2) given in philosophy. 
In the works of (Wand & Storey & Weber, 1999; Opdahl & Henderson-
Sellers, 2001), for example, ontology is clearly used as a system of 
categories, which is independent of language and state of affairs. In 
contrast, in the majority of the works in other areas of computer science, 
the term is used to denote a class of artifacts with a spectrum of divergent 
characteristics. To illustrate this terminological confusion, figure 3.14 from 
Figure 3-13  A Tourism 
Ontology referenced by 
context-aware 
applications in the 
ontology-based version 
of the WASP platform 
(exactly copy from Ríos, 
2003) 
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(Smith & Welty, 2001), depicts a wide range of different artifacts that have 
been termed ontologies in the literature. One can observe that these 
specifications range from simple catalogs containing, for instance, the 
products that a company sells, to a lexicon of terms with natural language 
definitions (thesaurus), to formal logical theories. 
complexity
without automated 
reasoning
with automated 
reasoning
a catalog
a set of 
text files
a glossary
a collection of 
taxonomies
a thesaurus a collection of 
frames
a set of general 
logical constraints 
 
In (Guarino & Giaretta, 1995), the authors discuss seven different 
interpretations of the word ontology as used in AI and, after a careful 
analysis, restrict its possible use to three sound interpretations:  
 
(a). ontology as a representation of a conceptual system that is 
characterized by specific logical properties (special type of logical 
theory containing only necessarily true formulas);  
(b). ontology as a specification of an ontological commitment;   
(c). ontology as a synonym of conceptualization.  
 
Many of the specifications accounted in the classification of figure 3.14 are 
indeed ontologies in sense (a). However, another share of them complies 
only with a sense of the term, which was deemed in Guarino & Giarettas 
analysis insufficient to qualify as an ontology, namely, ontology as a 
representation of a conceptual system that is characterized by specific purposes. 
These different senses, as well as their interrelations are discussed in depth 
in the remaining of this section, in which we establish a precise definition 
for these terms as they are used in the remaining of this work. 
3.3.1 Ontology and Conceptualization 
One of the most cited definitions for the term ontology in the Computer 
Science literature is the one given by Tom Gruber in (Gruber, 1995): An 
Ontology is a explicit representation of a conceptualization. 
As discussed in (Guarino & Giaretta, 1995; Guarino, 1995), the way this 
definition was originally proposed by Gruber, it is a problematic one as it 
relies on a notion of conceptualization that is purely extensional, namely 
Figure 3-14  Different 
sorts of specifications 
classified as ontologies 
in the computer science 
literature (from Smith & 
Welty, 2001)  
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that of (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987). Moreover, as argued in (Smith & 
Welty, 2001), it is too open for interpretations as all those different types 
artifacts in figure 3.14 comply with this definition. Nonetheless, it captures 
an intuitive idea, which remains true for the sense of ontology which is 
employed in the great majority of the works referring to ontology in 
artificial intelligence, domain engineering and the semantic web.  
In chapter 2, we have used figure 3.15 to illustrate the relationships 
between a conceptualization, a language, a domain abstraction24 
(representing part of some state of affairs in reality articulated according to 
the conceptualization) and a specification in the language which represents 
this domain abstraction. 
 
Specification
interpreted as
represented by
 
Modeling
Language
 
Conceptualization
interpreted as
represented by
used to 
compose instance of
used to 
compose
  
 
Domain 
Abstraction
 
In (Guarino, 1998), the author points out that the sense in which ontology 
is used in philosophy as a system of categories accounting for a certain 
vision of the world is akin to what we name a conceptualization in figure 3.15. 
In the philosophical reading, an ontology is independent of language and of 
particular epistemic state or state of affairs. On one hand, the same 
ontology could be represented in different languages, For example, the 
words orange, arancia, laranja and sinasappel refer to exactly the same 
ontological entity, namely the natural kind denoted by these terms. On the 
other hand, an ontology is neutral w.r.t. the actual existence of a particular 
orange a, but in contrast, it stipulates that if there is a situation in which a 
exists as an orange then a also exists as a fruit in this situation. Finally, 
although we can have an epistemic state of an agent expressing his 
uncertainty whether a is an orange OR a lemon, there is no such a thing as an 
                                                      
24 In chapter 2, we have used the term model instead of domain abstraction since it is the most 
common term in conceptual modeling. In this session, exclusively, we adopt the latter in 
order to avoid confusion with the term (logical) model as used in logics and tarskian 
semantics. The term logical model here, in turn, bears no relation to the term logical model 
in databases as used in section 3.2.1 of this chapter. 
Figure 3-15  Relations 
between 
conceptualization, 
domain abstraction, 
modeling language and 
specification 
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ontological optional property, or something in reality that has the property 
of being either an orange or a lemon. 
 However, in order to reason about the characteristics of a 
conceptualization, we must have it captured in some concrete form. In this 
section, we use a minimum concrete representation of a conceptualization, 
which is still precise and useful for the purpose of the discussion. The idea 
is to characterize a conceptualization as an intensional structure which, hence, 
encompasses all state of affairs considered, and which is independent of a 
particular language vocabulary. This notion of a conceptualization has been 
proposed in (Guarino, 1998) and can be formally defined as follows: 
  
Definition 3.1 (conceptualization): a conceptualization C is an 
intensional structure 〈W,D,ℜ〉 such that W is a (non-empty) set of 
possible worlds, D is the domain of individuals and ℜ is the set of n-ary 
relations (concepts) that are considered in C. The elements ρ ∈ ℜ are 
intensional (or conceptual) relations with signatures such as ρn:W → 
℘(Dn), so that each n-ary relation is a function from possible worlds to n-
tuples of individuals in the domain. 
■ 
 
For instance, we can have ρ accounting for the meaning of the natural kind 
apple. In this case, the meaning of apple is captured by the intensional 
function ρ, which refers to all instances of apples in every possible world.  
 
Definition 3.2 (intended world structure): For every world w ∈ W, 
according to C we have an intended world structure SwC as a structure 〈D,RwC〉 
such that RwC = {ρ(w) | ρ ∈ ℜ}.  
■ 
 
More informally, we can say that every intended world structure SwC is the 
characterization of some state of affairs in world w deemed admissible by 
conceptualization C. From a complementary perspective, C defines all the 
admissible state of affairs in that domain, which will be represented by the 
set SC = {SwC | w ∈ W}.  
Let us consider now a language L with a vocabulary V that contains 
terms to represent every concept in C. 
  
Definition 3.3 (logical model): A logical model for L can be defined as 
a structure 〈S,I〉: S is the structure 〈D,R〉, where D is the domain of 
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individuals and R is a set of extensional relations; I:V→D ∪ R is an 
interpretation function assigning elements of D to constant symbols in V, 
and elements of R to predicate symbols of V. A model, such as this one, 
fixes a particular extensional interpretation of language L. 
■ 
 
Definition 3.4 (intensional interpretation): Analogously, we can define 
an intensional interpretation by means of the structure 〈C,ℑ〉, where C = 
〈W,D,ℜ〉 is a conceptualization and ℑ:V → D ∪ ℜ is an intensional 
interpretation function which assigns elements of D to constant symbols in 
V, and elements of ℜ to predicate symbols in V. 
 ■ 
 
In (Guarino, 1998), this intensional structure is named the ontological 
commitment of language L to a conceptualization C. We therefore consider 
this intensional relation as corresponding to the represents relation depicted 
in Ullmanns triangle in figure 3.16 depicted below (see discussion in 
section 2.1.4). 
Symbol
(language)
Concept
(conceptualization)
Thing
(reality)
represents abstracts
refers to
 
Definition 3.5 (ontological commitment): Given a logical language L 
with vocabulary V, an ontological commitment K = 〈C,ℑ〉, a model 〈S,I〉 of L  
is said to be compatible with K if: (i) S ∈ Sc; (ii) for each constant c, I(c) = 
ℑ(c); (iii) there exists a world w such that for every predicate symbol p, I 
maps such a predicate to an admissible extension of ℑ(p), i.e. there is a 
conceptual relation ρ such that ℑ(p) = ρ and ρ(w) = I(p). In accordance 
with (Guarino, 1998), the set Ik(L) of all models of L  that are compatible 
with K is named the set of intended models of L according to K.. 
■ 
 
Figure 3-16  Ullmanns 
Triangle: the relations 
between a thing in 
reality, its 
conceptualization, and a 
symbolic representation 
of this conceptualization 
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Definition 3.6 (logical rendering): Given a specification X in a 
specification language L, we define as the logical rendering of X, the logical 
theory T that is the first-order logic description of that specification 
(Ciocoiu & Nau, 2000). 
■ 
 
In order to exemplify these ideas let us take the example of a very simple 
conceptualization C such that W = {w,w}, D = {a,b,c} and ℜ = {person, 
father}. Moreover, we have that person(w) = {a,b,c}, father(w) = {a}, 
person(w) = {a,b,c} and father(w) = {a,b}. This conceptualization accepts 
two possible state of affairs, which are represented by the world structures 
SwC = {{a,b,c}, {{a,b,c},{a}} and SwC = {{a,b,c}, {{a,b,c},{a,b}}. Now, let us take 
a language L whose vocabulary is comprised of the terms Person and 
Father with an underlying metamodel specification that poses no 
restrictions on the use of these primitives. In other words, the metamodel 
specification of L has the following logical rendering T1: 
 
(T1) 
∃x Person(x) 
∃x Father(x) 
 
Clearly, we can produce a logical model of L (i.e., an interpretation that 
validates the logical rendering of L) but that is not an intended world 
structure of C. For instance, the model D={a,b,c}, person = {a,b}, father = 
{c}, and I(Person) = person and I(Father) = father. This means that we 
can produce a specification using L whose model is not an intended model 
according to C.  
However, we can update the metamodel specification of language L by 
adding the following axiom:  
 
(T2) 
∃x Person(x) 
∃x Father(x) 
∀x Father(x)→ Person(x) 
 
Contrary to L, the resulting language L with the amended underlying 
metamodel specification T2 has the desirable property that all its valid 
specifications have logical models that are intended world structures of C. 
We can summarize the discussion so far as follows. A domain 
conceptualization C can be understood as describing the set of all possible 
state of affairs, which are considered admissible in a given universe of 
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discourse U.  Let V be a vocabulary whose terms directly correspond to the 
intensional relations in C. Now, let X be a conceptual specification (i.e., a 
concrete representation) of universe of discourse U and let TX be a logical 
rendering of X, such that its axiomatization constrains the possible 
interpretations of the members of V. We call X (and TX) an ideal ontology of 
U according to C iff the logical models of TX describe all and only state of 
affairs which are admitted by C.  
The relationships between language vocabulary, conceptualization, 
ontological commitment and ontology are depicted in figure 3.17 below. 
This use of the term ontology is strongly related to the third sense (D3) in 
which the term is used in philosophy, i.e. as a theory concerning the kinds of 
entities and specifically the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a 
language system (section 3.1). 
 
Intended Models Ik(L)
Logical Models M(L)
Ontology
Conceptualization C
commitment K
Language L
 
The logical theory (T2) described above is, thus, an example of an ontology 
for the person/father toy conceptualization. The same would apply to the 
models depicted in figures 2.17, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.13.  
As pointed out in (Guarino, 1998), ontologies cannot always be 
ideal and, hence, a general definition for an (non-ideal) ontology must 
be given: An ontology is a conceptual specification that describes knowledge about 
a domain in a manner that is independent of epistemic states and state of affairs. 
Moreover, it intends to constrain the possible interpretations of a languages 
vocabulary so that its logical models approximate as well as possible the set of 
intended world structures of a conceptualization C of that domain.       
According to criteria of accuracy, we can therefore give a precise 
account for the quality of a given ontology. Given an ontology OL and an 
ideal ontology OC, the quality of OL can be measured as the distance 
between the set of logical models of OL and OC. In the best case, the two 
Figure 3-17  Relations 
between language 
(vocabulary), 
conceptualization, 
ontological commitment 
and ontology 
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ontologies share the same set of logical models. In particular, if OL is the 
specification of the ontological metamodel of modeling language L, we can 
state that if OL and OC are isomorphic then they also share the same set of 
possible models. It is important to emphasize the relation between the 
possible models of OL and the completeness of language L (in the technical 
sense discussed in chapter 2). There are two ways in which incompleteness 
can impact the quality of OL: firstly, if OL (and thus L) does not contain 
concepts to fully characterize a state of affairs, it is possible that the logical 
models of OL describe situations that are present in several world structures 
of C. In this case, OL is said to weakly characterize C (Guarino, 1998), since 
it cannot guarantee the reconstruction of the relation between worlds and 
extensional relations established by C; secondly, if the representation of a 
concept in OL is underspecified, it will not contain the axiomatization 
necessary to exclude unintended logical models. As an example of the 
latter, we can mention the incompleteness of UML class diagrams w.r.t. 
classifiers and part-whole relations discussed in chapters 4 and 5 of this 
work, respectively. In summary, we can state that an ideal ontology OC for a 
conceptualization C of universe of discourse U can be seen as the 
specification of the ontological metamodel for an ideal language to 
represent U according to C. For this reason, the adequacy of a language L 
to represent phenomena in U can be systematically evaluated by comparing 
Ls metamodel specification with OC.                 
By including the third axiom, (T1) is transformed into an ideal ontology 
(T2) of C. One question that comes to the mind is: How can one know 
that? In other words, how can we systematically design an ontology O that 
is a better characterization of C. There are two important points that should 
be called to attention. The first point concerns the language that is used in 
the representation of these specifications, namely, that of standard 
predicate calculus. The axiom added to (T1) to create (T2) represents a 
subsumption relation between Person and Father. Subsumption is a basic 
primitive in the group of the so-called epistemological languages (see 
3.4.2), which includes languages such as EER (Elmasri & Weeldreyer & 
Hevner, 1985) and OWL. It is, in contrast, absent in ontological neutral 
logical languages such as predicate calculus. By using a language such as 
OWL to represent a conceptualization of this domain, a specification such 
as the one in figure 3.18 should be produced. In this model, the third 
axiom would be automatically included through the semantics of the 
metamodeling language. Therefore, if a suitable ontology modeling language 
is chosen, its primitives incorporate an axiomatization, such that the 
specifications (ontologies) produced using this language will better 
approximate the intended models of a conceptualization C. Additionally, as 
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one can notice, subsumption is not a relation which is specific to the 
represented domain. In contrast, it is a formal relation that appears in 
several different universes of discourse. This feature is compatible with 
those of primitives that should figure in a general conceptual modeling 
language. 
Person Father  
 
The second point that should be emphasized is related to the question: how 
are the world structures that are admissible to C determined? The rationale that we 
use to decide that are far from arbitrary, but motivated by the laws that 
govern the domain in reality. In (Bunge, 1977), the philosopher of science 
Mario Bunge defines the concepts of a state space of a thing25, and a subset of 
it, which he names a nomological state space. The idea is that among all the 
(theoretically) possible states a thing can assume, only a subset of it is lawful 
and, thus, is actually possible. Additionally, he defends that the only really 
possible facts involving a thing are those that abide by laws, i.e., those 
delimited by the nomological state space of thing. As a generalization, if an 
actual state of affairs consists of facts (Armstrong, 1997), then the set of 
possible state of affairs is determined by a domain nomological state space. In 
sum, possibility is not by any means defined arbitrarily, but should be 
constrained by the set of laws that constitute reality. For example, it is law 
of the domain (in reality) that every Father is a Person. The specification 
(T2) is an ideal ontology for C because it includes the representation of this 
law of this domain via the subsumption relation between the corresponding 
representations of father and person. Conversely, if C included a world 
structure in which this law would be broken, the conceptualization itself 
would not be truthful to reality. To refer once more to Ullmanns triangle 
(figure 3.16), the relation between C and the domain nomological state space is 
that relation of abstracts between a conceptualization and reality.   
Now, to raise the level of abstraction, we can also consider the 
existence of a meta-conceptualization C, which defines the set of all 
domain conceptualizations such as C that are truthful to reality. Our main 
objective is to define a general conceptual modeling language L that can be 
used to produce domain ontologies such as OC, i.e., a language whose 
primitives include theories that help in the formal characterization of a 
domain-specific language L, restricting its logical models to those deemed 
                                                      
25 The word Thing is used by Bunge in a technical sense, which is synonymous to the notion 
of  substantial individual defined in Chapter 6. 
Figure 3-18  Example of 
a subsumption relation 
in UML 
86 CHAPTER 3 ONTOLOGY 
admissible by C. In order to do this, we have to include in L primitives that 
represent the laws that are used to define the nomological world space of 
meta-conceptualization C. In this case, these are the general laws that 
describe reality, and describing these laws is the very business of formal 
ontology in philosophy.  
In summary, we defend that the ontology underlying a general 
conceptual modeling language L should be a meta-ontology that describes 
a set of real-world categories that can be used to talk about reality. 
Likewise, the axiomatization of this foundational ontology must represent 
the laws that define that nomological world space of reality. This meta-
ontology, when constructed using the theories developed by formal ontology 
in philosophy, is named a foundational ontology. 
3.3.2 The Ontological Level 
When a general conceptual modeling language (or ontology representation 
language) is constrained in such a way that its intended models are made 
explicit, it can be classified as belonging to the ontological level. This notion 
has been proposed by Nicola Guarino in (Guarino, 1994), in which he 
revisits Brachmans classification of knowledge representation formalisms 
(Brachman, 1979).   
In Brachman's original proposal, the modeling primitives offered by 
knowledge representation formalisms are classified in four different levels, 
namely: implementation, logical, conceptual and linguistic levels.  
In the logical level, we are concerned with the predicates necessary to 
represent the concepts of a domain and with evaluating the truth of these 
predicates for certain individuals. The basic primitives are propositions, 
predicates, functions and logical operators, which are extremely general and 
ontologically neutral. For instance, suppose we want to state that a red 
apple exists. In predicate calculus we would write down a logical formula 
such as (F1) ∃x(apple(x) ∧ red(x)). 
Although this formula has a precise semantics, the real-world 
interpretation of a predicate occurring in it is completely arbitrary, since 
one could use it to represent a property of a thing, the kind the thing 
belongs to, a role played by the thing, among other possibilities. In this 
example, the predicates apple and red are put in the same logical footing, 
regardless of the nature of the concept they represent and the importance 
of this concept for the qualification of predicated individual. Logical level 
languages are neutral w.r.t. ontological commitments and it is exactly this 
neutrality that makes logic interesting to be used in the development of 
scientific theories. However, it should be used with care and not directly in 
the development of ontologies, since one can write perfectly correct logical 
 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS AND FORMAL CHARACTERIZATIONS 87 
formulas, but which are devoid of ontological interpretation. For example, 
the entailment relation has no ontic correlation. Moreover, while one can 
negate a predicate or construct a formula by a disjuction of two predicates, 
in reality, there are neither negative nor alternative entities (Bunge, 1977).   
In order to improve the flatness of logical languages, Brachman 
proposes the introduction of an epistemological level on top of it, i.e., between 
the logical and conceptual levels in the original classification.  
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies "the nature and 
sources of knowledge". The interpretation taken by Brachman and many other 
of the logicist tradition in AI is that knowledge consists of propositions, 
whose formal structure is the source of new knowledge. Examples of 
representation languages belonging to this level include Brachman's own 
KL-ONE (Brachman & Schmolze, 1985) and its derivatives (including the 
semantic web languages OIL, DAML, DAML+OIL, RDFS, OWL) as well 
as object-based and frame-based modeling languages such as EER, LINGO 
and UML. 
The rationale behind the design of epistemological languages is the 
following: (i) the languages should be designed to capture interrelations 
between pieces of knowledge that cannot be smoothly captured in logical 
languages; (ii) they should offer structuring mechanisms that facilitate 
understanding and maintenance, they should also allow for economy in 
representation, and have a greater computational efficiency than their 
logical counterparts; (iii) finally, modeling primitives in these languages 
should represent structural connections in our knowledge needed to justify 
conceptual inferences in a way that is independent of the meaning of the 
concepts themselves.  
Indeed languages such as UML and OWL offer powerful structuring 
mechanisms such as classes, relationships (attributes) and subclassing 
relations. However, if we want to impose a certain structure in the 
representation of formula (F1), in a language such as UML, we would have 
to face the following structuring choices: (a) consider that there are 
instances of apples that can posses the property of being red or, (b) 
consider that there are instances of red things that can have the property of 
being apples. Formally we can state either that (F2) ∃x:Apple.red(x) as 
well as (F3) ∃x:Red.apple(x), and both these many-sorted logic 
formalizations are equivalent to the previous one-sorted axiom. However, 
each one contains an implicit structuring choice for the sort of the things 
we are talking about.  
The design of epistemological languages puts a strong emphasis on the 
inferential process, and the study of knowledge is limited to its form, i.e., it 
is "independent of the meaning of the concepts themselves". Therefore, the focus of 
these languages is more on formal reasoning than on (formal) 
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representation. Returning to our example, although the representation 
choice (b) seems to be intuitively odd, there is nothing in the semantics of a 
UML class or an OWL concept that prohibits any unary predicate such as 
red or tall to be modeled as such. In other words, since in epistemological 
languages the semantics of the primitive sort is the same as its 
corresponding unary predicate, the choice of which predicates correspond 
to sorts is completely left to the user. 
In (Guarino, 1994), Guarino points out that structuring decisions, such 
as this one, should not result from heuristic considerations but instead 
should be motivated and explained in the basis of suitable ontological 
distinctions. For instance, in this case, the choice of Apple as the sort (a) can 
be justified by the meta-properties that we are ascribed to the term by the 
intended meaning that we give to it. The ontological difference between the 
two predicates is that Apple corresponds to a Natural Kind whereas Red 
corresponds to an Attribution. Whilst the former applies necessarily to its 
instances (an apple cannot cease to be an apple without ceasing to exist), 
the latter only applies contingently. Moreover, whilst the former supplies a 
principle of identity for its instances, i.e., a principle through which we judge 
if two apples are numerically the same, the latter cannot supply one. 
However, it is not the case that an object could subexist without obeying a 
principle of identity (van Leewen, 1991; Gupta, 1980), an idea which is 
defended both in philosophical ontology (e.g., Quine's dicto "no entity 
without idendity" (Quine, 1969)), and in conceptual modeling (e.g., Chen's 
design rational for ER (Chen, 1976)). Consequently, the structuring choice 
expressed in (F3) cannot be justified.  
For an extensive discussion on kinds, attributions and principles of identity 
as well as their importance for the practice of conceptual modeling we refer 
to chapter 4 of this thesis.  
In addition to supporting the justified choice for structuring decisions, 
the ontological level has important practical implications from a 
computational point of view. For Instance, one can exploit the knowledge 
of which predicates hold necessarily (and which are susceptible to change) 
in the design and implementation of more efficient update mechanisms.  
Finally, there are senses in which the term Red can be said to hold 
necessarily (e.g., "scarlet is a type of red" referring to a particular shade of 
color), and senses in which it carries a principle of identity to its instances 
(e.g., "John is a red" - meaning that "John is a communist"). The choice of 
representing Red as an attribution makes explicit the intended meaning of 
this predicate, ruling out these two possible interpretations. In 
epistemological and logical languages, conversely, the intended meaning of a 
predicate relies on our understanding of the natural language label used. 
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The position defended in this work is that, in general conceptual 
modeling languages, the meaning of structuring primitives should be 
characterized in terms of meta-level conditions that make explicit the 
ontological commitment made by the modeler when choosing a particular 
structuring primitive to represent a domain element. For example, in the 
profile used to create the ontology of figure 2.17, the modeling primitives 
are tagged with the ontological categories they represent. When choosing to 
represent Person as a Kind, the user explicitly commits to the 
axiomatization implied by this representation choice. There are alternative 
representations in which Person can be considered to hold only 
contingently, for example, if one considers Person as a synomym for 
LivingPerson and, let us say, Corpse as synonym for deceasedPerson (figure 
2.17). However, when contrasting the two representations we notice that 
the two usages of the term, although syntactically identical, are semantically 
and ontologically diverse, since they possess incompatible meta-properties.      
In this sense, the approach taken in this thesis departs from the one 
followed by top-level ontologies such as CyC (Lenat & Guha, 1990) and the 
IEEE Standard Upper-Level Ontology (SUO)26. In these cases, the idea is 
to create a specification that defines a complete inventory of reality in a way 
that all domain ontologies could commit to. CyC, for instance, has been 
under development since 1990 and, only its open source version 
(OpenCyC27), contains currently 6000 concepts and 60.000 assertions 
about these concepts. Conversely, the position taken here is that the choice 
of how to represent a certain domain of reality is the responsibility of a 
community of users. However, the intended meaning embedded in these 
representation choices should be made explicit via an ontological 
commitment to a system of meta-level categories, or a foundational ontology. 
In this way, agreement is reinforced on the meta-level and not on the level 
of individual domain theories. This is far from promoting a scenario where 
a unique meta-ontology exists. On the contrary, the position defended here 
is equivalent to the one of (Masolo et. al, 2003a), namely, that there should 
be a library of foundational ontologies, where each of these ontologies 
(explicitly) commits to different philosophical choices (see, for instance, 
section 3.4.3), and, consequently, is suitable for different classes of 
applications. Nonetheless, the stability and universality of these 
foundational ontologies should be supported by the theoretical 
developments in formal ontology, and afforded by empirical evidence, 
either in natural sciences or in the sciences of cognition.    
                                                      
26 http://suo.ieee.org/ 
27 http://www.opencyc.org/ 
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3.3.3 On a suitable Meta-Conceptualization 
Ontologies vary in the way they manage to represent an associated 
conceptualization. An ontology such as the one in figure 2.17 is more 
accurate than if it were represented in ER, OWL, pUML (Evans & Kent, 
1999) or LINGO. This is because the modeling profile which is used 
commits to a much richer meta-ontology than the ones underlying these 
other languages. As a consequence, to formally characterize its ontological 
distinctions, a formal language with higher expressiveness is needed. When 
the stereotyped modeling primitives of the profile in figure 2.17 are used, 
an axiomatization in the language of intensional modal logics is incorporated in 
the resulting specification, constraining the intepretation of its terms.  
Intensional modal logics are considerably more expressive than SHIQ or 
standard set theory. However, SHIQ has interesting properties such as 
computational tractability and decidability, which are properties that are in 
general absent in more expressive languages. Likewise, LINGO was 
designed to facilitate the translation to Object-Oriented implementations. 
Therefore, in the design of a general conceptual modeling language, the 
following tradeoff must be recognized. On one side we need a language that 
commits to a rich foundational ontology. This meta-ontology, however, will 
require the use of highly expressive formal languages for its 
characterization, which in general, are not interesting from a computational 
point of view. On the other side, languages that are efficient 
computationally, in general, cannot commit to a suitable meta-
conceptualization. The obvious question is then: how can we design a 
general conceptual modeling language according to these conflicting 
requirements?  
The position advocated here is analogous to the one defended in 
(Masolo et. al, 2003a), namely, that we actually need two classes of 
languages. On one hand, highly-expressive languages should be used to 
create strongly axiomatized ontologies that approximate as well as possible 
to the ideal ontology of the domain. The focus on these languages is on 
representation adequacy, since the resulting specifications are intended to 
be used by humans in tasks such as communication, domain analysis and 
problem-solving. The resulting domain ontologies, named reference ontologies 
in (Guarino, 1998), should be used in an off-line manner to assist humans in 
tasks such as meaning negotiation and consensus establishment. On the 
other hand, once users have already agreed on a common 
conceptualization, versions of a reference ontology can be created. These 
versions are named here lightweight ontologies. Contrary to reference 
ontologies, lightweight ontologies are not focused on representation 
adequacy but are designed with the focus on guaranteeing desirable 
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computational properties. Examples of languages suitable for lightweight 
ontologies include OWL and LINGO. An example of a conceptual 
modeling language that is suitable for reference ontologies is the one 
developed throughout this work.  
The importance of reference ontologies has been acknowledged in 
many cases in practice. For instance, (Ríos, 2003) illustrates examples of 
semantic interoperability problems that can pass undetected when 
interoperating lightweight ontologies. Likewise, (Fielding et. al, 2004) 
discusses how a principled foundational ontology can be used to spot 
inconsistencies and provide solutions for problems in lightweight 
biomedical ontologies. As a final example, the need for methodological 
support in establishing precise meaning agreements is recognized in the 
Harvard Business Review report of October 2001, which claims that one of the 
main reasons that so many online market makers have foundered [is that] the 
transactions they had viewed as simple and routine actually involved many subtle 
distinctions in terminology and meaning. 
Once we have made clear that the meta-ontology developed 
throughout this work should be a foundational one, an important issue still 
remains to be addressed, namely, which kind of foundational ontology one 
should commit to. In (Strawson, 1959), the philosopher Peter Strawson 
draws a distinction between two different kinds of ontological investigation, 
namely, descriptive and revisionary methaphysics. Descriptive metaphysics aims 
to lay bare the most general features of the conceptual scheme that are in 
fact employed in human activities, which is roughly that of common sense. 
The goal is to capture the ontological distinctions underlying natural 
language and human cognition. As a consequence, the categories refer to 
cognitive artifacts more or less depending on human perception, cultural 
imprints and social conventions (Masolo et. al, 2003a), and do not have 
necessarily to agree on the principles advocated by the natural sciences. 
Nonetheless, the very existence of these categories can be empirically 
uncovered by research in cognitive sciences (Keil, 1979; Xu & Carey, 1996; 
Mcnamara, 1986) in a manner that is analogous to the way philosophers of 
science have attempted to elicit the ontological commitments of the natural 
sciences 
Revisionary metaphysics, conversely, is prepared to make departures 
from common sense in light of developments in science, and considers 
linguistic and cognitive issues of secondary importance (if considered at all). 
The following example, from (Masolo et. al, ibid.), exemplifies these 
different approaches. Common sense distinguishes between things (spatial 
objects like a car, a city and the moon) and events (temporal objects like 
business processes, birthday parties and football games). According to the 
relativity theory, however, time is viewed as another dimension of objects 
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on a par with the spatial dimensions. As a consequence, revisionist 
researchers propose that the common sense distinction between things and 
events should be regarded as an (ontologically irrelevant) historical and 
cognitive accident, and that it should be abandoned in favor of an ontology 
of processes (Sowa, 2000; Whitehead, 1978).       
In summary, whilst a descriptive ontology aims at giving a correct 
account of the categories underlying human common sense, a revisionary 
ontology is committed to capture the intrinsic nature of the world in a way 
that is independent of conceptualizing agents. Nonetheless, the taxonomies 
of objects produced by both approaches can be shown to be in large degree 
compatible with each other, if only we are careful to take into account the 
different granularities at which each operates (Smith & Brogaard, 2002). 
In order to motivate a choice for a foundational ontology that a general 
conceptual modeling language should commit to, we first must investigate 
the definition and purposes of conceptual modeling and conceptual 
specifications. In a seminal paper, John Mylopoulos (Mylopoulos, 1992) 
provides the following definition, which highlights some aspects of the 
discipline and the produced representations that are of great relevance for 
the discussion carried out here. First, he defines conceptual modeling as 
the activity of formally describing some aspects of the physical and social world 
around us for purposes of understanding and communication. This passage 
highlights that conceptual modeling is about the modeling of reality and not 
about modeling a computational system. In another part of the text he 
states that conceptual modelling supports structuring and inferencial facilities that 
are psychologically grounded. After all, the descriptions that arise from conceptual 
modelling activities are intended to be used by humans, not machines. This is 
an important point that also emphasizes the precedence of truthfulness to 
reality over features such as computational efficiency and tractability of the 
produced representations. Moreover, it draws attention to the importance 
of considering human-oriented issues, such as the need to produce 
representations that are pragmatically efficient and are psychologically 
grounded and amenable to human cognition. Finally, he summarizes these 
aspects in the following adequacy requirement for conceptual modeling 
languages:The adequacy of a conceptual modelling notation rests on its contribution 
to the construction of models of reality that promote a common understanding of that 
reality among their human users. 
The main objective of conceptual specifications (in particular domain 
ontologies) in computer science is to support tasks such as communication, 
domain learning and problem solving in disciplines such as domain 
engineering and database schema integration. Moreover, in cases such as 
inter-organizational service interoperability, information brokering and 
intelligent search in the Semantic Web, the ontologies produced have an 
 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 93 
intrinsic social nature. In the majority of cases, these ontologies represent 
conceptualizations that are afforded by our common sense view of reality. 
For this reason, in this work we defend the idea that a general conceptual 
modeling language should commit to a descriptive foundational ontology. 
Consequently, the foundational ontology presented here should be 
understood as a descriptive theory of a priori distinctions, focused on 
entities of the so-called mesoscopic level, i.e., the level of human experience. 
That is to say that the categories in our foundational ontology focus on 
meta-properties of everyday objects such as apples, people, cars, chairs and 
insurance claims but neither on microscopic or macroscopic entities. For 
instance, it is outside the scope of this thesis to consider ontological 
problems such as the ones discussed in (Lowe, 2001), which arise when 
characteristics of entities of the atomic and subatomic levels are considered. 
3.4 Final Considerations 
In the course of this chapter we have discussed the reasons that have 
historically motivated the use of philosophical ontology in computer science 
disciplines such as information systems, domain engineering and knowledge 
representation. A common aspect of these disciplines is the need to: 
  
(i) promote reuse in a higher level of abstraction aiming at the 
maximization of the reuse of domain models;  
(ii) produce domain specifications that are truthful to reality.  
 
The main contribution of philosophical ontology in the accomplishment 
of these goals is the set of conceptual tools that have been developed along 
the years for constructing these general systems of categories. In 
philosophy, an ontology is committed only to the truth in the classical 
sense, i.e., it is meant to represent knowledge of reality in a way that is 
independent of a particular use one makes of it. Since the very task of 
semantic interoperation (e.g., database schema and framework integration, 
service interoperability) is to find a common conceptualization that 
different representations agree on, the potential benefit from philosophical 
ontology becomes evident or, how could this common conceptualization be 
achieved if not through a task-independent model of the underlying reality 
that different representations refer to? 
The relations between the various senses in which the term ontology 
has been used in philosophy and computer science can be summarized as 
follows: 
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1. Formal Ontology, as conceived by Husserl, is part of the discipline of 
Ontology in philosophy (sense D1), which is, in turn, the most 
important branch of metaphysics; 
 
2. Formal Ontology aims at developing general theories that accounts for 
aspects of reality that are not specific to any field of science, be it 
physics or conceptual modeling (sense D2); 
 
3. These theories describe knowledge about reality in a way, which is 
independent of language, of particular states of affairs (states of the 
world), and of epistemic states of knowledgeable agents. In this thesis, 
these language independent theories are named (meta) conceptualizations. 
The representation of these theories in a concrete artifact is a 
foundational ontology;  
 
4. A foundational ontology tries to characterize as accurately as possible the 
conceptualization it commits to. Moreover, it focuses on representation 
adequacy regardless of the consequent computational costs, which is not 
actually a problem since the resulting model is targeted at human users.  
 
5. A foundational ontology can be used to provide real-word semantics for 
general conceptual modeling languages, and to constrain the possible 
interpretations of their modeling primitives. An ontology can be seem as 
the metamodel specification for an ideal language to represent 
phenomena in a given domain in reality, i.e., a language which only 
admits specifications representing possible state of affairs in reality 
(related to sense D3).  
 
6. Finally, suitable general conceptual modeling languages can be used in 
the development of reference domain ontologies, which, in turn, among 
many other purposes, can be used to characterize the vocabulary of 
domain-specific languages.             
 
 Chapter 4 
4. Universals and Taxonomic 
Structures 
A central concern of this thesis is to construct a philosophical and cognitive 
ontology that can be used as a foundation for conceptual modeling 
languages. Moreover, we aim at formally characterizing the elements 
constituting this ontology. Finally, we intend to demonstrate the usefulness 
of the ontological categories and theories proposed in addressing recurrent 
problems in the practice of conceptual modeling. 
The construction of the foundation ontology proposed in this thesis is 
organized in four complementary chapters, namely, chapters 4 to 7. In this 
chapter, we aim at providing ontological foundations for the philosophical 
categories of universals and individuals, which are represented in conceptual 
modeling by the constructs of Types (classes, classifiers) and their instances, 
respectively.  
Types are fundamental for conceptual modeling, being represented in 
all major conceptual modeling languages (e.g., OO classes, EER Entity 
types, LINGO and OWL concepts). In general, monadic types used in 
structural conceptual models stand for universals whose instances are 
substantials. The precise notions of substantial adopted in this thesis will be 
formally defined in chapter 6. However, for now, an intuitive understanding 
of this term will suffice. The term, as used here, is akin to what is 
sometimes named thing (Bunge, 1977), endurant (Masolo et al., 2003a), or 
continuant (van Leeuwen, 1991) in the philosophical literature. Intuitively, it 
is similar to what is termed object, in the colloquial use of the latter term. 
Substantials are entities that persist in time while keeping their identity (as 
opposed to events such as a kiss, a business process or a birthday party). 
Examples include physical and social persisting entities of everyday 
experience such as balls, rocks, students, the North Sea and Queen Beatrix.  
In the practice of conceptual modeling, a set of primitives is often used 
to represent distinctions in different types of substantial universals (Type, 
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Role, State, Mixin, among others). However, there is still a lack of 
methodological support for helping the user of the language to decide how 
to represent elements that denote universal properties in a given domain 
(viz. Person, Student, Red Thing, Physical Thing, Deceased Person, 
Customer) and, hence, modeling choices are often made in an ad hoc 
manner. Likewise is the judgment of what are the admissible relations 
between these modeling constructs. Finally, an inspection of the literature 
shows that there is still much debate on the meaning of these categories 
(Wieringa & de Jong & Spruit, 1995; Bock & Odell, 1998; Steimann, 
2000b; Evermann & Wand, 2001b). 
In this chapter, we propose a philosophically and psychologically well-
founded theory of substantial universals for conceptual modeling. The 
ontological distinctions and postulates proposed by this theory are 
presented in section 4.1.  
In section 4.2, the ontological distinctions countenanced by the theory 
are organized in a typology of universals, together with a number of 
constraints on how the elements in this typology can be combined to form 
taxonomic structures. This typology and associated constraints are further 
used to derive a modeling profile for conceptual modeling, along with a set of 
methodological guidelines that govern its use. Still in section 4.2, we 
demonstrate the usefulness of the theory and derived profile proposed to 
evaluate and improve the conceptual quality of class hierarchies and concept 
taxonomies, and to solve some recurrent problems in the practice of 
conceptual modeling. 
In section 4.3, we present a number of empirical research efforts 
carried out in cognitive psychology that provide evidence supporting the 
proposed theory of universals.  
In section 4.4, we elaborate on two different (albeit complementary) 
systems of modal logics designed to formally characterize the distinctions 
and constraints proposed by the theory. The section also discusses how 
these systems address the limitations of classical (unrestricted extensional) 
modal logics in that respect.  
Section 4.5 discusses related work and demonstrates how the 
ontological distinctions proposed in this chapter are compatible but richer 
than those found in the conceptual modeling literature hitherto.  
Finally, section 4.6 elaborates on some final considerations. 
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4.1 A Theory of Universal Types: Philosophical and 
Psychological Foundations 
In (van Leeuwen, 1991), Jacques van Leeuwen shows an important 
grammatical difference occurring in natural languages between common 
nouns (CNs) on one side and arbitrary general terms (adjectives, verbs, 
mass nouns, etc) on the other. Common nouns have the singular feature 
that they can be combined with determiners and serve as argument for 
predication in sentences such as:  
 
(i) (exactly) five mice were in the kitchen last night; 
(ii) the mouse which has eaten the cheese, has been in turn eaten by the cat. 
 
In other words, if we have the patterns (exactly) five X and the Y which is 
Z, only the substitution of X, Y, Z by CNs will produce sentences that 
are grammatical. To verify that, we can try the substitution by the adjective 
Red in the sentence (i): (exactly) five red were in the kitchen last night.  A 
request to count the red in this room cannot receive a definite answer: 
Should a red shirt be counted as one or should the shirt, the two sleeves, 
and two pockets be counted separately so that we have five reds? The 
problem in this case is not that one would not know how to finish the 
counting but that one would not know how to start, since arbitrarily many 
subparts of a red thing are still red.  
It is important to emphasize that red here is not used as a CN, i.e., as a 
synonym for red color, which is a nominalization of an adjective and 
denotes a particular shade of red. This reading would make a sentence such 
as exactly 256 greys exist in the Windows color palette grammatically viable. In 
fact, in order to play the same role as a CN, general terms must be 
nominalized, which implies a shift to the category of common nouns (e.g., 
whiteness, the fall of Jack or a Bucket of water). 
The explanation for this feature unique of CNs lies on the function that 
determinates (demonstratives and quantifiers) play in noun phrases, which 
is to determine a certain range on individuals. Both reference and 
quantification requires that the thing (or things) which are referred or 
which form the domain of quantification are determinate individuals, i.e., 
their conditions for individuation and identity must be determinate. In 
other words, if it is not determinate how to count Xs or how to identify the 
X that is the same as Y, the sentences in the patterns (i) and (ii) do not 
express determinate propositions, i.e., propositions with definite truth 
values.  
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According to (van Leeuwen, 1991), this syntactic distinction between 
the two linguistic categories reflects a semantical and ontological one, and 
the distinction between the grammatical categories of CNs and arbitrary 
general terms can be explained in terms of the ontological categories of 
Sortal and Characterizing universals (Strawson, 1959), which are roughly their 
ontological counterparts. Whilst the latter supply only a principle of 
application for the individuals they collect, the former supply both a 
principle of application and a principle of identity. A principle of application is 
that in accordance with which we judge whether a general term applies to a 
particular (e.g., whether something is a Person, a Dog, a Chair or a 
Student). A principle of identity supports the judgment whether two 
particulars are the same, i.e., in which circumstances the identity relation 
holds.  
In (Mcnamara, 1986), cognitive psychologist John Macnamara, 
investigates the role of sortal concepts in cognition and provides a 
comprehensive theory for explaining the process that a child undergoes 
when learning proper nouns and common nouns. He proposes the 
following example: suppose a little boy (Tom), who is about to learn the 
meaning of a proper name for his puppy. When presented to the word 
Spot, Tom has to decide what it refers to. A demonstrative such as that 
will not suffice to determinate the bearer of the proper name. How to 
decide that that, which changes all its perceptual properties is still Spot? 
In other words, which changes can Spot suffer and still be the same? As 
Macnamara (among others) shows, answers to these questions are only 
possible if Spot is taken to be a proper name for an individual, which is an 
instance of a Sortal universal. The principles of identity supplied by the 
Sortals are essential to judge the validity of all identity statements. For 
example, if for an instance of the sortal Statue loosing a piece will not alter 
the identity of the object, the same does not hold for an instance of Lump of 
Clay.  
The statement that we can only make identity and quantification 
statements in relation to a Sortal amounts to one of the best-supported 
theories in the philosophy of language, namely, that the identity of an 
individual can only be traced in connection with a Sortal Universal, which 
provides a principle of individuation and identity to the particulars it collects 
(Mcnamara, 1986, 1994; Gupta, 1980; Lowe, 1989; van Leeuwen, 1991). 
The position advocated in this chapter affirms an equivalent stance for a 
theory of conceptual modeling. We defend that among the conceptual 
modeling counterparts of general terms (types) only constructs that 
represent sortals can provide a principle of identity and individuation for its 
instances. As a consequence, a principle that represents the junction of 
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Quines dicto no entity without identity (Quine, 1969) with the position 
defended in this section no identity without a Sortal can be postulated: 
 
Postulate 4.1: Every individual in a conceptual model (CM) of the domain 
must be an instance of a conceptual modeling type (CM-Type) representing 
a sortal. 
 
As argued by Kripke (Kripke, 1982), a proper name is a rigid 
designator, i.e. it refers to the same individual in all possible situations, 
factual or counterfactual. For instance, it refers to the individual Mick 
Jagger both now (when he is the lead singer of Rolling Stones and 62 years 
old) and in the past (when he was the boy Mike Philip living in Kent, 
England). Moreover, it refers to the same individual in counterfactual 
situations such as the one in which he decided to continue in the London 
School of Economics and has never pursued a musical career. We would 
like to say that the boy Mike Philip is identical with the man Mick Jagger 
that he latter became. However, as pointed out by Wiggins (Wiggins, 2001) 
and Perry (Perry, 1970), statements of identity only make sense if both 
referents are of the same type. Thus, we could not say that a certain Boy is 
the same Boy as a certain Man since the latter is not a Boy (and vice-versa). 
However, as Putnam put it, when a man x points to a boy in a picture and 
says I am that boy, the pronoun I in question is typed not by Man but 
by a supertype of Man and Boy (namely, Person), which embraces xs entire 
existence (Putnam, 1994). A generalization of this idea amounts to a thesis, 
proposed by Wiggins, named thesis D (Wiggins, 2001): If an individual falls 
under two sortals in the course of its history there must be exactly one 
ultimate sortal of which both sortals are specializations. (Griffin, 1977) 
elaborates Wiggins thesis D in terms of two correlated principles:  
 
a) The Restriction Principle: if an individual falls under two distinct 
sortals F and F in the course of its history then there is at least one sortal of 
which F and F are both specializations.  
 
b) The Uniqueness Principle: if an individual falls under two distinct 
sortals F and F in the course of its history then there is at most one ultimate 
sortal of which F and F are both specializations. A sortal F is ultimate if 
there is no other sortal F distinct from F which F specializes.  
 
It is not the case that two incompatible principles of identity could 
apply to the same individual x, otherwise x will not be a viable entity 
(determinate particular) (van Leeuwen, 1991). For instance, suppose an 
individual x which is an instance of both Statue and Lump of clay. Now, the 
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answer to the question whether loosing a piece will alter the identity of x is 
indeterminate, since each of the two principles of identity that x obeys 
imply a different answer. As a consequence, we can say that if two sortals F 
and F intersect (i.e., have common individuals in their extension), the 
principles of identity contained in them must be equivalent. Moreover, F 
and F cannot supply a principle of identity for x, since both sortals apply to 
x only contingently, and a principle of identity must be used to identify x in 
all possible worlds. Therefore, there must be a sortal G that supplies the 
principle of identity carried by F and F. This proves the restriction 
principle. The uniqueness of the ultimate sortal G can be argued as follows: 
(i) G is a sortal, since it supplies a principle of identity for all the things in 
its extension; (ii) if it restricts a sortal H then, since H cannot supply an 
incompatible principle of identity, H either is: equivalent to G (i.e., does 
supply the same principle of identity) and therefore should be ultimate, or 
does not supply a principle of identity for the particulars in its extension 
(see text on dispersive classifiers below). This proves the uniqueness 
principle. The unique ultimate sortal G that supplies the principle of 
identity for its instances is named a substance sortal.  
As a consequence of thesis D, we derive a second postulate: 
 
Postulate 4.2: An individual represented in a conceptual model of the 
domain must instantiate exactly one CM-Type representing an ultimate 
Substance Sortal. 
 
In the example above, the sortal Person is the unique substance sortal 
that defines the validity of the claim that Mick Jagger is the same as Mike 
Philip or, in other words, that Mike Philip persists through changes in 
height, weight, age, residence, etc., as the same individual. Person can only 
be the sortal that supports the proper name Mick Jagger in all possible 
situations because it applies necessarily to the individual referred by the 
proper name, i.e., instances of Person cannot cease to be so without ceasing 
to exist. As a consequence, the extension of a substance sortal is world 
invariant. This meta-property of universals is named Modal Constancy 
(Gupta, 1980) or rigidity (Guarino & Welty, 2002b) and is formally stated 
as follows: 
 
Definition 4.1 (Extension functions): Let W be a non-empty set of 
possible worlds and let w ∈ W be a specific world. The extension function 
extw(G) maps a universal G to the set of its instances in world w. The 
extension function ext(G) provides a mapping to the set of instances of the 
universal G that exist in all possible worlds, such that  
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1. ext(G) = U
W∈w
w (G)ext   
■ 
 
Definition 4.2 (Specialization relation): Let F and G be two universals 
such that F is a specialization of G. Then, for all w ∈ W we have that  
 
2. extw(F) ⊆ extw(G)  
■ 
 
Definition 4.3 (Rigid Universal): A universal G is rigid (or modally 
constant) iff for any w,w ∈ W 
 
3. extw(G) = extw(G)  
■ 
 
Putting definitions 4.1 and 4.3 together, we have that for any rigid universal 
G the following is true 
 
4. ext(G) = extw(G), for all w ∈ W 
 
A rigid universal is one that applies to its instances necessarily, i.e., in every 
possible world. Every substance sortal G is a rigid universal. Examples of 
non-rigid Sortals include universals such as Boy and Adult Man in the example 
discussed above, but also Student, Employee, Caterpillar and Butterfly, 
Philosopher, Writer, Alive and Deceased. Actually, these examples of sortals are 
not only non-rigid, but they are anti-rigid. Non-rigidity is the simple logical 
negation of rigidity, i.e., a universal is non-rigid if it does not apply 
necessarily to at least one of its instances. In contrast, a universal is anti-
rigid if it does not apply necessarily to all its instances. An example of a 
non-rigid universal is Seatable. Suppose the instances of Seatable include a 
particular chair x and a particular crate c. In this case, whilst x instantiates 
Seatable necessarily, this is not the case for c: a crate can cease to be steady 
to afford sitting but still be the same crate.   
Non-rigidity and anti-rigidity of universals are defined formally in the 
sequel:  
 
Definition 4.4 (Non-Rigid Universal): A universal G is non-rigid iff for 
a w ∈ W 
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5. There is an x such that x ∈ extw(G), and there is a w∈ W such 
that x ∉extw(G)  
■ 
 
Definition 4.5 (Anti-Rigid Universal): A universal G is anti-rigid iff for 
any w ∈ W 
 
6. For every x such that x ∈ extw(G), there is a w∈ W such that x 
∉extw(G)  
■ 
 
Notice that non-rigidity constitutes a much weaker constraint than what is 
imposed by anti-rigidity, i.e. anti-rigidity is a sort of non-rigidity. In 
(Guarino & Welty, 2002b), a universal is named semi-rigid iff it is non-rigid 
but not anti-rigid. 
Sortals that possibly apply to an individual only during a certain phase 
of its existence are named phased-sortals in (Wiggins, 2001). Contrary to 
substance sortals, phased-sortals are anti-rigid universals. For example, for 
an individual John instance of Student, we can easily imagine John moving 
in and out of the Student type, while being the same individual, i.e. without 
loosing his identity. Moreover, for every instance x of Student in a world w, 
there is another world w in which x is not an instance of Student. Finally, 
as a consequence of the Restriction Principle, we have that for every 
phased-sortal PS that applies to an individual, there is a substance sortal S 
of which PS is a specialization. Formally a phased-sortal can be defined as 
follows: 
 
Definition 4.6 (Phased-Sortal): Let PS be a universal and let S be a 
substance sortal specialized (restricted by) PS. Now, let  
 
7. extw(~PS) = extw(S) \ extw(PS)  
 
be the complement of the extension of PS in world w. In this formula, the 
symbol \ represents the set theoretical operation of set difference. The 
universal PS is a phased-sortal iff for all worlds w ∈ W, there is a w ∈ W such 
that  
 
8. extw(PS) ∩ extw(~PS) ≠ ∅  
■ 
 
Putting (2), (4) and (6) together we can derive another postulate:  
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Postulate 4.3: A CM-Type representing a rigid universal cannot specialize 
(restrict) a CM-Type representing an anti-rigid one. 
 
Proof: Take an arbitrary rigid universal G which specializes an anti-rigid 
universal F. Let {a,b,c,d} and {a,b} be the extension of F and G in world w, 
respectively. By (6), there is a world w in which a ∉ extw(F). By (4), 
however, extw(G) = extw(G) and, thus, a ∈ extw(G). By (2), extw(G) ⊆ 
extw(F) and, ergo, a ∈ extw(F). We then have that a ∉ extw(F) and a ∈ 
extw(F), which is a contradiction. We therefore conclude that a rigid 
universal cannot specialize an anti-rigid one.  
□ 
 
If PS is a phased-sortal and S is the substance sortal specialized by PS, there 
is a specialization condition ϕ such that x is an instance of PS iff x is an 
instance S that satisfies ϕ (van Leeuwen, 1991). A further clarification on 
the different types of specialization conditions allows us to distinguish 
between two different types of phased-sortals which are of great importance 
to the practice of conceptual modeling, namely, phases and roles.  
Phases (also named dynamic subclasses in Wieringa & de Jonge & Spruit, 
1995) or states (Bock & Odell, 1998) constitute possible stages in the 
history of a substance sortal. Examples include: (a) Alive and Deceased: as 
possible stages of a Person; (b) Catterpillar and Butterfly of a Lepidopteran; 
(c) Town and Metropolis of a City; (d) Boy, Male Teenager and Adult Male 
of a Male Person. Universals representing phases constitute a partition of the 
substance sortal they specialize. For example, if Alive, Deceased is a phase-
partition of a substance sortal Person then for every world w, every Person x 
is either and instance of Alive or of Deceased but not of both. Moreover, if 
x is an instance of Alive in world w then there is world w such that x is not 
an instance of Alive in w, which in this case, implies that x is an instance of 
Deceased in w.  
This can be generalized as follows: Let P1Pn be a phase-partition 
that restricts the sortal S. Then we have that for all w ∈ W: 
9. extw(S) = U
>∈< npp ... P
iw
1i
)(Pext  
and for all Pi,Pj ∈ P1Pn (with i ≠ j) we have that 
10.  extw(Pi) ∩ extw(Pj) = ∅  
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Finally, it is always possible (in the modal sense) for an instance x of S to 
become an instance of each Pi, i.e., for any Pi ∈ P1Pn which restricts S, 
and for any instance x such that x ∈ extw(S), there is a world w ∈ W such 
that x ∈ extw(Pi). This is equivalent of stating that for any Pi ∈ P1Pn the 
following holds      
11. ext(S) = ext(Pi)  
Contrary to phases, roles do not necessarily form a partition of substance 
sortals. Moreover, they differ from phases with respect to the specialization 
condition ϕ. For a phase P, ϕ represents a condition that depends solely on 
intrinsic properties of P. For instance, one might say that if Mick Jagger is a 
Living Person then he is a Person who has the property of being alive or, if 
Spot is a Puppy then it is a Dog who has the property of being less than an 
year old. For a role R, conversely, ϕ depends on extrinsic (relational) 
properties of R. For example, one might say that if John is a Student then 
John is a Person who is enrolled in some educational institution or that, if 
Peter is a Customer then Peter is a Person who buys a Product y from a 
Supplier z. In other words, an entity plays a role in a certain context, 
demarcated by its relation with other entities. In general, we can state the 
following: Let R be a role that specializes a sortal S (named the allowed type 
for R (Bock & Odell, 1998)) and ϕr be a binary relation defined between R 
and the universal D on which R is externally dependent of (Welty & Guarino, 
2001). For instance, ϕenrollment ⊆ Student × School, ϕpurchase-from ⊆ 
Customer × Supplier or ϕMarriage ⊆ Husband × Wife. Moreover, let the 
domain of the relation ϕr in world w (Domw) be defined as follows: 
Domw(ϕr) = {x |<x,y> ∈ extw(ϕr)}. Then for all worlds w ∈ W we have 
that 
12. extw(R) = Domw(ϕr)  
 
Relational properties are represented in this chapter in terms of plain 
(extensional) relations for simplicity only. In chapter 6, we present the 
complete treatment of relations and relational properties which is adopted 
in our foundational ontology. That is, in turn, used in chapter 7 to 
elaborate on a fuller characterization of roles. For the same reason of 
simplicity, we will thus not extend the representation of relations in the 
example above to the case of n-ary relations.   
Although Frege argued at length that one cannot count without knowing 
what to count (Frege, 1934), in artificial logical languages inspired by him, 
natural language general terms such as common nouns, adjectives and verbs 
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are treated uniformly as predicates. For instance, if we want to represent 
the sentence there are tall men, in the fregean approach of classical logic 
we would write ∃x (Man(x) ∧ Tall(x)). This reading puts the count 
noun Man (which denotes a Sortal) on an equal logical footing with the 
predicate Tall. Moreover, in this formula, the variable x is interpreted into a 
supposedly universal kind Thing (or Entity). So, the natural language 
reading of the formula should be there are things that have the property of 
being a man and the property of being tall. Since, by postulate 4.1, all 
individuals must be instances of a substance sortal we must conclude that 
Thing is a unique universal ultimate sortal that is able to supply a principle 
of identity for all elements that we consider in our universe of discourse. 
Moreover, by postulate 4.2, this principle of identity must be unique. Can 
that be the case?  
In (Hirsch, 1982), Hirsch argues that concepts such as Thing, (Entity, 
Element, among others) are dispersive, i.e., they cover many concepts with 
different principles of identity. For instance, in the extension of Thing we 
might encounter an individual x that is a cow and an individual y that is a 
watch. Since the principles of identity for Cows and Watches are not the 
same, we conclude that Thing cannot supply a principle of identity for its 
instances. Otherwise, x and y would obey incompatible principles of 
identity and, thus, would not be determinate individuals. Therefore, as 
defended in (van Leeuwen, 1991; Gupta, 1980; Mcnamara, 1994; Hirsch, 
1982), dispersive concepts do not denote sortals, despite that they are 
considered CNs in natural languages, and therefore cannot have direct instances. 
More than that, a principle of identity supplied by a substance sortal G is 
inherited by all universals that specialize G or, to put in another way, all 
subtypes of G carry the principle of identity supplied by G. Thus, all 
specializations of a sortal are themselves sortals, ergo,  
 
Postulate 4.4: A CM-Type representing a dispersive universal cannot 
specialize a CM-Type representing a Sortal. 
4.2 An Ontologically Well-Founded Profile for 
Conceptual Modeling Universals 
We start this section by compiling the ontological distinctions proposed by 
the theory of section 4.1 in a typology of substantial universals. The elements 
constituting this typology are depicted in figure 4.1 below. 
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Substantial Universal
AntiRigidSortal
MixinUniversalSortalUniversal
{disjoint}
RigidSortal
RolePhaseSubKindKind
{disjoint, complete} {disjoint, complete}
{disjoint}
NonRigidMixin
{disjoint, complete}
RigidMixin
Category
{disjoint, complete}
AntiRigidMixin
RoleMixin Mixin
Universal
 
The idea here is to use the ontology of universals depicted above to design a 
fragment of a conceptual (ontology) modeling language. This language 
should contain (as modeling primitives) constructs that represent the 
bottom-most specialization of the ontological categories proposed by this 
theory, i.e., the leaf nodes of the generalization tree of figure 4.1 
(highlighted in grey).   
We use the extension mechanisms of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) to illustrate these ideas by proposing a profile whose modeling 
elements represent each of the relevant distinctions made by the theory. It 
is important to emphasize, however, that UML is used here solely with the 
purpose of exemplification, due to its acceptance and practical relevance, 
and to the convenience offered by the built-in extension mechanisms of the 
language. A similar result could be achieved by extending, for instance, 
LINGO via its theory inclusion extension mechanisms (Falbo & Menezes & 
Rocha, 1998), or simply by proposing a new modeling language.  
The UML built-in extension mechanisms allow one to modify the 
language elements to suite certain modeling needs. Extensions to the 
language can be performed in two different ways: (i) by specializing the 
UML metamodel (layer 2) to add new semantics to UML modeling 
elements; or (ii) by changing the so-called MOF model (layer 3) to add new 
elements to the UML metamodel. The former mechanism is named 
lightweight extension and the latter heavyweight extension. A coherent set of such 
extensions, defined accordingly to a specific purpose or domain, constitutes 
a UML profile (OMG, 2003b).  
In a representation mapping (see chapter 2) from the ontology of figure 
4.1 to the UML metamodel, we can map the category of universal to the 
UML meta-construct of a Class. In UML, a Class describes a set of Objects 
Figure 4-1  Ontological 
Distinctions in a 
Typology of Substantial 
Universals 
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sharing a collection of Features, including Operations, Attributes and Methods, that 
are common to the set of Objects. (OMG, 2001, p.32). The model is concerned 
with describing the intension of the class, that is, the rules that define it. The run-
time execution provides its extension, that is, its instances. (ibid., p.202). The 
concept underlying this construct, namely, the one of a Type, is one of the 
most common modeling concepts in conceptual modeling. For instance, it 
can be found practically in all object-modeling languages (e.g., OMT, 
Objectory, OML), semantic web languages (e.g., OWL, DAML+OIL), 
ontology modeling languages (e.g., LINGO) and information systems 
grammars (e.g., ER). For this reason, the principles and distinctions laid 
out in section apply to any of these conceptual modeling languages in which 
the substantial universal concept is represented. 
If we continue this representation mapping, we realize that in UML 
(but also in all of the languages aforementioned) there are no modeling 
constructs that represent the ontological categories specializing Substantial 
Universal in figure 4.1. In other words, there are ontological concepts 
prescribed by the theory of section 4.1 that are not represented by any 
modeling construct in the language. A case of ontological incompleteness at 
the modeling language level (see section 2.2.4).  
In order to remedy this problem, in the sequel, we propose a 
lightweight extension to UML that represents finer-grained distinctions 
between different types of classes. The proposed profile contains a set of 
stereotyped classes that support the design of ontologically well-founded 
conceptual models according to the theory proposed in this chapter. 
Moreover, the profile also contains a number of constraints (derived from 
the postulates of the theory) that restrict the way the modeling constructs 
can be related. The goal is to have a metamodel such that all syntactically 
correct specifications using the profile have logical models that are intended 
world structures of the conceptualizations they are supposed to represent (see 
definition 3.2 in chapter 3). 
In summary, according to the ontological semantics given to the 
profile, the ontological interpretation of the class meta-construct is that of a 
Universal. Each of the stereotyped classes comprising the profile, thus, 
represents one of the leaf ontological categories specializing substantial 
universal in figure 4.1. In terms of the profile, this also means that all 
stereotyped classes have as the base class the UML Class meta-construct 
(OMG, 2003b). 
In the subsections that follow, we elaborate in each of these distinctions. 
It is important to emphasize that the particular classes chosen to exemplify 
each of the proposed categories are used for illustration purposes only. For 
example, when stereotyping class Person as a Kind we are not advocating that 
Person should be in general considered as a kind in conceptual modeling. 
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Conversely, the intention is to make explicit the consequences of this 
modeling choice. The choice itself, however, is always left to the model 
designer. 
4.2.1 Kinds and Subkinds 
A UML class in this profile stereotyped as a « kind » represents a 
substance sortal that supplies a principle of identity for its instances. Kinds can 
be specialized in other rigid subtypes that inherit their supplied principle of 
identity named subkinds. For instance, if we take Person to be a kind then 
some of its subkinds could be Man and Woman. In general, the stereotype 
« subkind » can be omitted in conceptual specifications without loss of 
clarity.  
Every object in a conceptual specification using this profile must be an 
instance of a Kind, directly or indirectly (postulate 4.1). Moreover, it 
cannot be an instance of more than one ultimate Kind (postulate 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 shows an excerpt of a conceptual specification that violates the 
second postulate (extracted from the CYC28 upper-level ontology). Here, 
we assume that the kinds Social Being and Group supply different principles 
of identity. Moreover, it is considered that Group supplies an extensional 
principle of identity, i.e. two groups are the same iff they have the same 
members. This is generally incompatible with a principle supplied by Social 
Being: we can change the members of a company, football team or music 
band and still have the same social being. Moreover, the same group can 
form different social beings with different purposes. One should notice that 
if the particular referred by the proper name The Beatles would be an 
instance of both Kinds, it would not be a determinate object (an answer to 
the question whether it was still the same thing when Ringo Star replaced 
Pete Best, is both affirmative and negative!). Figure 4.3 shows a version of 
the specification of figure 4.2 that obeys the constraints of this profile. In 
this revised representation, we have explicit modeled the substantial The 
Beatles and the group of people that compose this individual in a given 
circumstance as distinct individuals. 
                                                      
28 http://www.opencyc.org/ 
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«kind»
Social Being
«kind»
Group
Organization
The Beatles
instanceOf
 
«kind»
Social Being
StaffOrganization
The Beatles
instanceOf
{John,Paul,George,Ringo}
instanceOf
1 1
«kind»
Group
 
By postulate 4.3, rigid classes cannot be supertyped by anti-rigid ones. 
Therefore, kinds cannot appear in conceptual models as subtypes of phases, 
roles (see section 4.2.3), and role mixins (section 4.2.4). 
4.2.2 Phases 
UML classes stereotyped as « phase » in this profile represent the phased-
sortals phase. Figure 4.4 depicts an example with the kind Person, its 
subkinds Man and Woman and the phases Child, Adolescent and Adult. 
The classes connected to one single hollow arrowhead symbol in UML 
(concrete syntax for the subtyping relation) define a generalization set (OMG, 
2003b). In the UML 2.0 metamodel, the classes that are member of a 
generalization are necessarily disjoint. However, by default, they do not 
form a partition (in the mathematical sense) of the restricted subclass. In 
order to represent that a set of subclasses form a partition of their direct 
common superclass, the corresponding generalization set must be 
decorated with the constraints {disjoint, complete}. In other words, the 
concept of a type partition is represented as a decorated generalization set in 
UML.  
The kind person in figure 4.4 represents the substance sortal restricted 
by a phase-partition 〈Child, Adolescent, Adult〉. According to formulas (9) 
and (10) in section 4.1, the generalization set representing a phase-
Figure 4-2  Example of 
an instance with 
conflicting principles of 
identity 
Figure 4-3  An 
ontologically correct 
version of the 
specification of  
figure 4-2 
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partition must indeed by a partition in the mathematical sense and, hence, 
the restricted superclass must always be defined as an abstract class (i.e., a 
class that cannot have direct instances). In the specification of figure 4.4, 
the subkinds Man and Woman also define a partition for the substance 
sortal Person. However, contrary to phases, subkinds do not have to be 
necessarily defined in a partition. 
In UML, an abstract class is represented by a class with its name 
italicized. 
«kind»
Person
«phase»
Child
«phase»
Adolescent
«phase»
Adult
Man
Woman
{disjoint, complete}
{disjoint, complete}
 
4.2.3 Roles 
UML classes stereotyped as « role » represent the phased-sortals role. Roles 
and Phases are anti-rigid universals and cannot appear in a conceptual 
model as a supertype of a Kind (postulate 4.3). However, sometimes 
subtyping is wrongly used in conceptual modeling to represent alternative 
allowed types that can fulfill a role. For instance, in figure 4.5, the intention 
of the model is to represent that customers are either persons or 
organizations. An analogous example is shown in figure 4.6. In general, 
being a customer is assumed to be a contingent property of person, i.e., 
there are possible worlds in which a Person is not a customer but still the 
same person. Likewise, a participant can stop participating in a Forum 
without ceasing to exist. In summary, if the universals represented in figures 
4.5 and 4.6 are ascribed the semantics just discussed, these specifications 
are ontologically incorrect representations according to the theory 
postulated in section 4.1. 
Customer
Person Organization  
Figure 4-4  Two 
partitions of the same 
Kind Person: a subkind 
partition (Man, Woman) 
and a phase partition 
(Child, Adolescent, 
Adult)  
Figure 4-5  Problems on 
modeling Roles and 
their allowed types 
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Participant
Person SIG
Forum
1..* *
participation
 
In a series of papers (Steimann, 2000a, 2000b, 2001), Steimann discusses 
the difficulties of specifying allowed types for Roles that can be played by 
instances of disjoint types such as the roles Customer and Participant in figures 
4.5 and 4.6, respectively. As a conclusion, the author claims that the 
solution to this problem lies in the separation of role and type hierarchies. 
This solution not only departs from the traditional use of the concepts of 
role and type in the practice of conceptual modeling but, in particular, it 
leads to a radical revision of the UML metamodel (a heavyweight 
extension). In chapter 7 of this thesis, while discussing several problems 
w.r.t. role modeling found in the literature of conceptual modeling, we 
show that this claim is not warranted. To support our argument and 
propose a solution to the problem of role modeling with disjoint allowed 
types, we propose a design pattern based on the profile presented in this 
section. The solution presented has a smaller impact to UML than the one 
proposed by the author, since it does not demand heavyweight extensions 
to the language. The roles with disjoint allowed types design pattern proposed in 
chapter 7 can then be used as an ontologically correct solution to this 
recurrent modeling problem.  
Figure 4.7 below depicts an ontologically correct version of figure 4.5 
generated by the application of the design pattern aforementioned. We 
return to the discussion of this issue and, specifically, of this particular 
example in chapter 7. The notion of role mixin in figure 4.7 is discussed in 
section 4.2.4 below. 
«roleMixin»
Customer
«role»
PersonalCustomer
«role»
CorporateCustomer
«kind»
Person
Organization
«role»
Supplier
1..*
1..*
purchases-from
«kind»
Social Being
 
Figure 4-6  Mistaken 
cardinality specification 
for Roles  
Figure 4-7  An 
ontologically correct 
version of the 
specification of figure  
4-5 by using the profile 
and the roles with 
disjoint allowed types 
design patterns 
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Figure 4.6 contains yet another conceptual problem. In this specification, a 
participant can take part in zero-to-many forums. It is common in Database 
and Object-Oriented Design to use a minimum cardinality equal to zero to 
express that in a certain state of the system, for example, an object of type 
Participant is not related to any object of type Forum. However, from a 
conceptual viewpoint, the involvement in this relation is part of the very 
definition of the role type. In this example, the association participation is a 
specialization (restriction) condition (see section 4.1), which is part of the 
content of the concept Participant. In other words, a Participant is a Person 
or SIG that takes part in a Forum. As a consequence of formula (7), the 
following constraint must hold for classes stereotyped as « role »:  
 
Let X be a class stereotyped as « role » and r be an association 
representing Xs restriction condition. Then the minimum 
cardinality of X.r must be at least 1 (#X.r ≥ 1). 
 
This constraint is elaborated in chapter 8 of this thesis after our treatment 
of relations is presented and formally characterized in chapter 6. 
4.2.4 Mixins 
Conceptual modeling types classified as Mixins represent the dispersive 
universals discussed in section 4.1. Mixin types are perceived to be of great 
importance in structuring the specification of conceptual models (Jacobson 
& Booch & Rumbaugh, 1998; Booch, 1994; Welty & Guarino, 2001). They 
can represent top-most types such as Thing, Entity, Element (discussed in 
section 4.1) but also concepts such as RationalEntity, which represent an 
abstraction of properties that are common to multiple disjoint types (figure 
4.8). In this case, the mixin RationalEntity can be judged to represent an 
essential property that is common to all its instances and it is itself a rigid 
type. We use the stereotype «category» to represent a rigid mixin that 
subsumes different kinds.  
In contrast, some mixins are anti-rigid and represent abstractions of 
common properties of roles. These types are stereotyped as «roleMixin» 
and represent dependent anti-rigid non-sortals. Examples of role mixins 
include the so-called formal roles (Welty & Guarino, ibid.) such as whole and 
part and initiatior and responder. However, role mixins are more general than 
formal roles, representing any abstraction of common contingent properties 
of multiple disjoint roles. An example of a role mixin is depicted in figure 
4.7. Further examples are discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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«kind»
Person
«kind»
Artificial Agent
«category»
Rational Entity
 
Moreover, some mixins represent properties that are essential to some of 
its instances and accidental to others. As discussed in section 4.1, this meta-
property is named non-rigidity (a weaker constraint than anti-rigidity). An 
example is the mixin Seatable (figure 4.9), which represents a property that 
can be considered essential to the kinds Chair and Stool but accidental to 
Crate, Paper Box or Rock. We use the stereotype « mixin » (without 
further qualification) to represent non-rigid non-sortals.  
Finally, by postulate 4.4, we have that mixins cannot appear in a 
conceptual model as subclasses of kinds, phases or roles. Moreover, due to 
postulate 4.3, rigid mixins (categories) cannot be subsumed by anti-rigid 
ones, i.e., by role mixins. Finally, since they cannot have direct instances, a 
mixin must always be depicted as an abstract class in a UML conceptual 
specification. 
«kind»
Chair
«phase»
Solid Crate
«mixin»
Seatable
«phase»
Broken Crate
«kind»
Crate
 
 
Table 4.1 below summarizes the profile proposed in this section. 
 
Stereotype Constraints 
 RIGID SORTALS 
« kind » supertype is not a member of {« subkind », « phase », « role », « roleMixin »} 
« subkind » supertype is not a member of {« phase », « role », « roleMixin »} 
For every subkind SK there is a unique kind K such that K is a supertype of SK 
 ANTI-RIGID SORTALS 
« phase » Always defined as part of partition.  
For every Phase P there is a unique Kind K such that K is a supertype of P 
« role » Let X be a class stereotyped as « role » and R be an association representing Xs 
restriction condition. Then, #X.R ≥ 1 
For every Role X there is a unique Kind K such that K is a supertype of X 
Figure 4-8  Example of a 
category, i.e., a rigid 
mixin. 
Figure 4-9  Example of a 
semi-rigid mixin 
Table 4-1  Summary of 
the proposed modeling 
profile for the conceptual 
modeling representation 
of substantial universals  
114 CHAPTER 4 UNIVERSALS AND TAXONOMIC STRUCTURES 
 NON-SORTALS 
« category » supertype is not a member of  
{« kind », « subkind », « phase », « role », « roleMixin »} 
Always defined as an abstract class 
« roleMixin » supertype is not a member of {« kind », « subkind », « phase », « role »}.  
Let X be a class stereotyped as « roleMixin » and R be an association
representing Xs restriction condition. Then, #X.R ≥ 1 
Always defined as an abstract class 
« mixin » supertype is not a member of  
{« kind », « subkind », « phase », « role », « roleMixin »}  
Always defined as an abstract class 
4.3 Psychological Evidence 
The postulates presented in section 4.1 are represented in a list of 
psychological claims proposed by cognitive psychologist John Mcnamara in 
(Mcnamara, 1994). The proposed psychological claims are related to the 
cognitive interpretation of linguistic expressions. In that article, Mcnamara 
defends the position that there is a logic underlying the fact that we can 
understand certain propositions, and the proposed set of psychological 
claims points to a class of logics that take cognizance of this fact. This 
position, which is also supported by, for instance, (Mcnamara, 1986; Xu, 
2004; Lidz & Waxman & Freedman, 2003) is analogous to the one 
advocated by Chomsky in defense of his notion of a Universal Grammar 
(Chomsky, 1965, 1980, 1986). Chomsky is the proponent of the theory 
that states that the reason why we can learn a natural language is due to the 
existence of a mental language, a linguistic competence that is nature-supplied, 
uniform across individuals and complete in each one. According to this 
view, there is a close fit between the minds linguistic properties and 
properties of natural languages and, hence, natural languages have the 
properties they do because they can be recognized and manipulated by 
infants without the meta-linguistic support that is available to second-
language learners. Therefore, for Chomsky, a grammar for a particular 
language is descriptively adequate if it correctly describes its object, namely the 
linguistic intuition of the native speaker.  
In the same spirit, a number of cognitive scientists (see, for example, 
Mcnamara 1986, 1994), have proposed a theory of logical competence based 
on the notion of a Language of Though (Fodor, 1975). For him, the reason 
we can learn the meaning of natural language symbols for categories, 
individuals and their properties without the meta-linguistic support 
available to second language learners lies on the mapping between the 
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language specific symbols for these categories onto a system of categories 
already existing in the language of though, i.e., a cognitive ontology.  
In this section, we discuss some empirical evidence that support many 
of the points defended throughout this chapter. This evidence results from 
a number of psychological experiments in the areas of cognitive psychology, 
which has been developed with the aim of investigating categorical 
development and logical competence in infants since a pre-language age of 
3-4 months.  
Firstly, many laboratory results provide evidence that infants in the 
early age of 3-4 months are already able to form categories (e.g., Eimas & 
Quinn, 1994). (Cohen & Younger, 1983; Mcnamara, 1982), for instance, 
provide evidence that children are able to classify objects into categories for 
which they have no natural-language symbols. The reason that 
categorization appears so early in cognitive development is related to its 
fundamental relevance to cognition. As (Markman 1989, p. 11) puts it: 
Categorization . . . is a means of simplifying the environment, of reducing the load 
on memory, and of helping us to store and retrieve information efficiently. Without 
concepts, mental life would be chaotic. If we perceived each entity as 
unique, we would be overwhelmed by the sheer diversity of what we 
experience and unable to remember more than a minute fraction of what 
we encounter. Furthermore, if each individual entity needed a distinct 
name, our language would be staggeringly complex and communication 
virtually impossible. In contrast, if you know nothing about a novel object 
but are told it is an instance of X, you can infer that the object has all or 
many properties that Xs have (Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Nonetheless, in order to able the learn what are the properties that we 
can expect instances of X to have, another ability, namely the ability to 
(re)identity instances of X must be present. If all of an objects properties 
were immediately manifest to the child upon every encounter there would 
be no need to learn and remember what these properties were. However, 
carrying knowledge of substances becomes necessary since most of a 
substances properties are not manifest but hidden from us most of the 
time (Milikan, 1998). For example, different encounters with Felix will 
reveal different properties about the individual Felix and about the kind 
Cat. However, for this to happen, the child must be able to: (i) recognize 
that Felix is a Cat; (ii) recognize that the individual that can jump from the 
table to the TV set is the same as the one that can be fed milk; (iii) recognize 
that Tom is also a Cat, thus, he can also be fed milk. In summary, both 
principles of application and identity are fundamental in our construal of 
the environment. 
A number of experiments provide evidence for the existence of an 
individuation and indentity system in infants by the age they begin to form 
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categories. Researchers such as (Xu & Carey, 1996; Spelke et. al., 1995; 
Moore, Borton, & Darby, 1978) provide evidence that by the early age 3-4 
months old infants have criteria for deciding whether an object is the same 
one as a previously seen object. (Xu & Carey, ibid.), for instance, provide 
evidence that until about nine months of age, infants rely on a unique 
principle of individuation and identity for all objects, which is supplied by 
the type Physical Object. This notion of physical object is synonymous to 
maximally connected physical object whose parts move along together in a 
spatiotemporal continuous path. As defended by the authors, in this sense, 
physical object is indeed a sortal since any identity and individuation 
statements involving two physical objects is determinate. They term this 
system of individuation an object-based system. These results show that not 
only does spatiotemporal discontinuity lead to a representation of two 
distinct objects, but also that spatiotemporal continuity leads to a 
representation of a single, persisting object. Other laboratories have also 
replicated this basic finding using somewhat different procedures (e.g., 
Aguiar & Baillargeon, 1999). 
Thus, even young infants have some criteria for establishing 
representations of distinct objects. These first criteria are spatiotemporal in 
nature, including generalizations such as: (i) objects travel on 
spatiotemporally connected paths; (ii) two objects cannot occupy the same 
space at the same time, and (iii) one object cannot be in two places at the 
same time (Xu, 2004). 
Xu and Baker (Xu & Baker, 2003) address the question whether infants 
can use perceptual property information for object individuation, i.e., if 
non-sortal categories can support the judgment of individuation statements. 
The results show that, for 10-month infants, perceptual properties are at 
best only used to confirm the application of the principle of identity which 
is first supplied by the sortal Physical Object. Moreover, these results show 
that spatiotemporal evidence for a single object changing properties overrides 
perceptual property information (see also Xu & Carey, 1996). (Xu & Carey & 
Quint, 2004) also shows that 12-months infants are not able to use non-
sortal categories alone to support the judgment of individuation statements. 
This view is also supported by (Milikan, 1998) who calls the attention for 
the fact that children come to appreciate separable dimensions, such as 
color, shape, and size only after a considerable period in which holistic 
similarities dominate their attention.  
Results from (Xu & Carey & Quint, 2004) show that between 9 to 12 
months of age a second system of individuation emerges in infants 
cognition. This is named a kind-based individuation system and operates 
independently of the object-based attention system. In general, by the early 
age of 12 months, infants have already developed the multiple-sortal system 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 117 
which is used by adults to judge individuation and identity statements. 
Moreover, (Xu, 2004) shows that: (i) representations of object kinds can 
override strong spatiotemporal evidence for a single object; (ii) perceptual 
property information is always treated as kind-relative. As remarked by the 
author, during this period, infants worldview undergoes fundamental changes: They 
begin with a world populated with objects...By the end of the first year of life, they 
begin to conceptualize a world populated with sortal-kinds... In this new world, 
objects are thought of not as qua object but rather qua dog or qua table. Other 
experiments such as those conducted by Bonatti et al. (2002), Waxman and 
Markow (1995) and Booth and Waxman (2003) corroborate with these 
findings and support the claim that around 12-months infants are sensitive 
to the distinction between sortals and arbitrary general terms, which are 
represented differently and used differently in individuation tasks.  
(Xu, 2004) also suggests that it is not a coincidence that along with 
acquiring their first words, infants begin to develop their kind-based system 
of individuation. The bulk of a childs first words are concrete nouns, 
including proper names and names for sortal universals (Milikan, 1998). 
For example, (Mcnamara, 1972) shows that children learn common nouns 
(the linguistic counterparts of sortal universals) before they learn predicates 
such as verbs and adjectives (counterparts of characterizing universals). 
(Gentner, 1982) presents evidence that this finding holds cross-culturally 
for children learning German, Kaluli, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Turkish 
and English. In summary, in early stages of language learning, children are 
more likely to pick words for sortals than of other kinds. Although 
perceived, attributes and events are construed, individuated and 
conceptualized under the dependence of a sortal (Mcnamara, 1986, p.145).  
(Katz & Baker & Mcnamara, 1974) and (Mcnamara, 1982) provide 
evidence that children younger than 17-month-old are able to distinguish 
proper names by coordinating the notions of individual and kind. According 
to these findings, children are able to judge that individuals of some kinds, 
but not of others, are likely to be the bearers of a proper name. Together 
with the results from (Gelman & Taylor, 1984), these findings provide 
strong indications that under certain circumstances children are led to take 
some words as proper names (namely, when applied to individuals of 
familiar kinds) and in others to take them as sortals (when applied to 
individuals of unfamiliar kinds).  (Mcnamara, 1986) advocates that this 
evidence is an obvious suggestion that children have the appropriate sortals 
to support the learning of proper names in some language. In addition to 
that, when reporting on a number of observations extracted from the 
linguistic record he kept of his son, Mcnamara remarks that his sons use of 
proper names behaved like rigid designators from the start (Mcnamara, 
1986). 
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According to (Rosch et. al, 1976; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984), 
when learning a word for a kind of object, basic-level sortals (substance 
sortals) are the ones that occur to children. For example, when creating 
categories, children attend to similarities among dogs before subclassifying 
them and before they attend to properties dogs share with other animals. 
(Mcnamara, 1986, p.147) strongly argues that substance sortals hold a 
psychologically salient and privileged position compared to other types of 
rigid sortals, and that childrens perceptual systems seem to be especially 
tuned to identify substance sortals. This position finds evidence in the 
results of (Anglin, 1977; Mervis & Crisafi, 1982).     
In summary, a substantial number of psychological experiments 
confirm the philosophy of language thesis that individuation and identity 
judgment can only take place with the support of a sortal universal. Both 
systems of individuation and identity that are employed by human cognition 
are sortal-based. Humans start with a principle of identity afforded by the 
unique sortal physical object and, in a later developmental phase, undergo a 
cognitive shift to a system that employs a multitude of principles of identity 
supplied by different substance sortals. In both systems, perceptual 
property information is secondary and can be overridden. (Xu, 2004) 
defends the position that this developmental process makes good sense in 
terms of learnability, since it starts the child on the solid ground of a 
concept of object that seems to be inate (Spelke, 1990) and it allows the 
child to work with these individuated objects and with the help of language, 
ultimately develop a new ontology of sortal-kinds. In addition, as defended 
by (Milikan, 1998), the primacy of substance sortals also makes good sense 
in evolutionary terms since, from the standpoint of an organism that wishes 
to learn, the focus should be on constructing categorizations that are 
essential, since they are the ones that supply knowledge that affords the most 
useful and reliable inferences.          
4.4 Formal Characterization 
In this section we present two complementary systems of intensional sortal 
modal logics (intensional modal logics with quantification restricted by sortal 
terms). These systems differ mainly in the nature of the entities they admit 
to the domain of quantification. However, more importantly, they share the 
objective of making explicit the distinction between sortals and mixin 
universals (neglected in classical modal logics) in the sense that only sortals 
can carry a principle of persistence and trans-world identity for their 
instances. Moreover, they also incorporate in their semantics, the 
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constraints that qualify the different types of sortals universals recognized by 
the theory presented in section 4.1. 
4.4.1 Quantifying over Momentary States 
In the use of the term individuals that we have been employing in this 
chapter, individuals are special types of endurants, i.e., entities that exist in 
time while keeping their identity. Examples including ordinary objects of 
everyday experience such as: a person, a student, a house, a dog, among 
others. However, in a UML Object Diagram (Instance Specification), an 
UML instance represents an entity at a point in time (a snapshot) (OMG, 
2003c, p.59). In the language presented in this section, we explore this idea 
by taking the primitive elements of quantification in the system of 
intensional modal logics proposed to represent states of instances in given 
time boundaries, or to put it simply, snapshots of ordinary substantial 
individuals.  
The following example illustrates some of these ideas. Suppose that 
there is an individual person referred by the proper name John. As 
discussed in section 4.1, proper names for substantials refer rigidly and, 
hence, if we say that John weights 80kg at t1 but 68kg at t2 we are in the 
two cases referring to the same individual, namely the particular John. 
Now, let x1 and x2 be snapshots representing the projection of John at time 
boundaries t1 and t2, respectively. The truth of the statements 
overweight(John,t1) and overweight(John,t2) depends only on whether 
overweight applies to the states x1 or x2, respectively. In other words, the 
judgment if an individual i is an instance of a universal G (e.g., overweight) 
in world w depends only whether the principle of application carried by G 
applies to the state of i in w.  
In a computational system, the identity of x1 and x2 is guaranteed by 
the presence of some artificial identification scheme (oids, primary keys, 
surrogates). However, from an ontological perspective, how can one 
determine that, despite of possibly significant dissimilarities, x1 and x2 are 
states of the same particular John? As argued throughout the chapter, this is 
done via a principle of trans-world identity and, in particular, a principle of 
persistence supplied by the substance sortal Person, of which John is an 
instance.        
In classical (extensional) modal logics, no distinction is made between 
different types of universals. Universals are represented as predicates in the 
language that divide the world (at each circumstance) into two classes of 
elements: those that fall under them and those that do not. This principle 
determines the extension of each universal at each circumstance. Classical 
(one-place) predicates, i.e., as functions from worlds to sets of individuals, 
properly represent the principles of application that are carried by all universals 
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but fail to represent the principles of identity which are unique of sortals. 
Equivalently, they treat all objects as obeying the same principle of identity.       
This difference is made explicit in the language L1 defined in this section 
in the following way: 
 
 The intention of the proper name John is represented by an individual 
concept J, i.e., a function that maps to a snapshop xi of John in each 
possible world w. The notion of individual concepts, first introduced by 
Leibniz, refers to a singleton property that only holds for one individual. 
For instance, the property of being Mick Jagger has a single instance, 
namely the individual person Mick Jagger; 
 
 Sortal universals, such as Person, are represented as intensional properties, 
which are functions from possible worlds to sets of individual concepts. 
For instance, for the sortal Person there is a function ℓ that maps every 
world w to a set of individual concepts (including J). An individual x is a 
Person in world w iff there is an individual concept k ∈ ℓ(w) such that 
k(w) = x; 
 
 Individual Concepts represent the principle of identity supplied by the 
universal Person such that if J(w) = x1 and J(w)  = x2 then we say that 
x1 in w is the same Person as x2 in w, or in general: for all individuals 
x,y representing snapshots of an individual C of type T we say that x in 
w is the same T as y in w iff C is in the extension of T and C(w) = x 
and C(w) = y; 
 
 Whilst the principle of identity is represented by sortal determined 
individual concepts that trace individuals from world to world, the 
principle of application considers individuals only at a specific world. 
For instance, John is overweight in word w iff overweight(J(w),w) is true. 
 
In summary, in the language L1 presented below, the primitive elements in 
the domains of quantification are momentary states of substantial 
individuals, not the individuals themselves. Ordinary substantial individuals 
are instead represented by individual concepts. 
The idea of representing objects of ordinary experience by individual 
concepts is similar to the solution presented in (Heller & Herre, 2004) in 
which individual concepts for substantial individuals are named abstract 
substances or persistents. The notion of momentary state of individuals 
adopted here is similar to that of presentials in (Heller & Herre, ibid.). 
In the sequel, we formally define the syntax and semantics of L1. 
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Syntax of L1 
 
Let L1 be a language of modal logics with identity with a vocabulary V = 
(K,B,A,P,T) where: (a) T is a set of individual constants; (b) P is a non-
empty set n-ary predicates; (c) A is a set of anti-rigid sortal types; (d) B is a 
set of subkinds; (e) K is a non-empty set of kinds (substance sortal type); (f) 
R = K ∪ B is named the set of rigid sortal types and the set C = R ∪ A , 
the set of sortal types; The alphabet of L1 contains the traditional operators: 
= (equality), ¬ (negation), → (implication), ∀(universal quantification), □ 
(necessity). The notions of term, sortal and formula are define as follows: 
 
Definition 4.7 
(1) all individual constants and variables are terms; 
(2) All sortal types belong to the category of Sortal Types; 
(3) If s and t are terms, then s = t is an atomic formula; 
(4) If P is a n-place predicate and t1tn are terms, then P(t1,..,tn) 
is an atomic formula; 
(5) If A and B are formulas, then so are ¬A, A, (A→B); 
(6) If S is sortal classifier, x is a variable and A is a formula, then 
(∀S,x)A is a formula.    
■ 
 
The symbols ∃ (existential quantification), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ 
(disjunction), ◊ (possibility) and ↔ are defined as usual: 
 
Definition 4.8 
  
(7) (A ∧ B) =def  ¬( A → ¬B); 
(8) (A ∨ B) =def  ((A → B) → B); 
(9) (A ↔ B) =def (A → B) ∧ (B → A) 
(10) ◊A =def ¬□¬A 
(11) (∃S,x) A =def ¬(∀S,x) ¬A 
(12) (∃!S,x) A =def (∃S,y)(∀S,x) (A ↔ (x = y)) 
■ 
 
In L1, all quantification is restricted by Sortals. The quantification 
restricted in this way makes explicit what is only implicit in standard 
predicate logics. As previously discussed, suppose we want to state the 
following proposition: (a) There are red tasty apples. In classical predicate logic 
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we would write down a logical formula such as (b) ∃x (apple(x) ∧ tasty(x) 
∧ red(x)). In an ontological reading, (b) states that there are things which 
are red, tasty and apple. The theory proposed section 4.1 rejects that we 
can conceptually grasp an individual under a general concept such as Thing 
or Entity or, what is almost the same, that a logic (or conceptual modeling 
language) should presupposed the notion of a bare particular. Moreover, it 
states that only a sortal (e.g., Apple) can carry a principle of identity for the 
individuals it collects, a property that is absent in attributions such as Red 
and Tasty.  For this reason, a logical system, when used to represent a 
formalization of conceptual models, should not presuppose that the 
representations of natural general terms such as Apple, Tasty and Red stand 
in the same logical footing. For this reason, (a) should be represented as 
(∃Apple,x) (tasty(x) ∧ red(x)) in which the sortal binding the variable x is 
the one responsible for carrying its principle of identity.  
In L1, sortal classifiers are never used in a predicative position. 
Therefore, if S ∈ C is a sortal type, the predicate s(x) (in lowercase) is a 
meta-linguistic abbreviation according to the following definition. 
 
Definition 4.9 
 
 s(t) =def (∃S,x) (x = t) 
■ 
 
According to this definition, the sentence John is a Man is actually 
better rendered as John is identical to a Man. In opposition, in the 
sentence John is Tall, the copula represents the is of predication, 
which denotes a relation of mere equivalence. 
 
Semantics of L1 
 
Definition 4.10 (model structure) 
 
A model structure for L1 is defined as an ordered couple 〈W, D〉 where: (i) 
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; (ii) L1 adopts a varying domain frame 
(Fitting & Mendelsonh, 1998) and, thus, instead of a set, D is a function 
that assigns to each member of W a non-empty set of elements. 
■ 
 
Given a model structure M (= 〈W, D〉), the intention of individual constant 
can be represented by an individual concept, i.e., a function i that assigns to 
each world w ∈W, an individual in D(w). Formally we have that 
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Definition 4.11 (individual concept) 
 
Let M = 〈W, D〉 and U = U
Ww
wD
∈
)( .  
An individual concept i in M is function from W into U, such that i(w) ∈ 
D(w) in all worlds. For a given model structure M we define I as a set of 
individual concepts defined for that structure. 
■ 
 
The intention of an n-place predicate is defined (as usual) as an n-ary 
property, i.e., a function that assigns to each world w ∈W a set of n-tuples. 
If a tuple 〈d1dn〉 belongs to the representation of a predicate at world w, 
then d1dn stand in w in the relation expressed by the predicate. 
Definition 4,12 (property) 
 
An n-ary property (n>0) in M is a function P from W into ℘(D(w))n, i.e., 
if 〈d1dn〉 ∈ P (w), then d1dn  ∈ D(w). 
■ 
 
The intension of sortal classifiers is defined in such a way that both the 
principles of application and identity are represented. This is done by what 
is named in (Gupta, 1980) sorts, i.e., separated intensional properties. 
 
Definition 4.13 (sort) 
 
Let M = 〈W, D〉 be a model structure. An intensional property in M is a 
function ℓ from W into the powerset of individual concepts in M (i.e., 
℘(I)).  
An intensional property assigns to each world a set of individual 
concepts, and it can be used to represent the intention of a sortal type in 
the following way. Suppose that ℓ represents the intension of the sortal type 
S and that the individual concept i belongs to ℓ at world w, i.e., i ∈ ℓ(w). 
Then i(w) is a S in w, and i(w) is identical to i(w) in w. 
Let ℓ be an intensional property in M, and let L =U
Ww∈
ℓ(w). 
Now, let i,j be two individual concepts such that i,j ∈ L. We say that the 
intensional property ℓ is separated iff: if there is a world w ∈ W such that 
i(w) = j(w) then, for all w∈ W, i(w) = j (w), i.e., i = j.  
Finally, a sort in a model structure M is an intensional property which is 
separated. 
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■ 
 
The requirement of separation proposed in (Gupta, 1980) states, for 
example, that if two individual concepts for Person, say 007 and James 
Bond, apply to the same object in a world w then they apply necessarily to 
the same object. This prevents unlawful conceptualizations in which a 
substantial individual splits or in which two individuals can become one 
while maintaining the same identity.  
Given a sort ℓ in M we designate by ℓ[w] the set of objects that fall 
under ℓ in w. Formally, 
 
Definition 4.14: 
  
ℓ[w] = {d: d ∈ D(w) and there is an individual concept i ∈ ℓ(w) such that 
i(w) = d}. 
■ 
Moreover, we define the set of objects in w that are possibly ℓ, i.e., 
 
Definition 4.15 
 
ℓ |[w]| = {d: d∈ D(w) and there is an individual concept i ∈ ℓ(w) such 
that i(w) = d}. 
■ 
 
We therefore are able to define the notion of counterpart relative to a sort ℓ.    
 
Definition 4.16 (counterpart) 
 
We say that d in world w is the same ℓ as d in w iff there is an individual 
concept i that belongs to ℓ at some world (i.e., there is a w such that i ∈ 
ℓ(w)) and i(w) = d and i(w) = d. The ℓ counterpart in w of the individual 
d in w is the unique individual d such that d  in world w is the same ℓ as d  
in w. 
■ 
 
Definition 4.17 (model) 
 
A model in L1 can then be defined as a triple 〈W, D, δ〉 such that:  
 
1. 〈W, D〉 is a model structure for L1; 
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2. δ is an interpretation function assigning values to the non-logical 
constants of the language such that: it assigns an individual concept to 
each individual constant c ∈ T of L1; an n-ary property to each n-place 
predicate p ∈ P of L1; a sort to each sortal type S ∈ C of L1. 
 
The interpretation function δ must also satisfy the following constraints. 
 
3. If S ∈ R then the sort ℓ assigned to S by δ must be such that: for all 
w,w ∈ W, ℓ(w) = ℓ(w), i.e., all rigid sortals are world invariant 
(modally constant); 
 
4. Let S ∈ (B ∪A) be a subkind or an anti-rigid sortal type. Then, there is 
a kind S ∈ K such that, for all w ∈ W, δ(S)(w) ⊆ δ(S)(w); 
 
5. Let S, S∈ K be two Kinds and let ℓ and ℓ be the two sorts assigned to 
S and S by δ, respectively. Then we have that: there is a w ∈ W such 
that ℓ(w) ∩ ℓ(w) ≠ ∅ iff ℓ = ℓ, i.e., sorts representing kinds do not 
intersect unless they are identical. In other words, this restriction states 
that individuals belong to one single substance sortal, i.e., they obey one 
single principle of identity; 
 
6. Let S ∈ A be an anti-rigid sortal type. The sort ℓ assigned to S by δ 
must be such that: for all w ∈ W, and for all individual concepts i ∈ 
ℓ(w), there is a world w ∈ W such that i ∉ ℓ(w); 
 
7. Let S, S∈ K be two Kinds and let ℓ and ℓ be the two sorts assigned to 
S and S by δ, respectively. Then we have that: there is a w ∈ W such 
that ℓ[w] ∩ ℓ[w] ≠ ∅ iff ℓ=ℓ. Differently from (5) above this 
restriction states that individual states of objects can only be referred by 
individual concepts of the same kind; 
■ 
 
Finally, we are now in position to define an assignment for L1. 
 
Definition 4.18 (assignment) 
 
An assignment for L1 relative to a model 〈W, D, δ〉 is a function that assigns 
to each variable of L1 an ordered pair 〈ℓ,d 〉, where ℓ is a sort relative to the 
modal structure 〈W,D〉 and d ∈ U =U
Ww
wD
∈
)( .   
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If a is an L1 assignment then ao(x) is the object assigned to variable x by 
a and aS(x) is the sortal to which x is bound. Moreover, it is always the case 
that ao(x) ∈ aS(x)|[w]| for all variables. 
■ 
Definition 4.19 
 
An assignment a for L1 is an ℓ variant of a at x in w iff: 
  
1. a' is just like a except perhaps at x (abbreviated as a~X a), 
2. as(x) = ℓ, 
3. ao(x) ∈ ℓ[w].    
■ 
 
Definition 4.20 
 
The w variant of an assignment a relative to w (abbreviated as f(w,a,w)) is 
the unique assignment a that meets the following conditions: 
 
(i) aS(x) = aS(x) at all variables x,  
(ii) ao(x) in w is the aS(x) counterpart of ao(x) in w relative, at all 
variables x. 
■ 
 
Definition 4.21 
 
Finally, let α be an expression in L1 and, let the semantic value of α at world w 
in model M and relative to assignment a be the value of the valuation 
functionvw aM , .  
 
With these definitions, we are able to define the semantics of L1 as follows: 
 
(a). If α is an individual constant or a sortal type, then vw aM , (α) = 
δ(α)(w). 
(b). If α is variable, then vw aM , (α) = ao(α) 
(c). If α is an atomic formula t1=t2, then vw aM , (α) = T if vw aM , (t1) = 
vw aM , (t2). Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F. 
 FORMAL CHARACTERIZATION 127 
(d). If α is an atomic formula P(t1tn), then vw aM , (α) = T if 
〈vw aM , (t1) vw aM , (tn)〉 ∈ δ(P)(w). Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F. 
(e). If α is the formula ¬A, then vw aM , (α) = T if vw aM , (A) = F. 
Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F. 
(f). If α is the formula (A→B), then vw aM , (α) = T if vw aM , (A) = F or 
vw aM , (B) = T. Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F. 
(g). If α is the formula (∀S,x)A, then vw aM , (α) = T if vw aM ', (A) = T for 
all assignments a which are δ(S) variants of a at x in w. Otherwise 
vw aM , (α) = F. 
(h). If α is the formula □A, then vw aM , (α) = T if vw wawfM' ),,'(, (A) = T for 
all w ∈ W. Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F.     
■ 
 
The language L1 has been proposed based on the first of the four systems 
introduced in (Gupta, 1980). Gupta, however, does not elaborate of 
different types of sortals. Consequently, restrictions from (3) to (7) posed 
to δ in definition 4.17 are simply not defined in his system. Restriction (7), 
in particular, would be rejected by Gupta, as a consequence of his 
contingent (or relative) view of identity. Note that restriction (7) implies 
(5) but not vice-versa.  
It is widely accepted that any relation of identity must comply with the 
so-called Leibnizs law: if two individuals are identical then they are 
necessarily identical (van Leeuwen, 1991). Relativists, however, adopt the 
thesis that it is possible for two individuals to be identical in one 
circumstance but different in another. A familiar example, cited by Gupta, 
is that of a statue and a lump of clay. The argument proceeds as follows: 
Suppose that in world w we have a statue st of the Dalai Lama which is 
identical to the lump of clay loc this statue is made of. In w, st and loc have 
exactly the same properties (e.g., same shape, weight, color, temperature, 
etc.). Suppose now that in world w, a piece (e.g., the hand) is subtracted 
from st. If the subtracted piece is an inessential part of a statue then the 
statue st that we have in w is identical to st. In contrast, the lump of clay 
loc which st is made of is different from loc. In sum, we have in w the 
same statue as in w but a different lump of clay.  
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In Guptas system, without restriction (7), we have that for two 
individual concepts i and j such that i(w) = j(w), it  is possible that there is a 
world w such that i(w) ≠ j(w). In other words, the formula (α) 
((∃Statue,x)(x = dl) ∧ (∃LoC,y)(y = dl) ∧ ◊(x ≠ y)) is satisfiable.  
Here, we reject this possibility for two reasons. Firstly, because we 
support the view that Leibnizs rule must hold for a relation to be 
considered a relation of identity. Otherwise, any equivalence relation such 
as being instance of the same class must be considered a relation of identity. 
Secondly, if Guptas primitive elements are thought as momentary states, 
then (α) does not actually qualify as a statement of relative identity. It 
actually expresses that two objects can coincide (i.e., share the same state) 
in a world w but not in a different world w (van Leeuwen, 1991). Notice 
that if restriction (7) is assumed, formula (α) is no longer satisfiable. 
 
Proof: (a) if (x = dl) is true then there is an individual concept st of Statue 
that refer in the actual world w to the same entity d as dl; (b) if (y = dl) is 
true then there is an individual concept loc of LoC that refer in the actual 
world w to the same entity d as dl; (c) by transitivity of equality, st and loc 
refer to the same d in world w and, consequently, d is then both of kind 
Statue and of kind LoC in w; (e) due to (7), the intentions of Statue and 
LoC are identical; (f) finally, due to separation, st and loc must coincide in 
every world. 
□ 
 
In L1, we take the multiplicationist (Masolo et al., 2003a) position that st and 
loc do not actually share the same state in w in the strong sense. In 
opposition, we consider that the states st(w) and loc(w) are numerically 
different albeit instantiating the same universals.  
A simple way to modify L1 in order to account for coincidence as 
manifested in Guptas system can be achieved by: 
 
(a). removing the constraint (7) in definition 4.17;  
(b). including the operator ≈ for coincidence with the following 
semantics: If α is an atomic formula t1 ≈ t2, then vw aM , (α) = T if 
vw aM , (t1) = vw aM , (t2). Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F; 
(c). Defining the identity relation between individual constants as (t1 = 
t2) =def □( t1 ≈ t2), i.e., two continuants are identical if they 
coincide in every possible world. 
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Example 
 
The UML specification of figure 4.10 depicts and example of a conceptual 
specification produced using the profile defined in table 4.1.  
 
«kind»
Person
«role»
Student
«kind»
School
1..* 1
enrollment
 
The L1 rendering of this specification is presented below: 
 
□(∀Student,x person(x)) 
□(∀Student,x ∃!School,y enrolled-in(x,y)) 
□(∀School,x ∃Student,y enrolled-in(y,x)) 
 
According to definition 4.9, □(∀Student,x person(x)) is actually an 
abbreviation for □((∀Student,x)(∃Person,y) (y = x)). 
 
In this case we have that  
 
K = R = C = {Person}, B = ∅, A = {Student},  
P = {enrolled-in}, T = ∅   
 
A L1 model for this specification is presented below: 
 
W = {w,w} 
D(w) = {α,β,γ}  D(w) = {ε,η,ι} 
I = {john,mary,UT} 
 
Individual Concepts 
 
john(w) = α   john(w) = ε 
mary(w) = β   mary(w) = η 
UT(w) = γ   UT(w) = ι 
 
Interpretation of Sortals 
Figure 4-10  Example 
depicting a phased-
sortal role, its allowed 
type and a relational 
restriction condition 
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δ(Person)(w) = {john,mary}  δ(Person)(w) = {john,mary} 
δ(School)(w) = {UT}    δ(School)(w) = {UT} 
δ(Student)(w) = {john}   δ(Student)(w) = {mary} 
 
Interpretation of Predicates 
 
δ(enrolled-in)(w) = {<α,γ>} δ(enrolled-in)(w) = {<η,ι>} 
4.4.2 Quantifying over substantial individuals 
In this section, we consider a modification of language L1 to arrive at a 
system L2 whose elements of quantification are ordinary individuals. 
The syntax of L2 is exactly like that of L1, i.e., every grammatically valid 
formula in the latter language is a valid formula of the former, and vice-
versa. In L2 all quantification is still restricted by sortals, and sortals and 
predicates still differ in the fact that whilst in the extension of the latter we 
have the primitive objects of quantification, in the extension of the former 
we have individual concepts.  
From a semantic point of view, we make the following modifications in 
the L2 in comparison to L1.  
 
Definition 4.22 (model structure) 
 
A model structure for L2 is defined as an ordered couple 〈W, D〉 where: (i) 
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; (ii) In L2, the domain D of 
quantification is that of possibilia, which includes all possible entities 
independent of their actual existence. Therefore we shall quantify over a 
constant domain in all possible worlds. Moreover, all worlds are equally 
accessible and therefore we omit the accessibility relation from the model 
structure (Fitting & Mendelsonh, 1998). 
■ 
 
Given a model structure M (= 〈W, D〉), the intention of individual 
constant can be represented by an individual concept. However, due to the 
nature of the domain D in L2, we also have to change the definition of the 
individual concepts adopted in this language.   
 
Definition 4.23 (individual concept) 
 
Let M = 〈W, D〉. An individual concept i in M is function from W into D.  
 FORMAL CHARACTERIZATION 131 
Let i be an individual concept in M such that i is a constant function. That 
is to say: for all w,w ∈ W, i(w) = i(w). The individual concepts in M that 
have this property are named here L2-individual concepts.       
For a given model structure M we define I as a set of individual 
concepts defined for that structure and, IC ⊆ I as the subset of I that 
includes only L2-individual concepts.  
■ 
 
The intention of n-place predicate and of sortal classifier are defined 
exactly as in L1, i.e., as an n-ary property and a sort, respectively. Notice that 
the following alternative definition for sorts in L2 can be given.  
 
Definition 4.24 (sort) 
 
Let M = 〈W, D〉 be a L2 model structure. An intensional property in M is a 
function ℓ from W into the powerset of individual concepts in M (i.e., 
℘(I)). A sort in M is an intensional property that has as co-domain the set 
IC, i.e., a sort is a function from worlds to sets of L2-individual concepts.  
■ 
 
Notice that separation becomes a consequence of this definition for sorts. 
 
Proof: Let ℓ be a sort in L2, and let i,j be two individual concepts such that 
there are worlds w,w ∈ W, such that i ∈ℓ(w), and j ∈ℓ(w). Since i and j 
are L2-individual concepts, they are constant functions. Thus, if i and j 
coincide at a world w, then they coincide in every world.    
□ 
 
Again, due to the nature of the domain D in L2, we also have to change 
the definitions of ℓ[w] and ℓ|[w]|. 
 
Definition 4.25 
 
ℓ[w] = {d: d ∈ D and there is an individual concept i∈ℓ(w)  such that  
i(w) = d}. 
■ 
Definition 4.26 
 
ℓ|[w]| = {d: d ∈ D and there is an individual concept i∈ℓ(w)  for some 
w ∈ W such that i(w) = d}. 
■ 
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The notion of counterpart becomes dispensable in L2 for reasons that 
we shall see in the sequel. A model in L2 is defined as: 
 
 
Definition 4.27 (model) 
 
A model in L2 can then be defined as a triple 〈W, D, δ〉 such that:  
 
1. 〈W, D〉 is a model structure for L2; 
2. δ is an interpretation function assigning values to the non-logical 
constants of the language such that: it assigns an L2-individual concept 
to each individual constant c ∈ T of L2; an n-ary property to each n-
place predicate p ∈ P of L2; a sort to each sortal classifier S ∈ C of L2. 
3. The interpretation function δ must also satisfy the following the 
constraints (3) to (7) from definition 4.17. 
■ 
 
Suppose that c ∈ T is an individual constant of L2. According to 
definition 4.27 above, the interpretation function δ assigns to c a L2-
individual concept i of the model structure 〈W, D〉. Since i is a constant 
function, we have that the interpretation of an individual constant c (proper 
name) is world invariant. This amount to Kripkes thesis that proper names 
are rigid designators (Kripke, 1982) and conforms to Montagues meaning 
postulate for common nouns 1 (MP1) (Montague, 1974).  
Notice that (even without restriction (7) of definition 4.17) statements 
of relative identity cannot be expressed in L2. This is because individual 
constants are always interpreted as L2-individual concepts. Thus, if two 
individual concepts i,j that represent the intention of L2 constants coincide 
at a world, they coincide in every world (since they are constant functions), 
even if they do not belong to the same type. Moreover, notice that if S ∈ K 
is a kind, and ℓ the sort assigned to S by δ, then we have that ℓ[w] = 
ℓ|[w]|, for any w ∈ W. This is due to: (a) since S is a kind then ℓ is a 
constant function; (b) every individual concept in ℓ is a constant function. 
In other words, if S is a kind, then every object which is a possible S is 
actually an S.           
In the sequel we define an L2 assignment. 
 
Definition 4.28 (L2 assignment) 
 
An assignment for L2 relative to a model 〈W, D, δ〉 is a function that 
assigns to each variable of L2 an ordered pair 〈ℓ,d〉, where ℓ is a sort relative 
to the model structure 〈W,D〉 and d ∈ D. If a is an L2 assignment then ao(x) 
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is the object assigned to variable x by a and aS(x) is the sortal to which x is 
bound. Moreover, it is always the case that ao(x) ∈ aS(x)|[w]| for all 
variables. 
An L2 is almost identical to an L1 assignment, with the difference that in 
ordered pair 〈ℓ,d〉 assigned to a L2 variable by a, d ∈ D.    
■ 
 
An assignment a for L2 is an ℓ variant of a at x is defined exactly as in 
definition 4.19. Moreover, the notion of a w variant of an assignment a 
relative to w (definition 4.20) becomes dispensable, since in L2 we no 
longer have the notions of counterpart. 
We can then finally define the truth for formulas α in L2.  
 
Definition 4.29 
 
Finally, let α be an expression in L2 and, let the semantic value of α at 
world w in model M and relative to assignment a be the value of the valuation 
function vw aM , .  
With these definitions, we are able to define the semantics of L2 as 
follows: 
 
(a). For all cases described in (a) to (g) in definition 4.21, the valuation 
function in L2 has exactly the same value as their respectives in L1.  
(b). If α is the formula □A, then vw aM , (α) = T iff for all w ∈ W then 
vw aM' , (A) = T. Otherwise vw aM , (α) = F. 
■ 
 
The L1 rendering of the specification of figure 4.10 presented in the 
previous section is still a syntactically valid L2 specification. A L2 model for 
this specification is presented below: 
 
W = {w,w} 
D = {Δ,Φ,Θ} 
I = {john,mary,UT} 
 
Individual Concepts 
 
john(w) = Δ      john(w) = Δ 
mary(w) = Φ      mary(w) = Φ 
UT(w) = Θ      UT(w) = Θ 
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Interpretation of Sortals 
 
δ(Person)(w) = {john,mary}  δ(Person)(w) = {john,mary} 
δ(School)(w) = {UT}    δ(School)(w) = {UT} 
δ(Student)(w) = {john}   δ(Student)(w) = {mary} 
 
Interpretation of Predicates 
 
δ(enrolled-in)(w) = {<Δ,Θ>} δ(enrolled-in)(w) = {<Φ,Θ>} 
4.5 Related Work 
4.5.1 OntoClean 
The work presented in this chapter has been influenced by the OntoClean 
methodology, which proposes a number of methodological guidelines to 
evaluate the conceptual correctness of specialization relationships (Guarino 
& Welty, 2004, 2002a, 2002b). Despite bearing a strong similarity with 
OntoCleans useful property types, the stereotypes presented in table 4.1 
also hold some important differences. Firstly, rigid sortals in our typology 
are always considered to be independent. Examples of rigid sortals that are 
typically considered dependent are universals whose instances are features in 
the sense of (Gangemi et. al, 2003) (e.g., holes, bumps, stains). In the 
scope of this work, features are considered parts of their hosts (as opposed 
to moments inhering in them, see chapter 6) and therefore do not qualify as 
dependent entities according to the definition of Guarino and Welty. The 
relation between a feature and its host is, thus, considered one of inseparable 
parthood. We say, for instance, that a hole in a piece of cheese is an 
inseparable part of the cheese, not externally dependent on it (see chapter 6). 
Likewise, substantial individuals can have features as essential parts. For 
instance, the key whole of a locker may be considered an essential part of 
the locker. The distinctions between inseparable parts/mandatory wholes 
and essential/mandatory parts are explained in details in chapter 5 of this 
thesis. Another consequence of this choice is that categories, which typically 
represent abstractions of different kinds, are also always considered to be 
independent.  
A second difference exists regarding the use of the term mixin. In 
OntoClean, mixin is used to denote a combination (conjunction or 
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disjunction) of rigid and non-rigid properties which are subsumed by at 
least one sortal. Therefore, in this sense mixin is also a sortal. Another 
example is a combination of the kind CAT and the formal role WEAPON 
producing the semi-rigid CAT-or-WEAPON. We believe that the category 
denoted by this sense of the word mixin, although useful in structuring 
large ontologies, is of little use in conceptual modeling. Conversely, we use 
the term mixin here according to its widespread use in the object modeling 
community, i.e. as an abstract type that can classify instances of different 
classes but which has no direct instances (Booch, 1994). In this sense, 
mixins include category, role mixin but also what is called attribution in (Welty 
& Guarino, 2001). Moreover, the stereotype « roleMixin » used here posses 
the same meta-properties as the category of formal roles in OntoClean. As 
previously mentioned, role mixins include the category of formal roles but 
it also includes dispersive types which are abstractions of common 
properties of material roles.              
In OntoClean, the notion of dependence applied to roles is a weaker 
constraint than the one proposed here. In their case, a role classifier is 
regarded as notionally dependent on another classifier. For instance, the roles 
Offspring and Parent are notionally dependent on each other and, thus, for an 
instance x of Offspring to exist another individual y, instance of Parent, 
must also exist. The notion of notional dependence used is the one of 
(Simons, 1997). Here, this constraint is strengthened: x and y must also be 
related via a relationship r, where r is the restriction condition for the two 
roles. 
Finally, in Ontoclean, despite of having the same meta-properties, 
phases are not explicitly required to be defined as partitions of the 
supertypes they specialize. 
4.5.2 The BWW (Bunge-Wand-Weber) Approach 
An approach that shares the same objectives as the work presented here 
appears in (Evermann & Wand, 2001b; Parsons & Wand, 2000; Wand & 
Storey & Weber, 1999; Weber, 1997; Wand & Weber, 1989, 1993). In 
these articles, the authors report their results in mapping common 
conceptual modeling constructs to an upper level ontology. Their approach 
is based on the BWW ontology, a framework created by Yair Wand and 
Ron Weber on the basis of the original metaphysical theory developed by 
Mario Bunge in (Bunge, 1977). In (Evermann & Wand, 2001b), in 
particular, the authors propose that a UML class should be used to 
represent a BWW-natural kind (it should be equivalent to functional 
schema of a BWW-natural kind). A natural kind is defined by Bunge as a 
set of substantial things that share lawfully related properties. According to this 
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definition, the authors proposal for the interpretation of the UML class 
meta-construct is equivalent to that of kinds and subkinds (i.e. rigid sortals) 
defined in this chapter. A law is an essential property of its instances (by 
definition). Since a natural kind is a grouping of things that share these 
essential properties it is, also by definition, a rigid class. Equating a natural 
kind with the denotation of a substance sortal concept of substantials is in 
conformance with other works in the philosophical literature (Lowe, 1989; 
van Leeuwen, 1991). 
As demonstrated throughout this work, kinds constitute a subset of the 
category types that are necessary to represent the phenomena available in 
cognition and language. Therefore, a modeling construct representing a 
kind is only one of a set of modeling constructs that should be available to 
the conceptual modeler. For this reason, the typology of classifiers 
presented in this chapter is not only compatible with the proposals of the 
BWW approach but extends it towards a much richer system of ontological 
distinctions. 
4.5.3 The Approach of Wieringa, de Jong and Spruit 
In (Wieringa & de Jong & Spruit, 1995), the authors propose three 
distinctions in types of taxonomic structures that should be employed to 
model class migration in object-oriented modeling, namely, static and 
dynamic subclassing and role playing.  
An example of a static taxonomic structure is depicted in figure 4.11. A 
static structure is always defined as a partition of a superclass that is 
responsible for supplying a principle of identity for the instances of the 
subclass. The authors write: an instance of a subclass is identical to an instance 
of a superclass. In their approach, the superclass is responsible for 
generating identifiers for its instances and, hence, for the instances of its 
subclasses. The authors write that object identifiers have a 1-1 relationship with 
objects and that relation can never be changed, i.e., object identifiers are 
representation of proper names, as here conceived, and also comply with 
Kripkes requirement of rigidity for proper names. Moreover, instances of 
the subclass can never migrate to other subclasses in the partition. For 
instance, a Car can never become a Truck and vice-versa. Since Car and 
Truck define a partition, ergo, a Car (Truck) can never cease to be a Car 
(Truck) without ceasing to exist. We can conclude therefore that if we take 
a possibilist29 view on modality, the extensions of both the superclass and 
                                                      
29 In a possibilist approach of modal logics, quantifiers range over entities that possibly exist 
and, therefore, the domain of quantification is constant in every possible world. In 
actualism, in contrast, quantification considers what actually exist in each world (Fitting & 
Mendelsonh, 1998).  
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each of the subclasses in a static partition are modally constant. This is, 
however, not explicitly represented by the authors who take an actualist 
approach. In summary, the superclass and subclasses in a static partition are 
analogous to what we term here kind and subkind, respectively. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the authors, we do not require a subkind 
taxonomic structure to be always defined as a partition of the kind. 
Vehicle
Car Truck  
A dynamic structure in their approach is identical to what we term here a 
phase partition. Wieringa and colleagues also explicitly forbid the 
construction of models in which a static partition is followed upwards in 
the taxonomic structure by a dynamic partition, i.e., a subclass in a dynamic 
partition cannot be a superclass in a static one. This is equivalent to say, 
again if we take a possibilist interpretation of their approach, that a phased-
sortal cannot subsume a rigid sortal. The justification for this constraint in 
Wieringa et al. is that it enhances the intuitive structure of the models and simplifies 
their formalization. Since this constraint is equivalent to our postulate 4.3, the 
philosophical justification provided for the latter in section 4.1 can also 
serve as a justification for the former.  
One of the main differences between the approach of Wieringa et al. 
and the one proposed here is w.r.t. the category of role universals. In their 
approach a role universal is not a phased-sortal. Conversely, roles are rigid 
classifiers whose instances are said to be played by instances of ordinary 
(static and dynamic) types. The played by relation (also termed inheritance by 
delegation by the authors) between a role instance r and an object o implies 
that r is specifically existentially dependent on o. This means that r can only be 
played by o, and can only exist when being played by o. However, in 
contrast, o can possibly be associated via the play by relation to many 
instances of the role class (and to many different role classes). Unlike static 
and dynamic subtypes, role universals are not required to be defined in a 
partition. Moreover, role universals are responsible to supplying a principle 
of identity for its instances, which is different from the one supplied by the 
universals instantiated by their players.   
Figure 4.12 depicts an example of ordinary and a role universal 
according to the Wieringa, de Jong, and Spruit. 
Figure 4-11  Example of 
a static subclassing 
partition 
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Person Student
player
1 *  
Although mainly motivated by practical implementation issues, a sound 
philosophical interpretation can be given to role universals and role 
individuals as conceived by the authors. In chapter 7, we discuss in depth 
the relation between the notions of role as proposed by Wieringa, de Jong 
and Spruit and the one proposed in this chapter. We demonstrate that, 
albeit strongly related, the two notions of role refer to different ontological 
entities with incompatible meta-properties. Actually, an even stronger 
statement can be made: role instances in the two approaches do not even 
belong to the same meta-level ontological category. Our notion of role 
universal (as well as the other universals discussed in this chapter) refers to 
the ontological category of substantial universals. Role universals, as conceived 
by the authors, conversely, refer to universals whose instances are 
individualized properties, i.e., moment universals (see chapter 6).  
We demonstrate throughout this thesis that both notions of role are 
important for the theory and practice of conceptual modeling. However, we 
have some remarks about the notion of role as formulated by the authors: 
 
1. In discussing the relations between what they term roles and ordinary 
objects, Wieringa and colleagues refer to the philosophical logic relation 
of coincidence of objects (see subsection 4.4.2). For example, a student s 
and a person p that plays the role of a student in world w are said to 
coincide at w. In our perspective, since s is actually a moment, the 
relation between s and p in this case is a relation of inherence (see chapter 
6) and not one of coincidence. It is important to emphasize that that 
coinciding objects are not existentially dependent on each other. For 
instance, in the statue/lump of clay example previously mentioned, their 
lifecycles are completely independent but merely coincident at some 
possible worlds;  
 
2. In the way presented by the authors, role individuals should be 
interpreted as intrinsic individualized properties, since they are 
existentially dependent on a single individual. For instance, in the 
aforementioned example, the student s is dependent on person p. 
However, this is actually not the case. In fact, student s depends not 
only on person p but also on the existence of another individual, say e, 
instance of Educational Institution. Thus, s should be conceived as a 
relational individualized property (see chapter 6) not an intrinsic one. 
Figure 4-12  Example of 
Role and Role Player 
Universals 
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This problem becomes clear in our approach due to our relational 
restriction condition for role universals; 
 
3. Since no restriction is defined for the allowed type of a role universal, 
optional cardinalities must be represented in the authors approach (see 
figure 4.12). As argued in, for instance, (Weber, 1997; Wand & Storey 
& Weber, 1999), from an ontological standpoint, there is no such a 
thing as an optional property and, hence, the representation of optional 
cardinality constraints leads to unsound models (in the technical sense 
of chapter 2) with undesirable consequences in terms of clarity. 
Furthermore, as empirically demonstrated in (Bodard et al., 2001), 
conceptual models without optional properties lead to better 
performance in problem-solving tasks that require a deeper-level 
understanding of the represented domain.  
 
In summary, our approach is compatible with one proposed by 
Wieringa and colleagues. However, it also complements their approach 
by elaborating on the distinctions among the category of non-sortal 
universals, and by discussing the admissible relations between sortals 
and non-sortals. Moreover, by also considering the notion of roles as a 
substantial sortals, we extend their approach towards a more complete 
typology of sortals universals for conceptual modeling. 
These issues related to role modeling are comprehensively discussed 
in chapter 7 of this thesis.  
4.6 Final Considerations     
In this chapter, we present a well-founded theory of universals for 
conceptual (ontology) modeling. The theory proposed is founded in a 
number of results in the literature of philosophy of language and descriptive 
metaphysics and supported by substantial empirical evidence from research 
in cognitive psychology.  
In section 4.2, this theory is used in the definition of a modeling profile 
comprised of:  
 
(i) a set of stereotypes representing the ontological distinctions 
on types of substantial universals proposed by the theory 
(depicted in figure 4.1);  
 
(ii) Constraints on the possible relations to be established between 
these elements, representing the postulates of the theory.  
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In chapter 8, we again make use of the theory proposed here to analyze 
and extend the UML metamodel, in the main case study of this thesis.   
The use of the modeling profile proposed here to address relevant 
modeling problems in conceptual (ontology) representation in this chapter 
is only briefly illustrated by examples. In chapter 7 of this thesis, the profile 
is used in to develop a design pattern that captures a solution to a recurrent 
real-world problem in role modeling with disjoint allowed types discussed in the 
literature. Additionally, in chapter 8, the ontologically well-founded version 
of UML which is produced in conformance with the theory presented here 
is employed to analyze and integrate concurrently developed semantic web 
(lightweight) ontologies in the scope of a context-aware service platform.     
In order to formally characterize the ontological distinctions and 
postulates proposed by the theory, we have presented two extensions to 
traditional systems of quantified modal logics, namely, the languages L1 and 
L2 discussed in section 4.4. These languages are far from complete and 
could be extended in many ways. For example, order-sorted extensions in 
the lines of (Kaneiwa & Mizoguchi, 2004) or of the dynamic database logic 
presented in (Wieringa & de Jong & Spruit, 1995) could be proposed. 
Moreover, in an alternative formulation, the constraints imposed to the 
interpretation functions of L1 and L2 could be directly considered in the 
object language, as in the sortal logic proposed by (Lowe, 1989) or as in the 
system proposed by (Freund, 2000). In the latter, not only quantification 
and identity are restricted by sortal concepts but (second-order) 
quantification over sortal concepts is also part of the language. The 
objective here, instead, is only to formally characterize in a simpler way the 
distinction between rigid and non-rigid sortal universals and the important 
distinction between sortals and non-sortals w.r.t. to the formers exclusive 
ability to supply a principle of persistence and transworld identity to its 
instances. 
 Chapter 5 
5. Parts and Wholes 
In this chapter we aim at developing an ontological well-founded theory of 
conceptual part-whole relations.  
Parthood is a relation of significant importance in conceptual 
modeling, being present in practically all conceptual/object-oriented 
modeling languages (e.g., OML, UML, EER, LINGO). Although it has not 
yet been adopted as a modeling primitive in the semantic web languages, 
some authors have already pointed out its relevance for reasoning in 
description logics (e.g., Lambrix, 2000). Nonetheless, in many of these 
languages, the concepts of part and whole are understood only intuitively, 
or are based on the very minimal axiomatization that these notions require. 
In addition to that, despite of being an active topic in the conceptual 
modeling literature, there is still much disagreement on what characterizes 
this relation and about the properties that part-whole relations should have 
from a conceptual point of view (Saksena et al., 1998; Snoek & Dedene, 
2001; Pribbenow, 2002; Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001; 
Odell, 1998).       
Part-whole relations are also fundamental from a cognitive perspective, 
i.e., for the realization of many important cognitive tasks (Tversky, 1989), 
and as a foundation for the formalization of other entities that compose our 
ontology. For these reasons, a theory of parts and wholes is considered as a 
fundamental part of any foundational ontology, regardless if it is a revisionary 
or a descriptive metaphysics effort (Bunge, 1977; Masolo et al., 2003a; 
Heller & Herre, 2004).  
Theories of parts (Mereologies) have been a central point of interest 
since the pre-socratic philosophers and along the years many precise 
theories have been developed. These formal theories provide an important 
starting point for the understanding and axiomatization of the notion of 
part, and for this reason they are discussed in section 5.1. Nonetheless, 
despite of their importance, there are many controversial properties 
ascribed to the part-whole relation by these theories that cannot be 
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accepted by cognitive and conceptual theories of parthood. These 
controversial properties are discussed in section 5.2.   
On one hand, formal theories of parts are ontologically extravagant and 
non-parsimonious, allowing for the existence of entities and for the 
derivation of transitive relations that are not accepted by cognition. On the 
other hand, they are too weak to characterize what makes something an 
integral whole composed of many parts. We thus need a theory of wholes, 
asides from a theory of parts. For this reason, in section 5.3, we discuss the 
topic of a principle of unity (which relates the parts composing a whole), and 
its relation to the transitivity of parthood.  
Another problematic feature of formal mereologies is the non-
differentiation among the roles that parts play within the structure of an 
aggregate, i.e., perceiving all parts as being of the same type. An important 
issue in any conceptual theory of parthood is to stipulate the different status 
that parts can have w.r.t. the whole they compose. For instance: (i) whether 
objects can share parts; (ii) whether an object only exists being part of a 
specific whole (or of a whole of certain kind); (iii) whether an object only 
exists having a specific object as part (or a part of a specific kind). These 
different modes of associations, known as secondary characteristics of parthood, 
are discussed in section 5.4.       
In section 5.5, we discuss in depth a classical linguistic study about 
meronymic relations, which propose a typology of different types of 
parthood, as well as a refinement of this study that aims towards a typology 
of cognitive part-whole relations.  
In section 5.6, we demonstrate how the different types of parthood 
relations elaborated in the typology presented in section 5.5 can be 
exploited to derive more direct guidelines for prescribing and proscribing 
transitive parthood relations.     
Section 5.7 discusses some relevant related work and section 5.8 
elaborates on some final considerations related to the chapter. 
5.1 Formal Theories of Parts 
The study of parthood relations can be traced back to the early days of 
philosophy, beginning with the presocratic atomists and continuing 
throughout the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and the early Kant, to 
cite just a few. The first attempt at a rigorous formulation of the theory was 
made by Edmond Husserl, (see his third Logical Investigation (Husserl, 
1970)), but the first completely theory of parts, named Mereology (from the 
Greek μερος, part), was proposed in 1916 by the Polish philosopher 
Stanislaw Lesniewski (Lesniewski, 1992), who used the part-whole relation 
as a substitute for the class membership in standard set theory. This theory 
 FORMAL THEORIES OF PARTS 143 
was later elaborated by Leonard and Goodman in their The Calculus of 
Individuals (Leonard & Goodman, 1940). 
Lesniewski's Mereology and The Calculus of Individuals have been used as a 
common basis for almost all developments in theories of parthood that we 
have in formal ontology today. An exception is the Assembly Theory developed 
in (Bunge, 1977). We shall also consider Bunges theory in the analysis that 
follows, since it has been applied by the conceptual modeling community as 
a foundation for the part-whole relation in conceptual modeling. 
As conveyed by the name Calculus of Individuals, these theories describe 
relations among individuals, irrespective of their ontological nature or the 
meta-level category to which they belong. In other words, the relata can be 
as different as material bodies, events, geographical regions or abstract 
entities. Mereologies are formal (i.e., domain independent) theories, which 
formally characterize the principles underlying the relations between an 
entity and its constituent parts, just like set theory formally characterizes 
the underlying relationships between a class and its members.   
The presentation and axiomatization of the different mereological 
theories in this section is based on (Varzi, 1996, 2003), (Simons, 1987) 
and (Herre & Heller, 2004).    
5.1.1 Core Concepts (Minimal Mereology) 
In all philosophical theories of parts, including Lesniewskis mereology, the 
Calculus of Individuals and the Assembly theory, the relation of parthood stands 
for a partial ordering, i.e., a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation. 
This is reflected in the following axioms, in which ≤ symbolizes the relation 
of parthood: 
 
(1). ∀x (x ≤ x)  
(2). ∀x,y (x ≤ y) ∧ (y ≤ x) → (x = y)  
(3). ∀x,y,z (x ≤ y) ∧ (y ≤ z) → (x ≤ z)  
  
These axioms amount to what is referred in the literature by the name 
of Ground Mereology (M), which is the core of any theory of parts.   
Taking reflexivity (and antisymmetry) as constitutive of the meaning of 
part implies regarding identity as a limit case of parthood. A stronger 
proper part relation (<), whereby nothing counts as part of itself, can thus 
be defined in terms of this one: 
 
(4). (x < y) =def (x ≤ y) ∧ ¬(y ≤ x)  
 
and consequently the following equivalence holds 
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(5) ∀x,y (x ≤ y) ↔ (x < y) ∨ (x = y) 
 
The proper part (<) relation is a strict partial ordering, i.e., an 
asymmetric and transitive relation, from which irreflexivity follows: 
 
(6). ∀x ¬(x < x)  
(7). ∀x,y (x < y) → ¬(y < x)  
(8). ∀x,y,z (x < y) ∧ (y < z) → (x < z)  
 
In summary, if we interpret the concept of being a part as that of being a 
proper part, we have that for all individuals x,y,z:  
 
(i) x is not a part of itself;  
(ii) if x is part of y then y is not part of x; 
(iii) if x is part of y and y is part of z then x is part of z. 
   
Either the proper part of or improper part of relations can be taken as 
primitive, and the choice is more a matter of convenience than anything 
else. While the former is a more natural concept, the latter is algebraically 
more convenient.  
Another important relation in theories of parts is that of overlapping. We 
say that two individuals overlap (•) if they have a part in common. This also 
includes the case in which one is part of another and also the case of 
identity. Overlap is, hence, reflexive and symmetric but not transitive: 
 
(9). (x • y) =def ∃z (z ≤ x) ∧ (z ≤ y)  
(10). ∀x  (x • x) 
(11). ∀x,y  (x • y) → (y • x) 
 
When two individuals overlap but neither is a part of the other then we 
say that they properly overlap (°): 
 
(12). (x ° y) =def (x • y) ∧ ¬(x ≤ y) ∧ ¬(y ≤ x) 
 
The example of a proper overlap depicted in figure 5.1 below makes it clear 
that overlapping is the mereological counterpart of the intersect relation in 
set theory. 
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x y z
 
If (and only if) two individuals x and y do not overlap, they are said to be 
disjoint. In other words, x and y are disjoint iff they have no part in common 
(e.g., x and z in figure 5.1). Disjointness (∫) can be defined as follows:  
 
(13). (x ∫ y) =def ¬(x • y)  
 
Like overlapping, disjointness is symmetric 
 
(14). ∀x,y  (x ∫ y) → (y ∫ x) 
 
The axioms (1-3) define the minimal (partial ordering) constrains that 
every relation must fulfill to be considered a part of relation. Although 
necessary, these constraints are not sufficient, i.e., it is not the case any 
partial ordering qualifies as a parthood relation. For example, the diagram 
of figure 5.2.a depicts a situation with only two objects x and y, such that y 
is a proper part of x. This represents a model of the ground mereology (in the 
logical sense), but which can hardly be considered a part of relation, since 
whenever an object has a proper part, it has more than one, as in the case 
depicted in figure 5.2.b. The question mark in figure 5.2.a, thus, represents 
an inexistent proper part of x that would be assumed to exist were y to be 
considered a part of x  
y
x
? y
y
z
(a) (b)  
Models such as the one of figure 5.2.a are thus excluded by the follow 
ing additional constraint: 
 
(15). ∀x,y (y < x) → ∃z (z < x) ∧ (z ∫ y)  
 
Formula (15) is termed in the literature the weak supplementation 
principle, and the theory composed by (1-3) and (15) is named the Minimal 
Mereology (MM). Some authors (e.g., Simons, 1987), regard (15) as 
Figure 5-1  Example of a 
proper overlap between 
individuals x and y, and 
y and z 
Figure 5-2  (a) Example 
of a model that does not 
satisfy the weak 
supplementation axiom 
(15); (b) Example of a 
model of minimal 
mereology 
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constitutive of the meaning of part and, hence, consider (1-3) plus (15) as 
the minimal constraints that a mereological theory should incorporate. 
Traditionally, MM has been extended in two different ways, both of 
which have been subject to philosophical controversy. These two extensions 
are discussed in the sequel. 
5.1.2 From Minimal to Extensional Mereology 
The first extension to MM has been created by strengthening the 
supplementation principle represented by (15). In this system, (15) is thus 
replaced by the following stronger supplementation axiom:     
 
(16). ∀x,y ¬(y ≤ x) → ∃z (z ≤ y) ∧ (z ∫ x) 
 
This axiom states that if an individual y is not a part of another individual x 
then there is a part of y which does not overlap with x. This includes the 
cases depicted in figure 5.3. In both figures 5.3.a (x < y) and 5.3.b (y ° x), 
there is a part z of y, which is disjoint (does not overlap) with x. In figure 
5.3.c (y ∫ x), every part of y is disjoint with x. 
x
y
z z q
y x
w
y x
z
(a) (b) (c)  
Formula (16) is named the strong supplementation principle, and the 
theory that incorporates (1-3), (15) and (16) is named Extensional Mereology 
(EM). 
If the axioms of ground mereology are assumed (1-3), then (16) implies 
(15). However, the converse is not true. For instance, the situation 
represented in figure 5.4 depicts a MM-model that is not a valid EM-
model. In this example, x and y are two distinct entities (symbolized by the 
double line) but that are composed of the same parts. Every part of x (and 
y) is supplemented by the other one so that (15) is satisfied. However, the 
same does not hold for (16), i.e., y is not a part of x, but there is no part of 
y  that is disjoint with x.  
Figure 5-3  Examples of 
models of extensional 
mereology. In (a), x is a 
proper part of y; in (b), x 
and y properly overlap; 
in (c), x and y are 
disjoint. In each of these 
cases, y is not a part of x 
and, therefore, there is 
always a part of y that 
does not overlap with x. 
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The name Extensional Mereology is exactly motivated by the exclusion of 
countermodels such as the one figure 5.4. In fact, the following is a 
theorem of EM: 
 
(17) ∃z (z < x) → (∀z  ((z < x) → (z < y)) → (z ≤ y))  
 
from which it follows that  
 
(18) ∃z (z < x) ∨ (z < y) → ((x=y) ↔ ∀z ((z < x) ↔ (z < y))) 
 
Theorem (18) states that two objects are identical iff they have the same 
(proper) parts30. This is the mereological counterpart of the extensionality 
principle in set theory, which states that two sets are identical iff they have 
the same members. The philosophical controversy of EM arises exactly 
because of this axiom. In a multiplicationist ontology (Masolo et. al, 2003a) 
such as the one proposed here, we can have continuants that share the same 
parts but which are not identical. To use an example already mentioned in 
chapter 4, a statue and a lump of clay can be composed of the same parts. 
They are, nonetheless, diverse, since they possess incompatible meta-
properties. We return to this point in section 5.2.2. 
5.1.3 From Extensional to Classical Mereology 
A second way that MM has been extended is with the aim to provide a 
number of closure operations to the mereological domain. As discussed, for 
example, in (Varzi, 1996, 2003) and (Simons, 1987), theories named CMM 
(Closure Minimal Mereology) and CEM (Closure Extensional Mereology) can be 
obtained by extending MM and EM with the following operations: 
 
a) Sum: also named mereological fusion (or juxtaposition in the case of 
Assembly Theory). The sum z of two objects x and y, symbolized as 
Sum(z,x,y), is the entity such that every object that overlaps with z, 
overlaps either with x or with y (or with both); 
                                                      
30An analogue for the improper part-of is already provable in M due to the reflexivity and 
antisymmetry of ≤.  
Figure 5-4  Two distinct 
entities that are 
composed of the same 
parts; example of a 
model of minimal 
mereology that is not a 
model of extensional 
mereology 
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 (19) Sum(z,x,y) =def ∀w((w • z) ↔((w • x) ∨ (w • y))) 
 
b) Product: also named superposition (in Assembly Theory). The product 
of two objects x and y is the entity z such that every part of z is either 
part of x or y;  
 
 (20) Pro(z,x,y) =def ∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ((w ≤ x) ∧ (w ≤ y))) 
 
c) Difference: the difference of two objects x and y is the entity z such 
that every part of z is part of x and does not overlap with y;   
 
 (21) Dif(z,x,y) =def ∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ((w ≤ x) ∧ ¬(w • y))) 
 
d) Complement: the complement of an entity x is the entity z such that 
every part of z does not overlap with x; 
 
 (22) Comp(z,x) =def ∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ¬(w • x)) 
 
These operations are the mereological counterpart of the set 
theoretical operations of union, intersection, set difference and complement of a 
set, respectively. In the presence of the extensionality principle, the zs that 
are the results of these operations are unique. Thus, for example, in an 
extensional mereology, if two objects x and y overlap then there is a unique 
entity z that is composed of the common parts of x and y. In particular, the 
existence of the product and difference of two individuals x and y, and of 
the complement of an individual x, are only guaranteed in certain cases. 
These conditions are expressed in formulas (23-25) below, respectively.  
  
(23) ∀x,y (x • y) → ∃z∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ((w ≤ x) ∧ (w ≤ y))) 
(24) ∀x∃y ¬(y ≤ x) → ∃z∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ((w ≤ x) ∧ ¬(w • y))) 
(25) ∀x∃y ¬(x • y) → ∃z∀w((w ≤ z) ↔ ¬(w • x)) 
 
The mereological sum (Sum), conversely, is guaranteed by the presence 
of an entity, termed the Universe of which everything is part (Simons, 
1987):   
 
(26) Universe(z) =def ∀x (x ≤ z) 
 
Once more, in an extensional mereology, the universe z is unique. The 
existence of a null individual that is part of everything would also 
guarantee the existence of the product and difference for any two 
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individuals, and the existence of a complement for any individual. However, 
most theories do not define such an entity. An exception is Bunges 
Assembly theory (Bunge, 1977).  
As demonstrated in (Simons, 1987), if the product operator is 
functional then the strong supplementation axiom (16) is implied by the 
weak supplementation principle (15). As a consequence, CMM and CEM 
collapse in one single theory.  
Finally, traditionally, unrestricted operations of fusion and product are 
also defined for closure mereologies. For the (unrestricted) mereological sum 
we define the following formula schema: 
 
(27) ∃xF(x) → ∃z∀y((y • z) ↔ ∃w(F(w) ∧ (y • w)) 
 
This expresses that for every satisfied predicate F there is an entity 
consisting of all those things that satisfy F or, to put it differently, z is the 
sum of the arbitrary non-empty set of entities wi such that F(wi) holds. 
Once more, in the presence of extensionality (16), the entity which is the 
sum of all entities satisfying predicate F has its uniqueness guaranteed. In 
this case, we can define a general sum as:  
 
(28) σxF(x) =def  ιz∀y((y • z) ↔ ∃w(F(w) ∧ (y • w)) 
 
The product of all members of a set G of overlapping objects can be 
defined as follows: Let W be set of all those things that are part of every 
member of set G, i.e.,  
 
(29) ∀x W(x) ↔ ∀y (G(y) → (x ≤ y)) 
 
The unrestricted product of all members of set G can, hence, be defined as 
the sum of all members of W, that is, by replacing F for W in the formula 
schema (27). The result of adding schema (27) to CMM or CEM is a theory 
named GEM (General Extensional Mereology) or Classical Extensional Mereology. 
 As demonstrated, for instance, in (Varzi, 2003), all closure operations 
(19-22) can be defined via choice of suitable predicates F to be substituted 
in (27). This gives the full strength of GEM, which has the algebraic 
structure of a quasi-boolean algebra (boolean algebra with a zero element 
removed)31.  
Figure 5.5 below represents schematically the logical space of these 
different mereological theories. 
                                                      
31 In the case of Bunges Assembly theory, it is as expressive as a complete Boolean lattice. 
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Ground Mereology 
(Partial Order)
Minimal Mereology 
(+ Weak Supplementation)
Extensional Mereology 
(+ Strong Supplementation, 
Extensionality principle )
Closure Extensional Mereology = 
Closure Minimal Mereology 
(+ Closure Operations, uniqueness condition)
General Extensional Mereology 
(+ Unrestricted Fusion)
 
A final way to extend the theories in figure 5.5 is by considering the issue of 
Atomism. A mereological atom is an entity that has no proper parts:       
 
(30) At(x) =def ¬∃y (y < x) 
 
 In an atomistic mereology everything has atomic parts, i.e., 
 
(31) ∀x ∃y At(y) ∧ (y ≤ x) 
 
 Conversely, in an atomless mereology the following axiom holds: 
 
 (32) ¬∃x At(x) 
 
Formulas (31) and (32) are clearly incompatible, but taken in isolation 
they can be added to any of the theories depicted in figure 5.5. In other 
words, the question of atomism is ortogonal and compatible to any of the 
mereologies discussed so far. Adding (31) to a theory X yields its atomistic 
version AX, whereas adding (32) yields its corresponding atomless version 
AX.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize two important features of 
atomistic mereologies: 
 
1. Atomistic mereologies (and only them) admit finite models, i.e., 
decomposition of parts must eventually come to an end; 
Figure 5-5  Relations 
between different 
mereological theories. 
The arrows go from the 
weaker to the stronger 
theory 
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2. When atoms are considered, important simplifications can be made to 
many of the axioms discussed so far (Varzi, 2003). For instance, the 
weak supplementation principle (15) can be replaced by  
 
(33) ∀x,y (y < x) → ∃z At(z) ∧ (z < x) ∧ ¬(z < y) 
5.2 Problems with Mereology as a Theory of 
Conceptual Parts 
Mereology has shown itself useful for many purposes in mathematics and 
philosophy (Varzi, 1996; Simons, 1987). Moreover, it provides a sound 
formal basis for the analysis and representation of the relations between 
parts and wholes, and among parts that compose a whole, regardless of 
their specific nature. However, as pointed out by (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 
1995) and (Pribbenow, 2002) (among other authors), it contains many 
problems that make it hard to directly apply it as a theory of conceptual 
parts. As it shall become clear in the discussion that follows, on one hand 
the theory is too strong, postulating constraints that cannot be accepted to 
hold generally for part-whole relations on the conceptual level. On the 
other hand, it is too weak to characterize the distinctions that mark the 
different types of conceptual part-whole relations. 
We shall carry out our discussion in a bottom-up approach w.r.t. figure 
5.5, i.e., we first discuss the problems of the basic axioms of Ground 
Mereology, and then continue upwards in the graph discussing the 
problems of stronger theories. 
5.2.1 Conceptual Problems in Ground Mereology 
Let us take the proper-part relation, which better reflects our common 
sense notion of part. According to the axioms (6-8), proper parthood is an 
irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation. Irreflexivity and 
antisymmetry are generally accepted as meta-properties that all (proper) 
part-whole relations should have. However, the same does not hold for 
transitivity. Take as examples the following cases:  
 
(i) The hand is part of the arm 
 The arm is part of the person  
 Ergo, the hand is part of the person 
 
(ii) A person is part of the KR (Knowledge Representation) group 
 The KR group is part of the AI (Artificial Intelligence) group   
 Ergo, the person is part of the AI group 
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In these two examples, transitivity holds without a problem. However, 
putting (i) and (ii) together, the following fallacious argument can be 
constructed: 
 
(iii) The hand is part of the person 
   The person is part of the KR group  
  (?) The hand is part of the KR group 
 
Another example where transitivity fails is the following: 
    
(iv) Eschede is part of The Netherlands 
  The Netherlands is part of the European Union   
  (?) Enschede is part of the European Union 
 
In (iii) and (iv), the problem arises because the mereological parthood 
relation fails in taking into account the different roles that parts play within 
the whole. In order to do this, we must complement mereology (the theory 
of parts) with a theory of wholes (Gangemi et al., 2001), in which the 
relations that tie the parts of a whole together are also considered. In 
section 5.3, we use a theory of integral wholes (Simons, 1987) to address 
the problem of transitivity in conceptual part-whole relations. We advocate 
that conceptual parthood relations should not be interpreted in an 
unconstrained manner, but always in regards to a specific context, and that 
these contexts demarcate the scopes in which transitivity can be guaranteed 
to hold. Moreover, we claim that understanding and defining what a 
context is amounts to the same task as understanding what makes 
something an integral whole. Finally, as we demonstrate in section 5.5, 
there is not just one, but many distinct notions of conceptual parts, and the 
issue of transitivity must be considered differently for each of these notions.    
 Finally, something that becomes clear in section 5.3 is that, although we 
deal with atomistic theories, the notion of atom as defined in the classical 
theories is too coarse. When defining contextual parthood, asides from 
absolute atoms, we need the notion of atoms relative to a given context or 
level. 
5.2.2 Conceptual Problems in Extensional Mereology 
The problem with extensional mereologies from a conceptual point of view 
arises from the introduction of the strong supplementation principle and, 
consequently, of formula (16) which states that objects are completely 
defined by their parts. In EM (and all its extensions), two objects are 
identical iff they have the same (proper) parts. This is the mereological 
counterpart of the extensionality principle in set theory, and the problems 
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associated with extensionality in part-whole relations from a conceptual 
point of view are similar to those associated with equating universals with 
sets in classical nominalistic theories of universals (Armstrong, 1989).  
Take, for example, an organization A composed by the members John, 
Peter and Mary. Now suppose a different organization B, composed of 
exactly the same members. According to (16) the following can be 
observed:  
 
(i).  A and B are identical;  
(ii).  If John leaves organization A then the organization A whose  
 members   are now only Peter and Mary is not the same organization 
 as A;  
(iii) since John did not leave organization B, organizations A and B are 
  identical in world w but not in world w.  
 
In parity with authors such as (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995), we believe 
that these conclusions are unacceptable. First, we can easily imagine two 
different organizations which share the same members. Imagine the 
situation in which John Lennon, Paul McCartney, George Harrison and 
Ringo Star are also the members of the indoor football team Liverpool F.C. 
The Beatles and the Liverpool F.C. are clearly different individuals despite 
of sharing the same parts. Not only they might obey completely different 
principles of identity but also their members play completely different roles 
within the internal structure of the composite. Using the same example, (ii) 
is clearly false for the case of The Beatles, since Ringo Star replaced Pete 
Best without spawning the creation of a new entity (and destruction of the 
former). Finally, (iii) is simply unacceptable because it contradicts Leibnizs 
Law (see chapter 4), which is accepted as an axiom in practically all theories 
of identity (van Leeuwen, 1991).           
 Examples such as this one can be found for many non-identical 
entities that happen to coincide in a certain world (e.g., the statue and 
lump of clay example previously discussed). In summary, extensional 
theories differentiate entities that in common sense we deem as the same 
and equate entities that we deem different. Moreover, it rejects the 
(strongly supported) claim defended in chapter 4 that there are several 
distinct principles of identity that are employed by human cognition. To 
accept extensionality amounts to the same as accepting the existence of one 
single principle of identity, namely, the extensionality principle. As discussed in 
section 4.3, the only period in which humans employ a unique principle of 
individuation and identity is in the pre-language period when they are 
younger than 9-months old. In this period, infants judgment of identity 
statements is supported by the unique sortal maximally-self-connected-
physical-object, i.e., the notion of an object with clear boundary contrasts 
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with its background and whose parts move along together with the whole 
(van Leeuwen, 1991, part 3). Perhaps, extensionality holds for this 
primitive notion of physical object as well as for amounts of matter (see 
section 5.5.1 of this chapter) but it certainly does not hold in general for 
substantials. Furthermore, as demonstrated by (Xu, 2004), this initial 
object-based individual system is overridden later in human cognition by a 
kind-based system with a multitude of sortal-supplied principles of identity.            
A different perspective on this problem is that extensionality considers 
all parts of an entity as essential, i.e., an entity is equal to the mereological 
sum of its parts, thus, changing any of its parts changes the identity of that 
entity. Ergo, an entity cannot exist without each of its parts, which is the 
same as saying that all its parts are essential. This conclusion is clearly false 
for many objects accounted by common sense. For example, as a person, 
there are many parts that I can loose without ceasing to be the same. For 
instance, during a persons lifetime one typically looses hair, teeth and nails. 
There are also more tragic cases when one can loose a member such as a 
finger, an arm or a leg. In fact, during a lifetime a person changes all cells in 
her body! Nonetheless, none of these changes alter the identity of the 
individual in question. This is not to say that there are no essential parts in 
the human body. For instance, one cannot survive without a heart or a 
brain. Additionally, despite that both relations person/heart and 
person/brain constitute ontological dependence relations, they are of quite 
diverse nature. Whilst in the former, we have a case of generic dependency; 
the latter exemplifies a case of specific existential dependency that 
characterizes real essential parts.  
 In summary, while some parts of a common sense object are essential, 
not all of them are essential. This topic is thoughtfully discussed in section 
5.4.2. 
5.2.3 Conceptual Problems in General Extensional Mereology 
From a conceptual point of view, the problem with the theory of General 
(Classical) Extensional Mereology is related to formula schema (27), which 
defines the existence of a sum (or fusion) for any arbitrary non-empty (but 
non-necessarily finite) set of entities. Just as in set theory one can create a 
set containing arbitrary members, in GEM one can create a new object by 
summing up individuals that can even belong to different ontological meta-
categories. For example, in GEM, the individual Θ created by the sum of 
Noam Chomskys left foot, the first act of Puccinis Turandot and the 
number 3, is an entity considered as legitimate as any other.  
In the literature, this feature of GEM is termed ontological extravagance, 
referring to the commitment of the theory to the existence of a wealth of 
entities that are utterly counterintuitive and that have no place in human 
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cognition. In addition, GEM is also deemed to be ontologically exuberant, 
since it dramatically increases the number of entities to be included in the 
inventory of the domain (Varzi, 2003).  
As argued by (Pribbenow, 2002), humans only accept the summation 
of entities if the resulting mereological sum plays some role in their 
conceptual schemes. To use an example cited by Pribbenow: the sum of a 
frame, a piece of electrical equipment and a bulb constitutes an integral 
whole that is considered meaningful to our conceptual classification system. 
For this reason, this sum deserves a specific concept in cognition and name 
in human language. The same does not hold for the sum of bulb and the 
lamps base. Another example of meaningful sums occurs when entities are 
summed up to provide a target for a linguistic plural reference such as in 
two of the children of my sister. 
A way to understand why only meaningful sums are accepted by 
cognition is to recall the purpose of classification in our conceptual system. 
As discussed in chapter 4, the ability to categorize is central for our 
construal of the environment, and without it, learning would be hardly 
possible. For example, if I am able to recognize that Felix is an instance of 
the category Cat, then I am able to infer that it has all the properties that I 
know that apply to cats. Additionally, all properties that I come to learn 
about Felix can be carried out to other cats that I may encounter. Finally, as 
point out by (Milikan, 1998; Mcnamara, 1986; Schuun & Vera, 1995), our 
cognitive system seems to be specially tuned to form conceptual categories 
that are based on a common essence, supported by a theory-based 
explanation for their principle of application (see section 5.8). This is 
because these are the categories that provide the most useful sources for 
inductive knowledge. In this perspective, what is the point for our cognitive 
system to recognize the existence of entities as unique and alien as the 
mereological sum Θ aforementioned? What properties can we expect Θ to 
have? What can we learn about it that can be carried to other individuals? 
 For this reason, we advocate that a theory of conceptual part-whole 
relations should forbid the construction of unrestricted sums, and formula 
schema (27) should only be defined for predicates that represent genuine 
universals (see discussion on chapter 6). In contrast, the notions of integrity 
and unifying condition that comprise a theory of wholes should be taken 
seriously. This is to say that a theory of conceptual parts and wholes should 
only countenance the existence of composite objects that are unified by 
bona fide unifying conditions. These issues are discussed in depth in section 
5.3 below. 
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5.3 Integral Wholes 
As we have previously discussed, one of the major conceptual problems 
with Classical Extensional Mereology comes from the generalized fusion 
axiom, which allows for the existence of a sum (or fusion) for any arbitrary 
non-empty set of entities. For example, it allows for the definition of an 
aggregate composed by the state of California and the number 3. A question 
that comes to the mind is: If these entities are unobjectionable from a 
formal point of view, why are they deemed unnatural by common sense? 
Or, equivalently, what makes an aggregation such as car, a football team, a 
forest, a human body, to be accounted as a natural conceptual whole?  
According to (Simons, 1987), the difference between purely formal 
ontological sums and, what he terms, integral wholes is an ontological one, 
which can be understood by comparing their existence conditions. For 
sums, these conditions are minimal: the sum exist just when the constituent 
parts exist. By contrast, for an integral whole (composed of the same parts 
of the corresponding sum) to exist, a further unifying condition among the 
constituent parts must be fulfilled.     
The distinction between a mere sum and an integral whole also appears 
in (Bunge, 1977, 1979) in the form of the distinction between, what he 
terms, a mere aggregate and a system. Bunge defines a mere aggregate as a 
compound thing, the components of which are not coupled, link, 
connected or bounded [, and which] therefore lacks integrity or unity 
(Bunge, 1979, p.4). In contrast, the components of system are 
interrelated rather than loose.  
Let us start by defining the Bungean concept of a link, coupling or bond 
among two things. Bunge explicitly states that [w]e must distinguish 
between a mere relation, such as that of being older, and a connection, such 
as that of exerting pressure. [T]wo things are connected (or coupled, or 
linked, or bounded) if at least one of them acts upon the otherwhere the 
action need not consist in eventuating something but  one thing acts 
upon the another if it modifies the latter history (p.6).  
Bunge emphasizes the distinction between the composition of a system and 
the merely formal notion of composition: A social system is a set of 
socially linked animals. The brains of such individuals are parts of the latter 
but do not qualify as members of components of a social system because 
they do not enter independently in social relations: only entire animals can 
hold social relations. In other words, the composition of a social system is 
not the collection of its parts but just the set of its atoms, i.e., those parts 
that are socially connectable (ibid., p.5).  
The relative composition of a system can thus be defined as follows: 
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Definition 5.1 (relative composition): Let S be the set of substantial 
individuals, and let the composition of a system x ∈ S be defined as  
 
(34). C(x) = {y | y ≤ x}. 
 
 Then the A-composition of a system x is defined as  
 
(35). CA (x) = {y ∈ A| y ≤ x},  
 
or simply, CA(x) = C(x) ∩ A. The set A ⊆ S is said to contain the A-atoms 
of x. 
■ 
 
Although this notion conceptualizes an important intuition, it begs some 
important clarifications. To start of with, Bunge is not explicit on how to 
define the set of atoms A. However, the text makes clear that the elements 
of A must be those elements in the world that participate in certain bonding 
relations. He uses examples such as: the molecular composition of a mass of 
water is the set of H2O molecules that are part of that mass, which, hence, 
excludes individual Hydrogen and Oxygen atoms. Alternatively, one could 
say that the molecular composition of a mass of water is composed by the 
set of parts of that mass that can engage in molecular relations. An 
analogous argument can be made in the case of a social system 
aforementioned: the set of social atoms of a system is composed by those 
parts of the system that can engage in social relations.  For instance, the 
social composition of a school is the set of staff and pupils, which are held 
together by relations of teaching and learning, managing and being 
managed, among others (Bunge, ibid., p.5). 
Some important notions that can be used to provide a foundation for 
the set of A-atoms of a system have been proposed by the philosopher Peter 
Simons in (Simons, 1987), namely, the notions of a R-closed, R-connected and 
R-closure system. 
 
Definition 5.2 (R-closed): A set B is closed under a relationship R, or 
simply R-closed, iff  
 
(36). cl 〈R〉 B =def ∀x (x∈B) → ((∀y R(x,y) ∨ R(y,x) → (y∈B)), 
 
i.e., the relationship R does not cross Bs borders in any direction.    
■ 
 
Definition 5.3 (R-connected): A set B is connected under the relation 
R, or simply, R-connected iff  
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(37). con 〈R〉 B =def ∀x (x∈B) → (∀y (y∈B) → (R(x,y) ∨ R(y,x)), 
 
i.e., every member of B bears a relation with another member of B.  
■ 
 
Definition 5.4 (R-closure system): A set B is a closure system under the 
relation R, or simply, R-closure system iff  
 
(38). cs 〈R〉 B =def  (cl 〈R〉 B)  ∧ (con 〈R〉 B), 
 
i.e., iff it is both connected and closed under R. 
■ 
 
Definition 5.5 (A-parthood): Let the set of A-atoms of a system x be 
defined in terms of a relationship R, such that A is a set of parts of x that 
form a closure system under R. In this case, x is said to be an integral whole 
unified under relationship R, and R is termed a characteristic relation or unifying 
condition for x. Therefore, we can finally define a parthood relation relative 
to A, or simply, an A-part as  
 
(39). (y ≤A x) =def (y ∈ CA(x)). 
■ 
 
An example of an integral whole is depicted in figure 5.6 below. The 
unifying relation R, in this case, is the relation of carrying out research in the 
area same area in the University of Twente. In this figure, the parts of the 
Distributed Systems Research Group (DSRG) that are not R-connected are 
excluded from its relativized composition (e.g., all the anatomical parts of 
John, the cellular parts of these anatomic parts, the atomic parts of these 
cellular parts, etc.). 
John Mary
R
Peter Mark
R
R
R R
R
R
Distributed Systems Research Group
 
Bunge also provides no explanation for why the members of A are to be 
considered atoms. However, according to the interpretation just given for 
Figure 5-6  Example of 
an integral whole unified 
by a characteristic 
relation R 
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the origin of set A, its members must indeed be A-atomic, i.e., if ∀x (x∈A) 
→ ¬∃y (y <A x)32. This is because, the whole x unified under R is maximal 
under this relation, by the definition of an R-closure system. As a 
consequence, no member of A can be unified under the same relation R.  
This is far from saying that they must be atomic w.r.t. the formal 
parthood relation. In fact, there can be other relations R and R, such that 
they can be used to form other closure systems among the subsets of A. 
Suppose that R is the relation of carrying out research in the same sub-area of 
the area of distributed systems in the University of Twente, we can then form the 
set B which is an R-closure system. Since every member of B is a formal 
part of the Distributed Systems Research Group (DSRG), we can say that 
the individual Modeling of Distributed Systems Research Group (MDSRG) is an 
integral whole unified under R, and also a part of  DSRG. An analogous 
procedure can be made for relation R creating the individual Performance 
Analysis of Distributed Systems Research Group (PADSRG). This situation is 
depicted in figure 5.7. 
John
Modeling of 
Distributed Systems 
Mary
R
Peter
Performance Analysis of 
Distributed Systems 
Mark
R
Distributed Systems Research Group
 
The set of B-atoms under R is {John, Mary}, and the set of C-atoms 
under R is {Peter, Mark}. Now, let us redefine the set of A-atoms under 
R as {John, Mary, Peter, Mark, MDSRG, PADSRG}. It is clear that DSRG 
can be unified under R, since: (i) every member of A is part of DSRG; (ii) 
every member of A is connected under R (e.g., John carries research in the 
same area as the MDSRG, which in turn, carries research in the same area 
as the PADSRG). The relations R and R are specializations of R and, thus, 
the sets B, C and A defined as closure systems of R, R and R, respectively, 
are such that B ⊆ A and C ⊆ A. 
Now, it is clear that ¬(John <A MDSRG), since MDSRG is an A-atom. 
However, it is true that (John <B MDSRG), (MDSRG <A DSRG) and 
(John <A DSRG). In fact, it is generally the case that if a characteristic 
relationship R is an specialization of another characteristic relationship R, 
                                                      
32 The relative proper parthood can be defined as usual, i.e., (y <A x) =df (y ≤A x) ∧ ¬(y = 
x). 
Figure 5-7  Refinements 
of a unifying relation R 
providing further 
structure within a whole 
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and if the sets B and A are unified under R and R, respectively, then it is 
true that  
 
(40). ∀x,y,z (x<B y) ∧ (y <A z)  → (x <A z). 
 
Proof: Suppose that ¬(x <A z). Since, (x <B y) we have that (x < y) and 
(x ∈ B), by the definition of <B. Likewise, since (y <A z) then (y < z) and 
(y ∈ A). From (x < y) and (y < z) we have (x < z), since formal parthood 
is always transitive. Moreover, since R is a unifying subrelationship of R 
then B ⊆ A. Therefore, (x ∈ A), and, consequently, (x ∈ CA(z)), by 
definition 5.1. Finally, we have that (x <A z), which contradicts the 
hypothesis. 
□ 
  We can now define the concept of a context as follows: 
 
Definition 5.6 (Context): Let (Rip  Rj) mean that if I is a Ri-closure 
system and J is an Rj-closure system then (I ⊆ J). Let (R1pp Rn) be a 
series of unifying relations, and let (≤1,,≤n) be a series of relative part-
whole relations defined such as in definition 5.5. We name (≤1,,≤n) a 
context, and, by a generalization of (40), we have that  
 
(41). ∀x,y,z (x ≤i y) ∧ (y ≤i+1 z)  → (x ≤i+1z).  
■ 
 
According to definition 5.6, transitivity holds generally within a context. 
However, for some types of part-whole relations there are no possible 
unifying subrelationships and, therefore, it is senseless to discuss contextual 
transitivity. For instance, the relationship being-a-direct-functional-part, by 
definition, cannot have a unifying subrelationship. Otherwise, it would have 
an indirect direct-functional-part.  
The discussion on the problem of transitivity carried out in this section 
is just a preliminary account of the relation between unifying relations for 
integral wholes and the transitivity of their parts. In sections 5.6 and 7.4, 
we are able to elaborate on this discussion by considering other distinctions 
of our ontological theory.  
5.4 Secondary Properties of Part-Whole relations 
In this section, we focus on some important aspects of conceptual part-
whole relations, which are not taken into account in classical mereological 
theories. Besides the classical notion of parthood defined, for example, by 
the axioms of Minimal Mereology, there are other axiom groups that can be 
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used to formally characterize further ontological distinctions among part-
whole relations. Two of these so-called secondary characterisitics (Opdahl & 
Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001) are discussed as the following 
subsections. In subsection 5.4.1, we discuss shareability, whereas separability 
is discussed in 5.4.2. 
5.4.1 Shareable Parts 
Shareability is considered a secondary characteristic of part-whole relations, 
in the sense that it is not the case that it is a property held by all relations of 
this type. In contrast, it can be used as differentiae among distinct types of 
parthood. Shareability is simpler to understand than the other secondary 
characteristics discussed in section 5.4.2, since it does not involve modal 
properties. A first tentative definition of a non-shareable (exclusive) part is 
given as follows:     
 
Definition 5.7 (exclusive part  first version): An individual x is said 
to be an exclusive (proper) part of another individual y (symbolized as x <X 
y) iff (i) x is a (proper) part of y; (ii) for every z such that x is a (proper) 
part of z then either: (a) z is a (improper) part of y or (b) y is a (improper) 
part of z, or (c) both, i.e., y and z are identical.   
 
(42). (x <X y) =def (x < y) ∧ (∀z (x < z) → (z ≤ y) ∨ (y ≤ z)) 
■ 
 
From x being an exclusive part of y it does not follow that x is not part of 
anything else, as it is sometimes wrongly stated in the literature of 
conceptual/object-oriented modeling. This is because, due to transitivity, x 
must also be part of everything y is part of.  
 An example of an exclusive parthood is represented in figure 5.8. In this 
picture, every instance of an engine is an exclusive part of a car, i.e., if the 
engine is also part of some other object (e.g., the power system of the car, 
not represented) then this object must also be part of the car, or it must 
have the car as one of its parts. 
Car Engine
1 1  
At first, definition 5.7 seems to suitably represent what it is meant by 
exclusiveness of parthood in conceptual modeling. However, on second 
thought, it becomes clear that it is too restrictive to figure as the only 
definition of exclusiveness to be employed. Take, for instance, the model of 
figure 5.9. This is an example that represents a recurrent pattern in 
Figure 5-8  An exclusive 
(i.e., non-shareable) 
parthood relation 
represented by the UML 
composition meta-
construct 
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conceptual models. Since the identity of the roles researcher and family 
member are supplied by the substance sortal person that they both 
subsume, it can certainly be the case that the same individual, say the 
person John Smith, is both a researcher and a family member and, 
therefore, is part of both a family and a research group. The logical model 
corresponding to this specification would be excluded by definition 5.7. 
ResearchGroup Family
1..*
1..*
«role»
FamilyMember
1
«kind»Person
«role»
Researcher
 
In order to remedy this situation, we propose a much weaker type of 
parthood exclusiveness, more adequate for the purposes of conceptual 
modeling. In the definition that follows, we use the notation x::U to 
represent the relation of instantiation between an individual x and a 
universal U.   
 
Definition 5.8 (exclusive part): An individual x of type A is said to be an 
exclusive (proper) part of another individual y of type B (symbolized as 
<X(x,A,y,B)) iff y is the only B that has x as part.  
 
(43). <X(x,A,y,B) =def (x::A) ∧ (y::B) ∧ (x< y) ∧ (∀z (z::B) (x < z) 
→ (y = z)) 
■ 
 
This type of exclusive part-whole relation can be also defined between the 
universals A and B as a general exclusive part-whole relation. 
 
Definition 5.9 (general exclusive part-whole relation): A universal A 
is related to a universal B by a relation of general exclusive parthood 
(symbolized as A <GX B) iff every instance x of A has an exclusive part of 
type B.  
 
(44). A<GXB =def ∀x (x::A) → ∃y (y::B) ∧ <X(x,A, y,B) 
 
or simply, 
Figure 5-9  Conflict in 
the notion of 
exclusiveness. Examples 
of exclusive and 
shareable parthood 
relations represented by 
the UML meta-
constructs of 
composition (black 
diamond) and 
aggregation (white 
diamond), respectively. 
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(45). A<GXB =def ∀x (x::A) → ∃!y (y::B) ∧ (x< y) 
 
■ 
 
 Figure 5.10 shows part of the example of figure 5.9 by using definition 
5.9. In the specification of figure 5.10, we employ a language with sortal 
restriction such as the languages L1 and L2 defined in section 4.4.  
Family
«role»
FamilyMember
1
«kind»
Person
2..*
 
In the articles (Saksena & France & Larrondo-Petrie, 1998) and (Saksena et 
al., 1998), Monika Saksena and colleagues have proposed a different notion 
of shareability, which they term conceptual shareability. This idea is 
exemplified in figure 5.11, which is an exact copy from the original model 
in (Saksena et al., 1998)33.  
Car Plane
0..1 0..1
1 2
Engine
{conceptual}
 
The intention behind the model of figure 5.11 is to represent that although 
an instance of an engine cannot be part of both a car and a plane, the 
concept represented by the class is shared (Saksena et al., 1998, p.4). 
Here we defend the idea that this alleged type of shareability is not only 
superfluous, but also stimulates the creation of poorer conceptual models. 
As we have discussed in section 4.5.3, conceptual models without 
minimum cardinality constraints equal to zero can be considered more 
suitable both in terms of ontological adequacy, and of practical 
performance in problem-solving tasks. In a situation such as the one 
                                                      
33 The tagged value {conceptual} in the picture is a proposal of (Saksena et al., 1998). 
Figure 5-10  
Exclusiveness defined in 
the type level and 
corresponding 
axiomatization 
Figure 5-11  Conceptual 
shareable parthood 
relation (from Saksena 
et al., 1998) 
(∀FamilyMember,x) (∃!Family,y) (x < y)  
164 CHAPTER 5 PARTS AND WHOLES 
depicted in figure 5.11, if an engine is built to be part of a car then it is a 
car engine, if it is built to be part of a plane, then it is a plane engine. 
Additionally, if the same engine type can be used both in cars and planes 
then, for every individual engine, being part of a car (or plane) is merely a 
contingent fact. In other words, every engine that is part of a car in world w 
could become (or have been) part of a plane in a world w (or vice-versa). 
Therefore, in the latter case, both concepts car engine and plane engine 
must be conceived as roles that an engine can play in certain circumstances. 
In figure 5.12, we present a version of this latter interpretation of figure 
5.11, in which these roles, which are implicit in figure 5.11, are made 
explicit. 
Car Plane
1 1
1
2
«role»
CarEngine
«role»
PlaneEngine
1
«kind»
Engine  
5.4.2 Essential and Mandatory Parts 
As discussed by (Simons, 1987), there are many issues regarding part-whole 
relations that cannot be clarified without considering modality. One of these 
issues is the secondary characteristic of separability.  
 In order to formally define separability, we first define some notions 
related to the topic of ontological dependence. In particular, the relations of 
existential and generic dependence discussed in the sequel are strongly 
based on those defined in (Husserl, 1970). 
 
Definition 5.10 (existential dependence): Let the predicate ε denote 
existence. We have that an individual x is existentially dependent on another 
individual y (symbolized as ed(x,y))iff, as a matter of necessity, y must exist 
whenever x exists, or formally 
 
(46). ed(x,y) =def □(ε(x) → ε(y)) 
 
■ 
 
Figure 5-12  The alleged 
Conceptual Sharability 
relation modelled by real 
non-shareable relations 
and explicitly 
represented roles 
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From a philosophical standpoint, there is a problem with this definition, 
namely, that it makes all objects existentially dependent of necessarily 
existing things (e.g., numbers or platonic forms). Therefore, a better 
definition would be ed(x,y) =def ¬□ε(y) ∧ □(ε(x) → ε(y)). Nonetheless, 
for the common-sense contingent individuals that we have interest in 
conceptual modeling, this difficulty can be overseen, since we are mostly 
interested here in parthood relations between substantial individuals. For 
this reason, and for the sake of clarity in the presentation, the safeguard 
condition that rules out necessary existence (¬□ε(y)) is omitted in the 
subsequent definitions. 
 With definition 5.10 we can define the concept of an essential part as 
follows: 
 
Definition 5.11 (essential part): An individual x is an essential part of 
another individual y iff, y is existentially dependent on x and x is, necessarily, 
a part of y: EP(x,y) =def ed(y,x) ∧ □(x ≤ y). This is equivalent to stating that 
EP(x,y) =def □(ε(y) → ε(x)) ∧ □(x ≤ y), which is, in turn, equivalent to 
EP(x,y) =def □(ε(y) → ε(x) ∧ (x ≤ y)). We adopt here the mereological 
continuism defended by (Simons, 1987), which states that the part-whole 
relation should only be considered to hold among existents, i.e., ∀x,y (x ≤ 
y) → ε(x) ∧ ε(y). As a consequence, we can have this definition in its final 
simplification 
 
(47). EP(x,y) =def □(ε(y) → (x ≤ y)) 
■ 
 
Figures 5.13.a and 5.13.b below depict examples of essential parts. In 
figure 5.13.a, every person has a brain as part, and in every world that the 
person exists, the very same brain exists and is a part of that person. In 
figure 5.13.b, we have an analogous example: a car has a chassis as an 
essential part, thus, the part-whole relation between car and chassis holds in 
every world that the car exists. To put in a different way, if the chassis is 
removed, the car ceases to exist as such, i.e., it looses its identity.  
Person Brain
1 1
Car Chassis
0..1 1
(a)
(b)  
The UML notation used in figure 5.13 highlights a problem that exists in 
practically all conceptual modeling languages. In order to discuss this 
problem, let us examine another model represented in figure 5.14. 
Figure 5-13  Wholes and 
their Essential parts 
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Person Heart
1 1
Car Engine
0..1 1
(a)
(b)  
According to the UML semantics, the models of figure 5.13.a and 5.14.a 
convey exactly the same kind of information. However, this is not the case, 
in general, in this domain in reality. Typically, the relation between a 
person and his brain is not of the same nature as the relation between a 
person and his heart. Differently from the former, a particular heart is not 
an essential part of a person, i.e., it is not the case that for every person x 
there is a heart y, such that in every possible circumstance y is part of x. For 
instance, the fact that an individual John had the same heart during his 
entire lifetime was only accidental. With the advent of heart transplants, 
one can easily imagine a counterfactual in which John had been 
transplanted a different heart. An analogous argument can be made in the 
case of figure 5.13.b. Although every car needs an engine, it certainly does 
not have to be the same engine in every possible world. 
The difference in the underlying real-world semantics in the cases of 
figure 5.13.a and 5.14.a are made explicit if we consider their 
corresponding formal characterization. In the case of fig.5.13.a, since it is a 
case of essential parthood, we have that:  
 
(figure 5.13.a)  □ ((∀Person,x)(∃!Brain,y) □(ε(x) → (y < x))) 
 
Whereas in the case of figure 5.14.a, the corresponding axiomatization 
is 
 
(figure 5.14.a) □ ((∀Person,x) □(ε(x) → (∃!Heart,y)(y < x))) 
 
A similar distinction can be made for the case of figures 5.13.b and 
5.14.b: 
 
(figure 5.13.b)  □((∀Car,x)(∃!Chassis,y) □(ε(x) → (y < x))) 
(figure 5.14.b) □((∀Car,x) □(ε(x) → (∃!Engine,y)(y < x))) 
 
In cases such as those depicted in the specifcations of figures 5.13.b and 
5.14.b, an individual is not specifically dependent of another individual, but 
generically dependent of any individual that instantiates a given universal. The 
concept of generic dependence is defined as follows: 
 
Figure 5-14  Wholes and 
their Mandatory parts 
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Definition 5.12 (generic dependence): An individual y is generic 
dependent of a universal U iff, whenever y exists it is necessary that an 
instance of U exists. This can be formally characterized by the following 
formula schema: 
 
(48). GD(y,U) =def □(ε(y) → ∃U,x ε(x)) 
■ 
 
We name individuals such as the instances of Heart and Engine in figures 
5.13.b and 5.14.b, respectively, mandatory parts. 
 
Definition 5.13 (mandatory part): An individual x is a mandatory part 
of another individual y iff, y is generically dependent of an universal U that x 
instantiates, and y has, necessarily, as a part an instance of U:  
 
(49). MP(U,y) =def □(ε(y) → (∃U,x)(x < y)). 
 
In order to represent the ontological distinction between essential and 
mandatory parts, we propose an extension to the UML notation used in the 
examples for the remaining of this chapter. We assume that the minimum 
cardinality of 1 in the association end corresponding to the part represents 
a mandatory part-whole relation. To represent the case of an essential part-whole 
relation, we propose to extend the current UML aggregation notation by 
defining the Boolean meta-attribute essential. 
 When the meta-attribute essential equals true then the minimum 
cardinality in the association end corresponding to the part must also be 1. 
This is expected to be the case, since essential parthood can be seen as a 
limit case of mandatory parthood. When essential equals false, the tagged 
value textual representation can be omitted. This extended notation is 
exemplified in figure 5.15 below. 
Person Brain
1 1
Heart1
1
{essential = true}
 
We emphasize that the particular examples chosen to illustrate the 
distinction between essential and mandatory parts are used here for 
illustration purposes only. For example, when modeling brain as an essential 
part of persons and heart as a mandatory one, we are not advocating that 
this is a general ontological choice that should be countenanced in all 
conceptualizations. Conversely, the intention is to make explicit the 
Figure 5-15  Extensions 
to the UML notation to 
distinguish between 
essential and mandatory 
parts 
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consequences of this modeling choice, and to advocate for the need of 
explicitly differentiating between these two modes of parthood. The choice 
itself, however, is always left to the model designer and is 
conceptualization-dependent. For example, an ontological choice implicit 
in the assumption of brain/heart example is that brain transplants are not 
possible and that the identity of an individual person is determined by the 
identity of her brain. A discussion on the issue of personal identity falls 
outside the scope of this work, and we are not in position here to discuss 
the possibility of brain transplants. Again, these ontological choices are 
taken here merely for the purpose of exemplification. The important point 
is that there are essential and mandatory parts in the world and one should 
be able to explicitly and suitably model them.      
 By using the definition of essential parts, one can formally characterize 
the notion of those individuals prescribed by Extentional Mereologies 
(EM), i.e., those individual for which all their parts are essential. These 
entities, named here extensional individuals are formally defined in the sequel. 
 
Definition 5.14 (extensional individual): An individual y is named an 
extensional individual iff for every x such that x is a part of y, x is an 
essential part of y: 
  
(50). E(y) =def □(∀x (x < y) → EP(x,y)) 
■ 
 
Our criticism to EM in section 5.2.2 was that this theory treats all 
individuals as extensional. This is not to say that there are no such entities. 
Examples of extensional individuals are discussed in section 5.5.  
 Up to this moment, we have interpreted possible worlds as maximal 
state of affairs, which can be factual or counterfactual. In other words, we 
have assumed a branching structure of time, and each world is taken as a 
time interval in a (factual or counterfactual) time branch. An alternative is 
to interpret possible worlds as histories, i.e., as the sum of all state of affairs 
in a given time branch. In this alternative conception of worlds, we can 
examine the possible relations between the lifespan of wholes and parts in 
different types of parthood relations. For instance, figure 5.16 illustrates 
the possible relations between the lifespan of a whole and one of its 
essential parts34. 
                                                      
34Actually, figure 5.16 depicts the possibilities for the relation between the lifespan of an 
object x (top) and any object y which is existentially dependent on x.    
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Time
Lifespan of an essential part
Possibilities for 
the lifespan of the whole
= start of lifetime = end of lifetime
a
b
c
d
 
This figure illustrates the true possibilities for, for instance, the relation 
between a chassis and a car as depicted in figure 5.13.b. In this case, the 
lifetime of the chassis is completely independent from the lifetime of any of 
the cars it happens to be a part of. Actually, as represented in figure 5.13.b, 
a chassis does not even have to be connected to a car (whole). This is a case 
of, what we term, essential part with optional whole.  
Conversely, if we analyze the relation between a brain and a person, we 
come to the conclusion that the lifespan (d) in figure 5.16 is the only real 
possibility in this case. That is to say that the lifespan of a person and her 
brain should necessarily coincide. This is because, in this case, a brain is 
also existentially dependent on its host. Whenever we have the situation 
that a part is existentially dependent on the whole it composes, we name it 
an inseparable part.         
 
Definition 5.15 (inseparable part): An individual x is an inseparable 
part of another individual y iff, x is existentially dependent on y, and x is, 
necessarily, a part of y:  
 
(51). IP(x,y) =def □(ε(x) → (x ≤ y)) 
■ 
 
The possible relations between the life spans of an inseparable part and its 
(essential) whole are depicted in figure 5.17. The case of an essential and 
inseparable part is shown in figure 5.18. 
Figure 5-16  Possible 
relations between the 
life spans of an 
individual whole and one 
of its essential parts  
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Time
Lifespan of the whole 
Possibilities for 
the lifespan of an 
inseparable part
a
b
c
d
 
Time
Lifespan of the whole 
Lifespan of an essential 
and inseparable part
 
Figure 5.17 does not represent all the possibilities for, for instance, the 
relation between a heart and its bearer (figure 5.14.b), since the heart of 
person is not an inseparable part of a person and, hence, their life spans can 
be completely independent. A heart can pre-exist its bearer as well as 
survive its death.  Nonetheless, a heart must be part of a person, only not 
necessarily the same person in all possible circumstances. For these cases, 
of generic dependence from the part to a whole, we use the term parts with 
mandatory wholes. 
 
Definition 5.16 (mandatory whole): An individual y is a mandatory 
whole for another individual x iff, x is generically dependent on a universal 
U that y instantiates, and x is, necessarily, part of an individual instantiating 
U:  
 
(52). MW(U,x) =def □(ε(x) → (∃U,y)(x < y))). 
■ 
 
Once more, the distinction between inseparable parts and parts with 
mandatory wholes is neglected in practically all conceptual modeling 
languages. For this reason, we propose to extend the current UML 
aggregation notation with the Boolean meta-attribute inseparable to 
represent inseparable parts. When inseparable is equal to true, the minimum 
cardinality constraint in the association end corresponding to the whole 
universal must be at least 1. If inseparable is equal to false, the tagged value 
textual representation can be omitted. A UML class representing a whole 
Figure 5-17  Possible 
relations between the 
life spans of an 
individual whole and one 
of its inseparable parts 
Figure 5-18  Possible 
relations between the 
life spans of an 
individual whole and one 
of its essential and 
inseparable parts 
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universal involved in an aggregation relation with minimum cardinality 
constraint of at least 1 in its association end represents a universal whose 
instances are mandatory wholes. 
5.5 Part-Whole Theories in Linguistics and Cognitive 
Sciences 
In this section, we start by reviewing perhaps the most well known linguistic 
study on the classification of part-whole relations. In an article entitled A 
taxonomy of part-whole relations, (Winston & Chaffin & Herrmann, 1987) 
(henceforth WCH), propose an account of the notion of part-whole by 
elaborating on different ways that parts can related to a whole. This study 
led to a refinement on the formal relation of partOf by distinguishing the six 
types of meronymic relations which are represented in table 5.1 below. 
 
Relation F H S Examples 
Component/ 
Functional Complex  
+ - + handle-cup, punch line-joke 
Member/Collection - - + tree-forest, card-deck 
Portion/Mass - + + slice-pie, grain-salt 
Stuff/Object - - - gin-martini, steel-bike 
Feature/Activity + - - paying-shopping, dating-adolescence 
Place/Area - + - Everglades-Florida, oasis-desert 
 
The meta-properties that are used to create these distinctions, namely 
Functionality (F), Homeomerousity (H) and Separability (S), are explained 
as follows in a quote from the authors: Functional parts are restricted by 
their function, in their spatial or temporal location. For example, the 
handle of a cup can only be placed in a limited number of positions if it is 
to function as a handle. Homeomerous parts are of the same kind of thing 
as their wholes, for example (slice-pie), while non-homeomerous parts are 
different from their wholes, for example (tree-forest). Separable parts can, 
in principle, be separated from the whole, for example (handle-cup), while 
inseparable parts cannot, for example (steel-bike). (Winston & Chaffin & 
Herrmann, 1987). 
This proposal makes an important contribution in acknowledging that 
there are different ways that parts composing a whole can relate to each 
other and to the whole they compose. Nonetheless, the study is overly 
linguistically motivated, focusing on the linguistic term part-of (and its 
Table 5-1  Different 
types of Meronymic 
relations according to 
(Winston & Chaffin & 
Herrmann, 1987) 
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cognates) independently of the ontological and conceptual adequacy of the 
proposed distinctions.  
Firstly, the notion of separability employed by the authors is very 
different from the one discussed in section 5.4.2 of this chapter. In their 
case, separability is based on whether parts can/cannot be physically 
disconnected, in principle, from the whole to which they are connected. 
(ibid.). The first problem with this definition is that it applies exclusively to 
physical objects, since it relies on the notion of possible physical 
disconnection (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995). It says nothing, for example, 
about whether the first act of Turandot is separable or not from the whole 
play. But more importantly, this notion of separability is of little use for 
conceptual modelling, since it does not elucidate anything about the 
ontological dependence relations between parts and wholes, their life-time 
dependencies, their identity and persistence conditions, etc. If a concept of 
separability that affords this type of analysis is adopted (such as the one 
advocated in section 5.4.2), many counterexamples can be found to 
question the authors classification. For instance, the relation between a 
human brain and a human body is of type Component/Functional 
Complex. However, under the assumptions we have made here, it is not the 
case that the brain is separable from the body. It certainly can be physically 
disconnected, however, due to the existential dependence between 
brain/body, in the case of separation it will cease to exist as a brain, and, 
since brain is a kind (in the sense of chapter 4), it will cease to exist as the 
same object. Therefore, one cannot state that it is the SAME object which 
has been separated from the body. Conversely, the authors deem the Stuff-
Object example of a portion of steel that is part of a bicycle as an instance 
of an inseparable part. Once more, if an ontologically meaningful notion of 
separability is adopted, this example is no longer true: if one has a physical-
chemical way of separating the steel which constitutes the bike from the 
bike itself (or the gin from the martini), there is no reason why one should 
not believe that it is the very same portion of steel (gin) that persists 
through the separation process. Moreover, the portion of steel might 
precede the creation as well as survive the destruction of the bike. 
Additionally, the bike could certainly be made of a different portion of 
steal. In summary, they are mutually independent from an existential point 
of view and, hence, separable.         
The original taxonomy proposed by WCH has been refined by other 
authors. For instance, (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995) have noticed that the 
distinction between (a) Component/Functional Complex and (b) 
Feature/Activity is a superfluous one. What examples such as handle-cup 
and punch line-joke have in common is a certain role that the part plays 
w.r.t. the whole, and it is the functionality associated with the role that 
typically poses constraints on the internal (spatial or temporal) structure of 
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the whole. The same holds for dating-adolescence and paying-shopping. 
The only difference is that in the former case (a), the relata are endurants 
whilst in (b) they are perdurants35.  
(Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995) as well as (Hornsby & Egenhofer, 1998) 
have noticed that the example of Place/Area are not in any important sense 
different from the cases of Component/Functional Complex and 
Feature/Activity aforementioned. Examples such as oasis-desert make clear 
that the part plays a role w.r.t. to the whole (e.g., providing water) and that, 
contra WCH, it does not constitute a case of homeomerousity. That is, the 
parts of desert are not of the same kind as the desert itself (an oasis is not a 
desert!). Likewise, the Everglades does not instantiate the same universals as 
Florida, since the latter posses many properties which the former lacks 
(e.g., having a governor) and vice-versa. 
(Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995) have also observed that the examples of 
Stuff/Object used by WCH misconceive the phenomena it is supposed to 
represent. By attempting to differentiate between the linguistic expressions 
be partly (e.g., a martini is partly alcohol) and made of (e.g., the lens is 
made of glass), in the case of Stuff/Object parthood the authors have 
conflated two propositions: one which is indeed a part-of relation and one 
which represents a case of constitution. For instance, the sentences  
 
(i) A Martini is partly alcohol;  
(ii) A bike is partly steel 
 
 can be decomposed in two propositions 
 
(iii) A part of Martini is made of alcohol;  
(iv) A part of the bike is made of steel 
 
In other words, instead of being primitive, this type of part-whole 
relation can be analyzed in terms of a constitution36 relation and one of the 
other types of part-whole relations (mass/quantity in the case of (iii) and 
component/Integral Object in the case of (iv)). 
 In summary, the refinement of the WCH taxonomy proposed in (Gerlst 
& Pribbenow, 1995) contains the following categories:  
 
(a). Mass/Quantity.  
(b). Member/Collection;  
(c). Component/Functional Complex;  
                                                      
35 see discussion of endurants and perdurants on chapter 6. 
36 Constitution is not considered here as an example of a part-whole relation. For instance, 
it does not satisfy any of the supplementation axioms (Masolo et al., 2003a). 
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These three new types of part-whole relations are discussed in the following 
subsections. The Mass/Quantity relation (a) is discussed in subsection 
5.5.1; The relations of type (b) and (c) are discussed in subsection 5.5.2.  
5.5.1 Quantities 
One difference between Mass/Quantity and the other two types of parthood 
is that the relata of this relation always belong to the category of amounts of 
matter (masses, quantities), while in the Component/Functional Complex 
and Member/Collection they are objects. Quantities (such as water, sand, 
sugar, martini, wine, etc.) lack both individuation and counting principles. For 
this reason, the general terms which are linguistically represented by mass 
nouns (the linguistic counterpart of amounts of matter) cannot be used to 
substitute X, Y and Z in sentences such as: 
 
(i) (exactly) five X; 
(ii) the Y which is Z. 
 
A substitution for, for example, water in sentence (i) is not viable, since 
arbitrarily many parts of water are still water. Likewise, a success in the 
substitution by water in (ii) depends on the possibility of determining the 
referent and judge identity statements of individual quantities of water. 
What exactly should be that referent? Before answering this question we 
should call attention to what exactly is meant by homeomerousity and its 
relation to the WCH taxonomy.  
Traditionally, homeomerousity means that an individual only has parts 
which are of the same kind (Zimmerman, 1995). This is clearly not the 
case for all amounts of matter, as the Gin-Martini case demonstrates. 
However, one can still say that every subquantity of Martini is again Martini 
and that although Martini is composed of Gin, Gin is itself homeomerous 
in this more liberal sense. This line of reasoning seems to suggest that 
homeomerousity is equated with infinite decomposability, i.e., for every 
subquantity of Martini there is always a subquantity of Martini, and the 
same holds for quantities of Gin. Some authors (e.g., Zimmerman, 1995), 
nonetheless, admit the existence of quantities of type K having K-atoms, 
i.e., individuals of type K that have no parts of the same type K. Examples 
include concrete mass terms such as furniture, cutlery or crowd. These 
allegedly exemplars of quantities are definitely not homeomerous, not even 
in the more liberal sense. For example, there are parts of a crowd, namely 
individual persons, which is not are a crowd themselves and which are not 
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homeomerous in any meaningful sense37. What can be said in this case is 
that these aggregates have a uniform structure and, in parity with (Gerlst & 
Pribbenow, 1995), we consider them as examples of member/collection 
parthood instead.  
One could also consider homeomerousity to simply mean that an 
aggregate can merely have some parts of the same kind while having other 
parts of other kinds. However, if this were to be the case one could not use 
it as a meta-property to differentiate Mass/Quantity from 
Member/Collection. Notice that examples of homeomerous parts in this 
sense can be easily found for Member/Collection: a crowd can be part of a 
larger crowd; a forest can be part of larger forest.  
Since WCH do not consider member/collection to be homeomerous, 
they would have to agree that quantities should be considered necessarily 
infinitely divisible in quantities of the same kind. We thus take the liberal 
approach and consider the case of real homeomerosity as a special case of 
infinitely divisible pure substances.  
Now, an important question that comes to the mind is how we should 
represent in conceptual models the universals whose instances are 
quantities in the sense just mentioned? As discussed in chapter 4, 
individuals in a conceptual model must have a determinate identity, a 
requirement which is put forward since the initial conceptions of the first 
conceptual modeling languages. For instance, (Borgida, 1990) writes that, 
in both semantic data models and knowledge representations, an individual 
is assumed to have a unique, intrinsic identity.  As we have discussed in chapter 
4, in order to be able to make viable references to general terms which are 
not count nouns (mass terms, adjectives, verbs) they first must be 
nominalized. A nominalization of a mass noun, verb or an adjective 
promotes the shift to the category of count nouns (e.g., the fall of Jack, a 
lump of clay), hence, allowing for the representation of the corresponding 
sortal universals. An important question that then arises is: what is the best 
nominalization of mass terms so that they can be satisfactorily represented 
in conceptual models? 
In order to investigate the possibilities let us take the example of a 
portion of wine which could be differentiated from other portions of wine 
by the year and source vineyard. What is the meaning (and implied 
principle of individuation) of a universal whose instances are portions of 
wine?  
A first possibility is to consider the referent of the expression the 
portion of wine as a mereological fusion of all subportions of wine that 
                                                      
37 Of course, one could say that a person is a physical object and that every part of a physical 
object is itself a physical object. However, if interpreted in this way, homeomerousity 
becomes completely non-informative since everything can be said to be homeomerous.   
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constitutes it. This approach is standard in philosophy and (Simons, 1987) 
suggests that quantities are probably the best case of application of the 
Classical Extentional Mereologies (CEM), since practically all objections 
raised against the CEM for the purpose of conceptual modeling can be 
safely lifted in the case of quantities and their parts. For instance, portions 
are always transitive and there is always a sum of two portions of quantity 
regardless how scattered they are. Nonetheless, and still from a 
philosophical point of view, the first problem with this conception of 
quantities is whether it is at all possible to have a principle of identity for 
portions of wine in this sense (Zimmerman, 1995; Lowe, 2001). A 
mereological principle of identity in this case prescribes that portion of 
wine A is equal to portion of wine B iff they have the same parts. However, 
since the parts of A and B are also portions of wine, to decide if A and B 
have the SAME parts one has to decide about the identity of the parts, and 
the parts of the parts, leading to an infinite regress, since, by assumption, 
quantities are infinitely divisible. One could derive some synchronic 
information about identity by saying that two quantities are different if they 
do not occupy the same region of space38. However, this cannot be used as 
a diachronic principle of identity. Alternatively, one could say that a 
quantity A in t1 is not the same quantity as B in t2 if they have different 
properties such as volume or weight (still assuming the mereological 
principle). Nonetheless, the fact that B in t2 has the same volume or weight 
as A in t1 can only account for the sameness of the quantities in a very loose 
sense, meaning the same measure. In other words, in this case, the relation 
between A and B is one of equivalence, not one of numerical identity.  
In conceptual modeling, there are a number of situations in which 
dealing only with qualitative identity of masses does not suffice. For 
instance, one might be interested in tracking the persistence of a quantity of 
a certain liquid which has been poisoned, or, in a chemical experiment, it 
could be important to track the change of properties in the very SAME 
persisting quantity. For this reason, contra (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995), 
who proposes that quantities are arbitrary pieces of the whole as long as 
they are properly characterized by the quantitative measure, we advocate 
that a treatment of masses in conceptual modeling must deal explicitly with 
the case of numerical identity.  
 However, there is still a bigger problem with this idea from a conceptual 
modeling stance. Figure 5.19 depicts the representation of a portion of 
Wine universal in the sense just mentioned. In this specification, the idea is 
to represent a certain portion of wine as the mereological sum of all 
subportions of wine belonging to a certain vintage. As it can be noticed, 
                                                      
38 There is still the issue that space itself could be considered to be infinitely divisible (Lowe, 
2001).  
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since every portion of wine is composed of subportions of wine, the 
cardinality of the part-whole relation cannot be specified in a finite manner. 
The same holds for every cardinality constraint for associations involving 
portions of wine.  
Wine
{essential=true}
WineTank
1..*
 
Furthermore, homeomerous entities represented in this manner can 
induce to representation errors in the presence of other shareability 
constraints. For example, figure 5.20 presents an exact copy of a UML class 
diagram from (Saksena et. al, 1998)39 that symbolizes a Fractal (perhaps the 
prototypical example of homeomerous form). The intention of the authors 
seems to be to represent that a fractal, i.e., the rendering of one iteration 
step of an IFS, is part of only one instance of the infinite recursion of this 
function (Peitgen & Jurgens & Saupe, 1992). In other words, a part of an 
instantiation of a Julia Series is not a part of another instantiation of the same 
fractal form, or part of an instantiation of the Mandelbrot Series. However, 
that is not what is represented in the model. The model states that every 
instance of a fractal (i.e., every iteration of an IFS) is part of only one other 
fractal. This is clearly mistaken: the nth iteration of an IFS is part of all 
previous iterations of the same fractal. This problem is far from being 
specific to Fractals. In fact, for all homeomerous entities, with the 
exception of the maximal sum of subquantities, all other parts of quantity 
are necessarily part of innumerable other quantities of the same kind. 
Fractal
0..1
*
{homeomerous}  
There is still one further philosophical argument invalidating this modeling 
alternative for the purpose of conceptual modeling. According to 
(Wandinger, 1998), masses are identificationally dependent of substantials that 
are instances of sortal universals. As he put it: The formal concepts 
amount, part and stuff, like mass and matter, are formed on the 
back of (Simons 1987, p. 191) the formal concept (material) thing or 
(material) object. There is no mass, except the mass of a certain object. 
                                                       
39 The tagged value {homeomerous} in the picture is a proposal of (Saksena et al., 1998) 
and it is present in the original article. 
Figure 5-19  Problems 
with the representation 
of Quantities as 
Mereological Sums 
Figure 5-20  Mistaken 
representation of 
homeomerous part with 
non-shareability (from 
Saksena et al., 1998) 
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There is no stuff except the stuff a certain thing consists of. This is to say 
that individuating a quantity depends on the definite descriptions used for 
referring, which succeeds only when the referent can be individuated by 
sortals, i.e., it is the water in the bathtub, the clay that constitutes the 
statues, a cube of sugar, that can be referred to, not just some water, some 
clay, or some sugar. Moreover, quantities have no criteria for when they 
constitute a whole of some sort (unity criteria), except in cases in which we 
derive those criteria from objects that are only identifiable via sortals. This 
view is also supported in (Quine, 1960), who proposes that every 
occurrence of a quantity expression having the form The K, The same 
K (where K is a concrete quantity universal) is really a masked reference to 
a portion of K to which an ordinary sortal universal applies. Alternatively 
formulating, as Quine puts it: [in these situations, always] some special 
individuation standard is understood from the circumstances. This 
perspective gives rise to a second option of representation for the 
wine/wine tank example, as depicted in figure 5.21. 
Wine WineTank1 1
constitution
 
There are a number of observations that can be made about figure 5.21. In 
this second option for nominalization of quantities, Wine means the 
maximal content of a Wine Tank. Likewise, the referent of a portion of clay 
means whatever quantity of clay constitutes a given statue, which is in turn 
individuated by the principle of identity supplied by the sortal statue. In this 
representation, there is no longer a problem for the specification of 
cardinality constraints between portion of wine and wine tank: every wine 
tank has as its content one single definite portion of wine. Additionally, 
since wine portion means the maximal content of a wine tank, it is not the 
case that this concept is homeomerous, i.e., there is no part of a portion of 
wine which is itself a portion of wine (otherwise, it would not be the 
maximal content). Thus, there is no problem with infinite cardinalities, 
infinite divisibility and infinite domain of individuals (see section 5.1). 
Moreover, portion of Wine becomes a genuine sortal: it is always 
determinate if two portions of wine are identical and it is always 
determinate how many portions of wine there are. We emphasize that it is 
still convenient to consider portions of wine as having all parts as essential, 
i.e., if a part from a portion of wine is removed then it becomes a different 
portion of wine. The reason for this is that, otherwise, in some cases, the 
portion of wine becomes identical with the object it constitutes. Take the 
statue/lump of clay example. If A is the same lump of clay as long as it 
constitutes the same statue B, A would have necessarily the same properties 
as B and have a complete life-time dependency. For instance: (a) if a piece 
Figure 5-21  
Representation of 
Quantities as 
Identificationally 
Dependent of Objects 
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of B is removed, B is still the same statue and so is A still the same lump of 
clay, since it still constitutes the same statue; (b) If the form of B is altered, 
B ceases to exist and so does A, since it no longer constitutes the same 
statue. 
In summary, in this second alternative nominalization, a quantity is an 
inseparable constituent of the object it constitutes. In a manner which is 
analogous to the way such objects named Features in DOLCE (Masolo et. al, 
2003a) (e.g., holes, bumps, edges, stains) are considered here inseparable 
parts of their hosts (see section 5.4.2).  
Although this second alternative contains important advantages over the 
first one from a conceptual modeling point of view, it leads to a 
problematic consequence.  The problem is implied exactly by the rigid 
specific dependence relation between a quantity in this sense and its container. 
As put by (Cartwright, 1965), a sentence such as the same K (where K is 
a quantity universal) should be understood in a such way that  
 
x is the same K as y iff x is some K, y is some K, and (x = y) 
 
or, as discussed in chapter 4, in statements of identity, the relata must 
instantiate the same kind, i.e., the same rigid sortal supplying their principle 
of identity. In parity with (Cartwright, 1965; Zimmerman, 1995), we 
consider as meaningful a sentence such as the sugar that was in that cube is 
the same sugar as the one in this lump. However, if this is the case, which 
kind of individuation and identity principle should be applied to x and y, 
that of cubes or of lumps? Notice that x (or y) is not necessarily none of the 
above (in the modal sense) and there is not an ultimate substance sortal that 
would cover both universals.      
A third nominalization alternative that solves this problem is presented 
as follows. This last option relies on the notion of piece discussed in (Lowe, 
2001). According to Lowe, a piece of a quantity K is a maximally self-
connected object constituted by portions of K (portions in the first sense 
discussed above). Like in the second nominalization alternative, a quantity 
of K in this sense is an instance of a genuine sortal universal, i.e., it has 
definite individuation, identity and counting principles. Moreover, it is not 
homeomerous, however it can still be composed of other quantities K in 
the same sense of quantity (see figure 5.22). All its parts are also essential, 
and it does not contain the infinite regress problems mentioned for the first 
case. Nonetheless, differently from the second alternative, the dependence 
relation between a quantity and its container is a generic not a specific one. 
For this reason we can state that for the same maximally self-connected 
quantity of wine, there can be several container phases. This idea is 
represented in the (incomplete) model of figure 5.22. A vintage is an object 
constituted by (possibly many) quantities of wine, it is, however, not a 
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quantity since it can be scattered over many quantities. Moreover, it is not 
necessary for its constituent quantities to be essential: even if the quantity of 
wine now stored in a certain tank is destroyed, we still have numerically the 
same vintage. We, therefore, propose the use of this third alternative for the 
nominalization of quantities and their representation in conceptual models. 
From now on, we shall use the term quantity of matter K or objectified portion 
of matter K to refer to a piece of K in the Lowes sense aforementioned, and 
use the stereotype «quantity» to symbolize a kind whose instances are 
quantities in this sense. 
    We can summarize many points of the argument carried out in this 
section by using an example proposed by (Cartwright, 1965). If a sentence 
such as Heraclitus bathed in some water yesterday and bathed in the same 
water today is true then for some suitable substituends of x and y we have 
that: (a) x is a quantity of water and Heraclitus bathed in x yesterday; (b) y 
is a quantity of water and Heraclitus bathed in y today; (c) x = y. However, 
(c) when interpreted as (d) the water Heraclitus bathed in yesterday = the 
water Heraclitus bathed in today requires that: (e) there is exactly one x 
such that x is a quantity of water and Heraclitus bathed in x both yesterday 
and today. But, if quantity is interpreted in the first sense above, there are 
not one but infinitely many particulars that would satisfy (a), (b) and (d) 
without satisfying (c). The same does not hold for the second and third 
senses. 
«quantity»
Wine
«category»
Container1 1
«phase»
WineStoredinTank
«kind»
WineTank
«kind»
Vintage1
1..*
«quantity»
Alcohol
{essential=true}
1
1
«containment»
«constitution»
 
5.5.2 Collections and Functional Complexes 
As recognized by WCH, collections such as tree-forest, card-deck, brick-
pile, lion-pack cannot be said to be homeomerous wholes. Collections have 
parts that are not of the same kind (e.g., a tree is not forest) and they are 
not infinitely divisible. As a consequence, a representation of a collection as 
a mereological sum does not lead to the same complications as those 
encountered in the first alternative for the representation of quantities. 
Figure 5-22  
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Take, for instance, the example depicted in figure 5.23, which represents a 
situation analogous to that of figure 5.19. Differently from the case with 
quantities in figure 5.19, there is no longer the danger of an infinite regress 
or the impossibility for specifying finite cardinality constraints. 
Group of People
{essential=true}
*
* Guide
1..* 1responsible for
 
In figure 5.23, the usual maximum cardinality of many can be used to 
express that group of people has as parts possibly many other groups of 
people and that a guide is responsible for possibly many groups of people. 
Nonetheless, in many examples (such as this one), this model implies a 
somewhat counterintuitive reading. In general, the intended idea is to 
express that, for instance, John as a guide, is responsible for the group 
formed by {Paul, Marc, Lisa} and for the other group formed by {Richard, 
Tom}. The intention is not to express that John is responsible for the 
groups {Paul, Marc, Lisa}, {Paul, Marc}, {Marc, Lisa}, {Paul, Lisa}, and 
{Richard, Tom}. A simple solution to this problem is to consider groups of 
people as maximal sums, i.e., groups that are not parts of any other groups. 
In this case, depicted in figure 5.24, the cardinality constraints acquire a 
different meaning and it is no longer possible to say that a group of people 
is composed of other groups of people. 
Group of People Guide
responsible for
1..* 1  
This solution is similar to taking the meaning of a quantity K to be that of a 
maximally-self-connected-portion of K. However, in the case of collections, 
topological connection cannot be used as a unifying relation (see section 5.3) 
to form an integral whole, since collections can easily be spatially scattered. 
Nonetheless, another type of connection (e.g., social) should always be 
found. A question begging issue at this point is: why does it seem to be 
conceptually relevant to find connection relations leading to (maximal) 
collections?  We defend the idea that, alike quantities, arbitrary sums of 
collections make little cognitive sense. In the case of quantities, we are not 
interested in the sum of a subportion of my bathtubs water with a 
subportion of the North Sea. Instead, we are interested in the quantity of 
water in that specific bottle, or lying in that specific location. Likewise, we 
are not interested in arbitrary collections of individuals but aggregations 
that have a purpose for some cognitive task. As discussed in section 5.3, 
integral wholes exist because there is some unifying relation that holds 
Figure 5-23  
Representations of 
Collections with parts of 
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Figure 5-24  
Representation of 
Collections as Maximal 
Sums 
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among the totality of its parts and only among them, i.e., a closure system. 
For example, a group of people of interest can be composed by all those 
people that are attending a certain museum exhibition at a certain time. 
Now, by definition, a closure system is maximal (see definition 5.4), thus, 
there can be no group of people in this same sense that is part of another 
group of people (i.e., another integral whole unified by the same relation).  
Nonetheless, it can be the case that, among the parts of a group of 
people, further structure is obtained by the presence of other collections 
unified by different relations. For example, it can be the case that among 
the parts of a group of people A, there are collections B and C composed of 
the English and Dutch speakers, respectively. This situation is depicted in 
figure 5.25. Neither the English speaking segment nor the Dutch speaking 
segment is a group of people in the technical sense just defined, since a group 
of people has properties that apply to none of them (e.g., the property of 
having both English and Dutch segments). Moreover, the unifying relations 
of B and C are both specializations of As unifying relation. For example, A 
is the collection of all parties attending an exhibition and the B is the 
collection of all English speakers among the parties attending the same 
exhibition. For this reason, transitivity holds unrestricted among the part-
whole relations depicted in figure 5.25. 
We shall use the stereoptype «collective» to symbolize a kind whose 
instances are collections. 
 
«collective»
Group of Visitors «role»Guide
responsible for
1..* 1
«collective»
EnglishSpeakingSegment
«collective»
DutchSpeakingSegment
«kind»
Person
«role»
EnglishSpeakingMember
«role»
DutchSpeakingMember
 
Judging from this perspective, collections bear a strong similarity to 
functional complexes in the classifications of WCH and Gerlst & 
Pribbenow. This similarity is in fact acknowledged by (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 
1995) in the following passage: Depending on what aspect of this structure 
[i.e., the things structure] one focuses on, different types of part-whole 
relations are possible. However, in many cases there is a primary or 
prototypical viewthe primary view critically depends on the granularity 
Figure 5-25  
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level which is assumed for classifying an entityconfigurations such as a 
pile of books are on one hand similar to collections and on the other hand 
similar to complexes. In the course of the article, the authors propose that 
the difference between a collection and a functional complex is that whilst 
the former has a uniform structure, the latter has a heterogeneous and complex 
one.   
 We propose to rephrase this statement in other terms. In a collection, 
all member parts play the same role type. For example, all trees in a forest 
can be said to play the role of a forest member. However, a tree is not 
necessarily a forest-part, i.e., the latter is an anti-rigid concept, and 
representing the part-whole relation between forests and trees via the role 
type forest-tree prevents one from having to specify minimum cardinality 
relations which are zero. In complexes, conversely, a variety of roles can be 
played by different components. For example, if all ships of a fleet are 
conceptualized as playing solely the role of member of a fleet then it can 
be said to be a collection. Contrariwise, if this role is further specialized in 
leading ship, defense ship, storage ship and so forth, the fleet must 
be conceived as a functional complex. In summary, collections as integral 
wholes (i.e., in a sense that appeals to cognition and common sense 
conceptual tasks) can be seen as limit cases of Gerlst & Pribbenows 
functional complex, in which parts play one single role forming a uniform 
structure. 
 Finally, we emphasize that, differently from quantities, collectives do not 
necessarily obey an extensional principle of identity. Some collectives can 
be considered extensional by certain conceptualizations. In this case, the 
addition or subtraction of a member renders a different collective. 
However, we also consider here the existence of intentional collectives obeying 
non-extensional principles of identity (Botazzi et al., 2004).  
5.6 The Problem of Transitivity Revisited 
In section 5.3, we have addressed the problem of fallacious transitivity 
inferences in part-whole relations by employing the notion of contexts. 
However, at that point, we are still dealing with one single type of parthood 
inherited from the formal part-whole relation in mereology. A question 
begging issue at this point is: by taking advantage of the refinement of this 
relation developed in section 5.5, can we provide more direct guidelines for 
prescribing or proscribing transitive relations? In other words, can we 
establish some relations between the specific type of part-whole relation 
and the issue of transitivity? 
The distinction between the three types of part-whole relation 
discussed in the previous section (quantity/mass, member-collection, 
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component-functional complex), actually reflects a distinction among 
different types of relata.  
 
Mass-Quantity: 
 
The quantity/mass relation holds between quantities (in the technical sense 
explained in section 5.5.1). Let us suppose a model such as the one 
depicted in figure 5.26, in which A, B and C are quantities.  We can show 
that for any A, B, C, the part-whole relation (C < A) holds as a result from 
the transitivity (C < B) and (B < A). The argumentation can be developed 
as follows: if A is a quantity then it is a maximal portion of matter unified 
by the characteristic relation of self-connectedness. That is, any part of A is 
connected to any other part of A. If B is part of A then B is connected to all 
parts of A. Likewise, if C is part of B then C is connected to all parts of B. 
Since connection is transitive, then we have that C is connected to all parts 
of A. Thus, since A is unified under self-connection, C must be part of A 
(otherwise the composition of A would not be a closure system, see 
definition 5.4). Therefore, we conclude that for the case of quantities, 
transitivity always holds.  
Another way to examine this situation is by inspecting A at an arbitrary 
time instant t. We can say that all parts of A are the quantities that are 
contained in a certain region of space R (i.e. a topoid, see Guizzardi & 
Herre & Wagner, 2002a). Since A is an objectified matter, than the topoid 
R occupied by A must be self-connected. Therefore, if B is part of A then B 
must occupy a sub-region R, which is part of R. Likewise, if C is part of B, 
it occupies a region R, part of R. Since spatial part-whole relations are 
always transitive (Johansson, 2004), we have that R is part of R, and if C 
occupies R, then it is contained in R. Ergo, by definition, C is a part of A.  
{essential=true}
«category»
Container
«quantity»
A
«quantity»
B
«quantity»
CQ Q
containment
1 1 1 1 1 1
{essential=true}  
Parthood relationships between quantities are always non-shareable. For 
instance, in figure 5.23, B can only be part of one single quantity of A, since 
A is a maximal. Moreover, A has at maximum one quantity of B as part, 
since B is also a maximal portion. Finally, as discussed in section 5.5.1, 
every part B of A is essential.  
 As in figure 5.26, we decorate the standard UML symbol for 
composition with a Q to represent a quantity/mass parthood relation. If 
cardinality constraints are fully specified, then the Q-parthood is a relation 
which:  
 
Figure 5-26  Part-Whole 
relations among 
quantities 
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(i) is non-shareable;  
(ii) the part is essential to the whole;  
(iii) the cardinality constraints in both association ends are of one and 
exactly one;  
(iv) only holds between quantities;  
(v) it is transitive, i.e., for all a,b,c, if Q(a,b) and Q(b,c) then Q(a,c). 
 
The second type of parthood considered here is the member-collection 
relation. Notice that the relation between EnglishSpeakingSegment and 
Group of People in figure 5.25 does not exemplify this type of relation. 
Instead, it is a relation of type subcollection-collection. The difference between 
the two types of parthood can be linguistically motivated in the following 
manner. According to (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005), classical semantic analysis 
of plurals and groups (Landman, 1996; Link, 1991) distinguish between 
atomic entities, which can be singular or collectives, and plural entities. Any 
collective atomic entity (e.g., a group of men, the herd) is constituted of 
some plural entity (e.g., {John, Paul, George, Ringo}, or the cows, which 
are sum of man-atoms, or cow-atoms, respectively). Following (Aurnague & 
Vieu, 2005), we have that:  
 
Member-Collection: 
 
The member-collection relation is one that holds between a singular entity and 
either a plural or a collective term. This is the relation, for example, between 
John and a group of men, the cow Joanne and the herd, or between the 
province of Overijssel and The Netherlands. Member collection relations 
are never transitive, i.e., they are intransitive. This can be understood in our 
analysis in the following way. To say that a member must be a singular entity 
coincides in this case with this entity being an atom of a given context. Or to 
put it differently, the unifying relation underlying membership cannot be 
further refined. An example of a member-collection relation is the 
following case from (Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 1999): I am member 
of a club (collection) and my club is a member of an International body 
(collection). However, it does not follow that I am a member of this 
International body since this only has clubs as members, not individuals. 
This situation is depicted in figure 5.27 below, in which we decorate the 
standard UML symbol for aggregation with an M to represent a 
member/collection parthood relation. A M-parthood relation is intransitive, 
i.e., for all a,b,c, if M(a,b) and M(b,c) then ¬M(a,c). Therefore, in this 
model, although the ClubMember John is part of the F.C.Twente Club, and 
that the F.C.Twente is part of the an international body Ψ, John is not part 
of (member of) Ψ.  
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 The statement above about the intransitivity of the M-parthood can be 
made more general. Members of a collection are considered to be atomic 
w.r.t. the context in which the collection is defined. As a consequence, if an 
individual x is a part of (member of) a collection y, then for every z which is 
part of (memberOf, componentOf, subCollectionOf) x, z is not a part of 
(member of) y. Thus, for instance, although an individual John can be part 
of (member of) a Club, none of Johns parts (e.g., his heart) is part of 
(member of) that Club. 
«collective»
Club
«kind»
Person
«collective»
InternationalBody
M
1..*
1..*
«role»
ClubMemberM 1..*1..*  
Subcollection/Collection:  
 
The subcollection-collection, conversely, is a relation that holds between two 
plural entities, or collectives constituted by such plural entities, such that all 
atoms of the first are also atoms of the second. In our analysis, 
subcollections are always created by refining the unifying relation of a 
certain collection. In the example of figure 5.25, the EnglishSpeakingSegment 
is part of the Group of Visitors. The latter is unified by, for instance, taking all 
people that visit an exhibition x at date y. The former by taking all people 
that visit an exhibition x at date y, and that speak English. As another 
example, take a forest and the north part of the forest. The latter is a part 
of (subcollection-of) the former. The forest is unified by taking all the trees 
located in a given area A. The north-part of the forest is unified by the 
taking all the trees located in the north part of A.      
As in figure 5.26, we decorate the standard UML symbol for 
composition with a C to represent the subcollection/collection parthood 
relation. If cardinality constraints are fully specified, then the C-parthood is 
such that:  
 
(i) the part is essential to the whole;  
(ii) the cardinality constraints in the association end relative to the part 
is one and exactly one;  
(iii) only holds between collectives;  
(iv) it is transitive, i.e., for all a,b,c, if C(a,b) and C(b,c) then C(a,c). In 
this figure this means that every C is also part of an A.  
  
Figure 5-27  Examples 
of member/collection 
part-whole relations 
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Notice that if we have M(x,y) and C(y,z) then it is also the case that M(x,z), 
since this would clearly be a case of (x <A y) and (y <B z), where if R and 
R are the unifying relations of A and B then R is a refinement of R. 
Therefore, in figure 5.28 we have that every D is a part of (member of) a B 
and also a member of an A. In figure 5.25, this means that every 
EnglishSpeakingMember is part of (member of) the Group of Visitors. 
1 1
«collective»
A C
«collective»
B 1
C
«collective»
C M
«role»
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{essential=true}{essential=true}
1..*1..*
 
Component-Functional Complex: 
  
Now, we can turn our attention to the most important type of parthood 
relation for the purposes of conceptual modeling, namely, the 
component/functional complex relation.  
Differently from collectives, complexes are composed by parts that play 
a multitude of roles in the context of the whole. As a consequence, in 
practical cases, the isolation of contexts for complexes can result in a 
complicated task, and in particular, one that requires a strong knowledge of 
the domain being modeled. We believe it is reasonable to assume that 
conceptual modelers working on the representations of specific domains 
have access to sufficient domain knowledge that enables them to define 
unifying relations for complexes, and to consequently isolate suitable 
contexts. Nonetheless, as we show in the remaining of this section and also 
in section 7.4, we can provide some patterns of relations for the case of 
component/functional complex parthood, in which transitivity is guaranteed 
to hold. The proposal of these patterns is very much in line with one of the 
main objective of this thesis, namely, to provide well-founded engineering 
tools for conceptual modelers. 
The parts of a complex have in common that they all posses a 
functional link with the complex. In other words, they all contribute to the 
functionality (or the behavior) of the complex. Therefore, if it is generally 
the case that essential parthood entails dependence (see definition 5.11), in 
this type of parthood relation, an essential part represents a case of 
functional dependence. To put it more precisely, for all complexes, if x is an 
essential part of y then y is functionally dependent on x.  
Let us take the example depicted in figure 5.2940. According to 
definition 5.11, we have that:  
                                                      
40 Since the component/complex parthood relation is the most common one in conceptual 
modeling, we use the standard presentation of the UML aggregation symbol to represent 
relations of this type. In the examples concerning these relations in the remaining of this 
section, for simplification, we shall refrain from specifying cardinality constraints.   
Figure 5-28  Examples 
of SubCollection/ 
Collection and 
Member/Collection part-
whole relations 
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(i) □(∀Person,x)(∃!Brain,y) □(ε(x) → (y < x));  
(ii) □(∀Brain,x)(∃!Cerebellum,y) □(ε(x) → (y < x)).  
 
From (i) and (ii) it follows that  
 
(iii) □((∀Person,x)(∃!Cerebellum,y) □(ε(x) → ε(y))). 
 
Hence, following definition 5.10, we have that  
 
(iv) □((∀Person,x)(∃!Cerebellum,y) ed(x,y)), 
 
i.e., every person is dependent on a specific cerebellum.  
«kind»
Person
«kind»
Brain
«kind»
Cerebellum
{essential=true, 
inseparable=true}
{essential=true, 
inseparable=true}  
In chapter 6, we use the notion of existential dependence (definition 5.10), 
to distinguish between what we name substantial and moments. In short, 
substantials are concrete objects of every day experience such as cats, 
persons, houses, cars, brains and cerebellums. Moments, in contrast, are 
particulars such as a weight, a though, an electric charge, a smile, a hand 
shake. Substantials are mutually independent, except in case they are 
related via parthood, i.e., in the case of essential or inseparable parts. That 
is to say that if a substantial x is external to a substantial y (i.e., disjoint 
from y) then y is independent of x (see formula 10 in chapter 6).       
 Now, since the elements in figure 5.29 are substantials, and since we 
have shown that every person is dependent of a specific cerebellum, if the 
cerebellum x is not part of the person y, we have to conclude that y is 
existentially dependent on a substantial that is disjoint from it, and 
consequently, that y (a particular person) is not a substantial. This result is 
certainly absurd. Therefore, we must conclude that transitivity always holds 
across essential parthood relations. 
Figure 5.30 is an extension of the model of figure 5.29 by adding the 
role universal Student. We can show that, in this case, transitivity holds 
between the relationships cerebellum/brain and the inherited brain/student 
(represented by a dashed line) in the figure. Since the semantics we assume 
for the subsumption relation is that □((∀Student,x) person(x)) (see section 
4.1), from this and from (i) and (ii) above we can show that  
 
(v) □((∀Student,x)(∃!Cerebellum,y) □(ε(x) →ε(y))), 
Figure 5-29  Examples 
of (functional) essential 
parthood between 
complexes 
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or equivalently, that  
 
(vi) □((∀ Student,x)(∃!Cerebellum,y) ed(x,y)). 
 
Now, since a student is also a substantial then we must conclude that every 
student has a cerebellum as an essential part. 
«kind»
Person
«kind»
Brain
«kind»
Cerebellum
{essential=true, 
inseparable=true}
{essential=true, 
inseparable=true}
«role»
Student  
In section 7.4, we resume this discussion to consider also the case of generic 
(functional) dependence between complexes, i.e., in which situations 
transitivity holds across relationships of mandatory (as opposed to essential) 
parthood between functional complexes. 
5.7 Related Work 
In this section, we discuss several attempts in the literature to provide a 
theoretical foundation for part-whole relations in conceptual and object-
oriented modeling. 
5.7.1 The Approach of Odell and Bock 
 In an article entitled Six Different Kinds of Composition (Odell, 1998), James 
Odell has proposed an adaptation of the taxonomy of part-whole relations 
proposed by Winston, Chaffin and Herrman (see section 5.5) for the 
purpose of modeling object-oriented systems. We recognize the pioneering 
nature of Odells work as one the first attempts in the object modeling 
literature to emphasize the multitude of part-whole relations that should be 
considered. However, there are a number of important issues in which our 
approach differs from his, some of which are related to features that Odells 
approach inherits from WCH.  
On page 3 of the Six Different Kinds of Composition, the author makes 
the following comment on, what he terms, material-object composition 
(stuff-object in WCHs terminology): The word partly is not a requirement 
of the material-object relationship. For instance, a windshield could be 
made entirely of glass-not just partly. Other material-object relationships 
Figure 5-30  Transitivity 
of parts in the case of 
Roles 
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require a subjective judgment. For example, can the ceramics (of the spark 
plugs) be removed from a car? If so, ceramics is a component-integral 
object relationship, instead. From our perspective, in this passage there is 
confusing between the relations of parthood and constitution. If a glass 
would be considered the only part of a window, it would not satisfy the 
weak supplementation axiom, which is considered a minimum requirement 
for all part-whole relations (Simons, 1987). However, the biggest problem 
is with the second part of the statement: the difference between a spark 
plug and the ceramics it is made of is not a subjective one, but an 
ontological one. Akin to the statue/lump of clay problem, the plug and the 
quantity of ceramics in its constitution have different modal properties and, 
by Leibniz law, cannot be deemed identical. Finally, if we were to respect 
our common sense intuitions, both the ceramics and the spark plugs should 
be considered separable parts of the car. In other words, if separability is 
taken in an ontologically meaningful modal sense (see section 5.5): the 
ceramics (or the plugs) pre-existed the car, i.e., there are worlds in which 
the ceramics (or the plugs) exist without being part of the car.  
This conception of separability (as being physically entangled) has its 
source in the original WCH proposal. However, they reappear in other 
parts of Odells article. For instance, on page 4 of the same paper, he 
proposes that the difference between a place-area and portion-object 
compositions (portion-mass in WCHs terminology) is that while both are 
homeomerous, only the former is constituted solely by inseparable parts. As 
discussed in section 5.5, place-area compositions cannot be deemed 
homeomerous in any meaningful sense of the word, but, other than that, it 
is not the case that their parts are necessarily inseparable either. For 
instance, the province of Trentino-Alto Adige is a (place-area) part of Italy, 
but not an inseparable part, since there are worlds (namely before 1921), in 
which it belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This is far from being 
an isolated case: Uruguay used to be part of Brazil (under the name of 
Cisplatina), Strasbourg used to be part of Germany, and so forth. In 
summary, there is nothing in the place-area composition relation that 
requires the parts to be inseparable.  
One of the main intentions of the typology of meronymic relations 
proposed by Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann (WCH) is to address the 
problem of fallacious cases of transitivity in part-whole relations. By 
adopting the WCH framework, Odell states that when the same kind of 
[part-whole] relationship is used, the conclusion is always correct. A 
similar statement is also found in (Artale et al., 1996): as long as we are 
careful to keep a single sense of part, it seems that the part-whole relation is 
always transitive. However, when we inadvertently mix different meronymic 
relations problems with transitivity arise. As we discussed in section 5.6, 
member-collection relations are intransitive and component-functional complex 
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relations are non-transitive (i.e., transitive in certain circumstances and not 
transitive in others) irrespective of whether we maintain the same sense of 
part.          
As we have also discussed in section 5.5.1, if homeomerousity is given 
its standard interpretation in philosophy, portion-mass compositions are 
not homeomerous either. This actually becomes clear in an alleged example 
of portion-mass composition mentioned by Odell (p.3, ibid.): A meter is 
part of a kilometer. Instances of Meter and Kilometer clearly do not have the 
same properties (e.g., only the latter has the property of corresponding to 
1000 meters). Although both are subtypes of Measure, this should not be 
an argument for considering it a case of homeomerousity. After all, any part 
of a physical object can be considered to be a physical object. 
In differentiating the member-bunch composition (WCHs member-
collection) from the component-functional complex, Odell writes (page 4, 
ibid.): In the composition relationships above, the parts bear a particular 
functional or structural relationship to one another or to the object they 
comprise. Member-bunch composition has no such requirementThe 
member-bunch relationship is different-based, instead, on spatial proximity 
or social connection. For a shrub to be part of a garden implies a location 
close to the other plants. For an employee to be part of a union implies a 
social connection. As we have discussed in section 5.3, in order to provide 
a suitable foundation for conceptual part-whole relations, a mereology (a 
theory of parts) should be complemented with a theory of wholes. This is 
because the aggregates that interest us in a commonsense ontology of reality 
are integral entities, unified by genuine relations, not arbitrary formal ones. 
In fact, in our theory, an integral whole is defined in terms of closure 
systems containing all and only those objects that bear a unifying (material) 
relation to one another. Now, if this is the case, this should hold for all 
types of conceptual aggregates, i.e., both for forests and televisions. 
Otherwise, if trees in a forest bear no genuine relation to each other, how 
can we decide which trees are part of the forest and which are not? The 
point we want to emphasize here is that the relationships unifying 
collectives are genuine unifying relations, and that deciding whether they 
are functional or structural may be a matter of conceptualization. After 
all, for instance, employees who are socially connected to each other can very 
well be functionally related to each other. 
 Finally, in section 5.5.2, we have articulated a distinction between 
member-bunch and component-functional complex based on the fact that 
only in the former all parts seem to play the same role w.r.t. to the whole. 
In the examples of member-partnership (a special case of member-bunch) 
provided by Odell (e.g. Ginger and Fred are a waltz couple, p.5), the 
members can only be said to play the same role if one is willing to raise to a 
certain extent the level of abstraction. This seems to support our argument 
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that perhaps the distinction between member-collection and component-
integral object is strongly dependent on the conceptualization at hand. 
5.7.2 The BWW Approach 
In (Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001), the authors employ the 
BWW (Bunge-Wand-Weber) ontology (Wand & Weber, 1993; Weber, 
1997) as a foundation for a conceptual framework defining a taxonomy of 
part-whole relations in terms of their primary (e.g., reflexivity, asymmetry 
and transitivity), secondary (e.g., shareability, mutability, separability) and 
consequent properties (e.g., ownership, propagation of operations, 
encapsulation). Moreover, the article analyses the different kinds of part-
whole relations in terms of ontological soundness, i.e., if the proposed 
concepts are meaningful in terms of real-world semantics. Finally, some 
UML stereotypes are proposed in order to provide syntactical 
representations to the proposed ontological distinctions.  
Here we are only interested in those properties that are meaningful in 
terms of ontological correspondence. For that reason, we have chosen to 
ignore properties that are relevant only in terms of implementation 
decisions (e.g., ownership, propagation of operations, encapsulation, by-
value or by-reference, used or not used).  
In terms of the primary and secondary characteristics of part-whole 
relations there are three points of disagreement between our proposal and 
the one of (Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001):  
 
Emergent and Resultant properties  
 
Both (Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001) and (Wand & Storey 
& Weber, 1999) propose that we should only model a thing as an aggregate 
if we are interested in modeling its emergent and resultant properties. 
Emergent and Resultant properties are defined by Bunge in (1977, p.97) as 
follows: P is a resultant or hereditary property of x iff P is a property of some 
component y ∈ C(x) (see definition 5.1) other than x; otherwise P is an 
emergent or gestalt property of x.  
 The UML class diagram depicted in figure 5.31 is an exact copy from 
(Opdahl & Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 2001, p.391). In describing this 
model, the authors explicitly state that in the problem domain all 
Departments are aggregates of Employees. Nevertheless, Opdahl and colleagues 
deem unacceptable to add a part-whole between these two classes since the 
diagram would comprise no resultant/emergent property of Department 
relative to Employee. We strongly disagree with this view and we think that 
this restriction arises from a misinterpretation of Bunges ontology. 
 According to Bunge, every aggregate certainly has emergent and 
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resultant properties. However, his ontology makes explicit the distinction 
between the properties possessed by a thing and the representations of 
these properties, namely attributes. According to Bunge, there are no bare 
individuals, i.e., things without properties: a thing possesses at least one 
substantial property, even if we humans are not or cannot be aware of 
them. Humans get in contact with the properties of things exclusively via 
the things attributes, i.e. via a chosen representational view of its properties. 
 In summary, we agree that emergent/resultant properties are basic 
characteristics of part-whole relations, in the sense they are present in all of 
them. What we do not agree is to use the existence of resultant/emergent 
attributes as a criterion for deciding whether to represent part-whole 
relationships. In other words, emergent/resultant properties of aggregates 
will always exist but we do not have always to be interested in them and 
sometimes we cannot even be aware of them. Additionally, we think that 
the representation of these attributes is not a necessary condition for one to 
benefit from the representation of part-whole relations in terms of 
communicability, understanding and problem-solving. 
account no
opening date
balance
Account
account holder id
tot balance
account holder rating
AccountHolder
* 1
held-by/holds
employee no
name
phone no
address
Employee
department name
address
contact person
phone no
Department
 
 
 
Mixing-up different properties 
 
Lifetime dependency is a characteristic of part-whole relations with 
essential and/or inseparable parts. In this sense, we disagree with examples 
such as the one used in (Henderson-Sellers & Barbier, 1999) to justify the 
existence of parts that are separable, but that share the same destruction as 
the whole: a car wheel is independent of the car but if the wheel is in the car during 
the cars destruction then it is also destroyed. In this case, the wheel is clearly 
separable from the car, it just happened to be the same event that caused 
the destruction of both objects (had the wheel been separated from the car, 
the cars destruction would not propagate to the wheel).  
Figure 5-31  A part-
whole relationship 
between Employee and 
Department belonging to 
the domain is not 
represented in the 
model because neither 
emergent nor resultant 
properties are 
represented (from 
Opdahl & Henderson-
Sellers & Barbier, 2001, 
p. 391) 
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 This confusion seems to be motivated by an object-oriented 
programming bias towards conceptual modeling. Traditionally, in OO 
programming languages, an object can be made responsible for the 
destruction of other objects as a procedure for memory deallocation named 
garbage collecting. Thus, it can be warranted that an object X should trigger 
the destruction of other objects coupled with X in the moment of its 
destruction, even if the coupling is merely a contingent one.  
 The mixing of different conceptual properties due to an 
implementation-oriented attitude is not uncommon in conceptual 
modeling. Another example that is recurrent is the unfounded association 
between shareability and separability. For instance, (Saksena & France & 
Larrondo-Petrie, 1998) claim that shared parts are necessarily separable, 
and that sharing implies that if the membership of a part in one aggregate 
is nullified then that part can continue to exist. In other words, according 
to the authors, shareability implies separability. A converse confusion appears in 
(Snoeck & Dedene, 2001), in which the authors claim to present a 
problematic case of part-whole modeling w.r.t. separability. They use the 
following example of the relation between a paper and a journal issue: 
once a paper has been accepted and published in a journal issue, it has 
become a part of this issue and is in addition inseparable from the issue and 
cannot be shared by other issues(p.15). This example shows indeed a case of 
non-shareability. In fact, one could argue, a case of non-shareability w.r.t. 
to a given universal (see definition 5.9): although a paper cannot belong to 
different journals, it could perhaps be part of a collected papers series of some 
given authors.  
 As a case of non-shareability, this example is perfectly unproblematic, as 
it can be modeled in a standard way such as in the model of figure 5.32. 
Anyhow, the important point here is that the paper can be non-shareable 
without being inseparable. In this case one can perfectly argue that the 
paper is not inseparable from the journal, since it could perfectly well exist 
prior to the journal existence, and even if the journal issue goes out of 
existence it could still very well exist as part of the authors collected paper 
series41.  
Journal Issue Article
1 1..*  
Examples of non-shareability without inseparability abound. To cite just 
another one: the relation between a Heart to a Human Body is typically 
conceived as one of non-shareability. Nonetheless, the heart is clearly not 
                                                      
41 By the terms Journal Issue and Article here we do not refer to their physical copies (tokens), 
but to their logical existence.    
Figure 5-32  Standard 
UML notation for non-
shareable parts 
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an inseparable part of the body, since it can survive the extinction of the 
body. The example actually (fortunately) extends to most human organs, 
and that is what organ transplants is all about! Moreover, counterexamples 
of the converse also exist, i.e., there can be shareable parts that are 
inseparable to all (or some of) the wholes of which they are part. One of 
such examples is presented in figure 5.33: although a specific lecture of a 
regular course is an inseparable part of that course, it may be shared with 
any number of studium generale courses. In summary, shareability and 
separability are orthogonal secondary characteristics. 
Lecture RegularCourse
StudiumGeneraleCourse
11..*
11..*
{inseparable = true}
{inseparable = true}  
Transitivity 
Opdahl and colleagues chose to exclude transitivity from the list of 
primary characteristics of part-whole relations, based on the problematic 
examples of transitivity paradoxes, such as those discussed in section 5.2.1.  
 Parthood, as a formal relation, is considered transitive by all theories 
of parts. In fact, both (Varzi, 2003) and (Simons, 1997) consider 
transitivity as intrinsic to the very meaning of part. It is true that there are 
examples of meronymic relations that when put together derive fallacious 
conclusions. But it is also the case that these meronymic conceptual 
relations depart from the formal meaning that mereological binary relations intend to 
capture (Johansson, 2004). In a purely mereological sense it is indeed the 
case that both the door and the handle are parts of house, or that soldiers 
are parts of battalions. Therefore, a theory of parthood relations for 
conceptual modeling must explicitly differentiate between the formal 
relations of parthood defined in formal mereologies and the conceptual 
relations of parthood that are employed in cognitive tasks. The conceptual 
relation of parthood should not be interpreted in the same way as its purely 
formal counterpart.  
 From a conceptual and computational point of view there are many 
benefits from reasoning on parthood transitivity. Examples include 
propagation of properties such as movement, rotation, and (in some cases) 
creation and destruction, among others. For this reason, on one hand, we 
agree with Opdahl and colleagues that transitivity is not a primary 
characteristic of conceptual part-whole relations, in the sense that it does 
not hold for all relations of this type. However, on the other hand, we 
defend that besides assuming non-transitivity for these relations, it is 
Figure 5-33  An example 
of wholes with shareable 
parts but that are 
inseparable  
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fundamental to understand why transitivity holds in some cases and not in 
others, and to determine the contexts in which part-whole relations are 
indeed transitive. Therefore, in this sense, the work presented here can be 
considered as an extension of the work of Opdahl and colleagues. 
5.8 Final Considerations 
In this chapter we have concentrated on giving examples of part-whole 
relations between substantials. However, this is far from implying that this 
type of relation only holds between individuals pertaining to this ontological 
category. Conversely, part-whole relationships clearly exist among other 
types of individuals. Examples of parthood can easily be found among 
processes and events (perdurants) (buying is part of shopping, singing 
happy birthday is part of birthday party), among conceptual spaces (e.g., 
the color space is composed of hue, saturation and brightness), moments 
(e.g., a musical chord is composed of at least three notes; a thought can 
have proper parts), time and space, etc. Therefore, in this sense, we 
disagree with the BWW approach (Evermann & Wand, 2001b), which 
defines parthood only between things, i.e., substantial individuals. The 
categories of perdurants, moments and conceptual spaces are defined in 
chapter 6. 
  The focus on substantials here is motivated by the main objectives of 
this thesis, which emphasizes on providing ontological foundations for 
structural conceptual modes. Nonetheless, we strongly believe that most of 
the results developed here can be carried to part-whole relations holding 
among individuals of different categories. For example, the basic axioms of 
MM also hold for parts of processes, which also have mandatory and 
contingent parts, and so forth. For a study of the part-whole relation among 
processes, we refer to (Simons, 1987).     
One of the main objectives for the development of the typology of 
meronymic relations proposed by Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann (WCH) 
is to address the problem of fallacious transitive cases. As demonstrated in 
section 5.6, the typology of parthood relation that can be extracted from a 
revision of WCHs original account can be exploited to provide more direct 
guidelines for helping the user in the definition of these contexts. In 
chapter 7, we resume the discussion on this topic by proposing a number of 
visual patterns that can be used to identify transitivity context in parthood 
relations among complexes, which are the most typical sort of parthood 
relations to be found in conceptual modeling in computer science.     
We believe that the problem of transitivity bears some strong 
connection to another (very difficult) philosophical question, namely, that 
of why are some parts essential and other parts accidental to a thing. As 
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discussed in (Simons, 1987; Wiggins, 2001), the parts of a thing behave 
much like any other property of the thing. For this reason, parts are also 
determined by the nature of the particular or, to put in Aristotelian terms, 
by what the particular is? Since, in conformance with Wiggins, we 
consider that the essential properties of a thing are those implied by the 
(unique) substance sortal that it instantiates, the same applies to its essential 
parts.      
This makes clear that any deeper discussion on the reasons for the 
essentiality of some parts requires a discussion on the essentiality of 
properties. In our opinion, such a discussion cannot be carried out avoiding 
the philosophical discussion on the very meaning of Kinds, which in turn, is 
related to the ancient issues of essentialism and the problem of universals 
(Armstrong, 1989). Some authors (most notably Boyd, 1991), deny the 
existence of essences in traditional terms (i.e., as a list of essential 
characteristics) in favour of what can be termed nomological essentialism. 
Boyd proposes a view of essence in terms of what he names causal 
homeostasis. For him, the essence of a thing is a network of causal dispositions 
relating the properties of the thing. He argues that: kinds, properties, 
relations, etc. are natural if they reflect important features of the causal 
structure of the world the clustering of properties is not merely chance 
coincidencesthe presence of some properties tends to favor the presence 
of others where there are common underlying properties that tend to 
maintain the presence of the clusters. (cited by Keil, 1992).  
This notion of essence as a cluster of causally related properties is akin 
to the notion of organization proposed by Maturana and Varela (Maturana & 
Varela, 1987; Varela, 1979) in their theory of Autopoiesis (as noticed by 
Simons, 1998). This view implies that an individual can change all its 
manifest properties (e.g., perceptual characteristics) and keep its identity as 
long as its organization is maintained. Actually, Boyds argument is even 
stronger than that: some properties of the thing have to vary for the 
homeostasis to be maintained. This position is also shared by Bunge who 
states that the laws of a thing are essential to it (by definition of a law, it 
must hold necessarily), and the necessary properties of a thing are those 
which are lawfully related. In summary, both laws and lawfully related 
properties are essential. Since (i) the laws of an object are determined by its 
Natural Kind (Bunge, 1977, chapter 3), and (ii) a Natural Kind in Bunge is 
equivalent to what is termed here substance sortal (see discussion in section 
4.5.2), we can conclude that indeed the necessary properties of a thing are 
determined by the (unique) substance sortal it instantiates. 
In discussing individual adaptation, Bunge and more recently (Rowe & 
Leaney, 1997) and (Rowe & Leaney & Lowe, 1998) argue about change of 
properties in terms of Bunges concept of the nomological state space of a 
thing. The idea is that a thing can only assume states that are contained in 
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its nomological state space, i.e., lawful states. Suppose that a property p of a 
thing x changes, placing it an unlawful state s. This change must trigger 
changes in other property(ies), say p, so that another lawful state s can be 
reached. If no such compensatory change is possible, then object x will 
remain in a state that falls outside its nomological state space and, according 
to Bunge, it will change its name. In our terminology, this means that x 
will change its identity and therefore will cease to exist as such. As a 
consequence, we can state that the essential parts of a thing are those that 
are directly related to the thingss identity and, hence, those whose loss puts 
the thing in an unrecoverable unlawful state, i.e., in a state where no 
compensatory change exists to bring it back to its nomological state space. 
This conception of essence finds support in many authors in cognitive 
sciences (Keil, 1992; Milikan, 1998) and it has been empirically supported 
by works such as (Schunn & Vera, 1995). In particular, Schunn & Verna 
provide some empirical evidence that human cognition employs causal 
domain theories (and not typicality or frequency of properties) as its most 
important principle of application, and this is the case for both endurants 
and perdurants, natural entities and artifacts, and for entities of familiar and 
unfamiliar kinds. 
The cognitive psychologist Frank Keil (Keil, 1992) subscribes to the 
stronger idea that homestatic property clusters exist not only for natural but also 
for nominal kinds (Schwartz, 1980). He argues that it is unlikely that the 
elements in a nominal essence are fully arbitrary and defends that, in 
contrast, they are systematically connected to a set of real, or at least 
supposed, causal relations  not those in biology or physics but those 
governing human interactions.  For instance, chairs have a number of 
properties, which are used to identify them. Although there may not be 
internal causal homeostatic mechanisms of chairs that lead them to have 
these properties, there may well be external mechanisms having to do with 
the form and function of the human body and with typical social and 
cultural activities of humans. For example, certain dimensions of chairs as 
well as the weight range they are supposed to support are determined by 
properties of the human anatomy. Some of the features of nominal kinds 
can be arbitrary. For instance, take the rules of traffic: the choice of driving 
on the right or left of the road seems a random choice. However, having a 
rule that decides which side to drive it is not, since there are good causal 
justifications related to the consequence of collisions to humans on certain 
velocities and the difficulties in responding quickly enough with such a rule 
at certain velocity. In summary, for Keil, although the definition of nominal 
kinds (including artifacts) is heavily dependent of human intentions, the 
latter are not in themselves arbitrary. According to him, perhaps a clearer 
distinction between natural and nominal kind is that for the former the 
causal homeostatic mechanisms are closely related to various domains of 
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science (e.g. biology, chemistry, physics), whereas for the latter social and 
psychological domains of causality are involved. 
According to (van Leeuwen, 1991), the principle of identity and, in 
particular, the principle of persistence that an individual obeys is implied by 
its principle of application. This is compatible with his view that endurants 
are persisting integral wholes, i.e., if the principle of application is determined 
by the presence of a causal network of properties (essence) then a continuant is 
an object that persists in time maintaining that network, or as system 
theorists would say, maintaining its organization. Moreover, in parity with 
Bunge, the individual is the same as long as this network is maintained. 
Deciding what is the integral whole that should persist is therefore the very 
task of the principle of application. This supports the thesis that the principle 
of unity of an individual is also strongly related to its principles of application 
and identity. In order to individuate something we must decide what its 
parts are, i.e., we must see it as an integral whole. Thus counting presupposes 
individuation, individuation presupposes unity and unity presupposes 
application. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the universals that carry 
principles of identity, persistence, individuation and counting are also 
exactly those that also carry a principle of unity, namely sortal universals.  
Finally, if the principle of unity for an individual x is related to its 
principle of application (and so is its unifying condition), to determine what 
x is helps to determine what its parts are. In particular, if a principle of 
application is a causal network of properties then to determine xs parts is 
to determine the particulars that contribute to this network. Ergo, objects 
that are unified under the same unity condition are those that contribute to 
the causal network of properties that supply this condition. This argument 
seems to support the thesis defended in this chapter that transitivity holds 
within wholes that are unified by (refinements of) the same unity condition. 
In other words, material part-whole relations can be seen as embedding the 
implicit condition φ (see discussion in section 6.2.7) that their relata 
contribute to the same cluster of properties (nomological essence).  
A number of results in cognitive psychology provide empirical evidence 
for some of the points aforementioned. For example, (Tversky, 1989) 
shows that taxonomies and partonomies are strongly interrelated, and that 
children are more likely to group taxonomically when instances share parts 
than when instances do not share parts. This clearly suggests the relation 
between a criterion of unity and one of application. Moreover, as discussed 
in chapter 4, the establishment of kind categories (substance sortals) in the 
language of thought is essential for the learning of proper names, common 
nouns and for individuation and categorization tasks in general. According 
to (Mcnamara, 1986), the first notion of kind which young infants 
construct is in association with the so-called basic-level sortals (Rosch et al., 
1976). In taxonomy, basic-level sortals have a privileged status in many 
200 CHAPTER 5 PARTS AND WHOLES 
cognitive tasks, and it is at this level that subjects are first able to 
substantially produce attributes for the given categories. (Tversky & 
Hemenway, 1984) shows that most of these attributes are parts, and 
propose that parts may underlie the informativeness of the basic level and 
account for the convergence of many cognitive operations at that level as 
well. Finally, (Hall, 1998) conducts empirical studies with regard to the 
perceived conceptual relation between the identity of an object and the 
change of its parts. As his results show, knowledge about specific kinds of 
objects and their canonical transformations exerts an increasingly powerful 
effect, over the course of development, upon peoples tendency to rely on 
continuity as a criterion for attributing persistence to objects that undergo 
change. 
Finally, we summarize this discussion from a more pragmatic 
conceptual modeling point of view. Recently, many authors have proposed 
that an interesting way to conceptualize structure/organization of entities is 
to view it as a set of interrelated roles (Dignum, 2003; Odell & Parunak & 
Fleischer, 2003; Odell & Nodine & Levy, 2005). This possibility is also 
accounted for in (Odell & Bock, 1998), in which integral wholes are 
claimed to be aggregates of qua types. Although we mostly agree with this 
conception, there is still one point that should be rephrased. As discussed in 
chapter 4, roles are anti-rigid universals, and stating that wholes are unified 
by objects that play roles in its inner structure implies that all objects are 
only contingently part of this structure. We advocate that this is the case for 
some objects, namely mandatory parts42. However, for some objects this 
relation is not contingent, in which case one could say that they play the 
roles of themselves. These are the inseparable and/or essential parts. In 
summary, an object x is part of another object y if and only if it plays a 
role defined in the organization (context) of x.  
 We formally define the notion qua individuals in chapter 7. Moreover, in 
that chapter, we resume the discussion on the connection between qua 
individuals and part-whole relations. 
                                                      
42Theoretically they could also be merely contingent parts but this would demand the 
specification of zero minimum cardinalities in the (part-whole) relations between the 
aggregate and the role these parts play. This in turn would entail the creation of invalid 
models according to the postulates of chapter 4, since roles are relationally dependent 
entities.    
 Chapter 6 
6. Properties 
This chapter aims at providing ontological foundations for some of the most 
basic conceptual modeling constructs, namely types, attributes, data types, and 
associations.  
Types (e.g., Person or Car), attributes (e.g., being colored, or being happy), 
and associations (e.g., being married to, being enrolled at) are all considered 
sorts of universals, i.e., predicative terms that can possibly be applied to a 
multitude of individuals. In chapter 4, we have focused our discussion on 
types. Universals such as attributes and associations are referred here by the 
general name Property. This chapter is therefore mostly about properties. 
The notion of universal underlies the most basic and widespread 
constructs in conceptual modeling. Therefore, before we can provide 
ontological foundations for these constructs, we start here by investigating 
the nature of universals from a philosophical point of view. We start the 
chapter on section 6.1 by discussing the so-called problem of universals in 
philosophy. In particular, we analyze and criticize a specific theory of 
universals that underlies most current conceptual modeling languages, 
including the semantic web languages. In virtue of these criticisms, we justify 
the choice of some theoretical entities that are incorporated in our 
foundational ontology, which is fully elaborated in section 6.2.  
In section 6.3, we apply the proposed ontological categories to 
interpret the modeling concepts of types, attributes, datatypes, and 
associations, and to provide methodological guidelines for their use in 
conceptual modeling.   
In section 6.4, we present a more general discussion on related work in 
the conceptual modeling literature. Section 6.5 closes the chapter with 
some final considerations. 
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6.1 The Problem of Universals 
In chapter 4 of this thesis we have discussed different types of universals, 
and how they could relate to each other. In particular, we saw that some 
universals, such as Man or Dog provide a principle of identity to the objects 
they classify. In contrast, other universals, such as Red, Square or Hard, do 
not provide such a principle. Strawson (1959) names these two types of 
classifiers sortal and characterizing universals, respectively. 
Before proceeding, there is an important notion that should be 
defined, namely the distinction between determinables and determinates 
(Johnson, 1921). Universals can have different degrees of determinateness. 
Determinates can be understood as restrictions of determinables, providing 
a higher degree of specificity. For instance, being colored is a determinable 
and being red is a determinate for it. Since these are relative notions, being 
red can also be considered a determinable for being scarlet (one of its 
determinates). (Funkhouser, 2004) uses the terms super-determinable and 
super-determinate for the universals that are the root and the leaves of a 
specialization chain, respectively.    
Now, take for example a sortal like Person. For every individual 
person, say John, there are many characterizing universals that apply to 
John, in virtue of John being of that specific kind. For example, John can be 
1.80 meters tall, 80 kilograms of weight, be 29 years old, and so forth. Notice 
that properties such as being colored, being red, being-1.80-meters-tall or being 
married are indeed sorts of universals, since they can be multiple instantiated 
in different individuals (i.e., they are repeatable). This gives us the idea that 
sortal universals form clusters of characterizing ones. Actually, most of the 
categories in the profile proposed in chapter 4 are typically used to model 
clusters of characterizing universals, with the exception of mixins. 
Sometimes characterizing universals are represented as mixins for the 
purpose of improving the structure of the resulting models, but more 
typically they are represented in conceptual models as attributes (e.g, 
color), in the case of super-determinables, or as attribute values (e.g, red), 
in the case of determinates. In fact, (Guarino & Welty, 2000) use the term 
Attribution for mixins, highlighting the correlation between the two 
representations of characterizing universals.  
The issue of universal properties has been a topic of great interest (and 
controversy) throughout the entire history of western philosophy, from 
Plato and Aristotle to early analytic philosophers such as Russel and 
Wittgenstein, and contemporary philosophers such as Bunge (1977), Boyd 
(1991), Armstrong (1989, 1997) and Thomasson (2004). This topic is 
known in philosophy as the problem of universals (Loux, 2001) and can be 
summarized in the following manner. We know that proper names (e.g., 
Noam Chomsky or Spot) refer to individual entities, but what do general 
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terms (or universal properties) refer to (if anything at all)? We classify 
objects as being of the same type (e.g., person) and use the same predicate 
or general term (e.g., red) to different objects. What exactly is the same in 
different objects that justify their belonging to the same category? In the 
sequel, we briefly present different approaches in answering these questions 
that amount to different philosophical theories of universals. 
6.1.1 Lightweight Ontologies and the Class Theory of Universals 
A first group of theories is constituted by what we name here Class theories of 
universals (henceforth, C-theories). In a C-theory, the meaning of a type is 
associated with that of class in the mathematical sense, i.e., roughly a set. 
Hence, if a and b are of the same type, it is because they belong to the same 
set X, where X is the ontological interpretation of that type. 
In the sequel we discuss C-theories in some detail, mainly because 
there are many languages in conceptual modeling that commit to this view 
of universals. Examples include OWL (Bechhofer et al., 2004), LINGO 
(Falbo & Menezes & Rocha, 1998; Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 
2002), CCT (Dijkman & Ferreira Pires & Joosten, 2001); Z (Spivey, 1988), 
ER (Chen, 1976), among others. The choice for an underlying class 
ontology in these languages is sometimes motivated by mathematical 
simplicity and convenience, sometimes related to practical performance 
trade-offs. For example, LINGO was designed with the specific objective of 
achieving a positive trade-off between expression power of the language and 
the ability to facilitate bridging the gap between the conceptual and 
implementation levels (a preoccupation that also seem to be present in 
Peter Chens original proposal for ER diagrams). OWL, on the other hand, 
has been designed to explore the relation between a minimum 
expressiveness and computational tractability in the reasoning procedures. 
Although these choices can be justifiable in lightweight ontology modeling 
languages for practical reasons, there are many philosophical problems that 
would make them unsuitable as foundational43 conceptual modeling 
languages.      
   To start with, a major problem with the simplest form of a C-theory 
is the difficulty in correlating classes and types. If C-theory is to be true, 
there should be a one-to-one correlation between the two. However, this 
correlation is not to be found. Take the set-theoretical semantics given to 
some of the modeling languages aforementioned (e.g., CCT): 
  
 a type is interpreted as a set;  
                                                      
43 See the distinction between lightweight and foundational ontologies in section 3.3.3 of 
this thesis. 
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 the subtyping relation is interpreted as the subset relation;  
 the instantiation relation is interpreted as the membership relation.  
 
In this case, the following problems are immediately found: 
 
a1. If the subtyping relation between types A and B is interpreted as the 
subset relation between their extensions, then any type C with an empty 
extension (i.e., that has no instances) can be considered a subtype of any 
other type (the empty set is a subset of any other set). Moreover, any 
two types C and D with empty extensions (e.g., unicorn and centaur) 
become identical; 
 
a2. Starting with an individual, for instance the person John, one can 
construct an infinite series of sets, all which have exactly the same 
content (Sowa, 2000): the singleton set {John}; the set {{John}}; the 
set {{{John}}}, {{{{John}}}} and so forth. Although, in set-
theoretic terms, these are all different entities, they correspond to the 
same entity in reality. In fact, this type of ontological extravagance of set-
theory was one of the motivations for the proposal of formal 
mereologies (see section 5.1), since in extensional mereology there is no 
distinction between an entity A and the sum of its parts. This is captured 
in the following statement by (Goodman, 1956), one of the fathers of 
mereology: No distinction of individuals without distinction of content.   
 
a3. As discussed in chapter 4, the categorization mechanism employed by 
human cognition have the purpose of supporting learning, improving 
inductive knowledge, making memory and language possible, etc. Now, 
take the set formed by the last thought I had on last Christmas, the 
number two, the apple over my table and the last two minutes of a 
football game. This is a perfectly acceptable set (from a mathematical 
point of view), but one which has no place in a cognitive model of 
reality. 
 
An attempt to solve some of these problems is made by a refinement of 
the pure C-theory, named the Natural Class theory. This theory was first 
proposed by philosopher Anthony Quinton (1957), who proposes a 
fundamental distinction in the world between natural and unnatural classes. 
According to Quinton, it is a feature of the world that things fall into 
natural classes, and this primitive notion of belonging to a natural class 
cannot be further analyzed. Thus, particulars, by virtue of falling naturally 
into a class, can be said to be of this or that type. In other words, the 
meaning of a type (e.g., horse) is the natural class of things that are 
instances of that type, i.e., the set of individuals that are members of the 
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natural class of Horses. By recognizing that only certain sorts of classes are 
related to a type, the Natural Class theory can address the criticisms (a2) 
and (a3) above. In particular, the set mentioned in (a3) would lack 
naturalness and therefore would not be associated to a type. 
To meet the criticisms stated in (a1), one could just go a little bit 
further and postulate that the empty class is not natural. However, 
underlying the criticisms in (a1) there is a more general problem, due to 
the extensional principle of identity of sets. This principle of identity, know 
as the extensionality principle, states that two sets are identical iff they have the 
same members. According to this principle then, the following 
consequences are implied:  
 
b1. If a class is taken to be the ontological interpretation of a type, then the 
identity of classes become the identity of corresponding types. 
According to the extensionality principle, if a class gains or looses a 
member it becomes a different class. Take for example the type 
Electron. If the meaning of this type is the class of existing electrons, 
then addition or deletion of any electron would change the meaning of 
what is to be an electron. This is taken by many philosophers (and we 
agree) to be an absurd consequence; 
 
b2. Any two classes that happen to be co-extensional must be considered 
identical. The case of empty classes mentioned previously in (a1) is just 
an extreme case of this problem. Take for example the types human and 
featherless biped, or liquid and viscous. These types have completely 
different intentions and can have different associated principles of 
identity (see chapter 4). The fact that two types happen to coincide in 
their extensions should not be sufficient for equating them; 
 
b3. Suppose a subtyping relation between the types Organization and Group 
of People in the loose sense that every organization (e.g., musical 
group, football team, bird-watchers association) is a group of people. If 
subtyping is interpreted as the subset relation, then this is necessarily 
true in this case. However, as discussed in chapter 4, it can be the case 
that these universals supply incompatible principles of identity for their 
instances. For instance, if a football team exchanges one of its members 
it is still the same organization but it becomes a different group of 
people. As a consequence, despite of apparently sharing the same 
extension these two types cannot be related via subtyping, since they 
carry incompatible principles of identity.  
     
Consequently, a minimum requirement of a set-theoretic conceptual 
modeling language would be the explicit consideration of possible worlds. In 
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other words, the extension of natural class should consider individuals in all 
possible worlds44. This way, the theory can exclude all cases where the 
extensions of classes coincide only contingently. To cite one last example, it 
is a fact in our world that the classes of cordates (individuals that have a 
heart) and of renates (individuals that have a kidney) coincide. Now, 
suppose that this is just an evolutionary accident, in the sense that there is 
no fundamental direct functional dependence (see chapter 7) between hearts 
and kidneys. Therefore, one can conclude that there are possible worlds in 
which the extensions of cordate and renate do not coincide and, since the 
two classes do not coincide necessarily, they cannot be said to be the same. 
Moreover, by considering Natural classes as the extension of types in every 
possible world, the theory becomes more refined, and can choose to deem 
as unnatural empty classes, only those that are necessarily empty.  Finally, it 
can also escape criticism (b1) regarding the dependence that the meaning 
of type has on its members in its extensional counterpart. Notice that there 
is support in the cognitive psychology literature for taking the meaning of a 
general term to refer to particulars in counterfactual situations. For 
example, in the second of the psychological claims defended by John 
Mcnamara in (Mcnamara, 1994) it is proposed that the word DOG refers 
to all dogs that ever existed, that ever will be, or that could ever have been. 
Not to the dogs that currently exist.         
Extending the notion of natural class by considering possible words 
would solve some of the problems related to the ontological semantics of 
languages such as EER, Z, CCT and LINGO, when considered as 
conceptual modelling languages. However, there is still another 
philosophical disadvantage of the natural class approach. It is related to the 
so-called direction of explanation (Amstrong, 1989). Consider the following 
question: Is the sort of thing something is  say a horse - because it is a 
member of the class of Horses? Or it is rather a member of the class of 
Horses because it is a horse? In conformance with Armstrong, we claim the 
latter is the correct direction of explanation.  
This becomes more evident when considering the causal action of things. 
Things act causally by virtue of the properties they have, not because they 
belong to certain classes. For instance, the fire makes the water boil by 
virtue of its temperature and the object depresses the scale by virtue of its 
mass. It is the individual four kilograms object that acts on the scale in a way 
that is completely independent of the other four kilograms objects that exist 
(or may have existed). In other words, it is not the case that the whole class 
of four kilograms object is relevant for the causal action of an object on 
another, but the presence of certain property of the object. Finally, from an 
epistemological point of view, acknowledging the priority of properties over 
                                                      
44 See our function ext (as opposed to extw) in section 4.1.  
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classes seems to afford a more intuitive explanation for our ability to classify 
things. Suppose that we face a new particular of a familiar type and that we 
have no difficulty in correctly classifying it as being of that type. If this is the 
case, what happened is that the object has acted on us by virtue of certain 
properties. To use a simplistic example, we correctly apply the term Red to 
an object because we recognize the color red in it, not because we 
recognize it as a member of a (possible infinite) class of objects. 
We therefore propose an account of universals that recognize the 
precedence of properties over classes, and the precedence of intention over 
extension. Therefore, in the world view proposed here objects are endowed 
with a number of properties that make them what they are.  
There is a final problem with C-theories that is worth mentioning, 
since it is related to a recurrent practice in some modeling languages, in 
particular, in the so-called Semantic Web Languages (Bechhofer et al., 2004; 
McGuinness et al., 2002a,b). This problem becomes even more evident in a 
particular C-theory that we name here the predicate theory. Let us first briefly 
explain the predicate theory.  
The predicate theory of universals belongs to the group of the so-called 
nominalist theories. Nominalism (from the latin word Nomem for name) is a 
project of explaning the unity of the tokens falling under a certain type by 
some linguistic device (Armstrong, 1989). According to it, two things are of 
the same type iff the same predicate applies to them. To put it differently, 
the only thing that is universal among, for example, two red objects x and y 
is the fact that we apply the linguistic predicate red to both of them. This 
is a serious problem from a philosophical point of view because it commits 
to the idea that there are no real universal properties shared by individuals 
outside the minds of cognitive subjects. Even worse, it equates the set of 
universal properties to the set of predicates available in a language. Other 
C-theories such as the natural class theories do not make this commitment. 
The naturalness of a class (or lack of it) is taken to be a feature of reality 
and, thus, independent of language. 
However, there is a problem with predicate theory that is also common 
to the simplest form of C-theories. There are many predicates that can be 
constructed in the language that do not correspond to properties in reality, 
in particular, this is the case for the negative and disjunctive predicates (Bunge, 
1977). Take, for example, the complex predicate P(x) =def C(x) ∨ M(x) 
which is true for all objects x that have either an electrical charge or a mass. 
Although, P is a perfectly good predicate, it is not a universal (type) in the 
philosophical sense. To see that, consider the following situation: let a and 
b be two individuals such that both P(a) and P(b) hold. P(a) holds because a 
has an electrical charge and P(b) holds because b has a mass. Now, from the 
fact that the disjunctive predicate P applies to both a and b, can one say that 
in any serious sense that a and b have something in common? Asides from 
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that, as put by (Armstrong, ibid.), there is a close link between universals 
and causality. If a thing instantiates a certain universal then, in virtue of 
that, it has a certain power to act in a certain way. Moreover, different 
universals bestow different powers. For instance, by virtue of having a 
certain mass, b can act upon a scale. Likewise, by virtue of having a certain 
charge, a can repel certain things. Now, were P a genuine predicate of a (or 
b), it would add something to as (or bs) capacity to act. This is clearly not 
the case. A similar case can be made for opposing negative predicates. 
Although the predicate Q = ¬C(x) is a perfectly acceptable predicate, it 
does not correspondent to a bonafide universal in reality, since: (i) there is 
nothing necessarily in common between two things to which Q applies; (ii) 
there are no causal powers which are bestowed by not instantiating a 
universal. In summary, in a foundational ontology, there should be no 
negative or disjunctive universals (Bunge, 1977; Armstrong, 1989; 
Schneider, 2002).    
  We can summarize the discussion in this section by considering the 
following: mathematical set (class) theories have been developed in 
advanced forms for the last hundred years. The idea that we can give an 
account in set-theoretical terms of what is to be of certain type is attractive 
to logicians and mathematically inclined computer scientists. However, as 
we have made clear in the course of this section, developing purely set-
theoretical semantics for classifiers in conceptual modeling amounts to one 
of the exemplar cases in which formal semantics, for the sake of 
mathematical convenience, has been given an unfortunate precedence over 
real-world semantics. 
In a foundational ontology, the account of universals must be an 
intensional, not an extensional one. As discussed in depth in chapter 4, it is 
not the case that all properties that apply to an individual should be seen as 
ontologically equivalent. Some universals are sortal, thus providing a 
principle of individuation, persistence and identity. Other universals are 
merely characterizing. Some properties apply contingently to their 
instances, others essentially. In line with several proposals in the literature 
(e.g, Guarino & Welty, 2000, 2002b, 2004; Welty & Guarino, 2001; 
Gupta, 1980; van Leeuwen, 1991), we advocate that a full account of these 
distinctions is a fundamental feature for any conceptual modeling theory of 
universals. One, which is, unfortunately, ignored in many current 
conceptual modeling and ontology representation languages. 
6.2 Basic Ontological Categories 
In this section, we start collecting some categories that have been proposed 
in previous chapters and, in the light of what has been discussed in the 
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previous section we aim at constructing the backbone of our foundational 
ontology. 
As discussed in the previous section, a bicategorial ontology only based 
on sets and its members (as supplied by set theory) does not constitute a 
suitable inventory of formal entities that can be used to model reality. The 
approach presented here preserves set theory as a part of the foundational 
ontology proposed. Thus it accepts set membership as one of the 
ontologically basic (formal) relations that are adopted. At the same time, 
however, it introduces a number of other ontologically basic entities and 
relations. These entities are discussed in the sequel.  
6.2.1 Sets and Urelements 
A fundamental distinction in this ontology is between the categories of the 
so-called urelements and sets. Urelements are entities that are not sets. They 
form an ultimate layer of entities without any set-theoretical structure in 
their build-up, i.e., neither the membership (∈) relation nor the set 
inclusion (⊆) relation can unfold the internal structure of urelements.  
 We assume the existence of both urelements and sets in the world and 
presuppose that both the impure sets and the pure sets45 constructed over 
the urelements belong to the world. This implies, in particular, that the 
world is closed under all set-theoretical constructions.  
Here, we do not discuss any particular version of set theory, but only 
employ it to formally characterize aspects of other entities in our ontology. 
Therefore, we use common set theoretical operations such as element 
membership, set inclusion and proper inclusion (⊂), union (∪), 
intersection (∩) and difference (\) without providing any formalization. 
This is partly because many formal specifications of set theory already exist 
and are widely available (e.g., Heller et al., 2004), but also because this 
neutrality allows the ontology to be extended in that regard to suit 
particular needs, where one could choose for particular versions of set 
theory. Examples are the systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel and Neumann-
Bernays-Gödel (Weisstein, 2004), but also theories of quasi-sets (Kreuse, 
1992) can in principle be adopted46. In particular, sets (and associated 
notions) are assumed to play a fundamental role here in the formal 
                                                      
45 Pure Sets can only contain other sets as members. Impure Sets can also contain 
urelements (Weisstein, 2004).  
46 In the current version of our ontology we exclude the so-called quasi-objects, i.e., 
individuals that have determinate countability but indeterminate identity (Lowe, 2001). The 
reason for that lies in the purpose of our ontology (a commonsense based one) and the 
associated belief that quasi-objects do not exist in the mesocopic level. However, a theory of 
quasi-sets would have to be incorporated in a possible extension of our theory that admits 
quasi-objects.    
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characterization of conceptual spaces, quality dimensions and quality 
domains (see section 6.2.5). 
Urelements are classified into two main categories: individuals and 
universals. A urelement has to be either an individual or a universal, but not 
both. This can be expressed by the following axioms: 
 
(1). ∀x (Ur(x) ↔ Ind(x) ∨ Univ(x)) 
(2). ¬ ∃x (Ind(x) ∧ Univ(x)) 
 
The categories of Set and urelements (individuals and universals) and some 
of their interrelations are illustrated in figure 6.1. 
 
Urelement Set
Thing
{disjoint, 
complete}
*
*
isMemberOf >
*
* subsetOf
Individual Universal
{disjoint, complete}
 
6.2.2 Individuals 
Traditionally, in the philosophical literature, there is a fundamental 
distinction in the category of individuals between enduring and perduring 
entities (see, for instance, the distinction between endurants and 
perdurants in DOLCE (Masolo et al., 2003, or the distinction between 3D 
(presentials) and 4D individuals (processes) in GOL (Heller et al., 2004; 
Heller & Herre, 2004). Classically, the distinction between enduring and 
perduring individuals (henceforth named endurants and perdurants) can be 
understood in terms of their behavior w.r.t. time. Endurants are said to be 
wholly present whenever they are present, i.e., they are in time, in the sense 
that if we say that in circumstance c1 an endurant e has a property P1 and in 
circumstance c2 the property P2 (possibly incompatible with P1), it is the 
very same endurant e that we refer to in each of these situations. Examples 
of endurants are a house, a person, the moon, a hole, an amount of sand. 
For instance, we can say that an individual John weights 80kg at c1 but 68kg 
at c2. Nonetheless, we are in these two cases referring to the same 
individual, namely the person John.  
Figure 6-1  Fundamental 
distinction between sets 
and urelements 
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Perdurants are individuals composed of temporal parts, they happen in 
time in the sense that they extend in time accumulating temporal parts. 
Examples of perdurants are a race, a conversation, a football game, a 
symphony execution, a birthday party, the Second World War and a 
business process. Whenever a perdurant is present, it is not the case that all 
its temporal parts are present. For instance, if we consider the business 
process buy product at different time instants when it is present (figure 
6.2), at each time instant only some of its temporal proper parts are 
present. As a consequence, perdurants cannot exhibit change in time in a 
genuine sense since none of its temporal parts retain their identity through 
time. Whereas for an endurant we can say that the very same individual 
John changes his weight from from 80 kg in c1 to 68 kg in c2, if we say that 
buy product has the property of being electronically secure at c3 but non-
secure in c1, there are different proper parts of buy product that exhibit 
these properties.  In a figure 6.2, buy product is an instance of a social 
process (the Consumer-Buyer Behavior model, see for instance, Almeida & 
Guizzardi & Pereira Filho, 2000) whereas its temporal proper-parts are 
actions, i.e., intentional events (atomic processes) performed by (physical 
or social) agents. 
Identifying 
needs
Product 
Brokering
Merchant 
Brokering Purchase Delivery Evaluation
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6  
As previously mentioned, the urelement part of our foundational ontology 
complements set theory (and, thus the current set theoretical approaches 
present in the literature) by encompassing a number of basic ontological 
entities. In conformance with the motivations presented in chapter 3, the 
ontology proposed here accounts for a descriptive commonsensical view of 
reality, focused on structural (as opposed to dynamic) aspects. For this 
reason, our foundational ontology shall be an ontology of endurants. 
Therefore, from now on, we focus our discussion on endurant individuals 
and endurant universals.  
The core of the urelement fragment of our ontology amounts to a so-
called Four-category ontology. The idea of an ontology centered on the four 
specific categories highlighted in figure 6.3 comes originally from the 
second chapter of Aristotles Categories47. However, it finds support in many 
works in contemporary philosophical literature (Lowe, 2001; Mulligan & 
Simons & Smith, 1984; Smith, 1997; Neuhaus &  Grenon & Smith, 2004) 
and, in particular, in some of the foundational ontologies developed in 
                                                      
47 See, for example, the 1984 english translation (Aristotle, 1984). 
Figure 6-2  A buy 
product business 
process execution 
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computer science (Heller et al., 2004; Herre & Heller, 2004; Schneider, 
2002; see also the Basic Formal Ontology in Masolo et al., 2003). The 
categories comprising this ontology are two pairs individuals-universals, 
namely substantial and substantial universals; moments and moment 
universals. Individuals are discussed in the sequel. Universals are discussed 
in section 6.2.5. 
Urelement Set
Thing
{disjoint, complete}
*
*
isMemberOf >
*
* subsetOf
Individual
{disjoint, complete}
Endurant
Substantial Moment
{disjoint, complete}
Perdurant
Universal
Endurant Universal
Substantial Universal Moment Universal
{disjoint, complete}
Perdurant Universal
 
6.2.3 Moments 
The word Moment is derived from the german Momente in the writings of 
Husserl and it denotes, in general terms, what is sometimes named trope 
(Williams, 1966; Schneider, 2003b), abstract particular (Stout, 1921; 
Campbell, 1990), mode (Lowe, 2001; Schneider, 2002), particular quality, 
individual accident, or property instance. In the scope of this work, the term 
bears no relation to the notion of time instant in ordinary parlance. The 
origin of the notion of moment lies in the theory of individual accidents 
developed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics and Categories. For him, an 
accident is an individualized property, event or process that is not a part of 
the essence of a thing. We here use the term moment in a more general 
sense and do not distinguish a priori between essential and inessential 
moments. 
 As pointed out by (Schneider, 2002), there is solid evidence for 
moments in the literature. On one hand, in the analysis of the content of 
perception (Lowe, 2001, p. 205; Mulligan & Simons & Smith, 1984, p. 
304-308), moments such as colours, sounds, runs, laughter and singings are 
the immediate objects of everyday perception. On the other hand, the idea 
of moments as truthmakers (Mulligan & Simons & Smith, 1984, p. 295-
Figure 6-3  The 
urelement fragment on 
the proposed 
foundational ontology 
centered in a four-
categorical account 
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304) underlies a standard event-based approach to natural language 
semantics, as initiated by Davidson (1980, pp. 118-119) and Parsons 
(1990, chaps. 1-3). 
 The notion of moment employed here comprises:  
 
1. Intrinsic Moments: qualities such as a color, a weight, a electric charge, a 
circular shape; modes such as a thought, a skill, a belief, an intention, a 
headache, as well as dispositions such as the refrangibility property of 
light rays, or the disposition of a magnetic material to attract a metallic 
object; 
 
2. Relational Moments (or relators): a kiss, a handshake, a covalent bond, but 
also social objects such as a flight connection, a purchase order and a 
commitment or claim (Wagner, 2003; Guizzardi & Wagner, 2005a).  
 
 An important feature that characterizes all moments is that they can only 
exist in other individuals (in the way in which, for example, electrical 
charge can exist only in some conductor). To put it more technically, we 
say that moments are existentially dependent on other individuals (see 
definition 5.10, in chapter 5), named their bearers. Existential dependence 
can be used to differentiate intrinsic and relational moments: intrinsic 
moments are dependent of one single individual; relational moments 
depend on a plurality of individuals. 
Existential dependency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
something to be a moment. For instance, the temperature of a volume of a 
gas depends on, but is not a moment of its pressure. Thus, for an individual 
x to be a moment of another individual y (its bearer), a relation of inherence 
 sometimes called ontic predication  must hold between the two, 
symbolized as i(x,y).  For example, inherence glues your smile to your face, 
or the charge in a specific conductor to the conductor itself. In summary, 
moments are ways things are (Armstrong, 1989; Lowe, 2001) and, hence, 
cannot be conceived independently of the particulars they inhere in. 
 Inherence is an irreflexive, asymmetric and intransitive relation between 
moments and other types of endurants. These formal properties are 
represented in the formulas (5), (6) and (7) below, respectively. 
Additionally, as expressed in formula (4), inherence is a special type of 
existential dependence relation between particulars (symbolized as ed 
below): 
 
(3). ∀x,y (i(x,y) → Moment(x) ∧ Endurant(y)) 
(4). ∀x,y (i(x,y) → ed(x,y)) 
(5). ∀x  ¬i(x,x) 
(6). ∀x,y (i(x,y) → ¬i(y,x)) 
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(7). ∀x,y,z (i(x,y) ∧ i(y,z) → ¬i(x,z))  
 
According to (3), moments inhere in other endurants, which can 
themselves be moments. An example of moment inhering in another 
moment is the radius of a circular form. The infinite regress in the 
inherence chain is prevented by the fact that there are endurants that 
cannot inhere in other individuals, namely, substantials (see section 6.2.4). 
We can, thus, formally characterize a moment as an individual that inheres 
in (and, hence, is existentially dependent upon) another individual: 
  
Definition 6.1 (Moment): A moment is an endurant that inheres in, and, 
therefore, is existentially dependent of, another endurant. Formally, 
 
(8). Moment(x) =def Endurant(x) ∧ ∃y i(x,y) 
■ 
 
In our framework we adopt the so-called non-migration (Guizzardi & Herre 
& Wagner, 2002a) or non-transferability (Martin, 1980) principle. This means 
that it is not possible for a moment m to inhere in two different individuals 
a and b: 
 
(9). ∀x,y,z (Moment(x) ∧ i(x,y) ∧ i(x,z) →  y = z) 
 
If a moment x inheres in an individual y, y is termed the bearer of x and is 
defined as follows: 
 
Definition 6.2 (Bearer of a Moment): The bearer of a moment x is the 
unique48 individual y such that x inheres in y. Formally,   
 
(10). β(x) =def ιy i(x,y) 
■ 
 
This characteristic of moments seems at first counterintuitive. For example, 
if we have two particulars a (a red apple) and b (a red car), and two 
moments m1 (particular redness of a) and m2 (particular redness of b), we 
consider m1 and m2 to be different individuals, although perhaps 
qualitatively indistinguishable. What does it mean then to say that a and b 
have the same color? Due to (9), sameness here cannot refer to strict 
(numerical) identity, but only to a qualitative one (i.e., equivalence in a 
                                                      
48The iota operator (ι) used in a formula such as ιxϕ was defined by Russel in (Russel, 
1905) and implies both the existence and the uniqueness of an individual x satisfying 
predicate ϕ.   
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certain respect). In conformance with DOLCE (Masolo et al., 2003a), we 
distinguish between the color of a particular apple (its quality) and its 
value (e.g., a particular shade of red). The latter is named quale, and 
describes the position of an individual quality within a certain quality 
dimension. The notions of quale and quality dimension are discussed in 
depth in section 6.2.6. 
 Figure 6.4 depicts the inherence relation between moments and their 
bearers. Relators and modes are further discussed in section 6.2.7. 
Endurant
Substantial Moment
{disjoint, complete}
1
1..*
Intrinsic Moment
bearer
< inheres in
Relator
{disjoint}
 
6.2.4 Substantials 
In the previous section, we have formally stated that moments inhere in 
other individuals, forming a chain of inherence that ends in a substantial. 
Since inherence is a sort of existential dependence, we have that all 
moments are existentially dependent on other individuals. Substantials, in 
contrast, by not inhering in anything, enjoy a higher degree of 
independence. We, thus, define the category of substantials as follows. 
 
Definition 6.3 (Substantial): A substantial is an endurant that does not 
inhere in another endurant, i.e., which is not a moment. Formally,  
 
(11). Substantial(x) =def Endurant(x) ∧ ¬Moment(x)     
■ 
 
Substances are individuals that posses (direct) spatial-temporal moments and 
are founded on matter. They can be further classified in either Amounts of 
matter or Objects. The distinction is made based on whether members of 
these categories satisfy a unity condition. Amounts of Matter (are also known 
as Stuff) are substantials with no unity; all their parts are essential, i.e., they 
are mereologically invariant: the identity of an amount of mater is 
determined by the sum of its parts and, thus, a change in one of the parts 
changes the identity of that particular (see section 5.5.1). Since countability 
is strongly related to unity (see section 5.8), amounts of matter are 
Figure 6-4  Moments 
and their unique bearers 
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individuals with determinate principles of identity but with indeterminate 
counting principles. (Lowe, 2001) terms these entities quasi-objects. 
Examples of Amounts of Matter are individuals linguistically referred by mass 
nouns such as sugar, sand, and gold. 
 Objects, conversely, are substantials with unity, i.e., integral wholes 
unified by a certain unity criteria (see section 5.3). Contrary to amounts of 
matter, it is not the case that all parts of an object are essential. Instead of 
necessarily obeying a mereological principle of identity, the principle of 
identity of objects is supplied by the kinds (substance sortals) that they 
instantiate. These principles of identity determine which parts are essential, 
mandatory or merely contingent. Examples of objects include ordinary 
mesoscopic entities that are linguistically referred to as count nouns, such 
as a dog, a house, a hammer, a car, Alan Turing and The Rolling Stones but 
also Fiat Objects such as the North-Sea and its proper-parts, postal districts 
and a non-smoking area of a restaurant (Smith, 1994). 
We also consider as objects those parasitic substantials such as stains, 
edges, bumps, which are named features in DOLCE, but also what 
(Pribbenow, 2002) terms a negative object (e.g., a hole, the interior of a 
drawer). As a consequence, the relation between these parasitic entities and 
their hosts is one of inseparable parthood (see section 5.4.2) not one of 
inherence. For instance, we say that a hole in a piece of cheese is an 
inseparable part of the cheese, as opposed to one of its moments.  
Objects can also have parasitic substantials as essential parts. For 
instance, the key whole of a locker may be considered an essential part of 
the locker. In (Guizzardi & Wagner, 2005b), we make a further distinction 
between two types of objects: (i) agents - to which we can ascribe 
mentalistic notions (mental moments) such as beliefs, desires and 
intentions, and non-agentive objects. Here, in contrast, we shall not 
consider this distinction and, thus, we concentrate only on the common 
properties of objects. 
As discussed in chapter 5, conceptual models require that instantiated 
objects have determinate identities. For this reason, in order to represent 
amounts of matter, we must refer to them in a special sense, namely, that of a 
maximally-self-connected amount of matter. These objects, termed in 
chapter 5 quantity are genuine objects, possessing both determinate identity 
and determinate countability.  
Figure 6.5 below depicts the types of substantials considered here 
and their relation to moments. 
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Figure 6.5 also illustrates the bears relation between a substantial and its 
moments. This relation is the inverse of the inheres in relation shown in 
figure 6.4. As moments must inhere in some in individual (not necessarily a 
substantial), substantials must bear some moments, i.e., there are no 
propertyless individuals (Bunge, 1977), or bare particulars (see section 4.2). 
This is expressed in formula (12) below. We name substantial moments those 
qualities that necessarily inhere in a substance. 
 
(12). ∀x Substantial(x) → ∃y (Moment(y) ∧ i(y,x)) 
 
Finally, in the beginning of this section we state that substantials enjoy a 
higher degree of independence when compared to moments. Can we make 
a stronger statement? Can we say that substantials are existentially 
independent from all other individuals?  
If we take the notion of existential dependency that we give in definition 
5.10 in chapter 5, the answer is no. Existentially dependence has been 
defined as follows: 
 
Definition 5.10 (existential dependence): Let the predicate ε denote 
existence. We have that an individual x is existentially dependent on another 
individual y iff, as a matter of necessity, y must exist whenever x exists, or 
formally 
ed(x,y) =def □(ε(x) → ε(y)) 
■ 
 
Now, there are certainly pairs (x,y) where x is a substantial that satisfy 
ed(x,y). For example, if y is any of the essential moments of x. Moreover, 
even if both x and y are substantials, ed(x,y) can be satisfied. Take for 
example a substantial and any of its essential parts. Or, alternatively, a 
substantial x and another object y of which x is an inseparable part (see 
Figure 6-5  Types of 
Substantials and their 
relation to moments 
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definition 5.15). However, we can say that if x and y are two substantials 
and they are disjoint then they must also be independent from each other 
(symbolized as indep): 
 
(13). indep(x,y) =def ¬ed(x,y) ∧ ¬ed(y,x) 
(14). ∀x,y Substantial(x) ∧ Substantial(y) ∧ (x ∫ y) → indep(x,y) 
 
For example, a person depends on her brain, and a car depends on its 
chassis. However, a person (car) does not dependent on any other 
substance which is disjoint from her (it). Notice that formula (14) also 
excludes the case of mutual existential dependence between substantials 
that share a common essential part (see chapter 5). 
6.2.5 Universals 
To complete the Aristotelian Four-Categories ontology depicted in figure 
6.3, we consider the existence of both substantials universals and moment 
universals. We use the term universal in a broader sense than it is sometimes 
used in the philosophical literature, such as for instance in (Armstrong, 
1989). Therefore, we do not necessarily commit to existence of universals 
as abstract entities that are multiple instantiated in several individuals. Instead, we 
employ the term in a sense which is equivalent to term Category in (Heller et 
al., 2004). The position should be made clearer in the course of this 
section. For now, a universal can be considered simply as something (i) 
which can be predicated of other entities (or, in the Aristotelian sense, said 
of or attributed to other entities) and (ii) that can potentially be represented 
in language by predicative terms. In summary, as a synonymous of type as we 
have used it in chapter 4.  
 We use the symbol :: to denote the instantiation relation, a basic formal 
relation defined to hold between individuals (first argument) and universals 
(second argument). Hence, when writing x::U we mean that x is an 
instance of U or that x has the property of being a U: 
 
(15). ∀x,U x::U → Individual(x) ∧ Universal(U) 
 
The difference between substantial and moment universals can be 
characterized as follows (Schneider, 2002): 
Definition 6.4 (Substantial and Moment Universals): A Substantial 
universal is a universal that is instantiated only by substantial individuals. 
Analogously, a moment universal is a universal that is only instantiated by 
moment individuals. Formally, 
 
(16). SubstantialUniversal(U) =def Universal(U) ∧  
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  ∀x (x::U → Substantial(x)) 
(17). MomentUniversal(U) =def Universal(U) ∧  
  ∀x (x::U → Moment(x)) 
■ 
 
Although we want to avoid making unnecessary commitments to particular 
theories of universals, we believe that some interpretations for the nature of 
universals (and the corresponding theories) must be explicitly ruled out. To 
begin with, for all the reasons discussed in section 6.2.1, we exclude all 
sorts of class and predicate nominalisms (including the natural class theory). 
These theories are named in (Armstrong, 1989) Blob theories because of 
their failure to account for the existence and priority of properties. In 
conformance with Armstrong we defend that individuals belong to a certain 
category because they share a number of properties, not the other way 
around.  For this reason, we also exclude another type of Blob theory that 
has not been discussed so far, namely, the classical formulation of the 
resemblance theory (Price, 1953). 
 Traditionally, class theories of universals are extensional theories. Thus, 
as discussed in section 6.2.1, two classes are identical if they apply to the 
same individuals. Here, we reject this strong nominalist idea that equates 
universals with sets. For every universal U there is a set Ext(U), called its 
extension, containing all instances of U as elements. However, even if two 
universals U1 and U2 have identical extensions (Ext(U1) = Ext(U2)), they 
are not necessarily considered to be identical.  
 The identity of universals instead should be analyzed in terms of the 
identity of the supplied principles of application and identity, and/or in 
terms of the causal powers bestowed by them (Armstrong, 1989). 
However, a fuller consideration of this issue falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. The following definition relates the instantiation relation, universals 
and their extensions: 
 
Definition 6.5 (Extension of a Universal): The extension of a universal 
U is the set S that contains all instances of U, and only them. Formally,  
 
(18). Ext(U) =def {x|x::U} 
■ 
 
In chapter 4, we discuss the ontological distinction between sortals and 
non-sortals. There is, in particular, an intimate relation between the 
category of non-sortals named mixins (or attributions) and moment 
universals. This distinction is also present in Aristotles original 
differentiation between what is said of a subject (de subjecto dici), denoting 
instantiation and what is exemplified in a subject (in subjecto est), denoting 
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inherence. Thus, the linguistic difference between the two meanings of the 
copula is reflects an ontological one. For example, the ontological 
interpretation of the sentence Jane is a Woman is that the object Jane 
instantiates the (substantial) universal Woman. However, when saying that 
Jane is tall or Jane is laughing we mean that Jane exemplifies the moment 
universal Tall or Laugh, by virtue of her specific height or laugh. Thus, in 
pace with (Schneider, 2002), besides instantiation, we recognize another 
formal relation that can obtain between individuals and universals, namely, 
the relation of exemplification: 
 
Definition 6.6 (Exemplification): An individual x exemplifies the 
moment universal U iff there is a particular moment y instance of U that 
inheres in x. Formally,  
 
(19). exemplification(x,U) =def MomentUniversal(U) ∧ ∃y (i(y,x) 
∧ y::U) 
■ 
 
In formula (19) above the variable x is restricted to the category of 
endurants but not to its subcategory of substantials. This is because, since 
moments can also inhere in moments, the exemplification relation can also 
exist between moments and moment universals. For example, in Jane is 
laughing, Janes laugh can exemplify the moment universal frankness 
(Schneider, 2002), or in The ball is red, the color of the ball can 
exemplify the universal beauty. 
 As mentioned above, universals are not sets. Differently from sets, they 
are defined intensionally. According to (Guizzardi & Herre & Wagner, 
2002a,b; Guizzardi & Wagner & Herre, 2004), we capture the intension of 
a universal by means of an axiomatic specification, i.e., a set of axioms that 
may involve a number of other universals representing its essential features. 
A particular form of such a specification of a universal U is called an 
elementary specification. 
 
Definition 6.7 (Elementary Specification): An elementary specification 
of a universal U consists of a number of universals U1,,Un and 
corresponding functional relations R1, ,Rn which attach instances from 
the Ui to instances of U, expressed by the following schema: 
(20). ))),(::(...::( 1 iiiinin eaRUeeeUaa ∧∃→∀ ∧ ≤  
 
The universals U1,,Un used in an elementary specification are called 
features. A special case of an elementary specification is a intrinsic moments 
specification where U1,,Un are intrinsic moment universals.  
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■ 
The relation between a universal and the features in its elementary 
specification is one of characterization: 
 
Definition 6.8 (Characterization): A universal U is characterized by a 
moment universal M iff every instance of U exemplifies M. Formally,   
 
(21). characterization(U,M) =def Universal(U) ∧  
MomentUniversal(M) ∧∀x (x::U → ∃y y::M ∧ i(y,x)) 
■ 
 
Finally, there is another sort of Blob theory that we have not explicitly 
excluded yet, namely, the theory of universals known as Platonic realism, or 
simply, Platonims (Balaguer, 2004). Platonism amounts, in a nutshell, to the 
following: (a) universals are self-existent, ideal and external to individuals, 
and (b) universals precede their instances but can be exemplified by the 
latter (Bunge, 1977, p.103). Due to the independence of universals from 
their instances, Platonic realism leaves open the possibility for the existence 
of universals that have no instances. According to Bunge, there is not a shred 
of empirical evidence for the hypothesis that forms [i.e., universals] are detachable from 
their carriers [e.g., their bearers]. Therefore, we take here an Aristotelian view 
of universals w.r.t. accepting the so-called principle of instantiation 
(Armstrong, 1989, p.75). This principle states that, in order to exist, 
universals must have instances: 
 
(22). ∀x Universal(x) → ◊ ∃y y::x 
 
Much of what has been discussed in this section is summarized in figure 6.6 
below. 
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6.2.6 Qualities, Qualia, Quality Dimensions and Quality 
Domains 
An attempt to model the relation between moments and their 
representation in human cognitive structures is presented in the theory of 
conceptual spaces developed by the Swedish philosopher and cognitive 
scientist Peter Gardenfors (Gardenfors, 2000; 2004). The theory is based 
on the notion of quality dimension. The idea is that for several perceivable or 
conceivable moment universals there is an associated quality dimension in 
human cognition. For example, height and mass are associated with one-
dimensional structures with a zero point isomorphic to the half-line of 
nonnegative numbers. Other moments such as color and taste are 
represented by several dimensions. For instance, taste can be represented as 
a tetrahedron space comprising the dimensions of saline, sweet, bitter and 
sour, and color can be represented in terms of the dimensions of hue, 
saturation and brightness. Here, we do not distinguish between physical 
(e.g., color, height, weight, shape) and nominal moments (e.g., social 
security number, the economic value of an asset).  
According to Gardenfors, some of the quality dimensions (especially 
those related to perceptual qualities) seem to be innate or developed very 
early in life. For instance, the sensory moments of color and pitch are 
strongly connected with the neurophysiology of their perception. Other 
dimensions are introduced by science or human conventions. For example, 
the representation of Newtons distinction between mass and weight is not 
given by the senses but has to be learned by adopting the conceptual space 
of Newtonian mechanics. Another example is the cognitive dimension of 
time, which is deemed culture-dependent (while in western cultures we 
Figure 6-6  Substantials, 
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perceive time as a one-dimension linear structure, other cultures perceive 
time as circular or recurrent). Whereas scientific or conventional 
dimensions are prescribed by a community of users or defined by a 
scientific theory, phenomenal quality dimensions have to be empirically 
extracted via analysis of subjects judgement of similarity between different 
stimuli (Wilson & Keil, 1999; Shepard, 1962a,b). 
As discussed in section 4.3, there is empirical support in the cognitive 
psychology literature for the thesis that some dimensions are innate and 
have been hard-wired in the brain for evolutionary reasons. Examples 
include are our tri-dimensional perception of space and our perception of 
spatio-temporal continuity. These dimensions are used in our first applied 
principles of individuation, persistence and identity. On the solid ground 
provided by these innate dimensions, we expand our conceptual space by 
including different dimensions associated with the perception of other 
moments. In fact, Gardenfors explicitly considers learning as the activity of 
expanding ones conceptual space into new quality dimensions (ibid., p.28) 
and Quine makes note that some innate quality dimensions are needed in 
order for learning to be possible (Quine, 1969, p.123). 
Gardenfors distinguishes between integral and separable quality 
dimensions: certain quality dimensions are integral in the sense that one 
cannot assign an object a value on one dimension without giving it a value 
on the other. For example, an object cannot be given a hue without giving it 
a brightness value Dimensions that are not integral are said to be 
separable, as for example the size and hue dimensions. (Gardenfors, 2000, 
p.24).  He then defines a quality domain as a set of integral dimensions that 
are separable from all other dimensions (Gardenfors, 2000, p.26) and a 
conceptual space as collection of one or more domains (ibid.). Finally, he 
defends that the notion of conceptual space should be understood literally, 
i.e., quality domains are endowed with certain geometrical structures 
(topological or ordering structures) that constrain the relations between its 
constituting dimensions. In his framework, the perception or conception of 
a moment individual can be represented as a point in a quality domain. In 
accordance with DOLCE (Masolo et al., 2003a) and (Goodman, 1951), 
this point is named here a quale. 
We adopt in this work the term quality structures to refer to quality 
dimensions and quality domains. Additionally, we use the term quality 
universals for those moment universals that are associated with a quality 
structure. Finally, we name quality a moment individual that instantiates a 
quality universal. In the sequel we define these notions formally. We use 
the predicates QS, QDom and QDim for quality structure, quality 
dimension and quality domain, respectively. 
 
 (23). ∀x QS(x) ↔ QDom(x) ∨ QDim(x) 
224 CHAPTER 6 PROPERTIES 
 
Definition 6.9 (Quality, Quality Universal and the association 
relation): We define the formal relation of association (assoc) between a 
quality structure and an intrinsic moment universal. A quality universal is an 
intrinsic moment universal that is associated with a quality structure, i.e.,   
 
(24). qualityUniversal(U) =def intrinsicMomentUniversal(U) ∧ ∃!x 
QS(x) ∧ assoc(x,U)    
 
Qualities are the instances of quality universals: 
 
(25). quality(x) =def  ∃!U qualityUniversal(U) ∧ (x::U) 
 
Finally, quality structures are always associated with a unique quality 
universal  
(26). QS(x) =def  ∃!U qualityUniversal(U) ∧ assoc(x,U) 
 ■ 
 
An example of a quality domain is the domain of tone with the 
dimensions of pitch and loudness. Another example is the set of integral 
dimensions related to color perception, which is further explored in the 
sequel.  
A color quality c of an apple a takes it value in a three-dimensional color 
domain constituted of the dimensions hue, saturation and brightness. 
Figure 6.7 depicts the geometric space spawned by the three quality 
dimensions that form this domain. The hue dimension stands for a term 
whose meaning is close to that of the word color in everyday life. It is a 
characteristic of the co-called chromatic colors (e.g., red and blue) but not of 
the achromatic colors (i.e., black, white and the totality of neutral greys in 
between). In figure 6.7, this quality dimension is represented as a circle and 
the polar coordinates describing the angle of the color around the circle 
gives the hue value. 
Saturation (or Chromaticness) refers to the purity of the color, that is, 
the degree to which it is chromatic instead of achromatic. The more grey 
(or black and white) is mixed with a color, the less saturation it has. In 
figure 6.7, this quality dimension has a representation that is homomorphic 
to the real line ranging from grey (zero color intensity) to increasingly 
greater intensities. Figure 6.6 depicts the color circle view of the 
dimensions of hue and saturation together.   
Brightness is a measure that varies both among the chromatic and 
achromatic colors, although it stands out most clearly in the latter. In figure 
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6.7, brightness is represented as linear quality dimensions with two end 
points, namely white and black. In other words, White is hueless and 
maximally bright; Black is hueless and minimally bright (Gleitman, 1991).   
Some points in figures 6.7 and 6.8 are worth mentioning regarding the 
geometry of these representations: 
 
 In figure 6.8 one can easily observe the relation of complementariness 
between colors. Orange can be seen as the overlapping region between 
Red and Yellow, and Violet as overlapping between Red and Blue. The 
Red region can therefore be accounted as the sum of the Orange, Violet 
and (what is termed in color theory) unique Red. Likewise, the Green 
region in the color space is the sum of unique Green, Yellowish green 
and Blueish green (Fischer Nilsson, 1999). Since Red and Green do not 
overlap they are said to be complementary colors. The same holds for 
Yellow and Blue. Quality dimensions, quality regions, quality domains 
and conceptual spaces are one of the best examples of entities related by 
a type of parthood that obeys the full axiomatization of the Classical 
Extensional Mereology (see chapter 5). In fact, in DOLCE (Masolo et. 
al., 2003a), quality regions are defined as mereological sums of qualia, 
and a quality space (a notion analogous to conceptual space) as a 
mereological sum of quality regions. Finally, from a pragmatics point of 
view (see section 2.2.3), the visual geometric representation of 
conceptual spaces represent a case of pragmatic systematicity and afford 
cases of the so-called inferential free-rides (Shimojima, 1996); 
 
 The notion of opposition (complement) is derived from the geometrical 
structure generated by the color (hue) circle (e.g., it is meaningless to 
talk about opposite weights). In the linear dimensions of saturation and 
brightness, conversely, an ordering relation can be defined. For instance, 
the ordering {minimum (black) < low < medium < high < maximal 
(white)} can be defined for regions of the brightness quality dimension 
(Fischer Nilsson, 1999). Likewise, the axiomatization of total orders can 
be defined for the dimensions of weight, height, age, etc. In section 
6.4.3, we show how the structure of a quality dimension Q can be used 
to derive characteristics for the so-called comparative formal relations that 
are based on Q; 
 
 The geometric structure of figure 6.7 constrains the relation between 
some of these dimensions. In particular, saturation and brightness are 
not totally independent, since the possible variation of saturation 
decreases as brightness approaches the extreme points of black and 
white, i.e., for almost black or almost white, there can be very little 
variation in saturation. A similar constraint could be postulated for the 
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relation between saturation and hue. When saturation is very low, all 
hues become similarly approximate to grey. 
Hue Satura
tion
White
Black
B
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Unique YellowOrange
Unique BlueViolet
Unique
Red UniqueGreen
Chromaticness
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The trichromatic color quality domain is closely related to the human 
physiology of color perception. In the animal kingdom, a variety of color 
systems can be found (Thompson, 1995). For instance, many mammals are 
dichromats, while others are tetrachromats (e.g., goldfish and turtles). 
Additionally, for some specific artificial systems, the color domain can be 
specified in terms of different quality dimensions (e.g., the RGB system) 
(Raubal, 2004). The important point to be emphasized here is the 
following: for the same quality universal, there can be potentially many 
conceptual spaces associated with it, and which one is to be adopted 
depends on the objectives underlying each a specific conceptualization.   
A similar point is made in the GOL ontology (Heller et al., 2004). In 
GOL, there is an explicit distinction between what is termed a property (e.g., 
size) and what is termed a property value (e.g., small, medium, big) of that 
property. The idea is similar to the one defended here that for a quality 
universal (GOL-property) there can be a measurement structure associated 
Figure 6-7  The Quality 
Dimensions of Hue, 
Saturation and 
Brightness forming the 
Color Splinter 
(Gardenfors, 2000) 
Figure 6-8  The Color 
Circle view of the 
dimensions of Hue and 
Saturation 
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with it. For a given property P of a given individual x there is an instrument I 
that associates P with a value in a measurement structure. This value can 
be a point or a region of the measurement structure.  
The GOL notion of a measurement structure is akin the notions of 
quality domain (or quality dimension as a border case of quality domain) as 
used here. Likewise, the GOLs property value can be interpreted as our 
notion of quale. In summary, in conformance with GOL, we propose that 
for a given quality universal there can be different quality domains 
associated with different measurement instruments. In particular, human 
perceptual systems can be seen as an example, in which case the quality 
regions roughly correspond to qualitative sensorial experiences of humans. 
We also consider social conventions as instruments that are able to generate 
abstract quality dimensions and domains for nominal quality universals such 
as address, social security number, license place, etc.  
Once more, the notion of quality region should be taken here literally, 
i.e., as spatial regions determined by the geometry or the topology of a 
conceptual space. For instance, in a one-dimensional quality domain, say 
the time dimension, the time point now divides this dimension into two 
regions the past and future regions, which are both one-dimensional regions 
(lines) of the time domain obeying the same ordering axiomatization of the 
entire dimension. Conversely, in a bidimensional domain represented in a 
cartesian space, a region is a sub-area of the domain. Most quality domains 
are metric spaces (Gardenfors, 2000). The concepts of quale, metric space, 
distance and region are formally defined as follows. 
 
Definition 6.10 (quale): A point in a n-dimensional quality domain can 
be represented as a vector v = x1xn where each xi represents each of the 
integral dimensions that constitute the domain. A multidimensional quale is 
therefore the vector representing the several quality dimensions that are 
mutually dependent in a quality domain.  
■ 
 
Definition 6.11 (metric space) (Weisstein, 2004): Let S be a quality 
domain (set of qualia). A metric space is obtained by associating with S a 
distance function d (called the metric of S) such that, for every two quality 
values x,y in S, d(x,y) represents the distance between x and y in the 
domain S. The distance function obeys the following constraints: 
 
 a) d(x,y) = 0 iff (x = y); 
 b) d(x,y) = d(y,x); 
 c) d(x,y) + d(y,z) ≥ d(x,z) (triangle inequality) 
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Generally, the similarity between two vectors x = x1xn and y = y1yn 
in a n-dimensional domain can be computed by the Minkowskian Metric 
(Wilson & Keil, 1999). 
d(x,y) = 
)/1(
1
||
rn
i
r
ii yx ⎥
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In cognitive structures such as quality domains, the distance function is 
interpreted as being inversely related to the notion of conceptual similarity 
between two individuals (Wilson & Keil, ibid.). An example of distance 
function for quality domains (i.e., among integral dimensions) that 
suitability finds strong empirical evidence in the literature is the Euclidean 
Metric (i.e., for r = 2). In this case,  
 
d(x,y) = ∑
=
−
n
i
ii yx
1
2)( . 
■ 
The definition of a distance function is very important for many reasons, 
both in theoretical and in practical terms. Given a quality domain and its 
constituting dimensions, the quality function represents the degree of 
similarity between two individuals. One can for example give a precise 
account for why a certain shade of unique red is more similar to orange 
than to a shade of green, or why the taste of hazelnut is more similar to the 
taste of walnut than to the one of limes. The other reason is that, as shown 
by (Gardenfors, 2000), given a number of prototype points in a metric 
quality domain, and a similarity function, a partition of the domain in 
different quality regions can be generated. Moreover, all generated regions 
are convex regions. The notion of a convex region in a conceptual space can 
then be used to define the notion of a quality region:  
 
Definition 6.12 (quality region): A quality region is a convex region C 
of a quality domain. A region C is convex iff: for all two points x,y in C, all 
points between x and y are also in C (Weisstein, 2004).      
■ 
 
For example, take the color circle generated by the dimensions of hue and 
saturation in the color domain. By selecting certain color prototypes (for 
example, empirically) and by applying a distance metric to calculate the 
similarity between points in this circle, a so-called Voronoi tessellation 
(Weisstein, 2004) is generated, partitioning the circle in the familiar color 
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regions. Moreover, all these regions are indeed convex49. Therefore, 
properties such as Red and Green, which are determinables for the 
determinate moment universal color, correspond to convex regions in this 
domain. 
It is well understood in philosophical ontology that one should 
differentiate between the property that things have and the perceptions we 
have of these properties according to certain measurement instruments 
employed. Bunge (1977), for instance, uses the term substantial property for 
the ontological entity and the term attribute (or predicate) for its logical or 
linguistic counterpart, and emphasizes the lack of direct correspondence 
between the two groups of entities. On one hand, there can be properties 
of things that do not find representation on current measurement systems. 
On the other hand, predicates can be freely created in conceptual systems 
and in language that do not represent any substantial property. Examples 
include negation of predicates or predicates formed by logical disjunction, 
e.g., while one can use the predicate ¬horse(x), there is nothing that has 
the negative property of not-being-a-horse. Likewise, while one can use a 
predicate equivalent to (car(x) ∨ plane(x)), there is nothing that has the 
optional property of being-a-plane-or-a-car.  
According to (Gardenfors, ibid.), only attributes representing 
substantial properties will form quality regions in a conceptual space. 
Borrowing from David Lewis terminology (1986), we name these 
attributes natural attributions, as opposed to abundant attributions. This 
distinction, which has been unfortunately obliterated in terminological 
logics-based languages (e.g., OWL), is of great conceptual importance. 
Abundant attributions are, from a cognitive point of view, very poor sources 
of inductive knowledge (see section 5.2.3 on a similar argument about 
mereological sums).  
    The notion of quality dimensions presented here does not require the 
dimensions to be dense sets. An example of a discrete quality dimension is a 
collection of qualia that form a graph (see figure 6.9). Still in this 
dimension, it is possible to define the distance function as the shortest path 
between two elements in the graph50. Consequently, we still have a 
measurement of similarity between elements, and we can still generate 
convex quality regions. Finally, there can be quality dimensions that are not 
metric (e.g., enumerations). In fact, typically, for the same quality domain, 
                                                      
49In the case of color circle the relevant notion of line is not one of a familiar Euclidian 
straight line. This is because the distance metric used (since it is a circle) is a polar distance 
function not a Euclidean one. For this reason, the lines in this metric space are actually arcs 
from an Euclidian perspective.    
50Also in this case, the notion of line is one of a path in the graph. In general, line in a 
conceptual space is a metaphor whose Euclidean appearance depends on the nature of the 
metric used. 
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many different conceptual modeling representations can be generated. For 
instance, from the color spline of figure 6.7, the following representations 
could be derived (among others):  
 
1. an unstructured enumeration containing only the lexical representatives 
of color quality regions;  
2. a UML datatype with attributes x,y and z (whereas x is a polar 
coordinate for hue and y and z belong to an interval of  real numbers), 
together with a set of constraints on the possible values that the triplets 
x,y,z can assume;  
3. a concept lattice in which each node represents a quality region and the 
arcs represent the topological relations between these regions (e.g., 
similarity and complementariness).               
 
In other words, depending on the perspective and also on the need of 
accuracy for a given representation, for a given quality moment m, its 
corresponding quale can be represented in conceptual models, for example, 
as a vector of quale values (e.g., a particular shade of red with specific hue, 
saturation and brighness components) or a quality region (e.g., the red 
region in the color spline). 
In (Fischer Nilsson, 1999), the author proposes a conceptual space logic 
(an extended concept lattice formalism) as a way to represent conceptual 
spaces that is conformant with the traditional knowledge representation 
paradigm and that, hence, can be used for deriving datatype specifications 
in languages such as OWL and RDF. A hue lattice using Nilssons formalism 
is depicted in figure 6.9. By combining this lattice with others representing 
the saturation and brightness dimensions, other formal definitions can be 
made. For instance, the pink region can be defined as the intersection 
between the red region in the hue dimension with the high region in the 
brightness dimension (pink = red × saturation(weak + strong) × 
brightness(high)51). Shocking pink can be defined as red × saturation(strong) 
× brightness(high) and the region of warm colors as (red + yellow + 
yellowishgreen) × saturation(weak + strong). From the lattice it can be 
automatically inferred, for instance, that green and red, and blue and yellow 
are pairwise complementary (green × red = blue × yellow = ⊥), and that 
shocking pink is pink (shocking pink < pink). 
                                                      
51 The operators of + and × correspond, in an extensional perspective, to the set-theoretic 
operators ∪ and ∩, respectively. The symbols T and ⊥ are named the Top and Bottom 
elements in Lattice theory, respectively. The binary operation γ(X) named the Peirce Product 
can be understood as the restriction of T to those elements that are related via γ to an 
element in X. For details, one should refer to (Fischer Nilsson, 1999).       
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From a metaphysical point of view, quality dimensions and the relations 
between them, as well as quality domains are theoretical entities that can be 
used to explain and predict various empirical phenomena concerning concept 
formation (Gardenfors, 2000, p.31), i.e., abstract theoretical entities. As a 
tool for ontological analysis, they provide an interesting conceptualist52 
interpretation for W. E. Johnsons notions of determinable and determinate 
(Johnson, 1921): every quality region in a quality domain represents a 
determinable for all its subregions, which in turn, represent its 
determinates. Since determination is a relative notion (e.g., scarlet is a 
determinate of red, which is a determinate of color) we should define the 
ultimate determinable (super-determinable) and the ultimate determinate 
(super-determinate) in the determination chain (Funkhouser, 2004). In the 
theory presented here, super-determinables and super-determinates are 
represented by quality domains and its member qualia, respectively.  
From a modeling perspective, the position defended here is that the 
notion of a quality domain (and the constraints relating different quality 
dimensions captured in its structure) can provide a sound basis for the 
conceptual modeling representations of the corresponding quality universal, 
constraining the possible values that its attributes can assume. This point is 
further discussed and illustrated in section 6.4.2. In the remainder of this 
chapter, in order to conform to the representation tradition in conceptual 
modeling languages, we also take qualia to be abstract entities and represent 
quality dimensions as sets of qualia. Moreover, according to definition 6.11, 
we take quality domains to be defined in terms of the cross-product of their 
constituent quality dimensions, and stipulate that the formation rule for 
the tuples that are members of a quality domain must obey the 
constraints that relate its quality dimensions. For instance, the mass 
domain can be represented as a subset of the set of Real numbers 
                                                      
52In a nutshell, conceptualism is the doctrine that equates universals to conceptual categories 
in cognition. For details, one should refer to (Cocchiarella, 1986; Gardenfors, 2000). 
Figure 6-9  A Concept 
Lattice representing 
Quality Regions in the 
Hue dimension and 
some relations among 
them 
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(respecting the same axiomatization) and and the hue dimension can be 
represented as an enumeration of color qualia augmented with a set of 
formal relations between its members (e.g. complementaryOf and closeTo). 
Finally, the color domain can be defined as ColorDomain ⊂ 
HueDimension × SaturationDimension × BrightnessDimension.  
Thus, in this work, quality structures are non-empty sets: 
 
(27). ∀x QS(x) → Set(x) ∧ (x ≠∅) 
 
Following (Masolo et al., 2003a), we take that whenever a quality universal 
U is related to a quality domain D, then for every individual quality x::U 
there are indirect qualities inhering in x for every quality dimension associated 
with D. For instance, for every particular quality c instance of Color there 
are quality individuals h, s, b which are instances of quality universals Hue, 
Saturation and Brightness, respectively, and that inhere in c. The qualities 
h, s, b are named indirect qualities of cs bearer. This idea is illustrated in 
figure 6.10 below. 
a::Apple
h::Hue
s::Saturation
b::Brightness
c::Color
i
i
i
i
i
w::Weight
 
Qualities such as h, s, b and w in figure 6.10 are named simple qualities, i.e., 
qualities which do not bear other qualities. A quality such as c in this figure, 
in contrast, is named a complex quality. The quality universals instantiated by 
simple and complex qualities are named simple quality universals and complex 
quality universals. Formally, 
 
Definition 6.13 (Simple and Complex qualities, and simple and 
complex quality universals): 
 
(28). simpleQuality(x) =def quality(x) ∧ ¬∃y i(y,x) 
(29). complexQuality(x) =def quality(x) ∧ ¬simpleQuality(x) 
(30). simpleQualityUniversal(U) =def qualityUniversal(U) ∧  
  (∀x (x::U) → simpleQuality(x))    
(31). complexQualityUniversal(U) =def qualityUniversal(U) ∧  
  (∀x (x::U) → complexQuality(x))    
 ■ 
Figure 6-10  Example of 
an inherence chain from 
(indirect) quality to 
quality to substantial 
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Since the qualities of a complex quality x::X correspond to the quality 
dimensions of the quality domain associated with X, then we have that no 
two distinct qualities inhering a complex quality can be of the same type  
 
(32). ∀x,y,z,Y,Z complexQuality(x) ∧ (y::Y) ∧ i(y,x) ∧ (z::Z) ∧ 
i(z,x) ∧ (Y = Z) →  (y = z) 
 
For the same reason, since there are not multidimensional quality 
dimensions, we have that complex qualities can only bear simple qualities: 
 
(33). ∀x complexQuality(x) → (∀y i(y,x) → simpleQuality(y)) 
 
Moreover, we have that simple quality universals are always associated with 
quality dimensions and vice-versa, i.e.,  
(34). ∀x,y assoc(x,y) → (QDim(x) ↔ simpleQualityUniversal(y)) 
 
and that complex quality universals are always associated with quality 
domains 
 
(35). ∀x,y assoc(x,y) →  
  (QDom(x) ↔ ComplexQualityUniversal(y)) 
 
Suppose that D is quality domain associated with a (complex) quality 
universal U, then D can be defined in terms of the cross-product of the 
quality dimensions associated with the quality universals characterizing U. 
Formally, 
 
(36). ∀U,x QDom(x) ∧ assoc(x,U) → ∃y1...yn∃z1...zn (x ⊆ y1×...×yn) 
∧ ≤ni (assoc(yi,zi) ∧ characterization(U,zi)) ∧  
(∀w characterization(U,w) → ∨ ≤ni (w = zi)) 
 
We use predicate ql(x,y) to represent the formal relation between a quality 
individual y and its quale x:  
 
(37). ∀x,y ql(x,y) → quale(x) ∧ quality(y) 
(38). ∀x,y ql(x,y) → ∃U (y::U) ∧ ∃D assoc(D,U) ∧ (x ∈ D) 
 
Relation ql  is total functional for qualities 
 
(39). ∀x quality(x) → ∃!y ql(y,x) 
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Finally, we require every quale to be a member of a unique quality 
structure: 
 
(40). quale(x) ↔ ∃!y QS(y) ∧ (x ∈ y) 
 
We summarize the discussion of this section in the following way: suppose 
we have two distinct particular substantials a (a red apple) and b (a red car), 
and two qualities q1 (particular color of a) and q2 (particular color of b). 
When saying that a and b have the same color, we mean that their individual 
color qualities q1 and q2 are (numerically) different, however, they can both 
be mapped to the same point in the color quality domain, i.e., they have the 
same quale. The relations between a substantial, one of its qualities and the 
associated quale are summarized in figure 6.11. 
Apple Weight
a w
i
Extension
0
Weight Dimension
represented by
Weight Valuesq
ql
Substance Universal Quality Universal Quality Dimension
Substance (apple a) Quality 
(weight w of apple a)
Quale (value of weight w 
in this quality dimension)
Extension
 
Quality universals can, in principle, form subsumption taxonomies as much 
as their substantials counterparts. This is very well reflected in Johnsons 
notions of derterminable and determinate. As we mentioned before, 
determinates can be understood as restrictions of determinables, providing 
a higher degree of specificity. For instance, being colored is a determinable 
and being red is a determinate from it. However, being red can also be 
considered a determinable for being scarlet (one of its determinates). In pace 
with (Heller et al., 2004), we choose to specify quality universals here only at 
the super-determinable level. Moreover, as with GOL-Properties, the 
determinates of our moment universals depend on a particular measurement 
systems and its associated conceptual space. For instance, an individual 
color quality is an instance of the (super-determinable) universal Color. In a 
given quality domain HSBColorDomain, the relation ql(c,q) holds between 
a quality q and a determinate c (a specific shade of a color in 
Figure 6-11  
Substantials, Qualities 
and Qualia 
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HSBColorDomain), meaning that the quale c is the color value of q in that 
quality domain. 
This is far from disregarding the existence of genuine taxonomies of 
quality universals. We take here a realist stance on universals, in the sense 
that we believe that universals exist in reality independently of our capacity 
to know about them. However, we also believe that humans, as cognitive 
subjects, grasp universals by means of concepts that are in their minds and 
sometimes cannot capture the universals completely, but only as 
approximate views. Thus, we defend that, for the purpose of conceptual 
modeling of things, we must take explicitly into account the conceptual 
spaces that we use to build the concepts of universals employed in our 
representations. 
Approximating the determinates that we have in our conceptual spaces 
to the real taxonomy of determinates related to a quality kind is the very 
task of science discovery, learning and conceptual development 
(Gardenfors, 2000). In summary, although we believe that every quality 
instantiates many quality universals related in a determinable/determinate 
taxonomy, what we mean by a quality universal here is only the super-
determinate universal in that taxonomy. Therefore, here we consider that 
for each quality individual there is one and exactly one quality universal that 
it instantiates. 
Figure 6.12 summarizes some important points that we have discussed 
in this section. 
Urelement Set
Thing
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Figure 6-12  Qualities, 
Quality Universals and 
their associated Quality 
Dimensions, and Quality 
Dimensions as (non-
empty) sets of Qualia 
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6.2.7 Relations and Relators 
Relations are entities that glue together other entities. Every relation has a 
number of relata as arguments, which are connected or related by it. The 
number of a relations arguments is called its arity. As much as an unary 
property such as being Red, properties of higher arities such as being 
married-to, being heavier-than are universals, since they can be predicated of a 
multitude of individuals. Relations can be classified according to the types 
of their relata.  
There are relations between sets, between individuals, and between 
universals, but there are also cross-categorical relations, for example, 
between urelements and sets or between sets and universals. 
We divide relations into two broad categories, called material and 
formal relations. Formal relations hold between two or more entities directly 
without any further intervening individual. Examples of formal relations 
are: 5 is greater than 3, this day is part of this month, and N is subset of Q, but 
also the relations of instantiation (::), inherence (i), quale of a quality (ql), 
association (assoc), existential dependence (ed), among others.  
In principle, the category of formal relations includes those relations 
that form the mathematical superstructure of our framework. We name 
these relations here basic formal relations (Heller et al., 2004) or internal 
relations (Moore, 1919-1920). In this case, in conformance with 
(Armstrong, 1997; Schneider, 2002) we deem the tie (or nexus) between 
the relata as non-analyzable.  However, we also classify as formal those 
domain relations that exhibit similar characteristics, i.e., those relations of 
comparison such as is taller than, is older than, knows more greek than. We 
name these relations comparative formal relations. As pointed out in (Mulligan 
& Smith, 1984), the entities that are immediate relata of such relations are 
not substantials but qualities.  
For instance, the relation heavier-than between two atoms is a formal 
relation that holds directly as soon as the relata (atoms) are given. The 
truth-value of a predicate representing this relation depends solely on the 
atomic number (a quality) of each atom and the material content of 
heavier-than is as it were distributed between the two relata. Moreover, to 
quote Mulligan and Smith, once the distribution has been effected, the 
two relata are seen to fall apart, in such a way that they no longer have 
anything specifically to do with each other but can serve equally as terms in 
a potentially infinite number of comparisons.  
Material relations, conversely, have material structure on their own and 
include examples such as employments, kisses, enrollments, flight 
connections and commitments. The relata of a material relation are 
mediated by individuals that are called relators. Relators are individuals with 
the power of connecting entities; a flight connection, for example, founds a 
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relator that connects airports, an enrollment is a relator that connects a 
student with an educational institution. The notion of relator (relational 
moment) is supported by several works in the philosophical literature 
(Heller et Herre, 2004; Loebe, 2003; Degen et al., 2001; Mulligan & 
Smith, 1986; Mulligan & Simons & Smith, 1984; Bacon, 1995; Simons, 
1995; Smith & Mulligan, 1983) and, the position advocated here is that 
they play an important role in answering questions of the sort: what does it 
mean to say that John is married to Mary? Why is it true to say that Bill 
works for Company X but not for Company Y? To quote (once more) 
Mulligan & Smiths article The relata of real material relations such as 
hittings and kissings, in contrast, cannot be made to fall apart in this way: 
Ernas hitting, r, is a hitting of Hans; it is not a hitting of anyone and 
everyone who happens to play a role as patient of a hitting qualitatively 
identical with r. Hence the relational core of such relations cannot be 
shown to be merely formal.  
The distinction between formal and material relations in the quotes 
from Mulligan and Smith makes it analogous to another distinction among 
relations, namely the one between bonding and non-bonding relations as 
proposed by (Bunge, 1977)53. For Bunge, bonding relations are the ones 
that alter the history of the involved relata. For example, the individual 
histories of John and Mary are different because of the relation "John Kisses 
Mary". The same is not true for the relation "John is taller than Mary". One 
can have a world (as history) in which Mary does not exist or in which Mary 
is taller than John and both individual's history are exactly the same.  
Perhaps a stronger and more general way to characterize the difference 
between formal and material relations is based on their foundation. 
However, before we proceed, there are some important notions that must 
be defined. We start with the notion of a mode.   
Modes are intrinsic moments that are not directly related to quality 
structures. Gardenfors makes the following distinction between what he 
calls concepts and properties (Gardenfors, 2004, p.23): Propertiesform as 
special case of concepts. I define this distinction by saying that a property is 
based on single domain, while a concept may be based on several domains. We 
claim that only the moment universals that are conceptualized w.r.t. a single 
domain, i.e., quality universals, correspond to properties in Gardenfors 
sense. However, there are moments that as much as substantial universals 
can be conceptualized in terms of multiple separable quality dimensions. 
Examples include beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptions, symptoms, skills, 
                                                      
53The analogy between formal and material relations and bonding and non-bonding ones is 
only warranted for the case of relations between individuals. Abstract entities have no 
spatiotemporal qualities and, consequently, no history. However, here we only consider 
domain relations between particulars.        
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among many others. We term these entities modes. Like substantials, modes 
can bear other moments, and each of these moments can be qualities 
referring to separable quality dimensions. However, since they are 
moments, differently from substantials, modes inhere necessarily in some 
bearer. We, thus, define modes as follows:  
 
Definition 6.14 (mode): A mode is an intrinsic moment individual which 
is not a quality.      
 
(41). mode(x) =def intrinsicMoment(x) ∧ ¬quality(x)  
■ 
 
A special type of mode that is of interest here is the so-called externally 
dependent modes. Externally dependent modes are individual modes that 
inhere in a single individual but that are existentially dependent on (possibly 
a multitude of) other individuals that are independent of their bearers. 
Take, for instance, being the father of. This is an example of a universal 
property, since it is clearly multiple instantiated. Suppose that John is the 
father of Paul. According to our view of universals, in this case, there is a 
particular instance x of being the father of, which bears relations of existential 
dependence to both John and Paul. However, x is not equally dependent on 
the two individuals, since x is a moment it must inhere in some individual, 
in this case, John. Of course, we can also imagine that under these 
circumstances, there is another extrinsic moment, instance of being the son 
of which conversely inheres in Paul but is also existentially dependent on 
John. Formally we have, 
 
Definition 6.15 (Externally Dependent Mode): A mode x is externally 
dependent iff it is existentially dependent of an individual which is 
independent of its bearer. Formally, 
 
(42). ExtDepMode(x) =def Mode(x) ∧ ∃y indep(y,β(x)) ∧ ed(x,y) 
■ 
 
The indep relation defined in (13) is symmetric. The intention of (42) is to 
capture circumstances in which an object has a moment in virtue of its 
association to an external entity. By using the relation indep in (42) we can 
exclude several problematic cases, such as: (i) the moment x being 
dependent on its bearer; (ii) x being dependent on other moments of its 
bearer (e.g., color of an object can be considered dependent on the objects 
spatial extension); (iii) x being dependent on the essential parts or essential 
wholes of its bearer.   
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In the case of a material externally dependent moment x there is an 
individual external to its bearer (i.e., which is not one of its parts or intrinsic 
moments), which is the foundation of x. The notion of foundation can be 
seen as a type of historical dependence (Ferrario & Oltramari, 2004), in the 
way that, for instance, being connected to is founded in an individual 
connection, or being kissed is founded on individual kiss, being punched by is 
founded in an individual punch, working at is founded in a working contract. 
Since founding individuals are typically perdurants, we refrain from 
elaborating on the notion of foundation here.  
Suppose that John is married to Mary. There are many externally 
dependent modes of John that depend on the existence of Mary, and that 
have the same foundation (e.g., a wedding event or a social contract 
between the parts). These are, for example, all responsibilities that John 
acquires by virtue of this foundation. Now, we can define an individual that 
bears all externally dependent modes of John that share the same 
dependencies and the same foundation. We term this particular a qua 
individual (Masolo et al., 2004, 2005; Odell & Bock, 1998). Qua individuals 
are, thus, treated here as a special type of complex externally dependent modes. 
Intuitively, a qua individual is the way an object participates in a certain 
relation (Loebe, 2003), and the name comes from considering an 
individual only w.r.t. certain aspects (e.g., John qua student; Mary qua 
musician) (Masolo et al., 2004).   
The notion of qua individuals is ancient and comes at least from 
Aristotle54. For example in On Interpretation he says that someone might be 
good qua cobbler without being good. This problem, that was called by 
medieval philosophers the problem of reduplicatio or the problem of 
qualification (Poli, 1998), was faced also by Leibniz when he formulated the 
identity principle known as Leibniz law (see chapter 4), and by Brentano 
(Angelelli, 1967). More recently, in contemporary philosophy qua 
individuals have been employed in order to solve some problems related to 
theories of constitution (Fine, 1982) and theories of action (see Anscombe, 
1979 and Fine, ibid.). Furthermore, they have been used in the literature to 
ascribe incompatible properties to the same individual x that result from xs 
participation in different relations. This is illustrated by the classical 
example Nixon qua quaker is a pacifist, while Nixon qua republican is not 
(Masolo et al., 2005). In an ontology that countenances the notion of qua 
individuals, this situation can be modelled by having two different modes 
Nixon-qua-quaker and Nixon-qua-republican inhering in the substantial Nixon. 
In this case, we take that whilst the former exemplifies pacifism, the latter 
does not.   
                                                      
54 See for example (Szabó, 2003) and, for a more historical and deep account (Baek, 1982). 
240 CHAPTER 6 PROPERTIES 
Our notion of qua individual is akin to what is termed a Material Role in 
(Heller et al., 2004) and (Loebe, 2003). Moreover, this notion resembles 
strongly the one of roles in (Wieringa & de Jonge & Spruit, 1995), with the 
difference that Wieringa and collegues do not discuss this type of external 
dependence of a role. We resume this discussion on roles in section 7.3, in 
which we elaborate on the relation between the concepts of role proposed 
by these authors and the one that we have proposed in chapter 4 as well as 
their interrelationships.                   
Finally, we can define an aggregate55 of all qua individuals that share the 
same foundation, and name this individual a relator. Now, let x, y and z be 
three distinct individuals such that: (a) x is a relator; (b) y is a qua individual 
and y is part of x; (c) y inheres in z. In this case, we say that x mediates z, 
symbolized by m. Formally, we have that: 
 
(43). ∀x,y m(x,y) → relator(x) ∧ Endurant(y) 
(44). ∀x Relator(x) →  
∀y (m(x,y) ↔ (∃z quaIndividual(z) ∧ (z < x) ∧ i(z,y))) 
 
Additionally, we require that a relator mediates at least two distinct 
individuals, i.e.,   
 
(45). ∀x Relator(x) → ∃y,z (y ≠ z ∧ m(x,y) ∧ m(x,z)) 
 
In conformance with (Degen et al., 2001), a relator is considered here 
as a special type of moment. Thus, formally, according to definition 6.1, a 
relator must inhere in a unique individual, i.e., it must have a bearer (see 
formula 10). We therefore estipulate that the bearer of a relator r is the 
mereological sum56 of the individuals that r mediates, i.e.,      
 
(46). ∀x Relator(x) → (β(x) = σym(x,y)) 
 
Finally, a relation of mediation analogous to that of characterization can be 
defined to hold between relator universals and those universals of their 
mediated entities: 
 
                                                      
55 Relators are genuine integral wholes according to the criteria posed in section 5.4, since 
the relation of common foundation can be used as a suitable characterizing relation. A 
similar argument can be made in favour of the bearers of relators (see formula 46) in terms 
of the relation of common mediation. 
56 The notion of mereological sum is defined in chapter 5. In a nutshell, σxϕ represents the 
individual x composed by all individuals that satisfy the predicate ϕ. In the case of formula 
(46), the bearer of a relator x is the individual y which is composed by all entities mediated 
by x.    
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Definition 6.16 (Mediation): The mediation relation holds between a 
universal U and a relator universal UR iff every instance of U is mediated by 
an instance of UR. Formally, 
 
(47). mediation(U, UR) =def Universal(U) ∧  
RelatorUniversal(UR) ∧ ∀x (x::U → ∃r r::UR ∧ m(r,x))  
■ 
 
A relator universal is a universal whose instances are relators. Relator 
universals constitute the basis for defining material relations R whose 
instances are n-tuples of entities. In general, a material relation R can be 
defined by the following schema.  
 
Definition 6.17 (Material and Formal Relations): Let φ(a1,,an) 
denote a condition on the individuals a1,,an 
 
(48). [a1an]::
R(U1Un) ↔ ∧i ≤ n ai::Ui 
∧ φ (a1an) 
 
A relation is called material if there is a relator universal UR such that the 
condition φ is obtained from UR as follows:  
 
φ(a1an) ↔ ∃k (k::UR ∧i ≤ n m(k,ai))). 
 
In this case, we say that the relation R is derived from the relator universal 
UR, or symbolically, derivation(R,UR). Otherwise, if such a relator universal 
UR does not exists, R is termed a formal relation.  
■ 
 
An example of a ternary material relation is purchFrom corresponding to 
a relator universal Purchase whose instances are individual purchases. These 
individual purchases connect three individuals: a person, say John, an 
individual good, e.g. the book Speech Acts by Searle, and a shop, say Amazon. 
Thus,  
 
[John, SpeechActsBySearle, Amazon]::RpurchFrom(Person, Good, 
Shop). 
 
Since John::Person, SpeechActsBySearle::Good, Amazon::Shop, and there is a 
specific purchase relator p::Purchase such that 
 
m(p,John) ∧ m(p, SpeechActsBySearle) ∧ m(p,Amazon) 
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We obtain the following definition for the triple [a1, a2, a3] being a link of 
the relation universal purchFrom between Person, Good and Shop: 
 
[a1,a2,a3]::RpurchFrom(Person, Good, Shop) ↔ John::Person ∧ 
SpeechActsBySearle::Good ∧ Amazon::Shop ∧ ∃p (p::Purchase ∧ 
m(p,John) ∧ m(p, SpeechActsBySearle) ∧ m(p,Amazon)). 
 
We can summarize this section as follows:  
 
 we make a fundamental distinction between formal and material 
relations. Whilst the former hold directly between two entities without 
any further intervening individual, the latter are induced by mediating 
entities called relators. Moreover, material relations are founded by 
material entities in reality, typically perdurants, which are external to 
their relata. Comparative formal relations, in contrast, are founded in 
qualities which are intrinsic to the their relata and, hence, can be 
reduced to relations between these qualities;  
 
 Relators are special types of (relational) moments, i.e., particularized 
relational properties. Relators are composed of certain externally 
dependent modes named qua individuals;  
 
 Qua individuals are (potentially complex) externally dependent modes 
exemplifying all the properties that an individual has in the scope of a 
certain material relation; 
 
Formal relations shall be treated here as classes of tuples, but which are 
defined intensionally, as opposed to extensionally. These entities and their 
interrelationships are exemplified in figure 6.13. 
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6.3 An Ontological Foundation for Conceptual 
Modeling most Basic Concepts 
In this section, we employ the set of ontological categories proposed is 
section 6.2 to analyze and provide a foundation for some of the most basic 
constructs in conceptual modeling, namely, classes, objects, attributes, attribute 
values and associations. These modeling concepts are represented in 
practically all conceptual modeling languages. Thus, the conclusions drawn 
in what follows can be extended to all these languages. However, with the 
sole purpose of exemplification, we shall refer in the sequel to these 
concepts as they are represented by UMLs modeling primitives. In the 
remaining of this section, we refer to the OMG UML Superstructure 
Specification 2.0 (OMG, 2003c) when quoting text in italics. For simplicity, 
we write CM-ontology when we mean domain ontology in the form of a 
conceptual model specification. Whenever the context is clear, we omit the 
prefix UML and simply say object, class, etc., instead of UML object, 
UML class, etc. 
6.3.1 Classes and Objects  
In a UML-based conceptual model specification, an object represents a 
particular instance of a class. It has identity and attribute values (OMG, 
2001). A Class describes a set of Objects that share the same specification of features, 
Figure 6-13  Modes, 
Qua Individuals and 
Material Relations 
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constraints and semantics. (p.86). The purpose of a class is to specify a 
classification of objects and to specify the features that characterize the structure and 
behaviour of those objects. (p.87). Moreover, a UML specification is 
concerned with describing the intention of a class, that is, the rules that 
define it. The run-time execution provides its extension, that is, its instances 
(OMG, 2001). 
We may observe a direct correspondence between universals and classes 
of a certain kind, as stated in the following principle:  
Principle 6.1: In a CM-ontology, any universal U of the domain that carries 
a determinate principle of identity for its instances may be represented as a 
concrete class CU. Conversely, for all concrete classes (of a CM-ontology) 
whose instances are basic objects or links (representing individuals), there 
must be a corresponding universal in the domain. 
There are some important points that are represented in this principle. 
Firstly, it states that only universals that carry a determinate principle of 
identity for their instances can be represented in a conceptual model as a 
concrete class (a class that can have direct instances). Therefore, as argued 
in chapter 4, non-sortal substantial universals must be represented as 
abstract classes. It is a general requirement in conceptual modeling languages 
that the represented instances must have a definite identity (Borgida, 
1990). For this reason, in the category of substantials, what is meant by 
object in conceptual modeling coincides with our use of the term in figure 
6.5, i.e., non-object substantials (amounts of matter) can only be 
represented in a conceptual model as quantities (see section 5.5.1).  
Moreover, this principle represents an important divergence between 
the view proposed here and the BWW approach (see, for example, Wand & 
Storey & Weber, 1999). The proponents of the BWW approach claim that 
classes in a conceptual model of the domain should only be used to 
represent substantial universals. In particular, they deny that moment 
universals should be represented as classes. In our opinion, this claim is not 
only counterintuitive but also controversial from a metaphysical point of 
view. This is discussed in depth in section 6.5.1.    
Most classes in a CM-ontology indeed represent Substantial Universals. 
Firstly, because conceptual models are typically used to model static aspects 
of a domain and, consequently, the universals represented are typically 
endurant universals. In addition, Substantials are prior to Moments not only 
from an existential but also from an identification point of view. For 
example, (Schneider, 2003b) claims that moments (tropes) are 
identificationally dependent on substantials (objects), i.e., while the latter can 
be single out on their own, in order to identify a moment m of substantial 
s, one has to identify s first.   
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Principle 6.1, although important to establish the correspondence 
between conceptual modeling classes and universals, is not elaborated 
enough to account for the necessary distinctions in this category. For this 
reason, we defend that the class construct in conceptual modeling should 
be extended to account for all distinctions among the categories of 
substantial and moment universals proposed in chapter 4 of this thesis as well 
as in the remainder of this section. 
6.3.2 Attributes and Data Types 
Suppose that we have the situation illustrated in figure 6.11, i.e., a 
substantial universal Apple whose elementary specification contains the 
feature Weight. Thus, for an instance a of Apple there is an instance w of the 
quality universal Weight inhering in a. The intention of this universal could 
be represented by the following quality specification:  
 
∀a (a::Apple → ∃w (w::Weight ∧ i(w,a))) 
 
Associated with the quality universal Weight we have a quality dimension 
WeightValue and, hence, for every instance w of Weight there is a quale c 
denoting a particular weight value, i.e., a point in the weight quality 
dimension such that ql(c,w) holds.   
We take the weight quality domain to be a one-dimensional structure 
isomorphic to the half-line of non-negative numbers, which can be 
represented by the set WeightValue. We assume that any quality domain 
could be represented as an Algebra A = (V,F), where V is the set of qualia 
and F a finite set of functions. However, we will not discuss the specifics of 
algebraic specifications and even less shall we discuss particular algebras. 
Firstly, because algebraic specification is a topic that has been extensively 
explored in the literature (see for example Goguen & Malcolm, 2000). 
Secondly, because here we are only interested in the ontological and 
cognitive foundations underlying these algebraic specifications. From a 
conceptual modeling perspective, knowing what should be represented is 
prior to particular mathematical forms of representation.       
The mapping between a substantial a and its weight quale can be 
represented by the following function 
weight: Ext(Apple) → WeightValue 
 
such that  
 
weight(x) = y | ∃z z::Weight ∧ i(z,x) ∧ ql(y,z). 
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In general, let U be a substantial or moment universal and let Q1,,Qn be a 
number of quality universals. Let E be an elementary specification capturing 
the intention of universal U:  
 
(49). ∀x (x::U → ∃q1,,qn ∧ ≤ni (qi::Qi ∧ i(qi,x))). 
 
If Di is a quality domain associated with Qi, we can define the function Qi: 
Ext(U) → Di (named an attribute function for quality universal Qi) such that 
for every x::U we have that  
 
(50). Qi(x)= y | y ∈ Di ∧ ∃q::Qi ∧ i(q,x) ∧ ql(y,q). 
  
Let us suppose for now a situation in which every Qi composing in the 
elementary specification of a universal U (50) is a simple quality universal 
i.e., Qi is associated to a quality dimension. In this simplest case, the quality 
universals appearing in the elementary specification of U can be represented 
in a CM-ontology via their corresponding attribute functions and associated 
quality dimensions in the following manner: 
 
Principle 6.2: Every attribute function derived from the elementary 
specification of the universal U may be represented as an attribute of the 
class CU (representation of the universal U) in a CM-ontology; every quality 
dimension which is the co-domain of one these functions may be represented 
as data types of the corresponding attributes in this CM-ontology. Finally, 
relations constraining and informing the geometry of a quality dimension 
may be represented as constraints in the corresponding data type.   
 
For example, in UML a data type is a special kind of classifier, similar to a class, 
whose instances are values (not objects)... A value does not have an identity, so two 
occurrences of the same value cannot be differentiated (p.95). A direct 
representation of Apples elementary specification in UML according to 
principle 6.2 maps the attribute function weight: 
Ext(Apple)→WeightValue to an attribute weight with data type 
Weight(Kg)57 in class Apple (figures 6.14.a-b). In UML, specifically, 
                                                      
57For now, we shall assume a standard metric unit for each quality dimension (e.g., 
kilograms in this case). Different metric units affect the granularity but not the structure of 
a quality domain. For instance, if we consider Weight(Ton) instead of kilograms, the weight 
dimension is still isomorphic to the half-line of the positive numbers obeying the same 
ordering.       
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navigable end names (figure 6.14.b) are a natural alternative mechanism for 
representing attribute functions since they are semantically equivalent to 
attributes (OMG, ibid., p.82). 
weight:Weight(Kg)
«kind»
Apple «kind»
Apple
«datatype»
Weight(Kg)
*
weight
1
(a) (b)  
Suppose now that we have the following extension of the elementary 
specification of the universal Apple represented in figure 6.11: 
 
∀a (a::Apple → ∃c∃w (c::Color ∧ i(c,a)) ∧ (w::Weight ∧ i(w,a))) 
 
In order to model the relation between the quality c (color) and its quale, 
there are other issues to be considered. As previously mentioned, Color is a 
complex quality universal, and the quality domain associated with it is a 
three-dimension splinter (see figures 6.7 and 6.8) composed of quality 
dimensions hue, saturation and brightness. These dimensions can be 
considered to be indirect qualities universals exemplified in an apple a, i.e., 
there are quality individuals h, s, b which are instances of quality universals 
Hue, Saturation and Brightness, respectively, that inhere in the color quality 
c (which in turn inheres in substantial a). The intention of the quality 
universal Color could then be represented by the following specification:  
 
∀c (c::Color → ∃h∃s∃b (h::Hue ∧ i(h,c)) ∧  
(s::Saturation ∧ i(s,c)) ∧ (b::Brightness ∧ i(b,c))) 
 
In this case, we can derive the following attribute functions from the 
features in this specification:  
 
hue: Ext(Color) → HueValue;  
saturation: Ext(Color) → SaturationValue;  
brightness: Ext(Color) → BrightnessValue. 
Together these functions map each quality of a color c to its corresponding 
quality dimension. One possibility for modeling this situation is a direct 
application of principle 6.2 to the Color universal quality specification. In 
this alternative, depicted in figure 6.15, the class Color directly represents 
the quality universal color and, its attributes the attribute functions hue, 
saturation and brightness. 
Figure 6-14  Alternative 
Representations of 
Attribute Functions in 
UML 
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Another modeling alternative is to use directly the construct of a data type 
to represent a quality domain and its constituent quality dimensions (figure 
6.16). That is, we can define the quality domain associated with the 
universal Color as the set ColorDomain ⊂ HueValue × 
SaturationValue × BrightnessValue, thus complying with (36). Then, 
we can define the following attribute function for the substantial universal 
Apple according to (50):  
 
color: Ext(Apple) → ColorDomain  
 
such that  
 
color(x) = {〈h,s,b〉 ∈ ColorDomain | ∃c::Color i(c,x) ∧  
(h = hue(c)) ∧ (s = saturation(c)) ∧ (b = brightness(c))} 
 
where hue, saturantion and brightness are the attribute functions previously 
defined. 
 
weight:Weight(Kg)
«kind»
Apple hue:HueValue
saturation:SaturationValue
brightness:BrightnessValue
«datatype»
ColorDomain
*
color
1
 
 
In figure 6.16, we use the UML construct of a structured datatype to model 
the ColorDomain. In this representation, the datatype fields hue, 
saturation, brightness are placeholders for the coordinates of each of the 
(integral) quality dimensions forming the color domain. In this way the 
instances(members) of ColorDomain are quale vectors 〈x,y,z〉 where x ∈ 
HueValue, y ∈ SaturationValue and z ∈ BrightnessValue. The navigable end 
name color in the association between Apple and ColorValue represents the 
attribute function color described above.  
Figure 6-15 
Representing Quality 
Universals and Indirect 
Qualities 
Figure 6-16 
Representing Qualia in 
Multi-Dimensional 
Quality Domain 
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The two forms of representation exemplified in figures 6.15 and 6.16 
do not convey the same information, which we highlight by the use of 
different stereotypes. In figure 6.15, color objects are one-sidedly 
existentially dependent on the individuals they are related to via an inherence 
relation. These objects are bonafide individuals with a definite numerical 
identity. As discussed in section 6.2.3, the characterization relation between a 
quality universal and a substantial universal is mapped in the instance level 
to an inherence relation between the corresponding quality and substantial 
individuals. In figure 6.16, contrariwise, the members of the ColorDomain 
are pure values that represent points in a quality domain. These values can 
qualify a number of different objects but they exist independently of them 
in the sense that a color tuple is a part of quality domain even if no object 
has that color.  
Both representations are warranted, in the sense that ontologically 
consistent interpretations can be found in both cases, and which alternative 
shall be pragmatically more suitable is a matter of empirical investigation. 
Notwithstanding, we believe that some guidelines could be anticipated. In 
situations in which the moments of a moment all take their values (qualia) 
in a single quality domain, the latter alternative (shown in figure 6.16) 
should be preferred due to its compatibility with the modeling tradition in 
conceptual modeling and knowledge representation. This is certainly the 
case with complex quality universals. Additionally, since the 
conceptualization of these moments depends on the combined appreciation 
of all their quality dimensions, we claim that they should be mapped in an 
integral way to a quale vector in the corresponding n-dimensional quality 
domain.  
We can generalize this idea as follows. Let E be an elementary 
specification capturing the intention of a substantial or moment universal U:  
 
∀x (x::U → ∃q1,,qn ∧ ≤ni (qi::Qi ∧ i(qi,x))). 
 
And a quality specification capturing the intention of each complex quality 
universal universal Qi in E:  
 
∀q (q::Qi → ∃k1,,kn ∧ ≤nj (kj::Kj ∧ i(kj,q))). 
 
Let DOi be the quality domain associated with Qi. Thus, DOi ⊆ D1×,×Dn 
such that assoc(Kj,Dj) and characterization(Qi,Kj). Then we can define an 
attribute function  
 
Qi: Ext(U) → DOi 
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such that 
 
Qi(x) = 〈d1,,dn〉 ∈ DOi | ∃q∃k1...kn (q::Qi) ∧ i(q,x)(∧ ≤nj (i(kj,q) 
∧ql(dj,kj)). 
 
Or simply, if we take that (following formula 50) there are functions Kj: 
Ext(Qi) → Dj for all Kj above, then 
 
Qi(x) = 〈d1,,dn〉 ∈ DOi | ∃q (q::Qi) ∧ i(q,x)(∧ ≤nj  dj = Kj(q)) 
 
Quality domains are composed of integral dimensions. This means that the 
value of one dimension cannot be represented without representing the 
values of others. By representing the color quality domain in terms of a 
structured data type we can reinforce (via its constructor method) that its 
tuples will always have values for all the integral dimensions. Moreover, the 
representation of a quality domain should account not only for its quality 
dimensions but also for the constraints on the relation between them 
imposed by its structure. To mention another example, consider the 
Gregorian calendar as a quality domain (composed of the linear quality 
dimensions days, months and years) in which date qualities can be 
represented. The value of one dimension constrains the value of the others 
in a way that, for example, the points [31-April-2004] and [29-February-
2003] do not belong to this quality structure. Once more, constraints 
represented on the constructor method of a data type can be used to 
restrict the possible tuples that can be instantiated. 
In the sequel, we observe the following principle between quality 
domains and their representation in terms of data types: 
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Principle 6.3: Every quality dimension D associated to a quality universal 
Q may be represented as a datatype DT in a CM-ontology; Relations 
constraining and informing the geometry of a quality dimension D may be 
represented as operators in the corresponding datatype DT. A collection of 
integral dimension D1 Dn (represented by data types DT1 DTn) 
constituting a quality domain QD can be grouped in structured datatype W 
representing quality domain QD. In this case, every quality dimension Di of 
QD may be represented by a field of W of type DTi. Moreover, the 
relations between the dimensions Di of QD may be represented by 
constraints relating the fields of data type W. 
 
Principle 6.3 is a generalization of principle 6.2 in order to account for 
quality domains. In summary, every quality universal Q that is associated to 
a quality domain in an elementary specification of universal U can be 
represented in a conceptual model via attribute functions mapping 
instances of U to quale vectors in the n-dimensional domain associated with 
Q. The n-dimensional domains should be represented in a conceptual 
model as an n-valued structured data type. 
Now, let us consider a case where one of the moment universals M that 
characterizes a universal U in its elementary specification is a mode universal. 
We defend here that these are the cases in which we want to explicitly 
represent a moment universal in a conceptual model. An example of such a 
situation is depicted in Figure 6.17, which models the relation between a 
Hospital, its Patients, and a number of symptoms reported by these 
patients. Suppose an individual patient John is suffering from headache and 
influenza. Johns headache and influenza are moments inhering in John. 
Even if another patient, for example Paul, has a headache that is 
qualitatively indistinguishable from that of John, Johns headache and Pauls 
headache are two different individuals. Instances of Symptoms can have 
moments themselves (such as duration and intensity) and can participate in 
relations of, for example, causation or precedence.  
In figure 6.17, the moment universal Symptom is represented by a class 
construct decorated with the «mode» stereotype. The formal relation 
between Symptom and Patient is mapped to the inherence relation in the 
instance level, representing the existential dependence of a Symptom on a 
Patient. In other words, for an instance s of Symptom there must be a 
specific instance p of Patient associated with s, and in every situation that s 
exists p must exist and the inherence relation between the two must hold. 
This formal relation has a semantics that is outside the usual interpretation 
of the association construct in UML. According to its standard usage, the 
multiplicity 1 in the Patient end only demands that, in every situation, 
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symptom s must be related to an instance of Patient. The inherence 
relation, however, requires s to be always related to the one and the same 
instance of Patient. The difference between these two sorts of requirements 
is analogous to those marking the difference between mandatory and 
essential part-whole relations as discussed in chapter 5, respectively. 
«role»
Patient
«kind»
MedicalUnit
1..* 1..*
treatedIn
«kind»
Person
«kind»
Hospital
1
1..*
«mode»
Symptom
1..*
1
«characterization» d:DayValuem:MonthValue
y:YearValue
«datatype»
DateDomain
*
startDate
1
preceeding
*
preceeded *  
A mode universal such as Symptom in figure 6.17 can be seen as the 
ontological counterpart of the concept of Weak entities types in EER 
diagrams, which has been lost in the UML unification process. A weak entity 
can be defined as follows (Vigna, 2004):  
 
a weak entity is an entity that exists only if is related to a set of uniquely 
determined entities, which are called the owners of the weak entity. For 
instance, [the] weak entity type edition; each book has several editions, and 
certainly it is nonsense to speak about an edition if this does not happen in 
the context of a specific bookWhen an entity is deleted from a schema 
instance, all owned weak entities are deleted, tooFor entities of type W to be 
owned by entities of type X, a requirement must be satisfied: there must be 
an identification function from W to X that specifies the owner of each entity of 
type W, that is, a relationship type going from W to X whose cardinality 
constraint impose its instances to be functions. Deletion of an entity of type 
X implies deletion of all related entities of WWeakness is recursive. If X 
owns Y and Y owns Z, then X (indirectly) owns Zas a special case, it must not 
happen that an entity owns itself.  
 
If we perform suitable substitutions to the italicized terms in the above 
definition, it becomes directly applicable to the notion of moments adopted 
here: (i) a moment is an entity that exists only if is related to a set of 
Figure 6-17 
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Universals and Domain 
Formal Relations  
 AN ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR CONCEPTUAL MODELING MOST BASIC 
CONCEPTS 253 
uniquely determined entities, which are called the bearers of the moment 
(formulas 4 and 8 for the inherence relation). Moreover, the requirement 
that: (ii) when an object is deleted from a conceptual model, all inhering moments 
are deleted, too must be satisfied in implementations of the corresponding 
model, since moments are existentially dependent on their bearers, they 
cannot exist without the latter. Also the requirement that (iii) there must 
be an identification function from W to X that specifies the bearer of each 
moment of type W, that is, a relationship type going from W to X whose 
cardinality constraint impose its instances to be functions, is clearly 
satisfied by the inherence relation due to the non-migration principle 
defined for moments (9). Finally: (iv) indirect moment of is recursive. If X 
inheres Y and Y inheres Z, then X is an indirect moment of Z.as a special case, 
it must not happen that a moment inheres in itself. Again, inherence is 
irreflexive (5) and although it is intransitive (7), a relation of indirect moment 
of can be defined to be transitive.  
To summarize this section we can provide the following procedure to 
represent in conceptual modeling the elementary specification of universals 
and their associated quality universals and quality structures:  
 
Take a substantial universal U with its associated elementary specification. 
For every moment universal Q characterizing U do:  
 
1. If Q is a simple quality universal then principle 6.2 can be applied; 
2. If Q is a complex quality universal then principle 6.3 can be applied; 
3. If Q is a mode universal then it should be explicitly represented and 
should be related to U in a model via a characterization relation. 
Moreover, this procedure can be applied again to the elementary 
specification of Q.     
 
6.3.3 Associations 
In most conceptual modeling languages, n-ary relationships are taken to 
represent sets of n-tuples (e.g., OWL, LINGO, CCT, EER). In UML, the 
ER concept of a relationship type is called association. An association defines 
a semantic relationship that can occur between typed instancesAn instance of an 
association is called a linkAn association declares that there can be links between 
instances of the associated types. A link is a tuple with one value for each end of the 
association, where each value is an instance of the type of the endAn association 
describes a set of tuples whose values refer to typed instances.(p.81).  
 The OMG UML Specification is somehow ambiguous in defining 
associations. An association is primarily considered to be a connection, 
but, in certain cases (whenever it has class-like properties), an association 
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may be a class: An association class is [a] model element that has both 
association and class properties. An AssociationClass can be seen as an association that 
also has class properties, or as a class that also has association properties. It not only 
connects a set of classifiers but also defines a set of features that belong to the 
relationship itself and not to any of the classifiers.(p.118). 
An association A between the classes C1,,Cn of a CM-ontology can, in 
principle, be understood in our framework as a relation (relational 
universal) R between the corresponding universals U1,,Un whose 
extension consists of all tuples corresponding to the links of A. However, 
current conceptual modeling languages (including UML) do not distinguish 
between formal and material relations.  
In figure 6.18, an example of a comparative formal relation is the 
relation of precedence between Symptoms. Precedence is a partial order 
relation between symptoms that depends only on the starting date of each 
of them. 
«role»
Patient
1..*1 «characterization»
«mode»
Symptom
preceeding
*
preceeded *
d:DayValue
m:MonthValue
y:YearValue
«datatype»
DateDomain
startDate1
*
 
It is common in conceptual modeling languages that a number of formal 
meta-properties (e.g., reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity) are defined for 
relationships (e.g., LINGO, OWL, RDF, F-LOGIC). In the specific case of 
precedence, these meta-properties are irreflexivity, anti-symmetry and 
transitivity, i.e., it is a strict partial ordering relation. Can we provide an 
explanation for these meta-properties? 
As we have discussed in section 6.2.7, the immediate relata of formal 
comparative relations are not substantials but qualities. Take, for example, 
the relations of taller than, heavier than and precedence. All these relations can 
be reduced to relations between qualities:  
 
 x is taller than y iff height(x) > height(y);  
 x is heavier than y iff weight(x) > weight(y);  
 x preceeds y iff startDate(x) < startDate(y),  
 
in which height, weight and startDate are attribute functions mapping the 
substantials x and y to the corresponding qualia. All three quality structures 
involved in these expressions have a linear structure ordered by the < 
Figure 6-18  Example of 
a formal Relation 
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relation. By making this analysis explicit, it becomes evident that precedence 
is a partial order because the qualities founding this relation are associated 
with a total ordered quality dimension. In general, we can state that the meta-
properties of a comparative formal relation RF can be derived from the meta-
properties of the relations between qualia associated with the qualities 
founding this relation RF. This view is also shared by (Gardenfors, 2000). 
However, unlike Gardenfors, we do not claim that this holds for all types of 
relations.  
Take for instance the relation treatedIn between Patient and Medical 
Unit in figure 6.19 below. This relation requires the existence of a third 
entity, namely an individual Treatment mediating a particular Patient and a 
particular Medical Unit in order for the relation to hold. This latter case 
can be modeled in our framework as follows: Let treatedIn be a binary 
material association induced by a relator universal Treatment whose 
instances are individual treatments. These individual treatments connect 
two individuals: a patient, say John, and a MedicalUnit, say 
TraumaUnit#1. Thus, 
 
 [John, TraumaUnit#1]:RtreatedIn(Person, MedicalUnit), 
 
since John::Person and TraumaUnit#1::MedicalUnit, and there is a 
specific treatment t::Treatment such that (m(t,John) ∧ 
m(t,TraumaUnit#1), We obtain the definition for the tuple [a1,a2] 
being a link of the association treatedIn between Person and MedicalUnit: 
 
[a1,a2]:RtreatedIn(Person, MedicalUnit) ↔ a1::Person ∧ 
a2::MedicalUnit ∧ ∃t(t::Treatment ∧ (m(t, a1) ∧ m(t, a2)). 
«role»
Patient
«kind»
MedicalUnit
1..* 1..*
treatedIn
«kind»
Person
 
How can we represent a material relation in a conceptual modeling 
language such as UML? Let us follow for now this (tentative) principle: a 
material relation RM of the domain may be represented in a CM-ontology 
by representing the relator universal associated with the relation as an 
association class. By applying this principle to the treateadIn relation 
aforementioned we obtain the model of figure 6.20. 
Figure 6-19  Example of 
a Material Relation 
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«role»
Patient MedicalUnit
Treatment
1..* 1..*
Person
 
There is a specific practical problem concerning the representation of 
material relations as standard associations that supports a modeling choice in 
the lines of what is proposed by this principle. This problem, mentioned in 
(Bock & Odell, 1997a), is caused by the fact that the standard notation 
collapses two different types of multiplicity constraints. For instance, in figure 
6.20, the model represents that each Patient can be treated in one-to-many 
Medical Units and that each medical unit can treat one-to-many patients. 
However, this statement is ambiguous since many different interpretations 
can be given to it, including the following:  
 
 a patient is related to only one treatment to which participate possibly 
several medical units;  
 a patient can be related to several treatments to which only one single 
medical unit participates;  
 a patient can be related to several treatments to which possibly several 
medical units participate;  
 several patients can be related to a treatment to which several medical 
units participate, and a single patient can be related to several 
treatments.  
 
The cardinality constraint that indicates how many patients (or medical 
units) can be related to one instance of Treatment is named single-tuple 
cardinality constraints. Multiple-tuple cardinality constraints restrict the 
number of treatments a patient (or medical unit) can be related to. By 
modeling the relator universal Treatment as an association class one can 
explicitly represent both types of constraints. A version of figure 6.20 
adopting this principle is presented in figure 6.21. 
«role»
Patient
«kind»
MedicalUnit
d:Duration
Treatment
1..* 1..*
1..*
1..*1
1..*
 
This problem is not at all specific to this case. For another example of a 
situation where this problem arises see figure 6.22. In this case, the 
Figure 6-20  
Representing a Relator 
Universal as a UML 
Association Class 
Figure 6-21  Explicit 
Representation of 
Single-Tuple and 
Multiple-Tuple 
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(material) relation statement is that: (a) a customer purchases one-to-many 
purchase items from one-to-many suppliers; (b) a supplier supplies one-to-
many purchase items to one-to-many customers; (c) a purchase item can be 
bought by one-to-many customers from one-to-many suppliers. 
«roleMixin»
Customer
«roleMixin»
Supplier
«roleMixin»
PurchasedItem
**
*
 
PurchaseFrom is a material relation induced by the relator universal Purchase, 
whose instances are individual purchases. Therefore, we have that 
 
[a1,a2,a3]::RpurchFrom(Customer, PurchaseItem, Supplier) ↔ 
a1::Customer ∧ a2::PurchaseItem ∧ a3::Supplier ∧ ∃p (p::Purchase 
∧ m(p,a1) ∧ m(p, a2) ∧ m(p, a3)) 
 
In other words, for this relation to hold between a particular Customer, a 
particular PurchaseItem, and a particular Supplier, they must be mediated 
by the same Purchase instance. Once more, we can see that the 
specification in figure 6.22 collapses single-tuple and multiple-tuple 
cardinality constraints. For this reason, there several possible ways of 
interpreting this model, including the following: 
 
 In a given purchase, a Customer participates by buying many items from 
many Suppliers and a customer can participate in several purchases;  
 In a given purchase, many Customers participate by buying many items 
from many Suppliers, and a customer can participate in only one 
purchase;  
 In given purchase, a Customer participates by buying many items from a 
Supplier, and a customer can participate in several purchases;  
 In given purchase, many Customers participate by buying many items 
from a Supplier, and a customer can participate in several purchases;  
 
By depicting the Purchase universal explicitly (such as in figure 6.23), we 
can make explicit the intended interpretation of the material PurchaseFrom 
relation, namely, that in a given purchase, a Customer buys many items 
from a Supplier. Both customer and supplier can participate in several 
purchases. Although a purchase can include several items, each item in this 
model is a unique exemplar and, hence, can only be sold once. 
Figure 6-22  Example of 
a ternary material 
relation with ambiguous 
representation of 
cardinality constraints 
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«roleMixin»
Customer
«roleMixin»
Supplier
«roleMixin»
PurchasedItem
* *
*
Purchase
1
1..*
1
1..*
1..*
1
 
This problem is specific to material relations. Formal relations are 
represented by sets of tuples, i.e., an instance of the relation is itself a tuple 
with predefined arity. In formal relations, cardinality constraints are always 
unambiguously interpreted as being multiple-tuple, since there is no point in 
specifying single-tuple cardinality constraints for a relation with predefined 
arity. Hence, formal relations can be suitably represented as standard UML 
associations. One should notice that the relations between Patient and 
Treatment, and Medical Unit and Treatment are formal relations between 
universals (mediation). This is important to block the infinite regress that 
arises if material relations were required to relate these entities. The same 
holds for the pairwise associations between Customer, Supplier and 
PurchaseItem, on one hand, and Purchase on the other.   
At first sight, it seems to be satisfactory to represent a material relation 
by using an association class to model a relator universal that induces this 
relation. Nonetheless, the interpretation of this construct in the language is 
quite ambiguous w.r.t. defining what exactly counts as instances of an 
association class. We claim that the association class construct in UML 
exemplifies a case of construct overload in the technical sense discussed in 
chapter 2. This is to say that there are two distinct ontological concepts that 
are represented by this construct. To support this claim, we make use of 
the following (overloaded) semantic definition of the term as proposed by 
the pUML community: an associaton class can have as instances either (a) 
a n-tuple of entities which classifiers are endpoints of the association; (b) a 
n+1-tuple containing the entities which classifiers are endpoints of the 
association plus an instance of the objectified association itself (Breu et al., 
1997).  
Take as an illustration the association depicted in figure 6.21. In case 
(a), TreatedIn can be directly interpreted as a relational universal, whose 
instances are pairs [a,b], whereas a is patient and b is medical unit. In this 
Figure 6-23  Example of 
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case, [a,b] is an instance of TreatedIn iff there is a relator Treatment 
connecting a and b. In interpretation (b), TreatedIn is what is named in 
(Guizzardi & Herre & Wagner, 2002b; Guizzardi & Wagner & Herre, 2004) 
a Factual Universal. In short, if the relator r connects (mediates) the entities 
a1,,an then this yields a new individual that is denoted by 〈r: a1,,an〉. 
Individuals of this latter sort are called material facts. For every relator 
universal R there is a set of facts, denoted by facts(R), which is defined by 
the instances of R and their corresponding arguments. We assume the 
axiom that for every relator universal R there is a factual universal F(R) 
whose extension equals the set facts(R). Therefore, an instance of TreatedIn 
in this case could be the material fact 〈t1: John, MedUnit#1〉, whereas John 
is a Patient, MedUnit#1 is a Medical Unit and t1 is a treatment relator 
(founded in a treatment process).  
The relation between relators, relations and factual universals can be 
defined as follows. Let R be a relator universal. The factual universal F = 
F(R) is the basis for the material relation universal Γ(F) whose instances are 
n-tuples of entities. In general, a relation universal Γ(F) can thus be defined 
by the following schema. Let φ(a1,,an) denote a condition on the 
individuals a1,,an 
 
[a1an]:: Γ(F) (U1Un) ↔ ∧i ≤ n ai::Ui 
∧ φ(a1an) 
 
A relation is called material if there is a relator universal R such that the 
condition φ is obtained from R as follows: φ(a1an) ↔ ∃k (k::R ∧ 
〈k:a1an〉::F(R)). 
As a moment, a relator can bear other moments. For example, in figure 
6.21, the temporal duration of a Treatment is a moment of the latter. For 
this reason, between the two aforementioned interpretations for association 
classes, we claim that interpretation (b) should be favored, since it allows 
for the explicit representation of relators and their properties. However, 
there is still one problem with this representation in UML. Suppose that 
treatment t1 mediates the individuals John, and the medical units 
MedUnit#1 and MedUnit#2. In this case, we have as instances of Treatment 
both facts 〈t1: John, MedUnit#1〉 and 〈t1: John, MedUnit#2〉. However, this 
cannot be represented in such a manner in UML. In UML, t1 is supposed to 
function as an object identifier for a unique tuple. Thus, if the fact 〈t1: 
John, MedUnit#1〉 holds then 〈t1: John, MedUnit#2〉 does not, or 
alternatively, John and MedUnit#2 must be mediated by another relator. 
These are, nonetheless, unsatisfactory solutions, since it is the very same 
relator Treatment that connects one patient to a number of different 
medical units. 
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We therefore propose to represent relator universals explicitly as in 
figure 6.24. This model explicitly distinguishes the two entities: relator 
universals are represented by the stereotyped class «relator»; material 
relations are represented by a derived UML association stereotyped as 
«material». The dashed line between a material relation and a relator 
universal represents that the former is derived from the latter (see derived 
from relation figure 6.13). To mark this difference to the similar graphic 
symbol in UML, we attach a black circle in the relator universal end of this 
relation. In this figure, a particular Treatment is existentially dependent on 
a single Patient and in a (immutable) group of medical units. This would 
mean in UML that for every association representing an existential 
dependency relation between a moment and the endurant(s) it depends on, 
the association end should be frozen in the side of the latter. This 
compound modeling construct should replace the ambiguous association 
class construct in UML. 
Unlike in figure 6.21, the entities representing a relator universal (the 
stereotyped class that takes the place of an association class), and the 
material relation (the association itself) are distinct entities. In fact, the 
latter is completely derived from the former (see definition 6.16). For 
instance, the relator universal Treatment and the material relation 
TreatedIn represent distinct entities and can possibly have different 
cardinalities, since the same relator t1 can connect both the entities in 
[John, MedUnit#1] and [John, MedUnit#2]. Nonetheless, the cardinality 
constraints of TreatedIn can be completely deduced from the existential 
dependency relations between Treatment and the universals whose 
instances are the relata of TreatedIn, namely, Patient and MedicalUnit. 
«role»
Patient
«kind»
MedicalUnit
1..*
1..*
«mediation»
1
1..*
«mediation» «relator»
Treatment
1..* 1..*
«material»
/TreatedIn
 
This representation eliminates the construct overload present in figure 
6.21, since all constructs here have a unique and unambiguous ontological 
interpretation. Although (derived) relations can be important 
representation constructs, serving as a base for the specification of mappings 
in design time (Bock & Odell, 1997b), it is important to recognize the 
conceptual and ontological primacy of their foundations. Comparative 
formal relations are completely founded on certain intrinsic moments, and 
Figure 6-24  
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material relations are founded on relators. Moreover, as discussed in depth 
in (Snoeck & Dedene, 1998), the explicit representation of relator 
universals and their corresponding existential dependency relations provides 
a suitable mechanism for consistency preservation between static and 
dynamic conceptual models.  
Another benefit of this approach is that relator universals allow for the 
representation of anadic relations, i.e., relations whose arities are not fixed. 
Take for example the relation between some people that play together. For 
each instance of playing there may be a different number of people that 
participate in it (Loebe, 2003). This situation can modeled in the approach 
adopted here by explicitly representing of the anadic relator universal 
Playing. 
«relator»
Playing
«role»
Player
«mediation»
«kind»
Person
2..* 1..*  
In figure 6.25, the relator Playing connects individuals that play the same 
role. In (Loebe, 2003), this is named intensional symmetry (in contrast to the 
more common extensional symmetry that holds for formal relations). In 
general, a material relation RM is intensionally symmetric iff the relator 
universal UR from which RM is derived is such that: every instance of UR 
mediates only entities that instantiate the same role universal. It is 
important to emphasize that both comparative relations and material 
relations, as derived entities, have their meta-properties also derived from 
their foundations. In the case of formal relations, they are derived from the 
meta-properties of relations among qualia in the underlying conceptual 
space. In the case of material relations, they are derived from their founding 
relators and mediated entities. According to formula (45), relators must 
connect distinct entities. As a consequence, it should be clear that, there 
cannot be intensionally reflexive binary material relations. 
 The benefits of this approach are even more evident in the case of n-ary 
relations with n > 2. Take the UML representation of a ternary relation in 
figure 6.22. In this specification, we are forced to represent the minimum 
cardinality of zero for all association ends. As explained in the UML 
specification (p.82): For n-ary associations, the lower multiplicity of an end is 
typically 0. If the lower multiplicity for an end of an n-ary association of 1 (or more) 
implies that one link (or more) must exist for every possible combination of values for 
the other ends. As recognized by the UML specification itself, n-ary 
Figure 6-25  Using 
Relator Universals to 
represent Anadic 
Relations 
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associations in which there are tuples for every possible combination of the 
cross-product of the extension of the involved classes are atypically. Thus, 
in the majority of cases, the UML notation for n-ary associations 
completely looses the ability of representing real minimum cardinality 
constraints. Furthermore, as empirically demonstrated in (Bodard et al., 
2001), conceptual models without optional properties (minimum 
cardinality constraints of zero) lead to better performance in problem-
solving tasks that require a deeper-level understanding of the represented 
domain.     
 Finally, in the same way as qualities, relators can have their own inhering 
moments (e.g., Duration, as a quality associated to the universal Treatment, 
in figure 6.21) but also be mediated by other relators such as, for instance, 
a relator universal Payment whose instances connect particular Treatments 
and Payers. 
The results of this section can be summarized in the following principle 
regarding the representation of formal and material relations in a CM-
ontology:  
 
Principle 6.4: In a CM-ontology, any formal relation universal RF of the 
domain may be directly represented as a standard association whose links 
represent the tuples in the extension of RF. Conversely, a material relation 
RM of the domain may be represented in a CM-ontology by a complex 
construct composed of: (i) CM-class stereotyped as «relator» representing 
the relator universal. The relator universal is associated to CM-Classes 
representing mediated entities via associations stereotyped as «mediation»; 
(ii) a standard association stereotyped as «material» representing a material 
relation whose links represent the tuples in the extension of RM; (iii) a 
dashed line with a black circle in one of the ends representing the formal 
relation of derivation between (i) and (ii), in which the black circle lies in 
the association end of the relator universal. 
6.4 Related Work 
The approach found in the literature that is closest to the one presented 
here is the so-called BWW approach presented in (Shanks & Tansley & 
Weber, 2003; Evermann and Wand, 2001a,b; Wand & Storey & Weber, 
1999; Weber, 1997; Wand & Weber, 1995, 1993, 1990, 1989). In these 
articles, the authors report their results in mapping common constructs of 
conceptual modeling to an upper level ontology. Their approach is based on 
the BWW ontology, a framework created by Wand and Weber on the basis 
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of the original metaphysical theory developed by Mario Bunge in (Bunge, 
1977, 1979). 
In this section we compare the foundation ontology proposed here with 
BWW in terms of their theories and of their corresponding mapping 
approaches. Additionally, we discuss the approach proposed in (Veres & 
Hitchman, 2002; Veres & Mansson, 2005). This approach applies a 
psychologically and linguistically well-founded ontology as well as empirical 
evidence to criticize the general assumptions of the BWW approach, and in 
particular, its proposals for the representation of relational properties. 
6.4.1 Things and Substantials 
The concepts of substantial here and of thing in BWW are both based on the 
Aristotelian idea of substantial, i.e.,  
 
1. an essence which makes a thing what it is; 
2. that which remains the same through changes; 
3. that which can exist by itself, i.e., which does not need a subject in 
order to exist. 
 
In BWW, a thing is defined as a substantial individual with all its substantial 
properties: a thing is what is the totality of its substantial properties 
(Bunge, 1977, p.111). As a consequence, in BWW, there are no bare 
individuals, i.e., things without properties: a thing has one or more 
substantial properties, even if we, as cognitive subjects, are not or cannot be 
aware of them. Humans get in contact with the properties of things 
exclusively via the things attributes, i.e. via a chosen representational view 
of its properties. This is far from saying that Bunge himself embraces the 
so-called Bundle of Universals perspective. In fact, he explicitly rejects this 
theory and, instead, holds a position that can be better identified with a 
substance-attribute view (Armstrong, 1989).  
In short, in the former type of theory, particulars are taken as bundles of 
universals, i.e., as aggregates of properties which themselves are repeatable 
abstract entities. The most important exemplar of this type of theory was 
proposed by Russel in (Russel, 1948). A direct consequence of this theory 
is that two different things cannot have the same properties, where 
properties are universals. It is important not to confound this principle with 
another principle discussed in chapter 4 named the Leibnizs law, also know 
as the principle of the (P1) indiscernability of identicals. Principle (P1) states 
that if x is identical to y then whatever property x has then y has as well, or 
formally 
 
∀x,y (x = y) → ∀U (x::U ↔ y::U) 
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The principle is implied by the bundle theory of universals is named the 
(P2) Identity of indiscernibles and can be formally stated as follows 
 
∀x,y∀U (x::U ↔ y::U) → (x = y)  
 
that is, if two individuals instantiate the same universals then they are 
identical. Whilst principle (P1) is universally accepted among philosophers, 
(P2) is matter of great controversy, and there is at least the logical 
possibility that (P2) fails to be the case (Armstrong, 1989).  
Another problem with this bundle theory is that it makes universals the 
substance of reality, in the sense that everything is constructed out of 
universals. How can be the case that the concrete reality is made solely by 
these abstract entities? These problems (among others) are discussed in 
great detail in (Armstrong, 1989, chap.4). In fact, among the theories that 
countenance the existence of properties, Armstrong considers the bundle 
theory of universals to be the weakest from a philosophical point of view.           
The substance-attribute view makes an explicit distinction between a 
thing and the properties that the thing happens to have. As a consequence, 
the theory countenances the existence for every individual of a propertyless 
substratum, particularized essence or bare particular. The notion of substratum is 
strongly associated with the British empiricist philosopher John Locke 
(Armstrong, 1989) and due to its mysterious nature it has been the target 
of some criticism throughout history. Nonetheless, as a theoretical fiction 
(Bunge, 1977, p.57) it solves some of the philosophical problems existing 
in the bundle of universals theories.  
In summary, Bunge is a realist w.r.t. universals, i.e., he claims that 
universals exist in reality independent of our knowledge of their existence. 
However, he denies the existence of particularized properties, i.e., moments. 
The denial of property instances puts BWW in a singular position among 
the foundational ontologies developed in the realm of computer science 
(e.g., Schneider, 2003b, 2002; Heller et al., 2004; Masolo et al., 2003a; 
Neuhaus & Grenon & Smith, 2004).  
In principle, it seems that a thing in BWW could be directly associated 
to our concept of substance. However, there are some important 
differences between the two. Whilst a BWW-thing can be thought as a 
substratum instantiating a number of properties (as repeatable abstract 
entities), our substantials are particulars that bear other particularized 
properties (i.e., moments), or to borrow Simons phrase, particulars in 
particular clothing (Simons, 1994).     
 Although we do not make any ontological commitment w.r.t. the nature 
of our substratum, by adopting a four-category ontology, if necessary, we can 
dispense with a substratum of a mysterious nature. In this case, we can take 
a view such as the one of Simons Nuclear Theory. This theory proposes that 
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the accidental properties instances of an individual are held together by 
their mutual existential dependency to a nucleus. This nucleus, in turn, is 
composed by a number of essential properties that form what Husserl 
names a foundational set, i.e., a closure system under the relation of 
existential dependency.  This approach has the advantages of the substance-
attribute view, without having to accept its problems, since the nucleus is 
akin to a substratum, only not a mysterious one. In BWW, contrariwise, the 
mysterious substratum cannot be eliminated without putting the theory into 
a Bundle of Universals group. We claim that this flexibility puts an ontology in 
which moments are recognized in a better position than one in which they 
are not. 
6.4.2 Properties and Moments 
Despite the differences, an important commonality between a BWW-thing 
and our notion of substance is that, as the former, the latter has a non-
empty appearance, i.e. every substance bears at least one moment. The 
converse is also true, i.e., in both approaches a property exists only in 
connection with its bearer. In BWW, a property whose existence depends 
only on a single thing is called an intrinsic property. A property that depends 
on two or more things is called a mutual property. These concepts are 
analogous to our notions of intrinsic and relational moment universals. 
Nevertheless, once more, in our approach properties are instantiated. Thus, 
our intrinsic properties can be better defined as universals whose instances 
inhere in a single individual, while relational properties are universals whose 
instances mediate multiple individuals.   
In BWW, only things possess properties. As a consequence, a property 
cannot have properties. This dictum leads to the following modeling 
principle: Associations should not be modeled as classes (Rule 7 in 
Evermann & Wand, 2001b). Here, in contrast, according to principle 6.1 
we propose that any first-order universal can be represented as a conceptual 
modeling class. This issue marks an important divergence between the view 
proposed here and the BWW approach.  
The BWW authors claim that classes in a conceptual model of a 
domain should only be used to represent substantial universals. In 
particular, they deny that universals whose instances are particularized 
properties (i.e., moments) should be represented as classes. This claim is 
not only perceived as counterintuitive by conceptual modeling practitioners 
(as shown by Veres & Hitchman, 2002; Hitchman, 2003; Veres & Mansson, 
2005), but it is also controversial from a metaphysical point of view.  
Bunge denies that there properties of properties, i.e., higher-order 
properties. Since classes can have attributes representing properties, (Wand 
& Storey & Weber, 1999; Weber, 1997) claim that properties should not 
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be represented as classes, since in this case they could have attributes 
ascribed to them. We think there are some problems with this 
argumentation.  
First, claiming that there are no higher-order universals is itself quite 
controversial. (Armstrong, 1989), for instance, who embraces scientific 
realism as a theory of universals, claims that higher-order properties are 
necessary to represent the concept of a law. For Armstrong, a law such as 
Newtons F = MA describes a second-order relation between the three 
universals involved. Strangely enough, Bunge also defines the concept of a 
Law (quite a central notion is his approach) as a relation between 
properties, which then makes it a second-order relation (Bunge, 1977, 
p.77).  The view that there are, in fact, material higher-order universals is 
also shared by other approaches (e.g., Degen et al., 2001; Heller & Herre, 
2004). Even simple higher-order relations between universals such as 
Redness is more like Orange than it is like yellow cannot be dealt with in the 
current version of the BWW framework. As discussed in section 6.2.6, in 
the approach presented here, if one wants to dispense with higher-order 
properties, this relation can be expressed in terms of relations between 
quality regions (abstract individuals) in a conceptual space.  
The second problem with Wand & Webers argumentation is that, even 
if one denies the existence of higher-order properties, it is not necessary to 
proscribe the representation of properties as classes. Alternative, one can 
simply proscribe the representation of attributes in classes representing 
properties58.  
Nonetheless, if one subscribes to Bunges theory, there is a much 
stronger reason to argue against the representation of non-substantial 
universals as classes. Since Bunge denies the existence of particularized 
properties, one could simply state that properties should not be represented 
as classes because they should not be allowed to have instances. As 
discussed in section 6.2.3, there is philosophical, cognitive and linguistic 
support in the literature for taking an ontological view of individuals in 
which moments are accepted (Schneider, 2003b, 2002; Heller et al., 2004; 
Masolo et al., 2003a; Neuhaus & Grenon & Smith, 2004; Lowe, 2001). 
Moreover, even if both ontological choices were deemed equivalent, there 
are cognitive and pragmatic reasons for defending the acceptance of 
property instances and, hence, in favor of accepting also the representation 
of non-substantial universals as conceptual modeling types. As 
demonstrated in section 6.3.3, the explicit representation of relator 
universals (relational properties) allows for the explicit representation of 
                                                      
58Since the authors take attributes to represent substantial properties, we assume here that 
the restriction is meant only for this type of attributes. That merely formal higher-order 
attributes (predicates) can always be created for universals is beyond dispute. 
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single-tuple and multiple-tuple cardinality constraints in associations. 
Additionally, as discussed in the same section, it enables the possibility of 
consistency preservation between static and dynamic conceptual models of 
a domain. Finally, in our approach, properties of properties such as the hue 
of a certain color or the graveness of a certain symptom can be modeled as first-
order inherence relations between moments, and this is possible exactly 
because we countenance particularized properties.  
To provide one more example of the importance of relators in 
conceptual modeling, suppose the situation in which one wants to model 
that students are enrolled in universities starting in a certain date. Following the 
proscription of mutual properties being modeled as entity types, (Wand, 
Storey, and Weber 1999) propose the following model for this situation 
(figure 6.26)59. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We claim that it is rather counterintuitive to think about a model of this 
situation in these terms. According to Wand, Storey & Weber, relationships 
representing mutual properties are equivalent to n-ary attribute predicates. 
In this case, what is startDate supposed to stand for? Is it a binary predicate 
that holds, for example, for John and the University of Twente, like in 
startDate (John, UT)? This seems to be an absurd conclusion. Thus, 
startDate should at least be a ternary predicate applied to, for instance, 
startDate (John, UT, 14-2-2004). Now, suppose that there are many 
predicates like this one relating a student and a university. For example, the 
start-date of writing the thesis, the start-date of receiving a research grant, etc. We 
believe that, in this case, the authors would propose to differentiate the 
startDate depicted in figure 6.26 by naming it startDateofEnrollment. But 
does not this move make it obvious that startDate is actually a property the 
enrollment? In our approach, this can be explicitly modeled such as in 
figure 6.26. 
 
                                                       
59The BWW model is shown in the ER notion according to the original models presented in 
(Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999). 
Figure 6-26  An 
alternative modelling of 
properties of 
properties according to 
the BWW approach 
(from Wand &  Storey & 
Weber, 1999).  
Student University
(1,*) (1,*)
(1,*) (1,*)
attends
startDate
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1
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«mediation» «relator»
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DateDomain
*
startDate
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The model of figure 6.27 makes an explicit distinction between a closed-
linked relation between student and university and an indirect relation 
between student and start date. In what follows we discuss cognitive and 
linguistic justifications for highlighting this distinction. 
6.4.3 Conceptual Structures and a Linguistic Analysis of n-ary 
relationships 
In a series of papers, Veres and colleagues (Veres & Hitchman, 2002; Veres 
& Mansson, 2005; Hitchman, 2003) offer a detailed analysis and criticism 
of the general assumptions of the BWW approach. More specifically, in 
(Veres & Mansson, 2005), they provide empirical evidence to support a 
case against the BWW treatment of associations.  
They argued that claims about the intuitiveness of modeling languages 
constructed by the principles provided by the BWW approach are based on 
a hidden assumption about psychology. That is, the assumption behind the 
claim that an ontologically correct modeling language will be intuitive is 
that people's cognition is also ontologically correct at some level: if our 
models represent reality the way it really is, then people will find this a 
natural representation (Veres & Mansson, 2005). The criticism cannot be 
against ontology per se, since the authors themselves state that they 
describe an ontology of conceptual structure or psychologically 
motivated ontology for the same purpose, but against the use (for this 
purpose) of a revisionary ontology (such as Bunges) that lacks a linguistic 
and cognitive foundation. Moreover, they observe that the human cognitive 
architecture imposes fundamental constraints on our representations and 
that some prescriptions on the representation of entities should also be 
based on psychology 
In contrast, the authors propose the use of a psychologically motivated 
ontology based on the theory of conceptual structures developed by the 
linguist Ray Jackendoff (Jackendoff 1983, 1990, 1997) as a foundation for 
guiding conceptual modeling decisions. It is important to emphasize that 
Figure 6-27  The 
representation of 
properties of 
properties according to 
our approach 
 RELATED WORK 269 
conceptual structures themselves are not language dependent, and they are 
not determined by language use. Quite the contrary; language evolved as a 
way to externalize the pre existing content of cognition for the purpose of 
communication (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). The idea is that we gain insight 
into concepts by observing the correspondences between the structural 
properties of languages, on one side, and conceptual structures on another. 
This idea is very much conformant with approach developed here (see 
discussions on chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis). 
In (Veres & Mansson, 2005), the authors propose an interesting 
example that considers the linguistic (syntactic) distinction between 
complements and adjuncts. Observe the following sentences: 
 
1. Sarah robs the 7-11 in New York. 
2. Adam robs in Washington in February. 
 
The basic premise in both sentences is that someone commits a robbery. 
However, if one constructs a syntactic tree for these sentences it becomes 
manifest that robs and 7-11 in sentence 1 are more closely linked than are 
robs and Washington in sentence 2. 7-11 is a complement of the verb robs, 
whereas in Washington is a less closely linked adjunct. Simple transformations 
on these sentences can show that a verb is quite selective in the 
complements it will take, but insensitive to its adjuncts. An interesting point 
observed by the authors is that this distinction reflects a distinction in the 
underlying conceptual structure: following a lexical/conceptual 
correspondence rule from (Jackendoff, 1990) it can be shown that the 
complement is directly linked to the verb in the conceptual structure. 
Adjuncts, conversely, are mapped into some lower position in the recursive 
definition. 
Now, suppose a conceptual model containing the entities Person, 
Location, Establishment, Time_period. How should the situations in (1) and (2) 
be modeled? Both situations describe a ternary relationship between three 
entities: person-establishment-location or person-location-time_period. And, as 
(Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999) suggest, all n-ary relationships should be 
modeled alike. However, as Veres and colleagues demonstrate, the two 
scenarios have subtly different underlying conceptual representations.  
Figure 6.28 and 6.29 depicts two alternative models of situations (1) 
according to the BWW approach and to ours, respectively. First of all, the 
use of a relator universal in our model eliminates the ambiguity caused by 
the collapse of multiple-tuple and single-tuple cardinality constraints in 
6.28. Additionally, since it is not the case that there are tuples for all the 
combinations of instances of Thief, Establishment and Location, in figure 
6.28, the minimum cardinality constraints for all association ends 
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connected to these classes must be specified equal to zero. This problem 
disappears in figure 6.29.  
Notice that the specification of figure 6.28 contradicts the BWW rule 
that proscribes the representation of optional properties (Weber, 1997). In 
other words, the BWW model represented in this figure is inconsistent 
even w.r.t. to the rules prescribed by the BWW approach. Moreover, this 
will be the case for almost all n-ary relations with n > 2.    
Finally, the approach taken in figure 6.29 allows for the explicit 
representation of the relations between Thief (Person) and Establishment (a 
material relation mediated by a relator robbery) and the indirect relation 
between Thief and Location. Notice that robs can be hardly said to be a real 
ternary relation in the first place, since Location and Establishment are 
strongly coupled. In fact, once the establishment is fixed the location of the 
robbery is derived from the location of the establishment. 
 
Thief 
Establishment 
Location 
*  *  
*  
robs 
Person 
is-a  
 
«role»
Thief
«kind»
Establishment
1..*
1
«mediation»
1..*
1..*
«mediation» «relator»
Robbery
1..* 1..*
«material»
/robs
«datatype»
AddressDomain
*
/location
1«kind»
Person
 
Despite what has been discussed so far, the claim that the practice of 
representing domain attribute and relationship types as UML classes is 
ontologically incorrect made by the BWW authors is, in our view, not-
Figure 6-28  The 
representation of the 
sentence Person robs 
Establishment in 
Location according to 
the BWW approach 
Figure 6-29  The 
representation of the 
sentence Person robs 
Establishment in 
Location according to 
our approach 
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warranted. At maximum, one can say that this practice produces conceptual 
models that are non-conformant with the BWW ontology. However, 
models obeying this practice would conform to several other philosophically 
sound foundational ontologies in computer science (e.g., Heller et al., 
2004; Masolo et al., 2003; Schneider, 2002; Neuhaus & Grenon & Smith, 
2004, Veres & Mansson, 2005). In fact, we believe that the evidence shown 
here should support not only a case in favor of our ontological choices, but 
also a case against the suitability of Bunges ontology as a proper ontological 
foundation for conceptual modeling. 
 
6.4.4 Natural Kinds and Substantial Universals 
In BWW, the definition of a class is based on the notion of the scope of a 
property. A scope s of a property P is a function assigning to each property 
that exists in a domain a set of things from that domain, i.e., s(P) is the set 
of things in the domain that possess property P. A class is then defined as 
the scope of a property. 
If we have a non-empty set P of properties, the intersection of the 
scopes of all members of P is called a kind. Finally, a kind whose properties 
satisfy certain laws is called a natural kind.  
A model that describes things with common properties is named a 
functional schema. A functional schema comprises a finite sequence of 
functions F = 〈F1..Fn〉, such that each function Fi (named an attribute) 
represents a property shared by the members of the class described by the 
functional schema. For every attribute Fi there is a co-domain Vi of values. 
Evermann and Wand claim that a CM-type cannot be mapped to any of the 
BWW concepts of class, kind or natural kind, because the latter are defined 
extensionally (as special sets), while the former is defined intensionally and 
has an extension at run-time. They, therefore, propose that a CM-type is 
equivalent to a functional schema of a natural kind. 
As we discuss in section 4.5.1, the notion of a natural kind is equivalent 
to our substance sortal, or simply, a kind. In that section, we argue that a kind 
is only one of the many types of substantial universals that are needed for 
conceptual modeling. Clearly, some of the classifiers that are used in the 
examples provided by the BWW authors (e.g., student in figure 6.26) are 
not natural kinds according to this definition.     
Evermann and Wand propose that the conceptual modeling 
representations of Natural Kinds (i.e., functional schemas) should be 
accompanied of a constraints specification that restricts the possible values 
that the attributes of a substantial thing can assume. This idea has its origins 
in Bunges ontology itself. Bunge defines a function F(t) as the state function 
of the thing, such that F(t)= 〈F1(t)..Fn(t)〉 is said to represent the state of a 
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thing at time t. The set V1××Vn (i.e., the Cartesian product of all co-
domains) is termed the state space of a thing. Now, since the properties of 
instances of a natural kind are lawfully related, it is not the case that the 
coordinates of state vectors can vary freely. The subset of V1××Vn 
constrained by the laws of the natural kind being described is named by 
Bunge the lawful state space of a thing. In other words, the lawful state space 
associated with a natural kind defines all possible states that instances of this 
kind can assume.  
In our approach the lawful state spaces are the realist counterpart of 
conceptual spaces associated with substance sortals. As in the BWW, we claim 
that the conceptual model representation a universal U should be 
constrained by the laws relating the properties of U, or in a less than ideal 
case, by the known structure of the conceptual space associated with U. 
Nonetheless, unlike in BWW, we acknowledge that the value domains Vi 
can themselves be multidimensional, exhibiting a constrained structure that 
occurs in the definition of quality domains associated with possibly different 
substantial universals. For this reason, we believe the explicit representation 
of quality domains (associated with quality universals) as datatypes not only 
provides a further degree of structuring on lawful state spaces, but it also 
allows for a potential reuse of specifications of a subset of its constraints. 
6.5 Final Considerations 
In this chapter, we provide ontological foundations for some of the most 
basic conceptual modeling constructs, namely, classes, attributes and 
relationships. These are fundamental constructs in the sense that they are 
present in practically all conceptual modeling languages (e.g., UML, ER, 
LINGO, CCT), and in particular, in the so-called semantic web languages. 
However, in these languages, these constructs are understood only on a 
superficial level, and typically interpreted as sets of elements, or as the 
extensions of certain modeling predicates. According to (Wand & Storey & 
Weber, 1997) the relationship construct seems to be particularly 
problematic. Despite of being perceived as very important in practice and 
widespread in the literature, empirical evidence shows that the use of this 
construct is often problematical as a way of communicating meaning in an 
application domain. For example, in studying the process of logical database 
design, (Batra & Hoffler & Bostrom, 1990, p.137) conclude that the most 
commonly occurring errors pertain to the connectivity of relationships.    
In pace with Wand and colleagues, we believe that this is mainly due to 
the lack of consensus and imprecise definitions of the meaning of these 
categories. As a consequence, users of conceptual modeling languages are 
frequently confused about whether to show an association between things 
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via a relationship, an entity, or an attribute. (Wand & Storey & Weber, 
1999, p.494). In fact, an inspection in the conceptual modeling literature 
shows that these constructs receive a mere superficial characterization in 
most conceptual modeling languages, such as that associations represent a 
semantic link between objects (OMG, 2003c). Thus, in practice, a 
relationship is simply taken to stand for any n-ary predicate in natural 
language.  
In this chapter, we have shown that taking entity and relationship 
universals as sets does not provide any explanation for what it means for 
something to have a certain property (e.g., a certain atomic number), or for 
multiple things to be related (e.g., John being married to Mary). For this 
reason, any philosophically and cognitively well-founded ontology must 
countenance a number of more fundamental urelements that should 
complement the set-theoretical ontologies underlying existing conceptual 
modeling languages. To put it in a different way, Barrichellos Ferrari is red 
because it bears its particular redness, and Peter is kissing Sarah because there 
is a particular kiss in which both of them participate.        
   The foundational ontology developed in this chapter is centred in an 
Aristotelian ontological square depicted in figure 6.30. Ordinary 
mesoscopic objects of our every-day experience belong to the category of 
substantial. Examples are an apple, a cat, my car, Queen Beatrix, the Dutch 
part of the North Sea, etc. These objects are characterized by certain 
particular qualities. For instance, an apple x has a certain particular color y, 
which is a quality of this apple, and numerically distinct from the particular 
colors of all other apples. Because x bears y, which is an instance of a 
universal Y, x is said to exemplify Y, in the way, for example, that Monica 
Bellucci is said to exemplify beauty, or that Stephen Hawking is said to 
exemplify intelligence. Additionally, if every x exemplifies a number of 
(moment) universals Y1Yn, we say that these universals characterize the 
(substantial) universal X that x instantiates60. 
Substantial Universal
Substantial Particular
Moment Universal
Moment Particular
characterizes
inheres in
instantiates instantiates
exemplifies
 
As we have discussed along the chapter, there is strong support in the 
cognitive and philosophical literature for accepting the existence of 
particularized properties and particularized relations. Actually, in agreement 
                                                      
60This is far from saying that the meaning of a substantial universals correspond to an 
enumeration of properties common to all its instances (see discussion in Keil, 1992).  
Figure 6-30  The 
Ontological Square 
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with (Schneider, 2002), we believe that moments are indeed the 
immediate objects of everyday experience. From an ontological point of 
view, the acceptance of these entities enables the construction of a 
foundational ontology in which minimum metaphysical commitments are 
made. In section 6.4.1, we have discussed that it allows for an ontology that 
can dispense both with the controversial identity of the indiscernibles 
principle, and with a mysterious substratum or bare particular. However, 
another philosophical advantage can be pointed out in favour of this 
approach. In section 6.2.5, we are intentionally neutral w.r.t. to the nature 
of universals. However, in an ontology that accepts moments, there is open 
the possibility of conceiving universals as special sorts of particulars, such as, 
for example, resemblance structures (Armstrong, 1989; Schneider, 2003b). 
The advantage of such a view is that, if being a first-order particular is to be 
part of a resemblance structure then the same can be said for higher-order 
ones. In fact, in this case, higher-order instantiation could be explained in 
terms of mereological relations between resemblance structures. For 
instance, if the first-order universal Eagle is thought of as a particular then 
not only it can bear its own moments (e.g., life expectancy), which are not 
exemplified in any particular eagle, but it easily can be thought of as a 
instance (part of) the higher-order universal (resemblance structure) Bird 
species. There is support in the philosophy of biology literature for 
conceptualizing biological species as individuals, or more precisely as 
integral wholes unified by the characterizing relation of common ancestry 
(Erenefsky, 2004; Milikan, 1998). Although we shall not entertain this 
possibility here, it should be investigated in future extensions of our 
ontological framework. This idea, in principle, could be used to provide an 
ontological foundation for the important (but only vaguely explained) 
concept of Powertype in conceptual modeling.                     
One formal relation that plays a paramount role here is existential 
dependency. This simple notion, which has been formally defined in chapter 
5 allow us to precisely characterize: (i) the distinction between substantial 
and moments; (ii) inherence (mediation) relation between moments and 
substantials. In other words, once we have a formal notion of existential 
dependence, we can differentiate which particulars in the domain are 
substantials and which are moments. Based on the multiplicity of entities a 
particular depends on, we can distinguish between intrinsic and relational 
moments. With qualities we can explain comparative formal relations, and with 
relators, the material ones. In particular, by employing (explicitly 
represented) relators, we can provide not only an ontologically well-
founded interpretation for the (otherwise problematic) relationship 
construct, but also one that can accommodate more subtle linguistic 
distinctions. Additionally, from a conceptual point of view, we can produce 
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models that are free of cardinality constraint ambiguities. Furthermore, 
with the notions of modes and relators we can define qua individuals. Finally, 
with moments we can explain exemplification, and with exemplification 
characterization. In summary, practically the whole core of the urelement 
segment of our foundational ontology is based on the primitive and 
unambiguous notion of existential dependency.        
In this chapter, we have also been intentionally neutral to whether 
substantials and moments should be interpreted as continuants or as snapshot 
entities (i.e., momentary states of continuants)61. In the latter case, moment 
continuants can be thought as logical constructions from world-bounded 
moment snapshots, in the same way that in L1 (see section 4.4.1) 
substantials are considered as logical constructions from world-bounded 
substantial snapshots. We name these moment counterparts of substantial 
individual concepts as moment persistents (after Heller et al., 2004). This 
interpretation can provide an interesting explanation for some linguistic 
cases regarding properties. Take the following example from (Masolo et al., 
2003a): 
 
1. This rose is red. 
2. Red is a color. 
3. This rose has a color. 
4. The color of this rose turned to brown in one week. 
5. The roses color is changing. 
6. Red is opposite to green and close to brown. 
     
In (1), the predicate red is applied to an individual rose. As an adjective, 
red is a characterizing universal of the substantial universal rose, i.e., a 
mixin. In (2), red is intended as a noun, i.e., red is taken as abstract 
particular, a quality region in a quality domain (another abstract particular). 
The same hold for (6), in which a particular shade on red can be 
interpreted as a region of a quality domain that, due to the structure of that 
domain, bears certain relations to some other regions (brown and green). 
Sentence (3) can be interpreted as a case of inherence. Specially, when 
taken together with (4) and (5). In sentences (4) and (5) one is not 
speaking of a shade of color, neither of a characterizing universals but of 
something that changes while maintaining its identity. In DOLCE, this is 
explained by having a quality color that can change with time. This position 
is at odds with most approaches in the literature that take even super-
determinate moment universals to be rigid. In other words, if a particular is 
an instance of redness, it cannot cease to be so, ergo, it cannot become and 
instance of brownness. Therefore, in most theories of particularized 
                                                      
61 See discussion in section 4.4. 
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properties, these changes are explained by having one particular quality 
replaced by another. However, in this case, there is no quality there that 
persists while keeping its identity. Now, if individuals are interpreted as 
snapshots then we can have:  
 
(i) in world w1 a moment x1 instance of color c1 inhering in r1 
(rose snapshot);  
(ii) in world w2 a moment x2 instance of color c2 inhering in r2 
(rose snapshot); 
(iii) r1 and r2 are states of the same continuant rose because there 
is an individual concept R (in the extensional of the universal 
rose) such that R(w1) = r1 and R(w2) = r2; 
(iv) x1 and x2 are states of the same moment continuant Color 
because there is an moment persistent62 C  such that C(w1) = x1 
and C(w2) = x2. 
 
In this case, C is exactly what persists in (4) and (5) while maintaining its 
identity, and which is capable of changes in a genuine sense.   
Finally, besides the concrete urelements that constitute our ontology, 
we explicitly take into account the conceptual measurement structures in 
which particular qualities are perceived (and conceived). By employing the 
theory of conceptual spaces, we can provide a theoretical foundation for the 
conceptual modeling notion of attribute values and attribute value domains. 
Traditionally, in conceptual modeling, value domains are taken for granted. 
In general, they are considered by taking primitive datatypes as representing 
familiar mathematical sets (e.g., natural, integer, real, Boolean) and the 
focus has been almost uniquely on mathematical specification techniques. 
Once more, we defend that understanding what should be represented is 
prior to delving on specific ways of specifying it. Whatever constraints 
should be specified for a datatype must reflect the geometry and topology 
of the quality structure underlying this datatype. Moreover, as discussed in 
section 6.3.3, by understanding the structure of a certain quality domain, 
we can derive meta-properties (e.g., reflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity) for 
the comparative formal relations that are based on this domain.  
We emphasize that there are other benefits for conceptual modeling in 
adopting a notion such as the one of conceptual spaces. For example, in 
(Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995), besides their classification of parts as 
quantities, elements or components (see discussion on section 5.5), the authors 
                                                      
62 In the case that a substance bears only one moment of each kind, C can be logically 
constructed by taking in each world the unique individual xi that instantiates the super-
determinable universal Color. We aimed at generality here to account for situations in 
which this is not the case, such as in the case of qua individuals.   
 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 277 
propose an orthogonal criterion of classification, which is independent of 
the inherent compositional structure of the entity considered as a whole. 
The authors name a Portion as an aggregate constructed by selecting certain 
parts of an integral object, according to certain internal properties of this 
object. For example,  
 
a. the red parts of a painting; 
b. the exciting parts of a story;  
c. the reddish parts of an object; 
d. the dark (colored) parts of a picture; 
e. the tall animals in the group. 
 
The resulting portions are those parts of the whole that provide the 
requested value of the relevant property. However, some sentences like (c) 
and (d) make it clear that the construction of portions with respect to a 
specific property must be rely on the underlying structure in which a 
certain property takes it values. Sentence (e) actually exemplifies a situation 
where the use of contrast classes in conceptual spaces can allow for interesting 
cases of non-monotomic reasoning (Gardenfors 2000; 2004). Since, for 
instance, although every squirrel is an animal, a tall squirrel is not a tall 
animal.  
By explicitly representing conceptual spaces and their constituent 
domains and dimensions, one can analyze the same object in different 
measurement structures. In particular, one can define transformations and 
projections between conceptual spaces that facilitate knowledge sharing and 
semantic interoperability.  Moreover, one can allow for context-aware 
reasoning, by providing context matrices that emphasize certain dimensions 
in detriment of others in certain circumstances. In (Raubal, 2004), the 
author demonstrates how conceptual spaces have been used to model 
façades of buildings as landmarks for a wayfinding service in Vienna. First, 
different conceptual spaces are associated with the same landmarks for 
different purposes. For example, in a database system that stores and 
manipulates information about the landmarks, the color domain assumed is 
the RGB model, and a cultural importance dimension of the landmarks is 
considered. For the wayfinding service, a color model based on human 
perception (HSB, see figures 6.7 and 6.8) is used instead, and the cultural 
importance dimension is not taken into account. Finally, weight matrices are 
used to highlight different dimensions in different contexts. As discussed by 
Raubal, people select different landmarks for wayfinding during the day and 
at night. Thus, while in a day context, the best landmark to be used by the 
service could be a façade with the most contrasting color, in a night 
context, it can be simply the highest or widest landmark. 

 Chapter 7 
7. Roles 
In this chapter, we employ some of the results of our previous chapter to 
describe the modeling concept of roles.  
Roles represent a fundamental notion for our conceptualization of 
reality. This notion has received much attention both in philosophical 
investigation (van Leeuwen, 1991; Wiggins, 2001; Loebe, 2003; Masolo et 
al., 2004, 2005) and in the conceptual modeling literature in topics such as 
object-oriented modeling (Bock & Odell, 1998), agent-oriented modeling 
(Odell & Parunak & Fliescher, 2003; Odell & Nodine & Levy, 2005), and 
organizational modeling (Dignum, 2004), among others. In a 
comprehensive study on this topic, Friedrich Steimman (2000b) defends 
that the role concept naturally complements those of objects and relationships, 
standing on the same level of importance. However, Steimann also 
recognizes that the role concept, although equally fundamental, has long not 
received the widespread attention it deserved, and that although there appears to be 
a general awareness that roles are an important modelling concept, until now no 
consensus has been reached as to how roles should be represented or integrated into the 
established modeling frameworks (ibid., p.84). The last statement can be 
verified by inspecting the diversity and incompatibility of the several 
conceptualizations of roles currently co-existing in the literature (Wieringa 
& Spruit & de Jong, 1995; Loebe, 2003; Steimann, 2000a,b, 2001; Bock & 
Odell, 1998). 
Recently, not only has the interest in roles grown continuously, but also 
has the interest in finding a common ground on which the different notions 
of roles can be judged and reconciled. In fact, a significant part of the work 
presented in this chapter originated in a material that we prepared for an 
invited presentation in a workshop dedicated to discussing different 
conceptualizations of this concept (see Guizzardi, 2004, but also Masolo et 
al., 2005). 
This chapter also exemplifies the usefulness of the categories proposed 
in our foundational ontology. Firstly, by employing the categories and 
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postulates of the theory of universals constructed in chapter 4, we propose 
an ontological design pattern that captures a solution to a recurrent and much 
discussed problem in role modeling (section 7.1). Moreover, with some 
definitions offered in chapter 5, we investigate the link between some of the 
formal meta-properties defined for part-whole relations and those meta-
properties by which roles are characterized (section 7.2). Furthermore, by 
borrowing some results from chapters 4 and 6, we manage to harmonize 
some different conceptions of roles that are used in the literature (section 
7.3). Finally, by building on an existing theory of transitivity of linguistic 
functional parthood relations, and on the role related notion of qua 
individuals discussed in section 7.3, we propose a number of visual patterns 
that can be used as a methodological support for the identification of the 
scope of transitivity for the most common type of part-whole relations in 
conceptual modeling (section 7.4).  
Section 7.5 concludes the chapter by presenting some final 
considerations. 
7.1 An Ontological Design Pattern for Role Modeling 
Figure 7.1 below exemplifies a recurrent problematic case in the literature 
of role modeling (Steimman, 2001), which is termed here the problem of 
role with multiple disjoint allowed types (Bock & Odell, 1998). Suppose a 
conceptualization in which the social concept of Customer should be 
represented. A Customer, in this conceptualization, is assumed to be a role 
played by an entity in the context of purchasing relation to a Supplier. 
Moreover, in this conceptualization, not only persons but also organizations 
can be customers. Notice that, in this case, customer is indeed a role 
according to the definition of chapter 4, i.e., it is anti-rigid and relationally 
dependent universal. The problem is how to model the relationship 
between the role type Customer and its allowed types Person and 
Organization? This problem is also mentioned in (van Belle, 1999): how 
would one model the customer entity conceptually? The Customer as a supertype of 
Organisation and Person? The Customer as a subtype of Organisation and Person? 
The Customer as a relationship between or Organisation and (Organization or 
Person)?  The first two alternatives are presented in figures 7.1.a and 7.1.b, 
respectively. 
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Customer
PersonOrganization Customer
PersonOrganization
(a) (b)  
In the model of figure 7.1.a, the role Customer is defined as a supertype of 
Person and Organization. This modeling choice violates postulate 4.3 (see 
chapter 4) and produces an ontologically incorrect conceptual model. 
Firstly, not all persons are customers, i.e., it is not the case that the 
extension of Person is necessarily included in the extension of Customer. 
Moreover, an instance of Person is not necessarily a Customer. Both 
arguments are equally valid for Organization.  
In a series of papers (Steimann, 2000a,b, 2001), Steimann discusses the 
difficulties in specifying admissible types for Roles that can be filled by 
instances of disjoint types. As a conclusion, the author claims that the 
solution to this problem lies in the separation of role and type hierarchies, 
which would lead to a radical and counterintuitive revision to the 
metamodel of most current conceptual modeling languages, or to put in 
UML terms, a counterintuitive heavyweight extension to the language (OMG, 
2003b). In the sequel we show that this claim is not warranted. Moreover, 
we propose a design pattern based on the profile introduced in chapter 4 that 
can be used as an ontologically correct solution to this recurrent problem. 
Finally, this solution has a smaller impact to conceptual modeling 
metamodels than the one proposed by the author, since it does not demand 
radical heavyweight extensions to the language.  
In the example above, Customer has in its extension individuals that 
belong to different kinds and, thus, that obey different principles of 
identity. Customer is hence a dispersive or transsortal type (a non-sortal) 
and, by definition, cannot supply a principle of identity for its instances. 
Since an (determinate) individual must obey one and only one principle of 
identity (postulates 4.1 and 4.2 in chapter 4), every instance of Customer 
must be an instance of one of its subtypes (forming a partition) that carry 
that principle of identity. For example, we can define the sortals 
PrivateCustomer and CorporateCustomer as subtypes of Customer. These sortals, 
in turn, carry the (incompatible) principles of identity supplied by the kinds 
Person and Organization, respectively. In summary, if x is a Customer (abstract 
class) then x must be an instance of exactly one of its subtypes (e.g., 
PrivateCustomer) that carries the principle of identity supplied by an 
appropriate substance sortal (e.g., Person).  
Figure 7.2 shows how this solution can be incorporated in a conceptual 
modeling design pattern. In this picture the abstract class A is the role mixin 
Figure 7-1  Problems 
with modeling roles with 
multiple allowed types  
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that covers different role types (e.g., Customer, Participant). Classes B and 
C are the disjoint subclasses of A that can have direct instances, 
representing the sortal roles that carry the principles of identity that govern 
the individuals that fall in their extension. Classes D and E are the ultimate 
substance sortals (kinds) that supply the principles of identity carried by B 
and C, respectively. The association r represents the common specialization 
condition of B and C, which is represented in A. Finally, class F represents 
a type that A is relationally dependent of. 
«roleMixin»
A
«role»
B
«role»
C
«kind»
D
F
1..*
R
«kind»
E
 
An application of this pattern is illustrated in figure 7.3 in which it is used 
to produce ontologically correct versions of two stereotypical models of this 
situation (one of them being the model depicted in figure 7.1). In both 
cases, the universal the role mixin depends of, and the association 
representing the specialization condition are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
«roleMixin»
Customer
«role»
PrivateCustomer
«role»
CorporateCustomer
«kind»
Person
Organization
«kind»
Social Being
«roleMixin»
Participant
«role»
IndividualParticipant
«role»
CollectiveParticipant
«kind»
Person
SIG
«kind»
Social Being
 
7.2 Parts of Roles 
In chapter 5, we have presented a division of parthood relations w.r.t. 
ontological dependence containing three possible subtypes:  
 
 essential parts: characterized by existential dependence from the whole to 
a part;  
 mandatory parts: characterized by generic constant dependence from the 
whole to the universal a part instantiates;  
 contingent parts.  
Figure 7-2  An 
ontological design 
pattern for the problem 
of specifying roles with 
multiple disjoint allowed 
types 
Figure 7-3  
Ontologically correct 
models of roles with 
disjoint allowed types 
obtained by the 
application of the design 
pattern of figure 7.2  
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Let us take the human body as an example. The relation between an 
individual Human Body and an individual Human Brain is an example of 
(i). In contrast, the relation between a Human Body and a Human Heart is 
an example of (ii). In the former case, a Body x depends specifically on the 
existence of a particular Brain y, i.e., for every instance of Human Body x 
there is a unique Brain y such that in every world that x exists, y is part of x. 
In the latter case, contrariwise, the Body x depends on the existence of any 
instance of the Heart universal, not on a specific one. In other words, for 
every Human Body x and in every world that x exists, there is a Human 
Heart y that, in that world, is part of x. These two situations are depicted in 
figure 7.4 together with their corresponding modal logics formalizations. 
For the sake of simplicity, we formalize in this case only the axioms w.r.t. 
the relation from the whole to the part. All other axioms are omitted. 
Moreover, one should remember that we are dealing only with non-trivial 
entities here, i.e., we dispense with entities that are necessarily existent or 
necessarily non-existent. 
«kind»Person
«kind»Brain
1
1
{essential = true}
«kind»Heart
1 1
 
In all examples used in chapter 5, the universals representing wholes are 
kind universals (see chapter 4). Let us now investigate how these different 
types of necessary parthood relations can be used to characterize other non-
rigid universals, such as Roles. Suppose, for instance, the situation depicted 
in figure 7.5. The figure illustrates the relation between a Boxer and one of 
his hands. What the picture attempts at representing is the statement that 
every boxer must have a hand. This relation is certainly not one of 
mandatory parthood, since it is not the case that a Boxer depends 
generically on the universal hand but specifically on one particular hand63. 
It thus appears to be the case that this relation is one of essential parthood. 
                                                      
63 We are here not considering the possibility of hand transplants. Once more, the point of the 
argumentation is not the specific example.   
Figure 7-4  
Representation of 
essential and mandatory 
parthood in a conceptual 
specification of the 
human body 
□((∀Person,x) (∃!Brain,y) □(ε(x) →(y < x)))
□((∀Person,x) □(ε(x) →((∃!Heart,y)(y < x))))  
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However, this is not true either. If a hand were to be considered an 
essential part of a particular boxer then the corresponding formula 
represented in figure 7.5 should be valid. To show that this is not the case, 
suppose the following: let John be a boxer in world w and let x be Johns 
hand in w. What the formula in figure 7.5 states is that in every world w in 
which John exists, x must be part of John in w. This formula is clearly 
falsifiable. One just have to imagine a world w, in which John exists 
without being a boxer and without having x as his hand (supposed that x 
has been tragically amputated in w). This problem arises from the 
ambiguity of the word must in every boxer must have a hand. 
Intuitively, the situation that this model intended to express is the valid 
statement that For every Person x, there is a hand y, such that in every world 
that x is a Boxer, y is a hand of x. 
«role»Boxer
«kind»Hand
1
1
«kind»
Person
..2
?
 
In the example of figure 7.5, Boxer cannot have essential properties and, in 
particular, cannot have essential parts, since it is an anti-rigid universal. In 
other words, if to be a boxer is consider as a property, it is not an 
essential property itself of any individual. 
However, this situation can be understood in terms of the 
philosophical distinction between de re and de dicto modality. Take the 
following two sentences: 
 
(i) The queen of the Netherlands is necessarily queen 
(ii) The number of planets in the solar system is necessarily odd 
 
In the de re reading, the first sentence expresses that a certain individual 
(Beatrix) is necessarily queen. This is clearly false, since we can conceive a 
different world in which Beatrix decides to abdicate the throne. However, 
in the de dicto reading the sentence simply expresses that it is necessarily 
true that in any circumstance whoever is the Dutch queen is a queen. The 
second sentence works in the converse manner. In the de re reading the 
sentence (ii) expresses that a certain number (9) is necessarily odd. This is 
Figure 7-5  Problems in 
the representation of 
specifically dependent 
parts for anti-rigid 
universals 
□((∀Boxer,x) (∃Hand,y) □(ε(x) →(y < x)))
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indeed necessarily true. The de dicto reading of the sentence however is 
false. It is not necessarily the case that the number of planets in the solar 
system is odd. We can imagine a counterfactual situation in which the solar 
system has, for instance, 8 or 10 planets. The Latin expressions de re 
represents a modality which refers to a property of the thing itself (res), 
whereas de dicto represents a modality that refers to an expression (dictum). 
This is made explicit in the logical rendering of the possible readings of 
these two expressions: 
 
(iii-a)    de re (false):  ∀x QueenOfTheNetherlands(x) → □(Queen(x)) 
(iii-b)   de dicto (true): □(∀x QueenOfTheNetherlands(x) → Queen(x)) 
 
(iv-a)   de re (true): ∀x NumberOfPlanets(x) → □(Odd(x)) 
(iv-b)   de dicto (false): □(∀x NumberOfPlanets(x) → Odd(x)) 
 
Take now the expression every boxer has necessarily a hand. Once more, 
this expression is true only in one of the readings, namely, the de dicto 
reading. Whilst it is the case that the expression In any circumstance, 
whoever is boxer has at least one hand is necessarily true, it is false that If 
someone is a boxer than he has at least a hand in every possible 
circumstance. Figure 7.6, expresses a correct representation of this 
situation in the de dicto modality. 
«role»Boxer
«kind»Hand
1
1
«kind»
Person
..2
 
We now have expressed three different types of dependency relations 
between wholes and parts:  
 
 specific dependence with de re modality;  
 generic dependence with de re modality;  
 specific dependence with de dicto modality.  
 
The remaining option is, of course, conceivable, i.e., generic dependence 
with de dicto modality. This situation can be captured by the following 
Figure 7-6 Correct 
representation of 
specifically dependent 
parts of anti-rigid 
universals 
□((∀Boxer,x) (∃Hand,y) □(ε(x) ∧ Boxer(x)→(y < x)))  
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formula (v), in which A represents the (anti-rigid) whole and B represents 
the part. In this formula, the predicate B is used as what we term here a 
guard predicate. Intuitively, this predicate selects those worlds, in which 
the parthood relation must hold. The same holds for the predicate Boxer in 
figure 7.6.       
 
(v)  □(∀A,x □(ε(x) ∧ A(x)→∃y B(y) ∧ (y < x))) 
 
We have seen that essential properties, i.e., specific dependence expressed 
in terms of the de re modality, can only be expressed for rigid universals. 
For anti-rigid universals (e.g. roles), only the corresponding de dicto 
modality can be applied. Nonetheless, it is also true that for every de re 
statement regarding an individual x, we can express a corresponding de dicto 
one, by using as guard predicate the substance sortal that x instantiates. For 
instance, if it is true that The number of planets in the solar system (9) is 
essentially odd then it is also true that In any circumstance, if 9 is a 
number then 9 is odd. We therefore could rephrase the formulas in figure 
7.4 as follows:         
 
(vi)  □((∀Person,x)(∃!Heart,y) □(ε(x) ∧ person(x)→ (y < x))) 
(vii)  □((∀Person,x) □(ε(x) ∧ person(x)→(∃!Heart,y)(y < x))) 
 
Since Person is a substance sortal (rigid universal), everything that is person 
is necessarily a person (see chapter 4). In other words, the predicate person 
is modally constant, and for every object selected by the universal 
quantifier, person must be true for this object in every possible world. 
Consequently, (vi) and (vii) are logically equivalent to their counterparts in 
figure 7.4. 
In order to achieve a uniform axiomatization, we therefore propose the 
following formula schemas depicted in figure 7.7, which must hold 
irrespective of the whole universals being rigid or anti-rigid sortals. If the 
universal A is rigid then A(x) is necessarily true (if true) and the antecedent 
(ε(x) ∧ A(x)) can be expressed only by (ε(x)). In this case, the Bs are truly 
essential parts of As.  
From now on, we refrain from using the term essential parts for the cases 
in which a mere de dicto modality is expressed. Therefore, for the case of 
specific dependence from instances of roles (and role mixins) to theirs part we 
adopt the term immutable part instead. Of course, every essential part is also 
immutable. 
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A
B
1
{immutable = true}
C
1
 
Generalization axioms analogous to those in figure 7.7 can be produced for 
the case of inseparable and mandatory wholes. Figure 7.8 depicts a 
representation of inseparable parts and mandatory wholes, in which guard 
predicates are included to produce generalizations of the axioms in 
definitions 6.14 and 6.15 that are suitable for the cases of both rigid and 
anti-rigid universals. 
A
B
1
{inseparable = true}
C
1
 
7.3 Harmonizing different notions of Roles in 
Conceptual Modeling 
In chapter 4, we have discussed the related work of (Wieringa, de Jong and 
Spruit, 1995), which discusses the need for elaborating on the distinctions 
among the types of universals used in conceptual modeling. Wieringa and 
colleagues propose three classifier categories: static classes, dynamic classes and 
roles. The first two of these correspond to our categories of kinds (and 
subkinds) and phases, respectively. However, differently from our proposal, 
Figure 7-7  General 
representation for 
Immutable and 
Mandatory parts 
Figure 7-8  General 
representation for 
Inseparable Parts and 
Mandatory Wholes 
□((∀A,x) □(ε(x) ∧ A(x) →((∃C,y)(y < x))))
□((∀A,x) (∃B,y) □(ε(x) ∧ A(x) →(y < x)))
□((∀C,x) □(ε(x) ∧ C(x) →((∃A,y)(x < y))))
□((∀B,x) (∃A,y) □(ε(x) ∧ B(x) →(x < y)))
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in their approach a role universal is not a phased-sortal. Conversely, their 
roles are rigid universals whose instances are said to be played by instances of 
ordinary (static and dynamic) types. The played by relation (also termed 
inheritance by delegation by the authors) between a role instance r and an 
object o implies that r is existentially dependent on o. This means that r can 
only be played by o, and that r can only exist when played by o. However, 
in contrast, o can possibly be associated via the play by relation to many 
instances of the role class (and to many different role classes). Moreover, 
role universals are responsible for supplying a principle of identity for its 
instances, which is different from the one supplied by the universals 
instantiated by their players. Figure 7.9 depicts an example of ordinary and 
role universals according to the authors. 
Person
1 *
stID
averageGrade
Student
 
An inspection of the role literature shows, however, that most authors 
conceive role universals in a way which is akin to the notion proposed in 
chapter 4, i.e., as substantial universals. This includes authors both in 
philosophy (Wiggins, 2001; van Leeuwen, 1991) and in conceptual 
modeling in computer science (Bock & Odell, 1998; Essink & Erhart, 
1991; Jungclaus et al., 1991; Sowa, 1984, 1988). Moreover, several authors 
share the view that the identity of a role instance is supplied by a universal 
subsuming the role type that it instantiates (i.e., the roles allowed type) 
(Gottlob & Schrefl & Rock, 1996; Kristensen, 1995; Albano et al., 1993; 
Richardson & Schwartz, 1991). Finally, there are authors that explicitly 
share both views see (Guarino & Welty, 2004, 2002a,b, 2000; Steimann, 
2001, 2000a,b). In fact, in an extensive study about the topic of roles in the 
conceptual modeling literature, (Steimann, 2000b) deems the approach of 
Wieringa and colleagues to be a singular case in which the identity of role 
instances is not supplied by a universal subsuming the role type they 
instantiate. 
The motivation for such a view proposed by Wieringa and colleagues 
lies in a philosophical problem known as The Counting Problem (Gupta, 
1980). Consider the following argument: 
 
KLM served four thousand passengers in 2004 
Every passenger is a person 
Ergo, KLM served four thousand persons in 2004 
 
Thus, as Wieringa et al. write: if we count persons, we may count 1000, but if 
we count passengers, we may count 4000. The reason for this difference is that if we 
Figure 7-9  Example 
with Role and Role 
player universals  
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count things we must identify those things, so that we can say which things are the 
same and which are different. But in order to identify them, we must classify them.  
Although, we appreciate and share the view of connecting counting with 
identity and identity with classification (see chapter 4), we do not agree with the 
conclusion the authors make of this example, namely, that since person and 
passenger do not share a principle of counting then they must not share a 
principle of identity either. Since, as we discuss in chapter 4, a principle of 
identity can only be supplied by a rigid universal. This must be the 
foundation of the authors conclusion that a role universal therefore must 
be a rigid universal. 
Why do we think the conclusions made by the authors are not 
warranted? To start with, in line with (van Leeuwen, 1991), we defend that 
the counting problem is actually a fallacy. Take the argument posed by its 
defenders: The person that boarded flight KL124 on April 22nd, 2004 is a 
different passenger from the person who boarded flight KL256 on 
November 19th, 2004, but the two passengers are the same person. We do 
not agree that it can be correctly said that the two passengers are the same 
person, or, alternatively, that a single person is distinct passengers (at different 
times), if we are truthful to our commonsense use of the common noun 
passenger. However, let us suppose that this is the case, i.e., the person and 
passenger obey different principles of identity. In this situation, the second 
premise of the argument is no longer valid, i.e., one cannot say anymore 
that every passenger is a person in a reading in which the copula is is 
interpreted as a relation of identity. This is because, due to Leibniz Law, 
identity holds necessarily and that identical things necessarily share all their 
properties (principle of indiscernability of the identicals). As a 
consequence, we would arrive at the invalid conclusion that every person 
has all the properties of a passenger in all situations he/she is a person. 
Moreover, since identity is an equivalence relation, we would have that  
 
passenger x on flight KL124 is identical to person y  
passenger z on flight KL256 is identical to person y 
Ergo, passenger x on flight KL124 is identical to passenger z on flight 
KL256 
 
This conclusion contradicts the initial premise that the two passengers were 
different. Therefore, if we have the second premise interpreted in the 
strong reading, one must conclude that passenger carries the same principle 
of identity as person and, hence, that passenger x on flight KL124 and 
passenger z on flight KL256 are indeed numerically the same.  
In this case, though, the first premise ceases to be true, i.e., one can no 
longer say that KLM served two million passengers in 2004.We must 
conclude then that the second premise should have a weaker reading in 
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which the copula does no represent a relation of identity but one of 
coincidence. But, if this interpretation is taken the whole argument is clearly 
invalid, since the conclusion cannot be expected to follow from the 
premises.  
In summary, the conclusion that different principles of identity must 
be supplied by role types and the types instantiated by their players cannot 
follow from this argument. Furthermore, as pointed out by (Putnam, 
1994), if the principle of identity of passengers were not supplied by a 
unique substantial sortal subsuming passenger (see chapter 4), and if 
passenger were a rigid classifier whose identity would be tied to the context 
of particular flight, we would not be able to make sense of sentences such as 
The passenger came on flight KL109 and she continued on flight 311.                   
Despite disagreeing with the conclusions, we think there is an 
important truth highlighted by the argument of Wieringa and colleagues. If 
not instances of passengers, what is one counting when stating that KLM 
served two million passengers in 2004? Let us analyze the concept of role 
proposed by Wieringa et al.:  
 
1. a role universal is a rigid classifier;  
2. role instances are (one-sidely) existentially dependent of a unique 
object, which is said to play the role;  
3. objects play these roles only contingently, i.e., the play relation is only a 
contingent relation for the player. As a consequence, ceasing to play the 
role does not alter the identity of the player object. 
     
A recent work that has a concept of role similar to the one of Wieringa et 
al. is (Loebe, 2003). However, Loebes roles are not only existentially 
dependent on their players, but they also depend on the existence of another 
entity (distinct from their players), in the way, for instance, that being a 
student depends on the existence of a education institution, or being a 
husband depends on the existence of a wife, being an employee depends on the 
existence of an employer, etc.  This feature of roles is recognized in our 
analysis in chapter 4. In fact, it is generally accepted in the literature that 
roles only exist in a certain context, or in the scope of a certain relation 
(Masolo et al., 2004, 2005; Guarino & Welty, 2004, 2002a,b, 2000; 
Steimann, 2001, 2000a,b; Bock & Odell, 1998; Chu & Zhang, 1997; 
Elmasri & Weeldreyer & Hevner, 1985; Sowa, 1984). Thus, Loebes notion 
of roles agrees with that of Wieringa et al. in the points (a), (b) and (c) 
above, but it also characterizes role instances as existentially dependent on 
each other.  
The concept of role in Wieringa et al. and Loebe is equivalent to our 
notion of qua individuals discussed in chapter 6, since we can interpret their 
play by relation as a sort of inherence. Both relations represent a one-side 
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monadic existential dependence relation. Thus we can say that, like their 
notion of Roles, our qua individuals (special types of externally dependent 
modes) are: instances of a rigid classifier (a); one-side existentially 
dependent of objects, which are related to their players via a contingent 
sort of existential dependence relation (b). Furthermore, a qua individual is 
a complex of externally dependent modes (e.g., in figure 7.9, student id, 
average grade64), which, by definition, depends also on the existence of 
another object extrinsic to its bearer (player). Thus, as in Loebes concept 
of roles, asides from the inherence (play) relationship with its bearer 
(player), our qua individuals stand in parthood relationship with a unique 
relator in the scope of a material relation. Since relators consist of at least 
two distinct qua individuals, we conclude that the qua individuals 
composing a relator are existentially dependent on each other. 
Now, how can we relate this notion of roles as qua individuals with the 
one proposed in chapter 4? Let us revisit the example depicted in figure 7.9 
above. To start with, a point that can be argued against this model is the 
representation of optional cardinality constraints. In fact, since no 
restriction is defined for the allowed type of a role classifier, optional 
cardinalities must be represented in both Wieringas and Loebes 
approaches. As argued in, for instance, (Weber, 1997; Wand & Storey & 
Weber, 1999), from an ontological standpoint, there is no such a thing as 
an optional property and, hence, the representation of optional cardinality 
leads to unsound models (in the technical sense of chapter 2), with 
undesirable consequences in terms of clarity. Moreover, as empirically 
demonstrated in (Bodard et al., 2001), conceptual models without optional 
properties lead to better performance in problem-solving tasks that require 
a deeper-level understanding of the represented domain. To put it simply, 
not all persons bear a student moment, but only those persons that, for 
example, are enrolled in an educational institution. We can then define a 
restriction of the universal Person, whose instances are exactly those 
individuals that bear a student moment, i.e., that are enrolled in an 
educational institution (see figure 7.10). 
«role»
? stID
averageGrade
Student
1 1..*
Person
 
                                                      
64 To see that, for example, having a particular student id is an externally dependent moment, 
the reader should imagine a person that is registered in different departments of a 
university, having a different student id for each department.    
Figure 7-10  A Role 
universal, its allowed 
type and an 
exemplification relation 
to a qua individual 
universal 
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Now, the role universal in figure 7.10 is exactly what we mean by a role in 
chapter 4 and it is the one idea of role that accurately corresponds to the 
commonsense use of roles in ordinary language. For this reason, we 
propose to use the role name for the role universal and to create a new 
name for the qua individual universal (see figure 7.11). This choice is also 
supported by Aristotles analysis of substantial and moment universals: 
student as a universal is said of subject (de subjecto dici) not exemplified in a 
subject (in subjecto est). That is why the general term Student (Passenger, 
Employee, etc.) belongs to the grammatical category of count nouns, not to 
the category of adjectives65. 
«role»
Student PersonQuaStudent
1 1..*
Person
 
Although an improvement of figure 7.10, figure 7.11 is still incomplete in 
the sense that it does not express the additional dependence relation that a 
qua individual has with other objects extrinsic to its bearer (see definition of 
qua individual in chapter 6). This problem is solved in figure 7.12, in which 
relators (as aggregates of qua individuals) are represented explicitly and in 
which the externally dependent moments of a qua individual are 
represented as resultant moments66 of the relator. In this figure, the 
associations between Student and Enrollment and between Education 
Institution and Enrollment stand for formal relations of mediation (see 
chapter 6). 
«role»
Student stID
averageGrade
«relator»
Enrollment
1 1..*
«mediation»
«kind»
Person
«kind»
Education Institution
11..* «mediation»
 
Now, let us return to the counting problem previously discussed:  
 
                                                      
65 Etymologically the English word noun comes from the latin word substantivus, meaning 
expressing substance. The original form is still preserved in latin languages such as Portuguese 
(substantivo) and Italian (sostantivo), as well as in the English word substantive, which is a 
less familiar synonym for noun. Conversely, one of the meanings of adjective in English is 
not standing by itself, dependent (Merriam-Webster, 2004).   
66 Resultant properties of an object are properties that a whole inherits from one of its parts 
(Bunge, 1977, p.97). 
Figure 7-11  A Role 
universal, its allowed 
type and an 
exemplification relation 
to a qua individual 
universal (revised 
version) 
 
Figure 7-12  A role 
universal, its a allowed 
type and its associated 
relator universal 
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500 students graduated from the University of Twente in 2004 
Every student is a person 
Ergo, 500 persons graduated from the University of Twente in 2004 
 
In this argument, if the first premise is true than the word student refers to 
the mode Person qua student. The counting of these entities in a given 
situation is equal to the cardinality of the extension of the 
PersonQuaStudent universal in figure 7.11 (i.e., #ext(PersonQuaStudent)) 
or the cardinality of the extension of the Enrollment classifier in figure 7.12 
(i.e., #ext(Enrollment)), since there is always a 1-1 correspondence between 
relators and their composing qua individuals. However, if this 
interpretation for student is assumed, the second premise is simply false, 
since the relation between a student and a person would be one of 
inherence, not one of identity. Alternatively, if the word student is 
interpreted (in the more natural way) as in figure 7.11, then the counting of 
students is equal to the cardinality of the extension of the Student universal 
in this figure (i.e., #ext(Student)). Though, in this case, premise one is not 
necessarily true.  
In both cases, the alleged counting problem disappears. Nonetheless, 
with the model of figure 7.12 we are still able to represent for both kinds of 
entities (roles and qua individuals) and their respective counting in an 
unambiguous manner. Additionally, this solution is able to make explicit 
and harmonize the two diverse senses of Role which have been used in the 
conceptual modeling literature. Finally, as we demonstrate in section 6.3.3, 
there are other important conceptual modeling benefits of this type of 
representation proposed. 
In the same manner that qua individuals are employed to characterize 
roles in this section, one can think about other types of qua individuals that 
characterize other types of sortal universals. In this spirit, we can think 
about a phase qua-Individual as (potentially complex) intrinsic moments that a 
substantial bears when in a given phase, or a substantial qua-Individual67 as a 
potential complex of essential moments, which thus inhere necessarily in an 
individual. Any attribution (non-sortal) is, in fact, founded on a 
characterization relation to what can be conceived as some sort of qua 
individual universal (in the limit case any moment can be thought as a 
simple qua individual). However, in this thesis, when using the term qua 
individual we mean a relational qua-Individual, i.e., a special type of externally 
                                                      
67 In the Aristotelian tradition there is always a unique universal that answers the question of 
what a thing is? According to Aristotle, seeing an object as an instance of this universal is 
equivalent to seeing the individual qua itself (van Leeuwen, 1991). This universal is named 
here a kind (or substance sortal).     
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dependent mode that a substantial has in the context of a certain material 
relationship.  
 Finally, we can refine the characteristic relational dependence defined for 
roles in chapter 4 by explicitly relating the notions of role and qua 
individuals discussed in this section. As discussed in section 4.1, roles are 
defined as specializations of a substance sortal according to a relational 
specialization condition ϕ. Here, this specialization condition can be 
further analyzed as a material relation being derived from a certain relator 
universal UR (see definition 6.17). Consequently, we can state that a role 
universal bears always a mediation relation to a relator universal. 
 
(1). ∀x Role(x) → ∃y RelatorUniversal(y) ∧ mediation(x,y) 
 
Or alternatively, that a role universal is always characterized by a qua 
individual universal: 
 
(2). ∀x Role(x) → ∃y QuaIndividualUniversal(y) ∧ 
characterization(x,y) 
 
As a consequence of formula (1), we have that, in the UML profile defined 
in chapter 8 of this thesis, a UML class stereotyped as «role» must always 
be connected to an association end of a «mediation» relation (see section 
8.2.2). 
7.4 Qua Individuals and the problem of transitivity in 
mandatory parthood relations between functional 
complexes  
As we have discussed in chapter 5, the parts of a complex object have in 
common the fact that they all posses a functional link with the complex. In 
other words, they all contribute to the functionality (or the behavior) of the 
complex. Moreover, parthood between complexes also represents a case of 
functional dependence. In section 5.6, we have addressed the case of specific 
functional dependence between complexes, exemplified, in a given 
conceptualization, by the relation between an individual person and the 
specific brain of that person.   
In figure 7.13, we represent a parthood relation between two 
complexes. However, the functional dependence that is implied by the 
parthood relation in this example is not one of specific dependence. 
Conversely, this type of relationship between the universals Heart and Body 
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is what is named Generic Functional Dependence between two universals in 
(Vieu & Aurnague, 2005). This relationship can be defined as follows: 
 
(3). GFD(X,Y) ≡ !(∀x (x::X) ∧ F(x,X) → ∃y ¬(y = x) ∧ (y::Y) ∧ F(y,Y)) 
 
Heart Body
11
 
The predicate F(x,X) in formula (3) has the meaning x functions as an X. In 
Vieu and Aurnagues theory, it is not necessary for an X that it functions as 
an X. So for instance, although Engine is a rigid concept, it is not the case 
that in every circumstance an engine functions as an engine. We thus can 
think of a universal XF which is a restriction of X according to the 
restriction condition expressed by the predicate F(x,X), so that every XF is a 
X functioning as a X. We name the universal XF a functional restriction of 
X. Notice that XF in this case is an anti-rigid universal which can be 
characterized by the qua individual qX. This qua individual, in turn, stands 
for the moments bearing in an Xs while functioning as such, or the 
particular behaviour of an X while functioning as an X. For instance, an 
engine x can have the property of emitting a certain number of decibels or 
being able to perform certain tasks only when functioning as an engine.  
In figure 7.14, we can create restrictions of the universals Heart and 
Body to the universals HeartF (FunctioningHeart) and BodyF(FunctioningBody). 
In this picture, the arrow with the hollow head represents subsumption. 
The symbols ::, i and ed represent instantiation, inherence and existential 
dependence, respectively. Whenever a heart functions as such, i.e., 
whenever it instantiates the universal FunctioningHeart, there is a qua 
individual qh that inheres in it. Mutatis Mutandis, the same goes to Body and 
FunctioningBody in this picture. As represented in this picture, the qua 
individuals qh and qb are existentially dependent on each other. In this case, 
ed(qh,qb) can be interpreted as the heart functioning behavior existentially 
depends on the body functioning behavior. In this model the converse also 
holds, i.e., that ed(qb,qh), or that the body functioning behaviour 
existentially depends on the heart functioning behavior. Additionally, 
according to our model, a heart functioning qh must inhere a heart h. 
Likewise, a body functioning qb must inhere a body b. From this we have 
that whenever a heart h functions as a heart (i.e., i(qh,h)) there must exist a 
body functioning behavior qb (from ed(qh,qb)), which in turn, inheres a 
body b (i.e., i(qb,b)). In other words, whenever a heart h functions as a 
heart, there must be a body b functioning as a body. Again, from the model 
of figure 7.14 we can derive the converse information, namely, that 
Figure 7-13  A 
mandatory parthood 
relationship between two 
Complex Object 
Universals 
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whenever a body b functions as a body, there must be a heart h functioning 
as a heart. 
HeartF BodyF
qh qb
h b
::
ed
::
Heart Body
GFD
i i
 
By definition of the relational qua individuals we are considering here (see 
chapter 6), qh and qb in figure 7.14 are externally dependent modes that 
share the same foundation and therefore can be said to compose a relator r 
that, in turn, can be said to mediate the instances of FunctioningHeart and 
FunctioningBody. This idea is depicted in figure 7.15. The symbols m and < 
in this picture represent the mediation relation and the proper parthood 
relation, respectively.  
HeartF BodyF
qh qbed
i i
r
h b
:: ::
mm
R
::
<<
 
As discussed in chapter 6, the relator universal R of which the relator r in 
figure 7.15 is an instance, can be said to induce the material relation ϕR 
between the universals FunctioningHeart and FunctioningBody. We shall 
define here the more general binary predicate ϕ(x,y) ≡ ∃r m(r,x) ∧ m(r,y). 
In other words, ϕ(x,y) holds iff there is a relator r which mediates these 
two individuals. More naturally, in this case, we can say that ϕ hold of x and 
y of type X and Y iff x to function as an X is depends on y functioning as a 
Y, and vice-versa. Notice that the functional restriction FunctioningHeart 
(FunctioningBody) is indeed not only an anti-rigid universal but also a 
relationally dependent one and, consequently, it conforms to the formulas (1) 
and (2) previously discussed: a FunctioningHeart is a Heart functioning as a 
Figure 7-14  
Representation of 
universals with Generic 
Functional Dependence 
and their Functional 
Restrictions  
Figure 7-15  
Representation of the 
relator instance 
composed of two 
functional qua 
individuals 
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Heart in relation to a Body functioning as a Body, and vice-versa. To put in 
different terms, these functional restrictions of universals are types of Roles. 
    The predicate ϕ to hold for instances of functional restrictions XF and YF 
requires the presence of a relator r to mediate these instances. This requires 
that the functional qua individuals inhering in the mediated instances of XF 
and YF share a genuine foundation. The formula (3) of generic functional 
dependence between X and Y can then be better expressed as: 
 
(4). GFD(X,Y) ≡ !(∀x (x::X) ∧ F(x,X) → ∃y (y::Y) ∧ F(y,Y) ∧ ϕ(x,y))    
 
Notice that the predicate ϕ eliminates the possibility that formula (4) is 
trivially satisfied by its consequent being necessarily true. Another 
possibility for this formula being trivially satisfied is if its antecedent were to 
be necessarily false. This would imply that the (¬◊∃x (x::X) ∧F(x,X)) is 
true, which in turn implies that (¬◊∃x x::XF). However, this amounts at 
stating that the universal XF cannot be possibly instantiated. By adopting an 
Aristotelian theory of universals in chapter 6 and, therefore, rejecting the 
possibility of platonic universals, we require that every universal in the 
theory must be possibly instantiated. We conclude then that formula (4) 
cannot be trivially satisfied. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 6, a relator 
must mediate at least two distinct individuals. As a consequence, we have 
that ϕ(x,y) implies ¬(y = x),  rendering this condition superfluous in the 
consequent of formula (4).         
 Suppose that the universal X is a specialization of another universal A. 
Then not only every X is an A but whenever an X functions as such it also 
functions as an A (Vieu & Aurnague, ibid.). For example, suppose that X 
and A are the universals MechanicHeart and Heart, respectively. Whenever 
a MechanicHeart functions as a MechanicHeart, it also functions as a Heart, 
or alternatively, whenever a MechanicHeart bears the behaviour (or 
properties) of a functioning MechanicHeart, then it also bears the 
properties of a functioning Heart. This is illustrated in figure 7.16. 
MechanicHeart
Heart
MechanicHeartF
h
::  qh1
(h qua mechanic heart) qh2
i
i
(h qua heart)
 
Figure 7-16  
Propagation of 
Functioning to the 
Supertype 
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We thus have that 
 
(5).(F(x,X) ∧ Subtype(X,Y)) → F(x,Y)  
 
Moreover, we assume the following to hold: 
 
(6). F(x,X) → ε(x)  
 
That is to say, if x is functioning as an X in a given world then x exists in 
that world. As previously mentioned, we assume that concrete individuals 
are not necessarily existents. Therefore, we conclude that an individual X 
cannot necessarily function as an X either. In other words, a functional 
restriction of a universal is indeed an anti-rigid universal. 
Suppose the situation depicted in figure 7.17. 
AF BF
a b
::::
A B
GFD
C
 
The universal A is generally functionally dependent on universal B. Thus, 
for every instance a of A that functions as such there is an instance b of B 
functioning as a B. Moreover, the predicate ϕ holds for a and b. Now, since 
b is also a C and, due to (5), b also functions as a C. Hence, we have that 
whenever an instance a of A functions as such there is an instance b of C 
that functions as a C. Since ϕ(a,b), we can derive that GFD(A,C). Thus, we 
have that the following is always true: 
 
(7). GFD(X,Y) ∧ Subtype(Y,Z) → GFD(X,Z)  
 
 Now, suppose the situation depicted in figure 7.18. 
Figure 7-17  
Propagation of General 
Functional Dependence 
to the Supertype 
ϕ 
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AF BF
qa qbed
i
r
a b
::
<
i
::
CF
qc
i
c
::
ed
GFD GFD
ed
A B C
< <
 
In this model, every instance a of A functioning as an A bears a particular 
qabehaviour. The qua individual qa is existentially dependent on the qua 
individual qb, i.e., on the behaviour of a b functioning as a B. However, this 
model also represents that if b functions as a B (bears qb) there is a c 
functioning as a C, i.e., bearing a C behavior qc. Due to transitivity of 
existential dependence, we have that qa is existential dependent also on qc. 
Additionally, qa and qb share the same foundation and so do qb and qc. Thus, 
qa and qc also must share the same foundation. In other words, whatever is 
responsible for creating qa and qb must also be responsible for creating qc. 
By definition (see chapter 6), a relator is an aggregation of qua individuals 
that share the same foundation. We can then define a relator r which 
consists of qa, qband qc. Consequently, we have that ϕ(a,b), ϕ(b,c) and 
ϕ(a,c). Now, we have that for every instance a of A functioning as an A, 
there is an instance of c functioning as a C. Since ϕ(a,c), we then have that 
GFD(A,C). This argument shows that the following is always true: 
 
(8). GFD(X,Y) ∧ GFD(Y,Z) → GFD(X,Z) 
 
Although formula (4) defines the notion of general dependence, we need in 
addition to establish that a functional dependence link holds precisely 
between two individual entities x and y: 
 
(9). IFD(x,X,y,Y) ≡ GFD(X,Y) ∧ x::X ∧ y::Y ∧ (F(x,X) → F(y,Y)) 
 
This predicate termed individual functional dependence states that if an 
individual x::X is individually functionally dependent of another individual y::Y 
then: (i) there is a generic functional dependence between their types; (ii) x 
Figure 7-18  Transitivity 
of General Functional 
Dependence 
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and y are classified as those given types in that world; (iii) for x to function 
as a X in that world, then y must function as a Y. 
An example of individual functional dependence is one between a 
particular heart h and a particular body b in figures 7.14 and 7.15. As 
previously discussed, there is a generic functional dependence between the 
universals Heart and Body, and if in a given circumstance a heart h 
functions as a heart there is a body b that functions as a body in that 
circumstance. 
Let us now return to the example of figure 7.13 of a mandatory 
parthood relation between the universals Heart and Body. In this model, a 
particular heart h is not only functionally dependent of a body b in a given 
world, but h is also part of b. This type of the parthood relation is termed 
in (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005) direct functional parthood of type 1: 
 
Definition 7.1 (Direct Functional Part of type 1): An individual x 
instance of X is a direct functional part of type 1 of an individual y of type Y 
(symbolized as d1(x,X,y,Y)) iff x is a part of y and x is individually 
functionally dependent of y. Formally, d1(x,X,y,Y) ≡ ((x < y) ∧ 
IFD(x,X,y,Y)).  
■ 
 
Examples of d1 include cuff-sleeve, stem-plant, carburetor-engine, finger-
hand, hand-arm, arm-body, hand-body, heart-body, heart-circulatory 
system. 
 In conformance with the findings of (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005), we 
propose that a mandatory parthood relation between two functional 
complexes68 (such as the one depicted in figure 7.13) should be interpreted 
as a case of direct functional parthood. In this specific case, the model implies 
that: □(∀x x::Heart → (ε(x) → ∃y y::Body ∧ d1(x,Heart,y,Body))).  
Now, suppose that we have a model such as the one represented of 
figure 7.19. 
Mitral Valve Heart
11
Body
11
 
In this case, both the relationships between Heart and Body, and between 
Mitral Valve and Heart, are mapped in the instance level to cases of direct 
functional parthood(1), i.e., 
  
(i) □(∀x x::Heart → (ε(x) → ∃y y::Body ∧ d1(x,Heart,y,Body))) 
                                                      
68 See definition of a functional complex in chapter 5. 
Figure 7-19  Example of 
direct functional parts of 
type 1  
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(ii) □(∀x x::MitralValve → (ε(x) → ∃y y::Heart        
 ∧ d1(x,MitralValve,y,Heart))) 
 
The important question at this point is: from (i) and (ii), can we derive 
formula (iii) below? 
 
(iii) □(∀x x::MitralValve → (ε(x) →∃y y::Body        
  ∧ d1(x,MitralValve,y, Body))) 
 
We here adopt the so-called mereological continuism (Simons, 1987), which 
advocates that parthood only holds between existents. Since d1 implies 
parthood, we conclude that d1 also holds exclusively between existents. 
Thus, if in every world w that x::X exists there is a y::Y such d1(x,X,y,Y) in 
w then in every world w in which x::X exists there is a y::Y which also exists 
in w. Additionally, if in every world w that y::Y exists there is a z::X such 
that d1(y,Y,z,Z) in w then in every world w in which y::Y exists there is a 
z::Z which also exists in w. From this we conclude that in every world w 
that x::X exists there are y::Y and z::Z that also exist in w and both 
d1(x,X,y,Y) and d1(y,Y,z,Z) are true in that world. Consequently, we have 
that (iii) follows from (i) and (ii) iff d1 is transitive. Thus, the question 
above can be rephrased as: is direct functional parthood(1) a transitive 
relation?  
In the sequel we demonstrate that this is indeed the case. The 
abbreviations in the proofs are: (a) TFP (transitivity of formal parthood); 
(b) TLI (transitivity of the logical implication); (c) EC (Elimination of the 
Disjunction), and (d) IC (Introduction of the Disjunction).  
 
(T1) Theorem 1: d1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ d1(y,Y,z,Z) → d1(x,X,z,Z) 
Proof: 
 
1. d1(x,X,y,Y)            T1  
2. d1(y,Y,z,Z)            T1  
3. (x < y) ∧ IFD(x,X,y,Y)        1, Definition 7.1 
4. GFD(X,Y) ∧ x::X ∧ y::Y ∧ (F(x,X) → F(y,Y))  3, (8) 
5. (y < z) ∧ IFD(y,Y,z,Z)        2, Definition 7.1 
6. GFD(Y,Z) ∧ y::Y ∧ z::Z ∧ (F(y,Y) → F(z,Z))  5, (8) 
7. (x < z)             3,5, TFP 
8. GFD(X,Z)            4,6, (7) 
9. (x::X) ∧ (z::Z)           4,6, EC 
10. (F(x,X) → F(z,Z))          4,6, TLI 
11. GFD(X,Z) ∧ (x::X) ∧ (z::Z)  (F(x,X) → F(z,Z)) 8,9,10, IC 
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12. IFD(x,X,z,Z)           11, (8) 
13. (x < z) ∧ IFD(x,X,z,Z)        7,12, IC 
14. d1(x,X,z,Z)            13, Definition 7.1 
□ 
 
We can generalize this result for any chain of direct functional dependence 
in a model. Another example of such case is depicted in figure 7.20. 
Carburetor Engine
11
Machine
11
 
In models such 7.13 and 7.20, the mandatory parthood relation represents 
functional dependence in both directions. Take for instance figure 7.20. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the minimum cardinality constraint of 1 in the 
Engine association end of the aggregation relation between Carburator and 
Engine implies that every instance of Carburator necessitates an Engine to 
function as a Carburator. Likewise, the minimum cardinality constraint of 1 
in the Carburator association end of that relation implies that every Engine 
necessitates a Carburator to function as an Engine. (Vieu & Aurnague, 
2005) name this type of functional parthood in which x is part of y but y as Y 
is individually functionally dependent on x as an X direct functional parthood (2): 
 
Definition 7.2 (Direct Functional Part of type 2): An individual x 
instance of X is a direct functional part of type 2 of an individual y of type Y 
(symbolized as d2(x,X,y,Y)) iff x is a part of y and y is individually 
functionally dependent of x. Formally, d2(x,X,y,Y) ≡ (x < y) ∧ 
IFD(y,Y,x,X). 
■ 
 
Examples of d2 include wall-house, engine-car, electron-atom, atom-
molecule, finger-hand, hand-arm, cell-heart, and feather-canary. 
 
In the sequel, we prove that d2 is also transitive. 
 
(T2) Theorem 2: d2(x,X,y,Y) ∧ d2(y,Y,z,Z) → d2(x,X,z,Z) 
Proof: 
 
(1). d2(x,X,y,Y)             T2 
(2). d2(y,Y,z,Z)              T2 
(3). (x < y) ∧ IFD(y,Y,x,X)         1, Definition 7.2 
(4). GFD(Y,X) ∧ y::Y ∧ x::X ∧ (F(y,Y) → F(x,X))   3, (8) 
Figure 7-20  Examples 
of direct functional parts 
of type 1; transitivity 
always hold across 
parthood relations of this 
type 
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(5). (y < z) ∧ IFD(z,Z,y,Y)         2, Definition 7.2 
(6). GFD(Z,Y) ∧ z::Z ∧ y::Y ∧ (F(z,Z) → F(y,Y))   5, (8) 
(7). (x < z)              3,5, TFP 
(8). GFD(Z,X)             4,6, (7) 
(9). (z::Z) ∧ (x::X)            4,6, EC 
(10). (F(z,Z) → F(x,X))          4,6, TLI 
(11). GFD(Z,X) ∧ (z::Z) ∧ (x::X)  (F(z,Z) → F(x,X))  8,9,10, IC 
(12). IFD(z,Z,x,X)            11, (8) 
(13). (x < z) ∧ IFD(z,Z,x,X)         7,12,IC 
(14). d2(x,X,z,Z)           13, Definition 7.2 
□ 
 
Whenever in a conceptual model we have a representation of a mandatory 
parthood relation between complex objects such as in figures 7.13 and 
7.20, we have both a case of d1 and a case of d2. In particular, the model of 
figure 7.20 implies both formulas below: 
 
(i) □(∀x x::Carburator → (ε(x) → ∃y y::Engine ∧ 
d1(x,Carburator,y,Engine))) 
(ii) □(∀x x:: Engine → (ε(x) → ∃y y:: Carburator ∧ 
d2(y,Carburator,x,Engine)))    
 
Since both d1 and d2 are transitive, we maintain that transitivity holds within 
any chain of direct functional dependence relations in a conceptual model. 
 Now, take for instance the relationship depicted in figure 7.21 below. 
Human Heart «kind»Person
11
«role»
Musician
0..1
1
d1d2
i1
d2
 
Every human heart necessitates a person, and every person necessitates a 
human heart, i.e., both d1 and d2 hold between direct instances of human 
heart and person. Moreover, every musician is a person. So, as any person, 
a musician necessitates a human heart, i.e., d2 holds also between instances 
of human heart and musician. However, it is not the case that a direct 
functional dependence holds between human heart and musician. A human 
heart necessitates a person, but this person does not have to be a musician 
(this is made evident by the cardinality 0..1 of the inherited relation 
between these two universals). This type of relationship is termed indirect 
Figure 7-21  Example of 
an indirect functional 
parthood of type 1 (from 
Human Heart to 
Musician) 
304 CHAPTER 7 ROLES 
functional parthood (1) in (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005) and it is defined as 
follows: 
 
Definition 7.3 (Indirect Functional Part of type 1): i1(x,X,y,Y) ≡ (x 
< y) ∧ IIFD(x,X,y,Y). IIFD(x,X,y,Y) is the relation of individual indirect 
functional dependence and is defined as  
 
(9). IIFD(x,X,y,Y) ≡ y::Y ∧ ∃Z (Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ IFD(x,X,y,Z)). 
■ 
 
To put it in a simple way, x as an X is individually indirect functional 
dependent of y as a Y iff for x to function as an X, y must function as a Z, 
whereas Z is a more general universal (subsuming that Y) that y instantiates. 
Examples of i1 include handle-door (with movable entity for type 
subsuming door), door-house (with wall, enclosure or building 
subsuming house), engine-car (with machine subsuming car), brick-
wall (with construction subsuming wall), valve-carburetor (with fluid-
holding device subsuming carburetor), cell-heart (with organ subsuming 
heart), feather-canary (with bird subsuming canary). 
 Now, take the model depicted in figure 7.22 below. There are two 
potential parthood relations A and B. The relation A between Mitral Valve 
and Musician holds iff transitivity holds across (Mitral Valve ⎯→⎯ 1d Human 
Heart) and (Human Heart ⎯→⎯ 1i  Musician), since in the other reading of 
these relations, i.e., (Mitral Valve ⎯→⎯ 2d Human Heart) and (Human 
Heart ⎯→⎯ 1d  Musician), transitivity is already guaranteed by theorem 
(T2). To put it baldly, relation A is transitive in this case iff d1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ 
i1(y,Y,z,Z) → i1(x,X,z,Z) is a theorem. Likewise, relation B is transitive 
in this case iff i1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ d1(y,Y,z,Z) → i1(x,X,z,Z) is a theorem. 
Human Heart «kind»Person
«role»
Musician
0..1
1
d1d2
i1
d2
Mitral Valve
11
A (?)
d1d2
Orchestra
11
d1d2
11
B (?)
 
Figure 7-22  Two 
candidate parthood 
relations due to 
transitivity.  
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As we show in the sequel, d1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ i1(y,Y,z,Z) → d1(x,X,z,Z) ∨ 
i1(x,X,z,Z) is a theorem (T3) while i1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ d1(y,Y,z,Z) → 
d1(x,X,z,Z) ∨ i1(x,X,z,Z) is not. Therefore, whilst A is a case of indirect 
functional parthood between Mitral Valve and Musician, relation B is not 
warranted and, hence, must not exist in figure 7.22. 
 
(T3) Theorem 3: d1(x,X,y,Y) ∧ i1(y,Y,z,Z) → i1(x,X,z,Z) 
Proof: 
 
(1). d1(x,X,y,Y)             T3 
(2). i1(y,Y,z,Z)             T3  
(3). (x < y) ∧ IFD(x,X,y,Y)        1, Definition 7.1 
(4). GFD(X,Y) ∧ x::X ∧ y::Y ∧ (F(x,X) → F(y,Y))   3, (8) 
(5). (y < z) ∧ IIFD(y,Y,z,Z)        2, Definition 7.3 
(6). z::Z ∧ ∃W (Subtype(Z,W) ∧ IFD(y,Y,z,W))   5, (9) 
(7). GFD(Y,W) ∧ y::Y ∧ z::W ∧ (F(y,Y) → F(z,W))  6, (8) 
(8). (x < z)              3,5,TFP 
(9). GFD(X,W)             4,7, (7) 
(10). (x::X) ∧ (z::W)           4,7, EC 
(11). (F(x,X) → F(z,W))          4,7,TLI 
(12). GFD(X,W) ∧ (x::X) ∧ (z::W)  (F(x,X) → F(z,W)) 9,10,11,IC 
(13). IFD(x,X,z,W)           12, (8) 
(14). z::Z ∧ ∃W (Subtype(Z,W) ∧ IFD(x,X,z,W)   6,13,IC 
(15). IIFD(x,X,z,Z)           14, (9)  
(16). (x < z) ∧ IIFD(x,X,z,Z)        8,15, IC 
(17). i1(x,X,z,Z)          16, Definition 7.3 
□ 
 
Let us now modify the model of figure 7.22 to depict a more realistic 
conceptualization. In this modified specification (figure 7.23) we have that 
every Blood Pump is part of a Circulatory System and necessitates a 
Circulatory System in order to work as such (d1). Likewise, every 
Circulatory System has as part a Blood Pump and necessitates the latter to 
work as such (d2). As any Blood Pump, a Biological Heart is part of a 
Circulatory System and necessitates a Circulatory System to work as such, 
i.e., direct functional dependence (2) is inherited by Biological Heart from the 
subsuming universal. The same obviously holds for Artificial Heart. 
However, it is not the case that a Circulatory System is directly functionally 
dependent of a Biological Heart specifically. To put it in an alternative way, 
a Circulatory System, in order to function as such, relies on the behavior of 
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a Blood Pump, but this behavior does not have to be afforded in the specific 
way a Biological Heart does. In (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005), this type of 
relationship between Biological Heart and Circulatory System is termed 
indirect functional parthood (2) and it is defined as follows: 
   
Definition 7.4 (Indirect Functional Part of type 2): i2(x,X,y,Y) ≡ (x 
< y) ∧ IIFD(y,Y,x,X). 
■ 
 
Examples of i2 include heart-circulatory system (with blood pump 
subsuming heart), brick-wall (with construction material subsuming 
brick). 
Heart Cell Biological Heart
11
Coronary Circulatory System
11
Artificial Heart
«category»
Blood Pump
1
0..1
d1d2
d1d2
d1
i2
C (?)  
Once more, we have the question: does transitivity hold across (Heart Cell 
⎯→⎯ 2d Biological Heart) and (Biological Heart ⎯→⎯ 2i  Coronary 
Circulatory System)? In the other reading we have (Heart Cell 
Valve ⎯→⎯ 1d Biological Heart) and (Biological Heart ⎯→⎯ 1d  Coronary 
Circulatory System), thus, relation C is warranted iff the question above is 
answered affirmatively. The answer in this case is negative, since 
d2(x,X,y,Y) ∧ i2(y,Y,z,Z) → d2(x,X,z,Z) ∨ i2(x,X,z,Z) cannot be shown 
to be a theorem in this theory. However, the following is a theorem: 
 
(T4) Theorem 4: i2(x,X,y,Y) ∧ d2(y,Y,z,Z) → i2(x,X,z,Z) 
Proof: 
 
(15). i2(x,X,y,Y)            T4 
(16). d2(y,Y,z,Z)            T4 
(17). (x < y) ∧ IIFD(y,Y,x,X)        1, Definition 7.4 
(18). (y < z) ∧ IFD(z,Z,y,Y)         2, Definition 7.2  
(19). x::X ∧∃W (Subtype(X,W) ∧ IFD(y,Y,x,W))   3, (9) 
(20). GFD(Y,W) ∧ y::Y ∧ x::W ∧ (F(y,Y) → F(x,W))  5, (8) 
Figure 7-23  Example of 
an indirect functional 
parthood of type 2 (from 
Biological Heart to 
Coronary Circulatory 
System) and of a 
candidate parthood 
relationship (C) due to 
transitivity 
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(21). GFD(Z,Y) ∧ z::Z ∧ y::Y ∧ (F(z,Z) → F(y,Y))   4, (8) 
(22). (x < z)             3,4, TFP 
(23). GFD(Z,W)            6,7, (7) 
(24). (z::Z) ∧ (x::W)           6,7,EC 
(25). (F(z,Z) → F(x,W))          6,7,TLI 
(26). GFD(Z,W) ∧ (z::Z) ∧ (x::W)  (F(z,Z) → F(x,W)) 9,10,11,IC 
(27). IFD(z,Z,x,W)           12,(8) 
(28). x::X ∧ ∃W (Subtype(X,W) ∧ IFD(z,Z,x,W)   5,13,IC 
(29). IIFD(z,Z,x,X)           14,(9) 
(30). (x < z) ∧ IIFD(z,Z,x,X)        8,15,IC 
(31). i2(x,X,z,Z)           16, Definition 7.4 
□ 
Due to this theorem we have that the relation D between Biological Heart 
and Circulatory System (depicted in figure 7.24 below) is warranted, since 
transitivity holds across (Biological Heart ⎯→⎯ 2i Coronary Circulatory 
System) and (Coronary Circulatory System ⎯→⎯ 2d  Circulatory System) in 
this case. 
Biological Heart
Coronary Circulatory System
11
«category»
Blood Pump
10..1
d1d2
d1
i2
Circulatory System
11
d1d2
1
0..1
i2
d1
D  
Figure 7.25 below summarizes the results of this section in the following 
manner: Mandatory parthood between complex objects (functional 
parthood) is a non-transitive relation (i.e., transitive in certain cases and 
intransitive in others). Transitivity can be guaranteed for these relations 
only in cases where the patterns of figures (7.25.a-c) occur. 
Figure 7-24  Example of 
an indirect functional 
parthood of type 2 due 
to transitivity (from 
Biological Heart to 
Circulatory System) 
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A B C A B C
D
A B C
D
A B
CD
X
(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
A
B C
D
X
(e)  
7.5 Final Considerations 
In this chapter, we build upon some of the results developed in chapters 4, 
5 and 6 of this thesis to provide a foundation for the modeling concept of 
roles.  
First, by employing the categories from the theory of universals 
presented in chapter 4 and its postulates, we were able to propose a design 
pattern to target a recurrent problem in role modeling discussed in the 
literature. We believe that the definition of design patterns capturing 
standard solutions for ontological modeling problems contribute greatly to 
the task of defining sound engineering tools for conceptual modeling. 
Nonetheless, the investigation of ontological design patterns is still in its 
infancy, and very few examples exist in the literature. Two examples are the 
whole-part design pattern introduced in (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 
2002) and the Inflammation pattern proposed in (Gangemi & Catenacci & 
Battaglia, 2004).   
In chapter 5, we present a number of modal meta-properties 
characterizing part-whole relations. Here, we use these meta-properties to 
investigate their intertwining with anti-rigid universals and, in particular, 
with role universals standing as wholes in parthood relationships. We use 
the distinction between de re and de dicto modality in the literature of 
philosophical logic to characterize the different formal properties of the 
relations of specific dependence parthood from the whole to the part, 
depending whether the whole universal is rigid or anti-rigid. 
By using the concept of role (as anti-rigid and relationally dependent 
sortals) introduced in chapter 4, and the concept of qua individuals 
Figure 7-25  The 
patterns of figures (a), 
(b) and (c) represent 
cases in which a derived 
transitive parthood 
relation can be inferred. 
Intransitive cases are 
shown in figures (d) and 
(e)  
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(externally dependent modes) introduced in chapter 6, we manage to 
reconcile two incompatible views of roles present in the literature, as well 
as to present a modeling solution that retains the benefits of both 
approaches.  
Finally, in chapter 5, we have discussed the so-called problem of 
fallacious transitivity in part-whole relations. In that chapter, we address 
this problem for three types of conceptual parthood, namely, the 
subQuantityOf, subCollectionOf and memberOf relations. However, the 
remaining relation (componentOf) is the one which is most commonly 
represented in conceptual models, since most individuals represented in 
these models are functional complexes. As discussed in that chapter, 
transitivity among componentOf relations only holds in certain contexts, but 
the definition of these contexts typically demands a substantial knowledge 
of the modeling domain and of the characterizing relations that unify its 
entities. With the intent to provide some methodological tools for helping 
the modeler in this task, we propose a number of visual patterns that can be 
used to delimit these contexts in conceptual class diagrams. The patterns 
are elaborated by using the concepts of relators, qua individuals and 
existential dependency relations discussed in chapter 6, but chiefly by 
building on the pioneering theory of transitivity of linguistic functional 
parthood relations proposed by (Vieu & Aurnague, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Chapter 8 
8. A Case Study on Ontology-Based 
Evaluation and Re-Design  
In this chapter, we conduct two complementary case studies of the 
techniques developed in this thesis.  
 Firstly, in order to demonstrate the language evaluation framework 
proposed in chapter 2, we systematically analyze and re-design the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) as a conceptual modeling language. To achieve 
this objective, we employ the foundational ontology proposed throughout 
chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis as a basis for the evaluation of the current 
UML 2.0 metamodel, and for the definition of the real-world semantics of 
the ontologically well-founded version of UML that results from this re-
designing process. This process is conducted in three complementary 
sections: section 8.1 uses the results mainly from chapter 4 to address the 
UML metamodel elements of class and class taxonomies; section 8.2 uses the 
results mainly from chapter 6, taking a broader view on UML classifiers 
(which include, besides classes, also associations, datatypes and interfaces), 
but also analyzing the UML Property metaclass (e.g., attributes and 
association ends); Finally, section 8.3 uses the results mainly from chapter 5 
to address the representation of meronymic relations (e.g., composition 
and aggregation) in the UML metamodel. We employ the same structure in 
each of these three subsections: each subsection contains two parts; in the 
first part we always present a relevant fragment of the UML metamodel; in 
a second part we do three things, namely, (a) analyze this fragment in terms 
of a suitable part of our foundational ontology; (b) propose a revised 
version of the UML metamodel in conformance with the foundation 
ontology; (c) propose a modelling profile that implements the revised 
metamodel.  
Secondly, once the language has been re-designed, in section 8.5 we 
demonstrate its adequacy in tackling some recurrent representation 
problems as well as some problems of semantic interoperability in the 
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modeling and integration of lightweight ontologies to be used for context-
aware service platforms.  
Section 8.5 presents some final considerations for this chapter. 
8.1 Classes and Generalization 
8.1.1 The UML Metamodel 
In this section we briefly present the UML metamodel, focusing on static 
elements and, in particular, those modeling primitives used in the 
construction of UML class diagrams. From now on, we refer to the UML 
2.0 Superstructure Specification (OMG, 2003c) when quoting in italics the 
definition of elements of the UML metamodel.  
Figure 8.1 below depicts a fragment of the UML metamodel featuring 
the metaclasses which are more relevant for the purpose of this discussion. 
In particular, we focus our discussion on those meta-constructs highlighted 
in this figure, namely, Classifier, Class, Generalization and GeneralizationSet. 
Type
isAbstract:Boolean = false
Classifier
DirectedRelationship
Generalization
specific
1
generalization
*
general1
/general
*
isCovering:Boolean = false
isDisjoint:Boolean = true
GeneralizationSet
*
*
Relationship
name:String[0..1]
NamedElement
Element
/relatedElement
1..*
/target1..*
/source
1..*
Class
 
In the UML superstructure specification, a classifier is defined as follows: 
A classifier is a classification of instances according to their features. [It] may 
participate in generalization relationships with other Classifiers [, in which case] an 
instance of a specific Classifier is also an (indirect) instance of each of the general 
Classifiers. Any constraint applying to instances of the general classifier also applies to 
Figure 8-1  Excerpt from 
the UML metamodel 
featuring the 
metaclasses Classifier, 
Class, Generalization and  
GeneralizationSet 
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instances of the specific classifier. A Classifier defines a type. Type conformance between 
generalizable Classifiers is defined so that a Classifier conforms to itself and to all of its 
ancestors in the generalization hierarchy. [It] can specify a generalization hierarchy by 
referencing its general classifiers. If [the classifiers attribute isAbstract =] true, the 
Classifier does not provide a complete declaration and can typically not be instantiated. 
An abstract classifier is intended to be used by other classifiers, e.g. as the target of 
general metarelationships or generalization relationships. [The] default value is false. 
 A classifier in UML is a general abstract metaclass that subsumes other 
metaclasses such as Class, Association, Interface and Datatype. Its main purpose 
is to describe the general aspects of property (attribute) description and 
generalization hierarchies (taxonomies) for its subclasses. As recognized in 
the UML specification, among its different subtypes class is the most widely 
used classifier. A class is a type of classifier that describes a set of Objects sharing 
a collection of Features, including Operations, Attributes and Methods, that are 
common to the set of Objects [Its purpose] is to specify a classification of objects 
and to specify the features that characterize the structure and behavior of those 
objects. 
 In UML, a generalization is shown as a line with a hollow triangle as an 
arrowhead between the symbols representing the involved classifiers. The 
arrowhead points to the symbol representing the general classifier. A 
generalization relationship may be connected to a GeneralizationSet. This can 
be depicted graphically in one the following ways: 
  
1. By placing the name of the GeneralizationSet explicitly in an adjacent 
position to that of the generalization symbol. Therefore, all 
Generalization relationships with the same GeneralizationSet name are 
part of the same GeneralizationSet (figure 8.2.a); 
 
2. By drawing two or more lines (ends of the generalization line symbol) 
that converge to a single arrowhead. This symbolizes that all the specific 
classifiers belong to the same GeneralizationSet (figure 8.2.b); 
 
3. By drawing a dashed line across those lines with separate arrowheads 
that are meant to be part of the same set. This dashed line designates 
the GeneralizationSet (figure 8.2.c). 
 
In cases (b) and (c), the representation of the GeneralizationSet name is 
optional. 
A GeneralizationSet defines a particular set of Generalization 
relationships that describe the way in which a specific Classifier (or 
superclass) may be partitioned. For example, in figures 8.2.a, 8.2.b and 
8.2.c below, a GeneralizationSet named gender defines the partitioning of 
class Person in the two subclasses: MalePerson and FemalePerson. 
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However, in the UML specification, the term partition is not used 
necessarily in the mathematical sense. This is only the case if both attributes 
isCovering and isDisjoint of a GeneralizationSet have the true value. In the case 
of the aforementioned example, if (isCovering = true) then every instance of 
Person must be either an instance of MalePerson or FemalePerson, i.e., in 
every world the extensions of the subclasses that are part of the 
generalization set exhaust the extension of their superclass. If (isDisjoint = 
true) then there is no instance of Person who can be both and instance of 
MalePerson and of FemalePerson, i.e., within a world, the extensions of the 
subclasses that are part of the generalization set are necessarily mutually 
disjoint. The default interpretation in UML is that (isDisjoint = true) but 
(isCovering = false). 
Person
MalePerson FemalePerson
gender gender
Person
MalePerson FemalePerson
gender
Person
MalePerson FemalePerson
gender
(a) (b) (c)  
8.1.2 Ontological Interpretation and Re-Design 
In this section we focus in a special sense of the UML metaclass Class. By 
class hereby we mean the notion of a first-order class, as opposed to 
powertypes, and one whose instances are single objects, as opposed to 
association classes, whose instances are tuples of objects.   
In this sense, the ontological interpretation of a UML Class is that of a 
monadic universal (see figure 8.3).  Class diagrams are intended to represent 
the static structure of a domain. For this reason, we take here that classes 
should always be interpreted as representing endurant universals. In addition, 
since substantials are prior to Moments from an identification point of 
view, i.e., the latter are identificationally dependent on the former (Schneider, 
2003b), it is typically the case that most classes in a class diagram should be 
interpreted as substantial universals. In fact, we prescribe that a non-
stereotyped class in a class diagram should be interpreted as a substantial 
universal. 
Classes are therefore the representation of general terms in a 
description of a domain. A general requirement in conceptual modeling 
languages is that the represented instances must have a definite identity 
(Borgida, 1990). For this reason, classes in a class diagram representing 
substantial universals should always be interpreted as Object universals. 
 In chapter 4 of this thesis, we present a theory that proposes a number 
of ontological distinctions that refine the category of Object Universal. One of 
the sorts of object universal is a substance sortal, or a Kind. As discussed in 
Figure 8-2  Alternative 
representations for a 
GeneralizationSet 
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depth in chapter 5 of this thesis, within the category of kinds, we can make 
three further types distinctions, based on the ontological categories of their 
instances. These distinctions are quantity kind, collective kind and functional 
complex kind. Functional complex kinds are certainly the most commonly 
represented kinds in conceptual specifications. For this reason, for now on, 
we simply write kind when referring to a functional complex kind. These 
ontological distinctions are depicted in figure 8.3 below. 
 
Monadic Universal
Substantial Universal Moment Universal
{disjoint}
AntiRigidSortal
MixinUniversalSortalUniversal
{disjoint, complete}
RigidSortal
RolePhaseSubKind
Kind
{disjoint, complete}
{disjoint, complete}
NonRigidMixin
{disjoint, complete}
RigidMixin
Category
{disjoint, complete}
AntiRigidMixin SemiRigidMixin
RoleMixin Mixin
Universal
{disjoint}
Relation
Quantity Collective
Substance Sortal
{disjoint, complete}
{disjoint, complete}
 
If we make a representation mapping from the ontology of figure 8.3 to the 
UML metamodel, we can map the category of Monadic Universal to the UML 
element of a Class. However, by carrying on this process, we realize that in 
UML there are no modeling constructs that represent the ontological 
categories specializing Object Universal in this figure. In other words, there 
are ontological concepts prescribed by our reference ontology that are not 
represented by any modeling construct in the language. This amounts to a 
Figure 8-3  Ontological 
Distinctions among 
Substantial Universals 
316 CHAP. 8 A CASE STUDY ON ONTOLOGY-BASED EVALUATION AND RE-DESIGN 
case of ontological incompleteness at the modeling language level (see 
section 2.3.4).  
 
Type
isAbstract:Boolean = false
Classifier
DirectedRelationship
Generalization
specific
1
generalization
*
general1
/general
*
isCovering:Boolean = false
isDisjoint:Boolean = true
GeneralizationSet **
Relationship
name:String[0..1]
NamedElement
Element
/relatedElement
1..*
/target1..*
/source
1..*
Class
Object Class
Anti Rigid Sortal Class
Mixin ClassSortal Class
{disjoint, complete}
Rigid Sortal Class
RolePhaseSubKindSubstance Sortal
{disjoint, complete} {disjoint, complete}
{disjoint, complete}
Non Rigid Mixin Class
{disjoint, complete}
Rigid Mixin Class
Category
{disjoint, complete}
Anti Rigid Mixin Class Semi Rigid Mixin
RoleMixin Mixin
Quantity
isExtensional:Boolean
Collective
Kind
{disjoint, complete}
 
In order to remedy this problem, we propose a first extension to UML that 
represents finer-grained distinctions between different types of classes. We, 
thus, define extensions of the UML metaclass Class to represents each of the 
leaf ontological categories specializing substantial universal in figure 8.3. The 
extended UML metamodel must also include a number of constraints 
(derived from the postulates of the theories presented in chapters 4 and 5) 
that restrict the ways the introduced elements can be related. The goal is to 
have a metamodel such that all syntactically correct specifications according 
to this metamodel have logical models that are intended world structures of the 
conceptualizations they are supposed to represent (see section 3.4.1). 
 In figure 8.4 above we present an extension of the UML meta-model in 
order to represent the ontological concepts discussed in this section. The 
Figure 8-4  Revised 
fragment of the UML 
metamodel according to 
the ontological 
categories of figure 8.3 
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concrete metaclasses in this figure (highlighted in grey) represent the leaf 
ontological distinctions among the category of Object Universals prescribed by 
our theory. 
 In the sequel, we define a profile that implements the metaclasses of this 
(extended) UML metamodel, as well as their interrelationships and 
contraints. By using this profile, the concrete Object classes in figure 8.4 are 
represented in conceptual models as stereotyped classes representing each 
of the considered ontological distinctions. Likewise, the admissible relations 
between these ontological categories, derived from the postulates of our 
theory, are represented in the profile as syntactical constraints governing 
the admissible relations between the corresponding stereotyped classes. 
This modeling profile is presented in table 8.1 below. 
 
Metaclass Description 
Substance Sortal  Substance Sortal is an abstract metaclass that represents the general 
properties of all substance sortals, i.e., rigid, relationally independent 
object universals that supply a principle of identity for their instances. 
Substance Sortal has no concrete syntax. Thus, symbolic representations 
are defined by each of its concrete subclasses. 
Constraints 
 
1. Every substantial object represented in a conceptual model using this profile must be an 
instance of a substance sortal, directly or indirectly. This means that every concrete element 
of this profile used in a class diagram (isAbstract = false) must include in its general 
collection one class stereotyped as either «kind», «quantity» or «collective». This constraint 
is a refinement of postulate 4.1 in chapter 4; 
 
2. A substantial object represented in a conceptual model using this profile cannot be an 
instance of more than one ultimate substance sortal. This means that any stereotyped class 
in this profile used in a class diagram must not include in its general collection more than 
one substance sortal class. Moreover, a substance sortal must also not include another 
substance sortal nor a « subkind » in its general collection, i.e., a substance sortal cannot 
have as a supertype a member of {«kind», «subkind», «quantity», «collective»}. This 
constraint is a refinement of postulate 4.2 in chapter 4; 
 
3. A Class representing a rigid substantial universal cannot be a subclass of a Class 
representing an anti-rigid universal. Thus, a substance sortal cannot have as a supertype 
(must not include in its general collection) a member of {«phase», «role», «roleMixin»}. 
This constraint is a result of postulate 4.3 in chapter 4. 
 
Stereotype Description 
«kind»
A  
A «kind» represents a substance sortal whose instances are functional 
complexes. Examples include instances of Natural Kinds (such as 
Person, Dog, Tree) and of artifacts (Chair, Car, Television). 
Table 8-1  Ontologically 
Well-Founded UML 
modelling profile 
according to the 
ontological categories of 
figure 8.3 
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Stereotype Description 
«quantity»
A  
  
A «quantity» represents a substance sortal whose instances are 
quantities. Examples are those stuff universals that are typically referred 
in natural language by mass general terms (e.g., Gold, Water, Sand, 
Clay). 
 
Stereotype Description 
«collective»
A  
A «collective» represents a substance sortal whose instances are 
collectives, i.e., they are collections of complexes that have a uniform 
structure. Examples include a deck of cards, a forest, a group of people, 
a pile of bricks. Collectives can typically relate to complexes via a 
constitution relation. For example, a pile of bricks that constitutes a wall, 
a group of people that constitutes a football team. In this case, the 
collectives typically have an extensional principle of identity, in contrast 
to the complexes they constitute. For instance, The Beatles was in a 
given world w constituted by the collective {John, Paul, George, Pete} 
and in another world w constituted by the collective {John, Paul, 
George, Ringo}. The replacement of Pete Best by Ringo Star does not 
alter the identity of the band, but creates a numerically different group of 
people.   
Constraints 
 
1. A collective can be extensional. In this case the meta-attribute isExtensional defined in 
figure 8.4 is equal to True. This means that all its parts are essential and the change (or 
destruction) of any of its parts terminates the existence of the collective. We use the symbol 
{extensional} to represent an extensional collective.  
 
Stereotype Description 
«subkind»
A  
A
 
A «subkind» is a rigid, relationally independent restriction of a substance 
sortal that carries the principle of identity supplied by it. An example 
could be the subkind MalePerson of the kind Person. In general, the 
stereotype «subkind» can be omitted in conceptual models without loss 
of clarity. 
 
Constraints 
 
1. Following postulate 4.3, a «subkind» cannot have as a supertype (must not include in its 
general collection) a member of {«phase», «role», «roleMixin»}. 
 
Stereotype Description 
«phase»
A  
 
A «phase» represents the phased-sortals phase, i.e. anti-rigid and 
relationally independent universals defined as part of a partition of a 
substance sortal. For instance, 〈Catterpillar, Butterfly〉 partitions the kind 
Lepdopterum. 
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Constraints 
 
1. Phases are anti-rigid universals and, thus, a «phase» cannot appear in a conceptual model 
as a supertype of a rigid universal (postulate 4.3);  
 
2. The phases {P1Pn} that form a phase-partition of a substance sortal S are represented 
in a class diagram as a disjoint and complete generalization set. In other words, a 
GeneralizationSet with (isCovering = true) and (isDisjoint = true) is used in a representation 
mapping as the representation for the ontological concept of a phase-partition. 
 
Stereotype Description 
«role»
A  
 
A «role» represents a phased-sortal role, i.e. anti-rigid and relationally 
dependent universal. For instance, the role student is played by an 
instance of the kind Person. 
Constraints 
 
1. Roles anti-rigid universals and, thus, a «role» cannot appear in a conceptual model as a 
supertype of a rigid universal (postulate 4.3);  
 
2. Let X be a class stereotyped as «role» and r be an association representing Xs restriction 
condition. Then, #X.r ≥ 1. This constraint is elaborated in the next section, after additional 
elements of the UML metamodel are considered.  
 
Metaclass Description 
Mixin Class Mixin Class is an abstract metaclass that represents the general 
properties of all mixins, i.e., non-sortals (or dispersive universals). Mixin 
Class has no concrete syntax. Thus, symbolic representations are 
defined by each of its concrete subclasses. 
Constraints 
 
1. Following postulate 4.4 we have that a class representing a non-sortal universal cannot be 
a subclass of a class representing a Sortal. As a consequence of this postulate we have that a 
mixin class cannot have as a supertype (must not include in its general collection) a member 
of {«kind», «quantity», «collective», «subkind», «phase», «role»}.  
 
2. Moreover, as a consequence of postulate 4.1, a non-sortal cannot have direct instances. 
Therefore, a mixin class must always be depicted as an abstract class (isAbstract = true). 
 
Stereotype Description 
«category»
A  
 
A «category» represents a rigid and relationally independent mixin, i.e., a 
dispersive universal that aggregates essential properties which are 
common to different substance sortals. For example, the category 
RationalEntity as a generalization of Person and IntelligentAgent. 
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Constraints 
 
1. As a consequence of this postulate and of postulate 4.3, we have that a «category» cannot 
have a «roleMixin» as a supertype. In other words, together with condition 1 for all mixins we 
have that a «category» can only be subsumed by another «category» or a «mixin».  
 
Stereotype Description 
«roleMixin»
A  
 
A «roleMixin» represents an anti-rigid and externally dependent non-
sortal, i.e., a dispersive universal that aggregates properties which are 
common to different roles. In includes formal roles such as whole and 
part, and initiatior and responder. 
Constraints 
 
1. Let X be a class stereotyped as «roleMixin» and r be an association representing Xs 
restriction condition. Then, #X.r ≥ 1. The latter constraint is elaborated in the next section, 
after additional elements of the UML metamodel are introduced.     
 
Stereotype Description 
«mixin»
A  
 
A «mixin» represents properties which are essential to some of its 
instances and accidental to others (semi-rigidity).  An example is the 
mixin Seatable, which represents a property that can be considered 
essential to the kinds Chair and Stool, but accidental to Crate, Paper Box 
or Rock. 
Constraints 
 
1. Due to postulates 4.3, we have that a «mixin» cannot have a «roleMixin» as a 
supertype. 
 
8.2 Classifiers and Properties 
8.2.1 The UML Metamodel 
Classifier is an abstract metaclass in the UML metamodel aimed at describing 
some general aspects that are common to all its subclasses, such as the 
mechanisms for participating in generalization hierarchies and for 
properties description.  
A classifier can posses a number of features. A Feature represents some 
(behavioral or structural) characteristic that is common to all possible 
instances of its featuring classifiers. A structural feature is special type of 
feature that specializes both typed element and multiplicity element. As a 
consequence, it can impose a number of constraints on the range and type 
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of the values that can be assigned to a given feature of its associated 
classifiers at instantiation time.  
Structural feature is an abstract metaclass. Its most important subclass 
for the present discussion is property. When a property is owned by a class, 
an interface or data type it represents an attribute of that classifier. In this case 
it relates an instance of the classifier to a value of the type of the attribute. 
For instance, the property color can be defined as an attribute of class Apple. 
This property can have a name (since it is a named element), a type (e.g., 
the dataType colorValue as an enumeration of the colors black, white, blue, 
yellow, red, green), and a multiplicity (e.g., one-to-one). Therefore, every 
instance of apple must instantiate exactly one value of type colorValue for the 
property color.  
Class
Classifier
isDerived:Boolean = false
isReadOnly:Boolean = false
/isComposite:Boolean
Property
0..1
/attribute
*
Association
Relationship
memberEnd
0..1
2..*
StructuralFeature
name:String[0..1]
NamedElement
Element
TypedElementType
0..1
Feature
DataType
/upper:UnlimitedNatural [0..1]
/lower:Integer [0..1]
MultiplicityElement
0..1
ownedEnd *
{subsets 
memberEnd}
Interface
AssociationClass
/endType
1..*
0..1
none
shared
composite
«enumeration»
AggregationKindaggregation
1
 
A property is qualified according to two meta-attributes, namely, isReadOnly 
and isDerived. If the first attribute has the value true it means that the value of 
the property cannot be changed once it has been assigned an initial value. 
The second attribute indicates whether the property is derived, i.e., 
whether its value can be computed from other information in the model. 
For instance, a description of the class Person can contain the attribute data 
of birth, and the derivable attribute age, which is derived from the former for 
each given circumstance. The default value of both meta-attributes is false.   
When related to an association, a property represents an association end 
of that association. An association describes a set of tuples whose values 
Figure 8-5  Excerpt of 
the UML metamodel 
featuring classifiers  
and Properties 
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refer to typed instances. An instance of an association is called a link. Every 
association must have at least two association ends represented by 
properties, each of which is connected to the type of that property, which 
becomes therefore the type of the association end. Associations can be type 
reflexive, i.e., more than one association end of the same association may 
have the same type. In figure 8.5, association has two different relations with 
the metaclass property: one via memberEnd and another via ownedEnd. As 
represented in this model, the extension of the second one is a subset of 
that of the first. The first relation represents the association ends that are in 
fact owned by one of the associated classifiers. These are termed navigable 
ends and they are semantically equivalent to attributes, thus, merely 
representing an alternative notation. In contrast, in the association 
connected to ownedEnd, the properties represent type and cardinality 
restrictions for the possible tuples that instantiate that association. Figure 
8.6 below exemplifies a navigable end use as an alternative notation for a 
classifiers attribute. 
age:Natural
Person Person «datatype»Natural
age
1
(a) (b)  
An association may be refined to have its own set of attributes, i.e., 
attributes that do not belong to any of the connected classifiers but rather 
to the association itself. Such an association is called an association class. An 
association class is both a kind of association and a kind of a class. As an 
association it can connect a set of classifiers; as class it can have its own 
attributes and participate in other associations. Graphically, it is shown in a 
class diagram as a class symbol attached to the association path by a dashed 
line. Despite of being graphically distinct, the association path and the 
association class symbol represent the same underlying model element, 
which has a single name. An example of an association class is depicted in 
figure 8.7 below. 
Customer Supplier
day:Day
monty:Month
year:Year
«datatype»
Date
1..* 1..*
SupplyContract
*
startDate
1
* endDate 1
 
Figure 8-6  Navigable 
End as an alternative 
notation for representing 
an Attribute 
Figure 8-7  Exemple of 
an Association Class and 
its owned attributes 
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In the example above, Date is an illustration of a data type. According to the 
UML specification a data type is a type whose values have no identity (i.e., they 
are pure values)so two occurrences of the same value cannot be differentiated. A 
DataType defines a kind of classifier in which operations are all pure functions (i.e., 
they can return data values but they cannot change [them). They are usually] used for 
specification of the type of an attribute. [Additionally, DataTypes] may have an 
algebra and operations defined outside of UML, for example, mathematically. 
[Finally, as any classifier,] a DataType may also contain attributes to support the 
modeling of structured data types. 
 The remaining type of classifier to be discussed is the metaclass Interface. 
An interface is a declaration of a coherent set of features and obligations. It 
can be seen as a kind of contract that partitions and characterizes groups of 
properties that must be fulfilled by any instance of a classifier that 
implements that interface. The obligations that may be associated with an 
interface are in the form of various kinds of constraints (such as pre- and 
postconditions) or protocol specifications, which may impose ordering 
restrictions on interactions through the interface. Since interfaces are 
merely declarations, they are non instantiable model elements. That is to 
say that an interface cannot have direct instances, but only via their 
implementing classifiers. Figure 8.8 below shows an interface (Seatable), 
which is realized by two different classes: Crate and Stool. By implementing 
this interface, these classes commit to provide mechanisms for maintaining 
the information corresponding to the type and multiplicity of the property and facilitate 
retrieval and modification of that information. 
Crate Stool
maximumWeight(Kg):WeightValue
«interface»
Seatable
 
8.2.2 Ontological Interpretation and Re-Design 
In section 8.1.2, in an interpretation mapping from the UML metamodel 
to our foundational ontology, we have mapped the UML class to the 
ontological category of monadic universals. However, we have focused our 
discussion on the subcategory of substantial universals. The other kind of 
monadic universal prescribed by our theory is Moment Universal.  
 The category of moment universal along with other ontological 
categories which are relevant for the discussion carried out on this section 
are depicted in figure 8.9 below. 
 Moment universals can be differentiated from their substantial 
counterparts as follows: a moment universal has the characteristic that all its 
instances inheres in and, thus, is externally existentially dependent on some 
other individual. 
Figure 8-8  Example of 
an Interface and its 
implementing classifiers 
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 Within the category of moment universals we can use a different 
criterion to differentiate among its subcategories. An Intrinsic moment 
universal is a universal which instances are existentially dependent of a 
single entity (named its bearer). A Relator universal, conversely, is one 
which instances are existentially dependent of a plurality of entities. Both 
types of entities are fundamental from an ontological and conceptual point 
of view. Intrinsic moments constitute a foundation for attributes and 
comparative formal relations, but also weak entities and qua individuals. Qua 
individuals, in turn, constitute a foundation for material roles. Relators are 
the foundation of material relations.  
Monadic Universal
Moment Universal
Intrinsic Moment Universal Relator Universal
*
feature1..*
< characterization
1..*
*
< mediation
1..*
1
< derivation
Object Universal
Sortal
Non-Sortal
Role
RoleMixin
Universal
1..*
*
mediation >
1..*
*
mediation >
Relation Material Relation
Formal Relation
Entity Abstract Set
Quality Structure
Attribute Function
*
*
subsetOf
Quality Universal Mode Universal
Quality Domain
Quality Dimension
 
In a representation mapping from our reference ontology to the UML 
metamodel, we realize that there are no constructs that represent the 
ontological categories of mode universals and relator universals in the UML 
metamodel. Once more, there are ontological concepts prescribed by our 
theory that are not represented by any modeling construct in the language, 
i.e., another case of construct incompleteness at the modeling language 
level. 
According to postulate 6.1, universals of the domain should be 
represented in a conceptual model as Classes. We therefore propose an 
extension of the original UML metamodel of figure 8.5 to incorporate 
Figure 8-9  Relations, 
Moments, Quality 
Structures and related 
categories 
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these entities. Additionally, in a profile implementing this extended 
metamodel, we include two other stereotyped classes (base class UML 
class) to represent these entities. Mode universals are represented via a class 
decorated with the «mode» stereotype. Relator Universals are represented 
via the stereotype «relator».  
Quality universals are typically not represented in a conceptual model 
explicitly but via attribute functions that map each of their instances to points 
in a quality structure (see discussion on chapter 6). For example, suppose 
we have the universal Apple (a substantial universal) whose instances 
exemplify the universal Weight. We say in this case that the quality 
universal Weight characterizes the substantial universal Apple. Thus, for an 
arbitrary instance x of Apple there is a quality w (instance of the quality 
universal Weight) that inheres in x. Associated with the universal Weight, 
and in the context of a given measurement system (e.g., the human 
perceptual system), there is a quality dimension weightValue, which is a set 
isomorphic to the half line of positive integers obeying the same ordering 
structure. Quality structures are taken here to be theoretical abstract 
entities modeled as sets. In this case, we can define an attribute function 
(another abstract theoretical entity) weight(Kg), which maps each instance of 
apple (and in particular x) onto a point in a quality dimension, i.e., its 
qualia.   
Following principle 6.2 (section 6.3.2), attribute functions are 
therefore the ontological interpretation of UML attributes, i.e., UML 
Properties which are owned by a given classifier. That is, an attribute of a 
class C representing a universal U is interpreted as an attribute function 
derived from the elementary specification of the universal U.  
As any property, a UML attribute is a typed element and, thus, it is 
associated to Type. Type constrains the sort of entities that can be assigned 
to slots representing that attribute in instances of their owning classifier. 
Since Classifier is a specialization of Type, we have that both Classes and 
Datatypes can be the associated types of an UML attribute. In other words, 
an attribute represents both an attribute function and a sort of a relational 
image function69 that, for example, in binary relation ownership between the 
classifiers Person and Car, maps a particular Person p to all instances of Car 
that are associated with p via this relation (i.e., all cars owned by p). From a 
software design and implementation point of view, an attribute represents a 
method implemented by the owning class, and the type of the attribute 
                                                      
69In LINGO (Guizzardi & Falbo & Gonçalves, 2002), for instance, a relational image 
function is formally defined as follows: Let R be a binary relation defined for the two sets X 
and Y. The function Im with signature Im(_,_): X × (X ⇔ Y) →℘(Y) is defined as 
Im(x,R) = {y | (x,y) ∈ R}.  
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represents the returning type of that method. However, from a conceptual 
point of view, in the UML metamodel an attribute stands both for a 
monadic (instrinsic) and for a relational property and, thus, it can be 
considered a case of construct overload. To eliminate this problem, we 
prescribe that attributes should only be used to represent attribute 
functions. As consequence, their associated types should be restricted to 
DataTypes only. Attributes whose associated types are classes (known as 
mappings in the object-orientation literature) (see for instance Bock & 
Odell, 1997b) are more important from a design and implementation point 
of view than from a conceptual one. We propose here a different treatment 
of relational properties, which is discussed latter in this section.                   
The DataType associated with an attribute A of class C is the 
representation of the quality structure that is the co-domain of the attribute 
function represented by A (postulate 6.2). In other words, a quality 
structure is the ontological interpretation of the UML DataType construct. 
Moreover, we have that a multidimensional quality structure (quality 
domain) is the ontological interpretation of the so-called Structured 
DataTypes (postulate 6.3).  
Quality domains are composed of multiple integral dimensions. This 
means that the value of one dimension cannot be represented without 
representing the values of others. The fields of a datatype representing a 
quality domain QD represent each of its integral quality dimensions. 
Alternatively we can say that each field of a datatype should always be 
interpreted as representing one of the integral dimensions of the QD 
represented by the datatype. The constructor method of the datatype 
representing a quality domain must reinforce that its tuples always have 
values for all the integral dimensions. Finally, an algebra can be defined for 
a DataType so that the relations constraining and informing the geometry of 
represented quality dimensions are also suitably characterized.   
UML offers an alternative notation for the representation of attributes, 
namely, navigable end names. That is, the same ontological concept (attribute 
function) is represented in the language via more than one construct, which 
characterizes construct redundancy. This situation could be justified from a 
pragmatic point of view if navigable ends were used to model only 
structured DataTypes (as in figure 8.7), and if the textual notation for 
attributes were only used to model the simple ones (e.g., figure 8.6.a). 
However, as exemplified in figure 8.6, there is no constraint on using both 
notations for both purposes. To eliminate the potential ambiguity of this 
situation, we propose to use navigable ends to represent only attribute 
functions whose co-domains are multidimensional quality structures (quality 
domains). Conversely, those functions whose co-domains are quality 
dimensions should only be represented by the attributes textual notation.  
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According to the UML specification, a dataType is a type whose values 
have no identity (i.e., they are pure values)so two occurrences of the same value 
cannot be differentiated. What exactly is meant by have no identity here? 
Take for instance, the DataType Integer. It is clear that the member values 
of this DataType have identity in the usual sense of the term, i.e., identity 
statements such as (1=1) and ¬(1=2) are not only meaningful but also 
determinate. However, it is also true that two occurrences of the integer 1 
refer to exactly the same entity. So, a better statement would be that 
different occurrences of the same DataType value do not have a separate 
identity. A universal U (represented by a UML Class) is multiply 
exemplified in each of its numerically distinct instances. A DataType is an 
abstract entity that collects other abstract entities (pure values) that can be 
multiply referred. A DataType is therefore not a multiply instantiated 
universal but an individual (set) with other individuals as members.         
The ontological category of relations can be mapped in a representation 
mapping onto the UML concept of associations. Relations can be material or 
formal. The latter in turn can be subdivided in basic formal relations 
(internal relations) and comparative formal relations. Alternatively we can 
classify relations in basic relations and derived relations. The latter includes 
both comparative formal relations (derived from the relations among 
certain qualities) and material relations (derived from relator universals).  
Since class diagrams only represent universals, the only basic formal 
relations among the ones we have considered that should have a 
representation in these models are the relations of characterization, mediation 
and derivation. These concepts have no representation in the UML 
metamodel, which characterizes another case of construct incompleteness. 
Once more we propose an extension of the UML metamodel of figure 8.5 
to include associations (i.e., extensions of the UML association metaclass) 
to represent these ontological distinctions. Moreover, in a profile 
implementing this extended metamodel, we include stereotyped 
associations (i.e., the base class is the UML association) to represent these 
newly introduced formal relations. The relations of characterization and 
mediation are represented by the stereotyped associations 
«characterization» and «mediation», respectively. The relation of derivation 
has a special notation discussed later in this section. 
Object universals are characterized by intrinsic moment universals. As 
previously discussed, in the modelling profile proposed in this section, 
quality universals are not explicit represented in conceptual specifications. 
In contrast, mode universals are represented via a class decorated with the   
«mode» stereotype.  The formal relation of characterization that takes place 
between a mode universal and the universal it characterizes is explicitly 
represented by an association stereotyped as «characterization». 
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Associations stereotyped as «characterization» must have in one of its 
association ends a class stereotyped as «mode» representing the 
characterizing mode universal. Likewise, every «mode» must be an 
association end for one «characterization» relation.  
The characterization relation between a mode universal and the universal 
it characterizes is mapped at the instance level onto an inherence relation 
between the corresponding individual modes and their bearer objects. That 
means that every instance m of a class M stereotyped as «mode» is 
existentially dependent of an individual c, which is an instance of the class C 
related to M via the «characterization» relation. Inherence has the following 
characteristics: (a) it is a sort of existential dependence relation; (b) it is a 
binary formal relation; (c) it is a functional relation. These three 
characteristics impose the following metamodel constraints on the                          
«characterization» construct:  
 
1. by (a) and (c), the association end connected to the characterized 
universal must have the cardinality constraints of one and exactly one 
(lower = upper = 1);  
2. by (a), the association end connected to the characterized universal must 
have the meta-attribute (isreadOnly = true);  
3. «characterization» associations are always binary associations 
(#memberEnd = #ownedEnd = 2). 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, there are no optional properties. For this 
reason, the «characterization» relation must also have a minimum 
cardinality of one on the association end connected to the mode universal. 
For example, if the universal Patient is characterized by the mode universal 
Symptom, then every instance x of patient must bear an instance y of 
symptom. As a consequence we have the following additional constraint: 
 
4. In a «characterization» relation, the association end connected to the 
characterizing quality universal must have the minimum cardinality 
constraints of one (lower = 1).  
 
An analogous case can be made for attributes. For example, since every 
apple bears a color quality, and every color quality has a value on the color 
domain, ergo, the corresponding attribute function is a total function. Thus,  
 
5. A property owned by a classifier (representing an attribute of that class) 
must have the minimum cardinality constraints of one (lower = 1).  
  
Finally, this constraint also holds for DataTypes. As previously 
mentioned, the fields of a structured DataType represent the integral 
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quality dimensions that compose the quality domain represented by this 
DataType. By its very definition, a quale in a quality domain must have 
values for all integral dimensions that compose that domain.  
As discussed in section 6.3.3, the association class construct in UML 
exemplifies a case of construct overload, since an associaton class can have 
as instances either (a) a n-tuple of entities which classifiers are endpoints of 
the association; (b) a n+1-tuple containing the entities which classifiers are 
endpoints of the association plus an instance of the objectified association 
itself (Breu et al., 1997). This is to say that an association class can be 
interpreted both as a relational universal and as a factual universal. In addition 
to that, since the instance of the objectified association itself is supposed to be 
an object identifier for the n-tuple, one cannot represent cases in which the 
same relator mediates multiple occurrences of the same n-tuple. Therefore, 
association classes on one hand represent a case of construct overload, on 
the other land, allow for a case of construct incompleteness at the instance 
level. We propose, therefore, to disallow the use of association classes in 
UML for the purpose of conceptual modeling. 
In contrast, we propose to represent relational properties explicitly. 
We use the stereotype «relator» to represent the ontological category of 
relator universals. Relator universals can induce material relations. For 
instance, if there is a particular Marriage m connecting two persons a and b, 
we then can say that these persons stand up in a married-to relation, or that 
derived-from([a,b],m) holds. We say that a derivation relation holds between 
two universals F and G iff F is material relation (relational universal); G is a 
relator universal; For every instance x of F there is an instance y of G such 
that derived-from(x,y) holds.   
A material relation induced by a relator universal R is represented by a 
UML association stereotyped as «material» (UML base class association). 
The basic formal relation derivation is represented by a dashed line with a 
black circle in one of the ends. A derivation relation is a specialized type of 
relationship between the stereotyped association representing the derived 
«material» association and the stereotyped class representing the founding 
«relator» universal. The black circle represents the role of foundation of the 
relator universal side. Every «material» association must be the association 
end of exactly one derivation relation.  
The use of a different style of concrete syntax for the derivation 
relation than the one adopted for the other formal relations could in 
principle introduce some pragmatic inefficient, since the use of different 
syntax could allow for the misleading implicature (see chapter 2) that the 
represented entity belongs to a different ontological category. However, we 
believe that the drawback of this choice could be compensated by the 
benefit of using a syntax which is already familiar to UML users.               
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Derivation is a (total) functional relation and also a type of existential 
dependency. For this reason we have that every n-tuple x instance of a 
material relation F is derived from exactly one relator individual r and 
existentially dependent on the latter. As a consequence, the black circle end 
of the derivation relation must obey the following constraints: (a) have the 
cardinality constraints of one and exactly one (lower = upper = 1); (b) 
have the (isreadOnly = true).  
The formal mediation relation between a relator universal and the 
universals it mediates is mapped onto the instance level to a mediation (m) 
relation between the corresponding individuals. That means that every 
instance r of a class R stereotyped as    «relator» is existentially dependent 
of the individuals c1.cn instances of the classes C1C2 connected to R via 
the «mediation» relation. Mediation (as much as inherence) is a type of 
(binary) existential dependence relation, which imposes the following 
constraints on its representation:  
 
1. the association ends owned by each of the mediated universals must 
have the minimum cardinality constraints of at least one (lower = 1);  
2. the association ends owned by of the mediated universals must have the 
(isreadOnly = true);  
3. «mediation» associations are always binary associations (#memberEnd 
= #ownedEnd = 2). 
 
Moreover, since a relator is dependent (mediates) on at least two 
numerically distinct entities, we have the following additional constraint: 
 
1. Let R be a relator universal and let {C1C2} be a set of universals 
mediated by R (related to R via a «mediation» relation). Finally, let 
lowerCi be the value of the minimum cardinality constraint of the 
association end connected to Ci in the «mediation» relation. Then, we 
have that  
(∑
=
n
i 1
lowerCi) ≥ 2 . 
Let us suppose that R is a relator universal and that a mediation relation 
holds between R and the universals F and G (see figure 8.10). This means 
that for every instance r::R there is at least one f::F and one g::F such that 
m(r,f) and m(r,g). Now, let H be the material relation between F and G 
derived from R. Then we have that for every r::R there is at least one pair 
[f,g]::H such that derived-from([f,g],r) holds. As a direct consequence, the 
association end connected to H in the derivation relation must have the 
minimum cardinality constraint of one (lower = 1).   
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Still on figure 8.10, from the cardinality constraints of the two             
«mediation» relations we can derive the maximum cardinality of the 
derivation relation (on the material relation end) and the cardinality 
constrains on both association ends of the material relation itself. For 
instance, the upper constraint δ on the end connected to G in the H 
relation is the result of (d × h); the upper constraint β in the end connected 
to F is the result of (f × b). The upper constraint φ in the end H of the 
derivation relation is the result of (b × h). Likewise, we can calculate the 
derived minimum cardinality constraints in the following manner: γ = c × 
g; α = e × a, and ε = a × g. 
F G
«mediation»«mediation» «relator»
R
«material»
/H
c..d
a..b
e..f
g..h
 
Two alternative versions of a concrete example of this situation are depicted 
in figures 8.11.a and 8.11.b below. However, due to the lack of expressivity 
of the traditional UML association notation, these two models seem to 
convey the same information (from the perspective of the material relation 
supervised-by), although they describe completely different 
conceptualizations. As discussed in section 6.3.3, the benefits of explicitly 
representing relator universals instead of merely representing material 
relations, becomes even more evident in n-ary relations with n > 2. 
«role»
GraduateStudent
«kind»
Supervisor
«mediation»«mediation» «relator»
Assignment
«material»
/supervised-by
1..*
1
1..*
1
1..*
1
«role»
GraduateStudent
«role»
Supervisor
«mediation»«mediation» «relator»
Assignment
1..* 1..*
«material»
1..*
1..*
1..*
1..*
/supervised-by
(a) (b)  
Once more we should highlight that the relator individual is the actual 
instantiation of the corresponding relational property (the objectified 
relation). Material relations stand merely for the facts derived from the 
relator individual and its mediating entities. Therefore, we claim that the 
representation of the relators of material relations must have primacy over 
the representation of the material relations themselves. In other words, the 
representation of «material» relations can be omitted but whenever a               
Figure 8-10  Material 
Relations and their 
founding relators (the 
cardinality constraints of 
the derived relation and 
the derivation relation 
itself can be calculated 
from the corresponding 
mediation relations 
involving the founding 
relators) 
Figure 8-11  
Examplification of how 
relators can 
disambiguate two 
conceptualizations that 
in the standard UML 
notation would have the 
same interpretation 
ε..φ 
α..β γ..δ 
1..* 
1..* 
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«material» is represented it must be connected to an association end of a 
derivation relation.  
We use the stereotype «formal» to represent domain formal relations. 
Comparative formal relations and material relations are derived relations. 
Whilst the former are derived from intrinsic properties of the related 
entities, the latter are derived from relational properties and their 
mediating entities. Therefore, we prescribe that «material» must have the 
meta-attribute (isDerived = true). Analogously, we use the meta-attribute 
(isDerived = true) to represent formal relations which are not internal 
relations, i.e., which are comparative. 
Once more we should emphasize that there are no optional properties, 
e.g., there is nothing which has the optional property of being married. For 
this reason, «mediation» relations must have a minimum cardinality of one 
on the association end connected to the relator universal. For example, in 
figure 8.11, since the universal Supervisor is mediated by the relator 
universal Assignment, then every instance x of supervisor must have a m(y,x) 
relation with an instance y of assignment. A direct consequence of this rule 
is that the minimum cardinality constraints on both ends of the supervised-by 
material relation (derived from Assignment) must also have a value of at 
least one. The same applies to the association end connected to the material 
relation (supervised-by) in the derivation relation.  
This is especially evident when the mediated entities are Role classifiers. 
Take, for instance, the examples of figure 8.11. As discussed in chapter 4, a 
role is a restriction of kind by means of a relational restriction condition. 
For instance, a supervisor is a Person who supervises graduate students. Thus, being 
related to an assignment is part of the very definition of the universal 
supervisor (in this conceptualization). As we have elaborated in chapter 7, 
for x to be a role individual, then there must a role qua individual y such that 
i(y,x). However, a role qua individual must be part of a relator. In fact, if x 
is an individual such that there is a qua individual y which inheres in x and 
which is part of a relator z then x is mediated by z (see chapter 6). As a 
consequence, we have that for every role individual x there must be a relator 
individual z that mediates x.  
We can thus define the following constraints: 
 
1. In a «mediation» relation, the association end connected to the relator 
universal must have the minimum cardinality constraints of one (lower 
= 1);  
2. Every relationally dependent entity (role and role mixins) must be 
connected to an association end of a «mediation» relation. 
 
Finally, in figure 8.5, we have a last subtype of classifier, namely, the 
meta-construct Interface. According to the UML specification, an interface 
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is a declaration of a coherent set of features and obligations. It can be seen 
as a kind of contract that partitions and characterizes groups of properties 
which must be fulfilled by any instance of a classifier that implements that 
interface. In an interpretation mapping from the UML metamodel to the 
ontology of figure 8.9, an interface qualifies as a case of construct excess. 
This means that, being merely a design and implementation construct, 
there is no category in the conceptual modeling ontology proposed here 
that serve as the ontological interpretation for the UML interface. For this 
reason, we propose that the use of this construct should be disallowed in an 
ontologically well-founded version of UML that is suitable for conceptual 
modeling. 
In this respect we therefore strongly disagree with the works of 
(Steimann, 2000a,b, 2001) that proposes that the ontological concept of 
roles can be the interpretation for the UML interface construct. As 
recognized by the UML specification itself, interfaces are merely 
declarations and, hence, non-instantiable model elements. Interfaces can be 
implemented by classes that obey different principles of identity. Thus, as a 
classifier, an interface can only be interpreted as a non-sortal. So, at most, it 
would be fair to propose the mapping from interface to the ontological 
category of role mixin. However, unlike role mixins, interfaces are neither 
necessarily relationally dependent nor anti-rigid. In summary, there is 
absolutely no ground to propose a (representation) mapping from an anti-
rigid, relationally dependent sortal to a non-sortal which is not necessarily 
any of these things. 
 In figure 8.12, we present a revision of the UML metamodel of figure 
8.5 that faithfully represents the ontological distinctions proposed in this 
section. All the different dependency relations discussed in this section, 
namely, characterization, mediation and derivation have in common that they 
are all directed binary relations. By distinguishing between domain 
associations and formal relations (represented by the directed binary 
relationship metaclass) in the extended metamodel we help to prevent the 
construction of unintended models, i.e., models that portrait state of affairs 
that are excluded by the underlying conceptualization (see chapter 3). In 
particular, we exclude the possibility of constructing models containing 
dependency relations with more than two association ends. In addition, all 
dependency relations on this meta-model stand for relations of existential 
dependence (i.e., rigid specific dependence). This is to say that, at the instance 
level, the dependent instance must be related to one and the same 
depended entity one in all possible worlds. As a consequence, the target 
meta-attribute of Dependency Relations in this meta-model is a readOnly 
meta-attribute, i.e., once assigned it cannot be modified. Finally, it is 
important to emphasize that this metamodel omits those elements which 
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have no ontological interpretation (interface), or which are ill-defined from 
an ontological point of view (association class). 
Association
Relationship
Element
isDerived:Boolean = false
isReadOnly:Boolean = false
endType:Type[0..1]
Property
StructuralFeature
/upper:UnlimitedNatural [0..1]
/lower:Integer [0..1]
MultiplicityElement
associationEnd
0..1 2..*
0..1
source 1
0..1
target 1
Directed Binary Relationship
Directed Relationship
Characterization Mediation
target:Property {readOnly}
Depedency Relationship
Derivation
Classifier
Relational Classifier
Class
Role RoleMixin Mode Relator
Type
Formal Association Material Association
{self.source.lowerBound() >= 1
self.target.lowerBound() >= 1}
Datatype
Object Class Moment Class
 
The UML metamodel elements proposed in this revised model together 
with their characterizing specific syntactical constraints are implemented in 
a modelling profile. This profile, which extends the one of table 8.1, is 
summarized in tables 8.2 and 8.3 below.  
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«role»
A  
Class Refinement of the definition of the «role» stereotype 
presented in table 8.1. 
Constraints 
 
1. Refinement of condition 2 of «role» stereotype on table 8.1: Every «role» class must be 
connected to an association end of a «mediation» relation; 
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«roleMixin»
A  
Class Refinement of the definition of the «roleMixin» stereotype 
presented in table 8.1. 
Constraints 
 
1. Refinement of condition 1 «roleMixin» stereotype on table 8.1: Every «roleMixin» class 
must be connected to an association end of a «mediation» relation; 
 
Figure 8-12  Revised 
Fragment of the UML 
2.0 metamodel 
according to the 
ontological categories of 
figure 8.9 
Table 8-2  Extension to 
the UML modelling 
profile of table 8.1 that 
implements the revised 
metamodel of figure 
8.12  
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Stereotype Base Class Description 
«mode»
A  
Class A «mode» universal is an intrinsic moment universal. 
Every instance of mode universal is existentially 
dependent of exactly one entity. Examples include 
skills, thoughts, beliefs, intentions, symptoms, private 
goals. 
Constraints 
 
1. Every «mode» must be (directly or indirectly) connected to an association end of at 
least one «characterization» relation; 
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«relator»
A  
Class A «relator» universal is a relational moment universal. 
Every instance of relator universal is existentially 
dependent of at least two distinct entities. Relators are 
the instantiation of relational properties such as 
marriages, kisses, handshakes, commitments, and 
purchases.  
Constraints 
 
1. Every «relator» must be (directly or indirectly) connected to an association end on at least 
one « mediation » relation; 
 
2. Let R be a relator universal and let {C1C2} be a set of universals mediated by R (related 
to R via a «mediation» relation). Finally, let lowerCi be the value of the minimum cardinality 
constraint of the association end connected to Ci in the «mediation» relation. Then, we have 
that  
(∑
=
n
i 1
lowerCi) ≥ 2 . 
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«mediation»
 
Dependency 
Relationship 
A «mediation» is a formal relation that takes place 
between a relator universal and the endurant 
universal(s) it mediates. For example, the universal 
Marriage mediates the role universals Husband and 
Wife, the universal Enrollment mediates Student and 
University, and the universal Covalent Bond mediates 
the universal Atom. 
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Constraints 
 
1. An association stereotyped as «mediation» must have in its source association end a class 
stereotyped as «relator» representing the corresponding relator universal 
(self.source.oclIsTypeOf(Relator)=true); 
  
2. The association end connected to the mediated universal must have the minimum 
cardinality constraints of at least one (self.target.lower ≥ 1);  
 
3. The association end connected to the mediated universal must have the property 
(self.target.isreadOnly = true);  
 
4. The association end connected to the relator universal must have the minimum cardinality 
constraints of at least one (self.source.lower ≥ 1). 
 
5. «mediation» associations are always binary associations. 
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«characterization» Dependency 
Relationship 
A «characterization» is a formal relation that takes 
place between a mode universal and the endurant 
universal this mode universal characterizes. For 
example, the universals Private Goal and Capability 
characterize the universal Agent. 
Constraints 
 
1. An association stereotyped as «characterization» must have in its source association end a 
class stereotyped as «mode» representing the characterizing mode universal 
(self.source.oclIsTypeOf(Mode)=true); 
 
2. The association end connected to the characterized universal must have the cardinality 
constraints of one and exactly one (self.target.lower = 1 and self.target.upper = 1); 
 
3. The association end connected to the characterizing quality universal (source association 
end) must have the minimum cardinality constraints of one (self.source.lower ≥ 1); 
 
4. The association end connected to the characterized universal must have the property 
(self.target.isreadOnly = true); 
 
5. « characterization » associations are always binary associations. 
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Stereotype Base Class Description 
Derivation Relation Dependency 
Relationship 
A derivation relation represents the formal relation of 
derivation that takes place between a material relation 
and the relator universal this material relation is 
derived from. Examples include the material relation 
married-to, which is derived from the relator universal 
Marriage, the material relation kissed-by, derived from 
the relator universal Kiss, and the material relation 
purchases-from, derived from the relator universal 
Purchase. 
Constraints 
 
1. A derivation relation must have one of its association ends connected to a relator 
universal (the black circle end) and the other one connected to a material relation 
(self.target.oclIsTypeOf(Relator)=true, self.source.oclIsTypeOf(Material Association)=true); 
 
2. derivation associations are always binary associations; 
 
3. The black circle end of the derivation relation must have the cardinality constraints of one 
and exactly one (self.target.lower = 1 and self.target.upper = 1);  
 
4. The black circle end of the derivation relation must have the property 
(self.target.isreadOnly = true); 
 
5. The cardinality constraints of the association end connected to the material relation in a 
derivation relation are a product of the cardinality constraints of the «mediation» relations of 
the relator universal that this material relation derives from. This is done in the manner 
previously shown in this section. However, since «mediation» relations require a minimum 
cardinality of one on both of its association ends, then the minimum cardinality on the 
material relation end of a derivation relation must also be ≥ 1 (self.source.lower ≥ 1). 
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«material»
 
Association A «material» association represents a material relation, 
i.e., a relational universal which is induced by a relator 
universal. Examples include student studies in 
university, patient is treated in medical unit, person is 
married to person. 
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Constraints 
 
1. Every «material» association must be connected to the association end of exactly one 
derivation relation; 
 
2. The cardinality constraints of the association ends of a material relation are derived from 
the cardinality constraints of the «mediation» relations of the relator universal that this 
material relation is derived from. This is done in the manner shown in this section. However, 
since «mediation» relations require a minimum cardinality of one on both of its association 
ends, then the minimum cardinality constraint on each end of the derived material relation 
must also be ≥ 1 ; 
 
3. Every «material» association must have the property (isDerived = true).     
 
Stereotype Base Class Description 
«formal»
 
Association A «formal» association represents a formal relation, 
i.e., either a comparative relation (derived from 
intrinsic properties of the relating entities), or an 
internal relation. Examples include Person is older than 
Person, an Atom is heavier than another atom. We use 
UML symbolic representation for derived relations ( / ) 
to represent comparative relations.  
 
Metaclass Description 
Property  An attribute in the UML metamodel is a property owned by a classifier. 
Attributes are used in this profile to represent attribute functions derived for 
quality universals. Examples are the attributes color, age, and startingDate. 
Constraints 
 
1. A property owned by a classifier (representing an attribute of that classifier) must have the 
minimum cardinality constraints of one (self.lower ≥ 1). 
 
Table 8-3  A constraint 
on properties 
representing attributes 
which is incorporated in 
this modelling profile  
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Finally, in the UML 2.0, it is possible to apply a profile to a model, and 
indicate whether the model only have stereotypes of the profile or whether 
elements of the reference metamodel (e.g., the metamodel of figure 8.5) 
are still allowed. This option can be used in models adopting the profile 
proposed in this section to disallow the use of interfaces and association 
classes.  
8.3 Aggregation and Composition 
8.3.1 The UML Metamodel 
We refer once again to the metamodel fragment depicted in figure 8.5, but 
now with the focus on the representation of part-whole relations in UML.  
A part-whole relation is specified in UML in the following manner: An 
association may represent an aggregation; that is, a whole/part relationship. In this 
case, the association-end attached to the whole element is designated, and the other 
association-end of the association represents the parts of the aggregation. Only binary 
associations may be aggregations. 
Every member end of an association (being a property) has an attribute 
named aggregation. This attribute indicates whether that association 
represents a part-whole relation and, if so, which kind of part-whole 
relation. The possible values that this attribute can assume are specified in 
the enumeration AggregationKind. They are:  
 
1. none: indicates that the property has no aggregation, i.e., that the 
association that has this property as a member end does not represent a 
part-whole relation. This is the default value for this property;  
 
2. shared: indicates that the property has a shared aggregation and, 
consequently, that the corresponding association represents a shareable 
part-whole relation; 
 
3. composite: indicates that the property has a non-shared aggregation 
and, consequently, that the corresponding association represents a non-
shareable part-whole relation (composition). Composition is 
represented by the isComposite meta-attribute on the part end of the 
association being set to true. 
 
The UML specification defines the following semantics for composition: 
Composite aggregation is a strong form of aggregation, which requires that a part 
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instance be included in at most one composite at a time and that the composite object 
has sole responsibility for the disposition of its parts. This means that the composite 
object is responsible for the creation and destruction of the parts. In implementation 
terms, it is responsible for their memory allocation. If a composite object is destroyed, it 
must destroy all of its parts. It may remove a part and give it to another composite 
object, which then assumes responsibility for it. If the multiplicity from a part to 
composite is zero-to-one, the composite may remove the part, and the part may assume 
responsibility for itself, otherwise it may not live apart from a composite. 
Conversely, a shareable aggregation is defined as follows: A shareable 
aggregation denotes weak ownership; that is, the part may be included in several 
aggregates and its owner may also change over time. However, the semantics of a 
shareable aggregation does not imply deletion of the parts when an aggregate 
referencing it is deleted. 
In terms of primary meta-properties, both kinds of aggregations define a 
transitive, antisymmetry relationship; that is, the instances form a directed, non-cyclic 
graph. Composition instances form a strict tree (or rather a forest). 
 A part-whole relation is by default expressed as an aggregation in the 
UML. Otherwise, if the parts in the part-whole relation are non-shareable, 
then the relation is expressed as a composition (black-diamond). The use of 
composition implies the maximum cardinality of 1 w.r.t. the whole. An 
example of part-whole relation with shareable parts is the relation between 
researchers and research groups (researchers can be part of several research 
groups) depicted in figure 8.13.a. Conversely, the relation between a 
person and her heart (e.g., figure 8.13.b) is an instance of a non-shareable 
part-whole relation70. Finally, figure 8.13.c depicts a case of non-shareable 
parthood with optional wholes. 
Research Group Researcher
Person Heart
Car Engine
1..* 1..*
1 1
0..1 1  
                                                      
70 We assume here a conceptualization in which a human heart cannot be shared by more 
than one human body, thus, excluding the case of Siamese Twins. Once more, the example 
is used here for illustration purposes only and not to defend a particular ontological 
commitment.  
Figure 8-13  Part-Whole 
relations with: (a) 
shareable part; (b) non-
shareable part and 
mandatory whole; (c) 
mandatory part and 
optional whole  
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8.3.2 Ontological Interpretation and Re-Design 
In spite of being a small fragment of the UML metamodel, this part relative 
to the modeling of part-whole relations poses a number of serious 
difficulties from a conceptual modelling point of view. 
 To start with, UML defines only one general sort of parthood relation, 
which can, in turn, be qualified in two types, namely aggregation and 
composition. This is because the UML metamodel considers only one 
equally general notion of objects, i.e., it is insensible to the ontological 
distinctions among types of substantial individuals. 
 As discussed extensively in chapter 5, in our ontology we consider four 
sorts of conceptual parthood relations, based on the type of entities they 
relate, namely, (a) subQuantityOf, which relates individuals that are 
quantities; (b) subCollectionOf, which relates individuals that are collectives; 
(c) memberOf, which relates individuals that are functional complexes or 
collectives as parts of individuals that are collectives; (d) componentOf, which 
relates individuals that are functional complexes.  
 These different sorts of conceptual parthood relations are depicted in 
Figure 8.14 below. These different relations between objects are 
specializations of a more abstract partOf relation defined to hold between 
entities in general. 
Object
Quantity
*
* subQuantityOf
Collective
*
* subCollectionOf
Complex
*
* componentOf
1..*
memberOf
Entity
*
*
partOf
ComplexMember
CollectiveMember
Member
{disjoint, complete}
2..*
 
In a first analysis, the general notion of aggregation in UML can be thought 
to represent the partOf relation in this ontology. In UML, the general 
aggregation is an asymmetric and transitive relation, but it is not said to be 
irreflexive. This is because, in contrast to the partOf relation, aggregation is a 
Figure 8-14  Different 
types of meronymic 
relations according to 
the ontological category 
of their relata 
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relation between types, not between tokens. Therefore, it is, in principle, 
conceivable that we have a relation which is type-reflexive but which is still 
irreflexive at the instance level (i.e., there is no instance that bears this 
relation to itself). 
The partOf relation is an anti-symmetric and non-transitive relation. Non-
transitivity means that transitivity holds for certain cases but not for others. 
The relation of partOf must be deemed non-transitive since: two of its 
subclasses are transitive (subQuantityOf and subCollectionOf), one is 
intransitive (memberOf), and one is itself non-transitive (componentOf). In 
addition, this relation obeys the irreflexivity axiom and weak supplementation 
principle (i.e., if x is a part of y then there must be a z disjoint of x, which 
also part of y - see chapter 5).  
We conclude then we cannot identify elements of the UML metamodel 
that can be used to represent neither the partOf relation nor any of its 
subclasses. Once more we have a case of construct incompleteness. We 
therefore propose an extension of the UML 2.0 metamodel depicted in 
figure 8.5 to include metaclasses that represent each of these concrete types 
of conceptual parthood relations.  
By far, the most commonly used of these relations in conceptual 
modeling is the componentOf relation. This is because functional complexes are 
also the most commonly represented entities in conceptual specifications. 
For this reason, we use the standard UML symbolic notation for 
aggregation to represent this relation.   
As any partOf relation, componentOf is an irreflexive and anti-symmetric 
relation, which obeys the weak supplementation principle. As a result of 
this last principle, we have the following constraint: Let U be a universal 
whose instances are functional complexes and let {C1C2} be a set of 
universals related to U via aggregation relations. Finally, let lowerCi be the 
value of the minimum cardinality constraint of the association end 
connected to Ci in the aggregation relation. Then, we have that  
(∑
=
n
i 1
lowerCi) ≥ 2 . 
Mutatis Mutandis, this constraint in fact holds for all types of partOf 
relations. 
The componentOf is a non-transitive relation. Transitivity holds only in 
certain contexts, which can be isolated by following certain model patterns 
defined in sections 5.6 and 7.4.         
In UML, only one of the secondary properties or part-whole relations 
is considered, namely exclusiveness (or shareability). A standard aggregation 
relation, represented as a hollow diamond in the association end 
representing the whole, stands for a non-exclusive (shareable) part-whole 
relation. The composition relation, represented as a black diamond in the 
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association end representing the whole, stands for an exclusive (non-
shareable) one instead. Despite making this distinction, the UML 
specification is not precise on what exactly the distinction is supposed to 
represent. Firstly, the specification states that composite aggregation is a 
strong form of aggregation, which requires that a part instance be included in at most 
one composite at a time. In the way it is stated, this sentence is simply wrong: 
since the composition relation is deemed transitive by the specification, an 
object x which is part of composite y is also part of any composite z of 
which y is part. Therefore, it cannot be a necessity for a part instance [to] be 
included in at most one composite at a time. Even if we ignore this problem as a 
formulation mistake, it is in principle still possible to interpret the non-
shareability requirement as a demand for global exclusiveness. Global 
exclusiveness is defined as follows (definition 5.7): (x <x y) =df (x < y) ∧ 
(∀z (x < z) → (z ≤ y) ∨ (y ≤ z)). This means that if x is an (globally) 
exclusive part of y, then if x is part of z (different from y) then either z is 
part of y, or y is part of z. As discussed in section 5.4.1, we adopt a weaker 
notion of exclusiveness, namely, one of exclusiveness w.r.t. to a given 
universal (or local exclusiveness). Therefore, if x of type X is an exclusive part 
of y of type Y, then there is no other z of type Y such that x is part of z. In 
summary, the composition relation in UML is taken here to represent an 
(locally) exclusive componentOf relation. 
Another problem with the UML concept of composition is that it 
merges two different ontological meta-properties, namely, exclusiveness and 
dependence. This in itself is a case of construct overload. However, the 
specification is even more ambiguous w.r.t. which kind of dependence 
relation is being considered. First, it states that the composite object is 
responsible for the creation and destruction of the parts If a composite object is 
destroyed, it must destroy all of its parts. This seems to imply that there is a 
specific dependence from the parts to the composite, i.e., the parts are 
existentially dependent on the composite. If this were the case, the composite 
relation in UML would also represent a case of inseparable parthood 
(definition 5.15).  Nonetheless, in another part of the text, it is specified 
that [the composite] may remove a part and give it to another composite object, 
which then assumes responsibility for it. If the multiplicity from a part to composite is 
zero-to-one, the composite may remove the part, and the part may assume 
responsibility for itself, otherwise it may not live apart from a composite. This 
implies that if the minimum multiplicity from a part to composite is one 
then the part is only generically dependent on the universal that the composite 
instantiates, i.e., the part object can be part of any composite of the same 
type (part with mandatory whole). Conversely, if the minimum multiplicity 
from a part to composite is zero-to-one then the part is not at all dependent 
on the composite (part with optional whole). 
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Despite the possible dependency relations that might hold from the 
part to the whole, there are also (specific or generic) dependency relations 
that might hold from the whole to the parts. That is, a whole object can be 
existentially dependent on a specific part (essential), or generically 
dependent on the universal that a part instantiates (mandatory part).   
Shareability and inseparability/essentiality are completely orthogonal 
meta-properties, i.e., there are shared parts which are essential (and/or 
inseparable), and there are exclusive (non-shareable) parts which are only 
mandatory. An example of the former is depicted in figure 5.33. In an 
instance of that model, a particular Lecture can be shared by a Regular 
Course and by a Studium Generale Course. Nonetheless, the lecture is an 
inseparable part of both courses. An example of the latter is depicted in 
figure 8.13.b. A heart is not an essential part of a particular human being. 
However, it is a non-shareable part. 
Finally, as discussed in depth in section 7.2, only rigid universals can 
participate as wholes in essential parthood relations. In the case of anti-
rigid universals, the modal necessity of the parts can only be a case of de 
dicto necessity. These parts are named immutable parts instead.  
In order to eliminate the construct overload aforementioned we 
propose that shared/composition notation in UML to be used to represent 
only shareability. To represent mandatory parts and mandatory wholes we 
use the minimum cardinalities of the represented parthood relation in the 
corresponding way: a minimum multiplicity of one in the side of the part 
represents a generic dependence from the whole to the part (mandatory 
part); a minimum multiplicity of one in the side of the whole represents a 
generic dependence from the part to the whole (mandatory whole). 
Additionally, we extend the original UML aggregation notation with the 
following tagged values: (a) {inseparable = true}: represents inseparable parts 
(i.e., every part is existentially dependent of a specific whole); (b) {essential 
= true}: represents essential parts (i.e., every whole is existentially 
dependent of a specific part); (c) {immutable = true}: represents immutable 
parts (i.e., every whole bears a parthood relation to a specific part in all 
circumstances that it instantiates that specific whole universal). Since 
inseparability of parts is a stronger constraint than generic dependence, 
then whenever {inseparable = true} the minimum cardinality constraint in 
the association end connected to the whole must be one. Likewise, 
whenever {essential = true} or {immutable = true} the minimum cardinality 
constraint in the association end connected to the part must be one. 
Finally, in definition 5.14, we have introduced the notion of an 
extensional individual, i.e., an individual for which all parts are essential. 
We represent a universal whose instances are extensional entities by a 
tagged value {extensional} on top of the classifier representing that universal. 
A natural constraint is that all parthood relations in which an {extensional} 
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classifier participates as a whole, must have the meta-property {essential = 
true}.                
Although defined above for the componentOf relation, these meta-
properties can also be used to qualify the other types of partOf relations. In 
the sequel, we analyze each of these relations separately.   
 
subQuantityOf: As discussed in section 5.5.1, a quantity stands for a 
maximally-connected-amount-of-matter. Since a quantity is maximal, it 
cannot have as a part a quantity of the same kind. For the same reason, a 
subQuantityOf relation is always non-sharable. For example, take a case in 
which this relation holds between a quantity of alcohol x and a quantity of 
wine y. Since y is self-connected it occupies a self-connected portion of 
space. The same holds for x. In addition, the topoid71 occupied by x must 
be a (improper) part of the topoid occupied by y. Now suppose that there 
is a portion of wine z (different from y) such that x is a subQuantityOf z. A 
consequence of this is that z and x overlap, and since they are both self-
connected, we can define a portion of wine w which is itself self-connected. 
In this case, both z and x are part of w and therefore, they are not 
maximally-self-connected-portions. This contradicts the premises that x and z 
were quantities. Hence, we can conclude that the subQuantityOf (Q) relation 
is always non-sharable.  
Since every part of a quantity is itself a quantity, Q-parthood must have 
a cardinality constraint of one and exactly one in the subquantity side. Take 
once more the alcohol-wine example above. Since alcohol is a quantity 
(and, hence, maximal), there is exactly one quantity of alcohol which is part 
of a specific quantity of wine.    
As discussed in section 5.6, quantities are mereologically invariant, i.e., 
the change of any of its parts changes the identity of the whole. In other 
words, all parts of a quantity are essential. The consequences of this 
characteristic are: (i) subQuantityOf relations are essential parthood relations; 
(ii) since essential parthood relations are always transitive, subQuantityOf is 
always transitive (i.e., for all a,b,c, if Q(a,b) and Q(b,c) then Q(a,c)); (iii) 
since quantities are extensional entities, the weak supplementation axiom (3) 
defined to hold for all partOf relations can be replaced by the adoption of 
the strong supplementation axiom (chapter 5) for the case of the subQuantityOf  
relation.        
The axiomatization of the subQuantityOf relation thus includes the basic 
axioms of any mereological theory, namely, irreflexivity, anti-symmetry and 
transitivity of the proper-part relation. But also the strong supplementation 
axiom and the extensionality principle (see section 5.1.2). Moreover, it includes 
                                                      
71A Topoid is a region of space with a certain mereotopological structure (Guizzardi & 
Herre & Wagner, 2002a). 
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the exclusive parthood (definition 5.9) and the essential parthood 
(definition 5.11) axioms.   
In other words, the axiomatization of this relation is the one of 
Extensional Mereology (EM), with non-shareable parts. That means that two 
quantities are the same iff they have the same parts, and no two instance of 
the same quantity kind overlap.  
 
subCollectionOf: Like quantities, collectives are maximal entities. 
However, in contrast with quantities, the unifying relation of a collective is 
not necessarily one of physical connection.  For this reason, a collective can 
be shared by two or more collectives. For instance, the crowd C1 occupying 
street St1 and the crowd C2 occupying street St2 can both have as a part 
(subCollectionOf) the crowd C3 occupying the intersection between streets St1 
and St2. Therefore, subCollectionOf (C) can be shareable in some case while 
non-shareable in others.  
In this example, the crowds C3 and C1 (or C2) are not unified by the 
same type of relation. In fact, the unifying relation of the former is a 
refinement of that of the latter. Since a collective is a maximal entity, it is 
not the case that a collective can have as part another collective of the same 
type (i.e., unified by the same relation). Moreover, for the same reason, any 
collective can have at maximum one subcollection of a given type. Finally, as 
discussed in section 5.5.2, since every subcollection of a collective is 
obtained by refining the unifying relation of the latter, the subCollectionOf 
relation is always transitive. 
As discussed in section 5.6, unlike quantities, collectives do not 
necessarily have an extensional criterion of identity. That is, whereas for 
some collectives the addition or subtraction of a subcollection (or a 
member) renders a different individual, it is not the case that this holds for 
all of them.  
In summary, if cardinality constraints are fully specified, then the C-
parthood is as such that: (i) the cardinality constraints in the association end 
relative to the part is one and exactly one; (ii) only holds between 
collectives; (iii) it is transitive, i.e., for all a,b,c, if C(a,b) and C(b,c) then 
C(a,c). Every subCollectionOf relation is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive 
and obeys the weak supplementation axiom. That is to say that the 
axiomatization of the subCollectionOf relation is the one of the Minimum 
Mereology (MM).   
 
memberOf: The member-collection relation is one that holds between a 
singular entity (either a complex or a collective considered as a unity) and a 
collective. As discussed in section 5.6, memberOf (M) relations are never 
transitive, i.e., they are intransitive. This is to say that for all a,b,c, if M(a,b) 
and M(b,c) then ¬M(a,c). Nonetheless, transitivity does hold across M and 
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C, i.e., if we have M(x,y) and C(y,z) then it is also the case that M(x,z). In 
other words, if an individual x is a memberOf a collective Y, which is itself a 
subCollectionOf  collective Z, then x is also a memberOf Z. 
Typically members can be shared by more than one collective. 
However, it is also conceivable to have non-shareable memberOf relations.  
As previously mentioned, collectives are not necessarily extensional 
individuals. However, when this is the case, all memberOf relations that the 
extensional collective participates as a whole are relations of essential 
parthood. Since a collective (by definition) has a uniform structure, then all 
members of a collective are supposed to be indistinguishable. As a 
consequence, it cannot be the case that some members of a collection are 
essential and others not. In summary, memberOf relations are only relations 
of essential parthood if the collective in the association end connected to 
the whole entity is an extensional individual.  
In figure 8.15 below we present a revision of the UML meta-model in 
order to faithfully represent the ontological distinctions discussed in this 
section. As previously discussed, the original UML metamodel only allows 
for the distinction among parthood relations w.r.t. the shareability meta-
property (via the meta-attribute aggregationKind). In other words, parthood 
relations are treated as ordinary associations which can have the meta-
property of being an aggregation or a composition. This is a poor modeling 
choice for several reasons. Firstly, because it does not make justice to the 
special meta-properties and semantics of parthood relations. Secondly, 
because it is imprecise on the meaning of non-shareability represented, 
which collapses both the representations for shareability and inseparability 
in one single construct. Finally, because it does not sufficiently constrain 
the metamodel, the current representation of part-whole relations in UML 
allows for the representation of state of affairs which are not truthful to the 
underlying conceptualization. For example, one can define a parthood 
association in which both association ends have incompatible values for the 
aggregationKind meta-attribute. Moreover, like dependency relations, 
parthood relations are directed binary relations and therefore cannot be 
allowed to have more than two association ends. However, in the original 
UML metamodel, one can define a parthood association with arity higher 
than two. 
In our proposed revised metamodel, we separate the representation of 
standard domain association from meronymic associations, allowing for a 
faithful representation and special semantic treatment for the latter. 
Moreover, we explicitly represent the different kinds of meronymic 
relations (distinguished by the category of entities they relate) and provide 
mechanisms to fully qualify them in terms of the ontological meta-
properties considered. Finally, we proscribe the use of standard UML 
associations to represent part-whole relations. In other words, we require 
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that in any implementation of this metamodel the meta-attribute aggregation 
of the UML metaclass Property must have the value none.    
The metamodeling choices adopted (e.g., by making a meronymic 
relationship a special type of directed binary relationship) entails a cleaner 
metamodel and one that approximates the class of possible models to that 
of intended ones (see chapter 3). 
Association
Relationship
Element
isDerived:Boolean = false
isReadOnly:Boolean = false
endType:Type[0..1]
aggregation:AggregationKind
Property
StructuralFeature
/upper:UnlimitedNatural [0..1]
/lower:Integer [0..1]
MultiplicityElement
associationEnd
0..1 2..*
0..1
source 1
0..1
target 1Directed Binary Relationship
isShareable:Boolean
isEssential:Boolean
isInseparable:Boolean
Meronymic
isShareable = false {readOnly}
isEssential = true {readOnly}
subQuantityOf
subCollectionOf memberOf componentOf
Directed Relationship
Characterization Mediation
target:Property {readOnly}
Dependency Relationship
Derivation
 
Once more, we have defined a modelling profile implementing the 
corresponding revised fragment of the UML metamodel. In table 8.4, we 
summarize the results of this section by presenting this profile that 
implements the leaf ontological distinctions among meronymic relations 
depicted figure 8.14, together with the syntatical constraints that 
characterize these relations. This profile extends the ones presented in 
tables 8.1 to 8.3. 
 
Metaclass Description 
Meronymic  
 
Abstract metaclass representing the general properties of all 
meronymic relations. Meronymic has no concrete syntax. Thus, 
symbolic representations are defined by each of its concrete 
subclasses. 
 
Figure 8-15  Revised 
fragment of the UML 2.0 
metamodel according to 
the ontological 
categories of figure 8.14 
Table 8-4  Extensions to 
the UML profile of tables 
8.1 to 8.3 which 
implement the revised 
metamodel of figure 
8.15 
 AGGREGATION AND COMPOSITION 349 
 
 
Non-reflexivity, Anti-Symmetry, Non-Transitivity and Weak Supplementation.   
 
Constraints 
 
1. Weak Supplementation: Let U be a universal whose instances are wholes and let 
{C1C2} be a set of universals related to U via aggregation relations. Let lowerCi be the 
value of the minimum cardinality constraint of the association end connected to Ci in the 
aggregation relation. Then, we have that  
(∑
=
n
i 1
lowerCi) ≥ 2; 
 
2. Essential Parthood: The isEssential attribute represents whether the meronymic relation is 
one of essential parthood, i.e., whether the part is essential to the whole. In case the 
classifier connected to the association end representing the whole is an anti-rigid classifier, 
then the meta-attribute isEssential must be false, whereas the meta-attribute isImmutable 
may be true. However, if isEssential is true (in case of a rigid classifier with essential parts) 
then isImmutable must also be true. The concrete representation of this meta-property is via 
the tagged value {essential} decorating the association; 
 
3. Inseparable Parthood: The isInseparable attribute represents whether the meronymic 
relation is one of inseparable parthood, i.e., whether the whole is essential to the part. The 
concrete representation of this meta-property is via the tagged value {inseparable} 
decorating the association; 
 
4. Shareable Parthood: The isShareable attribute represents whether the meronymic relation 
is (locally) shareable, i.e., whether the part can be related to more than a whole of that kind. 
The concrete representation of this meta-property is via the color property of the symbol 
used to depict this relation (a diamond with or without a decorating letter): if (isShareable = 
true) then the symbol is shown in white color, otherwise, it is shown in black. 
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Metaclass Description and Concrete Syntax 
componentOf componentOf is a parthood relation between two complexes. 
Examples include: (a) my hand is part of my arm; (b) a car 
engine is part of a car; (c) an Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU) 
is part of a Central Process Unit (CPU); (d) a heart is part of a 
circulatory system. Since this is by far the most used in 
conceptual modeling, we propose the use of the standard 
UML symbolic representation for aggregation/composition to 
represent this relation, i.e., we use the symbols 
 and to represent the 
shareable and non-shareable componentOf relations, 
respectively. 
Meta-Properties 
 
Non-reflexivity, Anti-Symmetry, Non-Transitivity and Weak Supplementation.   
 
Constraints 
 
1. The classes connected to both association ends of this relation must represent 
universals whose instances are functional complexes. A universal X is a universal whose 
instances are functional complexes if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) If X is a 
sortal universal, then it must be either stereotyped as «kind» or be a subtype of a class 
stereotyped as «kind»; (ii) Otherwise, if X is a mixin universal, then for all classes Y such 
that Y is a subtype of X, we have that Y cannot be either stereotyped as «quantity» or 
«collective», and Y cannot be a subtype of class stereotyped as either «quantity» or 
«collective».  
 
Metaclass Description and Concrete Syntax 
subQuantityOf subQuantityOf is a parthood relation between two quantities. 
Examples include: (a) alcohol is part of Wine; (b) Plasma is 
part of Blood; (c) Sugar is part of Ice Cream; (d) Milk is part 
of Cappucino. We propose the icon Q  to 
represent this relation. 
 
Meta-Properties 
Non-reflexivity, Anti-Symmetry, Transitivity and Strong Supplementation (Extensional 
Mereology).  
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Constraints 
 
1. This relation is always non-shareable (isShareable = false); 
 
2. All entities stereotyped as «quantity» are extensional individuals and, thus, all 
parthood relations involving quantities are essential parthood relations;  
 
3. The maximum cardinality constraint in the association end connected to the part must 
be one (self.target.upper = 1). 
 
4. The classes connected to both association ends of this relation must represent 
universals whose instances are quantities. A universal X is a universal whose instances 
are quantities if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) If X is a sortal universal, then it 
must be either stereotyped as «quantity» or be a subtype of a class stereotyped as 
«quantity»; (ii) Otherwise, if X is a mixin universal, then for all classes Y such that Y is a 
subtype of X, we have that Y cannot be either stereotyped as «kind» or «collective», and 
Y cannot be a subtype of class stereotyped as either «kind» or «collective».   
 
Metaclass Description and Concrete Syntax 
subCollectionOf subCollectionOf is a parthood relation between two 
collectives. Examples include: (a) the north part of the Black 
Forest is part of the Black Forest; (b) The collection of Jokers 
in a deck of cards is part of that deck of cards; (c) the 
collection of forks in cutlery set is part of that cutlery set; (d) 
the collection of male individuals in a crowd is part of that 
crowd. We use the symbols C  and 
C  to represent the shareable and non-
shareable subCollectionOf relations, respectively. 
Meta-Properties 
Non-reflexivity, Anti-Symmetry, Transitivity and Weak Supplementation (Minimum 
Mereology).  
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Constraints 
 
1. The classes connected to both association ends of this relation must represent 
universals whose instances are collectives. A universal X is a universal whose instances are 
collectives if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) If X is a sortal universal, then it must 
be either stereotyped as «collective» or be a subtype of a class stereotyped as    
«collective»; (ii) Otherwise, if X is a mixin universal, then for all classes Y such that Y is a 
subtype of X, we have that Y cannot be either stereotyped as «kind» or «quantity», and Y 
cannot be a subtype of class stereotyped as either «kind» or «quantity». 
 
2. The maximum cardinality constraint in the association end connected to the part must 
be one (self.target.upper = 1). 
 
Metaclass Description and Concrete Syntax 
memberOf memberOf is a parthood relation between a complex or a 
collective (as a part) and a collective (as a whole). Examples 
include: (a) a tree is part of forest; (b) a card is part of a deck 
of cards; (c) a fork is part of cutlery set; (d) a club member is 
part of a club. We use the symbols M  and 
M to represent the shareable and non-
shareable memberOf relations, respectively. 
Meta-Properties 
 
Non-reflexivity, Anti-Symmetry, Intransitivity and Weak Supplementation.  
Although transitivity does not hold across two memberOf relations, an memberOf relation 
followed by subCollectionOf is transitive. That is, for all a,b,c, if memberOf(a,b) and 
memberOf(b,c) then ¬memberOf(a,c), but  if memberOf(a,b) and subCollectionOf(b,c) 
then memberOf(a,c). 
 
Constraints 
1. This relation can only represent essential parthood (isEssential = true) if the object 
representing the whole on this relation is an extensional (isExtensional = true) individual. 
In this case, all parthood relations in which this individual participates as a whole are 
essential parthood relations; 
 
2. The classifier connected to association end relative to the whole individual must be a 
universal whose instances are collectives. The classifier connected to the association 
end relative to the part can be either a universal whose instances are collectives, or a 
universal whose instances are functional complexes.  
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8.4 An Application of the re-designed UML 
In (Ríos, 2003), an architecture for an ontology-based context-aware 
service platform is proposed72. This platform, depicted in figure 8.16 
below, employs distributed ontologies to define the semantics of syntactic 
items which are used to compose the messages exchanged by the platform 
and its environment. These messages include both context-aware 
applications service subscriptions and context-information supplied by 
external (context) providers. 
SP
WASP Platform
CP
SP
Service Providers
Context Providers
WASP Applications
Set of ontologies
CP
CP
R
R
defined in
terms of
defined in
terms of
accesses
 
As demonstrated by Ríos, the use of ontologies in this version of the 
WASP platform brings a number of important benefits to the original 
proposal (Costa, 2003). These benefits include:  
 
1. More intelligent behaviour and the ability to reason about context 
information;  
2. Reusability: the platform can (re)use already existing ontologies for the 
modeling of context information;  
3. Flexibility: in contrast to the original proposal the platform is not closed 
w.r.t. a pre-defined set of context modeling concepts.  
 
Due to these benefits, ontologies are being considered in practically all the 
architectural evolutions of this platform (Costa, 2004b; Santos, 2004). 
                                                      
72 This platform is discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. For a complete 
description of the proposed architecture one should refer to (Ríos, 2003).  
Figure 8-16  An 
ontology-based version 
of the WASP platform 
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In spite of these benefits, in (Ríos, 2003), the author discusses the 
insufficiency of semantic web languages (and the lightweight ontologies 
produced) to prevent interoperability problems when different ontologies 
are integrated. Ríos, proposes the following illustrative example on the 
integration of five independent domain ontologies.  
The first ontology (which has a fragment depicted in figure 8.17) is a 
Spatial ontology that defines the concepts of Spatial Location and Physical Object 
and their corresponding properties (e.g., Spatial Location includes 
attributes such as latitude and longitude coordinates). This ontology might be 
considered as a very simple upper level ontology, as it does not define 
knowledge related to any specific domain. Thus, it can be referred or 
imported by different domain ontologies. For example, this ontology could 
be used by a GPS sensor agent to provide a service to track the location of 
physical objects in a context-aware platform.  
p:includes
Physical
Object
p:occupiesp:isInside
Spatial
Location
 
There are two axioms defined for the Spatial ontology: 
 
1. For every two arbitrary physical objects X and Y, if there are two 
spatial locations A, B, such that X occupies A, Y occupies B, and A 
is equal to B, then X and Y are the same physical object. 
 
This axiom helps the users of this ontology to identify an object in a given 
time instant (synchronic identity). However, it cannot distinguish if two 
physical objects X and Y at different spatial locations in different time 
instants are the same objects (diachronic identity). For this reason, the 
ontology prescribes the following axiom. 
 
2. For every two arbitrary physical objects X and Y, X is equal to Y if 
and only if they have the same parts, i.e., the identity criterion for 
physical objects is determined by the sum of its parts (extensional 
identity criterion). 
 
A second ontology presented is a fragment of a Medical ontology (figure 
8.18) defining some medically related concepts such as Human Organ or 
Human Being and Surgery Room. Ríos presents a situation, in which the 
Figure 8-17  Fragment 
of a Spatial Ontology 
(from Ríos, 2003) 
 AN APPLICATION OF THE RE-DESIGNED UML 355 
Medical ontology imports the concepts of Spatial Location and Physical Object 
from the Spatial ontology (symbolized by the i: character in the name of the 
class representing these concepts). The idea is to allow for the possibility of 
defining applications for checking location of patients, locate organs for 
transplants, and so forth. 
i:Physical
Object
Biological
Object
Inanimate
Object
Human
Organ
Human
Heart
Human
Being
Male Female
i:Spatial
Location
Surgery
Room
 
A third ontology presented is shown in figure 8.19. The idea is to represent 
a fragment of Legal ontology, which represents legal aspects of people and 
that can be used by bureaucratic applications. This ontology imports the 
concepts of Human Being, Male and Female from the Medical ontology. This 
import allows, for example, legal applications to refer to the medical 
histories of people; to have access to their personal data (e.g., blood type, 
skin colour, fingerprints, height, weight); to differentiate people by sex; or 
to maintain a record of living and deceased people in a community. 
Figure 8-18  Fragment 
of a Medical Ontology 
(from Ríos, ibid.) 
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Figure 8.20 shows a fragment of Museum ontology, which imports the Spatial 
and the Medical ontology to define spatial locations like galleries within a 
museum, or inanimate objects like statues. These imported ontologies allow 
for applications to locate objects within the museum (e.g., statues, 
paintings) using the Museum ontology. 
 
Finally figure 8.21 represents a fragment of a Musical Ontology containing 
some related concepts. Ríos defines as an application for the complete 
ontology (to which this fragment belongs) an Event Advisor, which notifies 
users about upcoming events that match their personal interests. The Music 
ontology imports from the Legal ontology concepts like person (and its 
possible attributes, like name, age, sex, etc.). 
 
Figure 8-19  Fragment 
of a Legal Ontology 
(from Ríos, ibid.) 
Figure 8-20  Fragment 
of a Museum Ontology 
(from Ríos, ibid.) 
Figure 8-21  Fragment 
of a Music Ontology 
(from Ríos, ibid.) 
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Ríos describes the following problems that can occur with the integration of 
these ontologies:  
 
1. An application using the Medical ontology can derive the following 
wrong information: if a human being receives a heart transplant, he/she 
becomes a different human being. This is due to the extensional identity 
criteria, which is defined for physical objects in the Spatial ontology. If 
the identity of an object is defined by the sum of its parts, then changing 
one of the parts changes the identity of the object. Similarly, consider a 
tourist route planner application that plans a route including tourist 
points of interest or events never seen by the user of the application. 
Due to an accident, a human statue known by the user has lost a hand. 
The application will consider this statue different from the one the user 
visited; therefore it will be included in the route plan by error. This 
example uses a physical object (statue) for the purpose of illustration of 
the problem, but an analogous situation can be imagined with events 
such as a play or a concert; 
 
2. Suppose an application for the obituary section of a music newspaper, 
which sends information about artists who die. It uses the Musical 
ontology, which imports the Legal ontology (to reuse the concept of 
person). The application will malfunction and it will send information 
about every person who dies, since [according to the ontology of figure 
8.21] every person is a performer artist. The intention in the ontology 
represented in figure [8.21] is to represent that either persons or bands 
are performer artists. However, as a side effect, the ontology also states 
that every person is a performer artist; 
 
3. Since Musical ontology imports the Legal ontology, which imports the 
Medical ontology, the heart (and all other parts) of a person can be 
inferred to be part of a band, due to transitivity of the partOf relation, 
which can cause undesirable inferences to be derived. 
 
A fragment of a Music Ontology such as the one presented in figure 8.21 can 
be found in practice in the MusicBrainz II Metadata proposal73. A simplified 
version of the MusicBrainz database structure is presented in figure 8.22. 
                                                      
73 MusicBrainz is a large database of music metadata (http://www.musicbrainz.org/). 
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Artist
Person Group
partOf
Album
p:creatorOf
Track
p:creatorOf
p:track
 
In fact, this model excerpt can be seen as an extension of a more general 
pattern found in the FOAF (Friend-of-a-Friend) ontology74 (Brickley & Miller, 
2003) shown in figure 8.23 below. The FOAF ontology is a proposal for 
capturing concepts related to the representation of personal information 
and social relationships. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for developing 
computational support for online communities. The FOAF ontology is also 
used by the SOUPA ontology (see discussion below) to support the 
expression and reasoning about a persons profile and social connections in 
pervasive computing applications. 
Agent
Person Group
Organization
p:knows
p:memberOf
 
The conceptualization modelled in the fragment of figure 8.23 has an 
analogous representation in the SOUPA (Standard Ontology for the Ubiquitous 
and Pervasive Application)75 Ontology (Chen, 2004; Chen et al., 2004). The 
SOUPA ontology also includes a Spatial Ontology (such as the one of figure 
8.17), whose fragment is presented in figure 8.24. 
                                                      
74 See The FOAF Project (http://www.foaf-project.org/) and the FOAF Vocabulary 
Specification (http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/) 
75 http://pervasive.semanticweb.org. 
Figure 8-22  Fragment 
of the MusicBrainz 
metadata proposal 
Figure 8-23  Fragment 
of the FOAF (Friend-of-
a-Friend) ontology 
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SpatialThing
longitude
latitude
altitude
LocationCoordinates
GeographicSpace
p:spatiallySubsumesp:spatiallySubsumedBy
p:hasLocation
 
SOUPA is a proposal for a standard ontology for supporting pervasive and 
ubiquitous computing application. It integrates parts of several other 
ontologies such as FOAF, DAML-Time (Hobbs, 2002; Pan & Hobbs, 
2004), OpenCyC76 and OpenGIS (Cox et al., 2003) (Spatial Entities), Rei 
Policy ontology (Kagal & Finin & Joshi, 2003), and COBRA-ONT (Chen & 
Finin & Joshi, 2004), but also an ontology defining agent related concepts 
named MoGATU BDI ontology (see figure 8.25)77. 
Agent Belief
p:believes
desire
p:desires
Intention
p:intends
p:lessImportantThan
p:moreImportantThan p:asImportantAs
Prority
p:hasPriority
ProrityLevel
p:hasPriorityLevel
p:higherThan
 
In the sequel, we apply the ontologically well-founded version of UML 
redesigned in this chapter, together with the modelling techniques 
proposed throughout this thesis, to illustrate the use of the language in 
making explicit the underlying ontological commitments and in producing 
an adequate conceptual model representation that integrates the ontologies 
used in the examples of (Ríos, 2003) as well as the fragments of 
MusicBrainz II, FOAF, SOUPA and MoGATU BDI presented above. 
The result of redesigning the integrated model is shown in figure 8.26 
below.  
                                                      
76 http://www.opencyc.org/. 
77 http://mogatu.umbc.edu/bdi/. 
Figure 8-24  Fragment 
of the SOUPA (Standard 
Ontology for the 
Ubiquitous and 
Pervasive Applications) 
dealing with spatial 
concepts and relations 
Figure 8-25  Fragment 
of the MoGATU BDI 
ontology 
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Figure 8-26  An 
integrated ontology 
using the ontologically 
well-founded version of 
UML proposed in this 
thesis 
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In producing this conceptual specification we have been forced to make a 
number of assumptions. This is due to the lack of information provided by 
the integrated ontologies w.r.t. the real-world semantics of the concepts 
represented. We emphasize, nonetheless, that the goal here is to 
demonstrate the suitability of the modelling language proposed. Thus, the 
underlying conceptualization which results from the set of assumptions 
made is of lesser relevance.      
First of all, in the model of figure 8.26, we separate physical spaces 
such as Surgery Room, Gallery and Museum from their spatial location (as 
informed by a GPS system), as it is the case in the SOUPA ontology. Firstly, 
because some geographical spaces (e.g., university) can have several location 
coordinates, but also because different geographical spaces can be 
associated with a particular set of location coordinates in different 
circumstances. Thus, whereas the physical spaces are represented by the 
general category of spatial thing, the spatial location of these physical spaces 
is modelled here as a quality domain composed of the quality dimensions 
latitude, longitude and altitude. The relation includes between spatial locations 
in figure 8.17 is represented by the relation spatiallySubsumes between 
geographical spaces in figure 8.26.   
A physical object is said to be located in (isInside) a geographical space if 
the location of the former is included in that of the latter. Additionally, we 
assume that, in contrast with physical objects, Biological Entities, Persons and 
Inanimate Entities do not carry extensional principles of identity. Therefore, 
we differentiate a Biological Entity, such as a heart, from the quantity of 
cellular tissue that constitutes this entity. Likewise, we differentiate an 
inanimate object, such as a statute, from the raw material that constitutes it 
(e.g., a lump of clay).  
A person is composed of a number of biological entities that amount to 
the persons body and its constituent parts. A person has the spatial location 
of its body, which in turn is derived from the spatial location of its 
constituent physical object. The analogous holds for inanimate entities. By 
separating the universals that carry different principles of identity, we avoid 
the problems mentioned by Ríos in (1) above.  
The problem mentioned in (2) is solved in figure 8.26 by applying the 
role modelling design pattern proposed in chapter 4. Performer Artist is a 
mixin universal, since it has as instances individuals that obey incompatible 
principles of identities, namely, bands (which are kinds of organizations) 
and individual artists (which are persons). However, in this case the mixin 
universal Performer Artist is a semi-rigid mixin (as opposed to a role mixin), 
since it is a rigid universal for some of its instances (bands) and anti-rigid 
for others (individual artists). 
 Figure 8.27 below presents an excerpt of the specification of figure 8.26 
that focuses on the alleged derived meronymic relation between a human 
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heart of a band member and its band. As this specification shows, the 
relation between a Human Heart and a Band Member is one of indirect 
functional parthood (i1) and the relation between a Band Member and a Band 
is one of direct functional parthood (d1). As discussed in chapter 7, transitivity 
does not hold across i1 and d1. Thus, in this specific specification, a Human 
Heart is not part of a Band. 
«kind»
Person
«role»
Individual Artist
«role»
Band Member Band
1..*2..*
«mixin»
Performer Artist
«kind»
Human Heart
11
0..1
1
d1
d1i1
X
 
As an agent, a Person can be a member of a group (figure 8.26). For 
example, Eric Clapton is a member of the British Guitar Players. However, 
Claptons hands are not members of this group. That is, also in this case, 
transitivity does not hold across the two meronymic relations represented, 
since the combination of componentOf and memberOf relations is never 
transitive (figure 8.28). 
«kind»
Person
«kind»
Human Heart
11
«role»
Individual Artist «collective»
Group of Artists
1..*2..*
M
0..1
1
X
 
There are a number of material relations in the model of figure 8.26. As it 
can be noticed, the explicit representation of the foundations of these 
relations contributes to make their meaning evident. Take for instance the 
relation parentOf between Parent and Offspring. In this case, we assume that 
parent is considered in this conceptualization in the legal not in the 
biological sense, and that in legal terms a person is a parent of another 
Figure 8-27  
Instantiation of the 
pattern that exemplifies 
situations in which 
transitivity does not hold 
across functional 
parthood relations 
Figure 8-28  Although a 
human heart can be part 
of an individual artist, 
which in turn is part of a 
group of artists, a human 
heart is never a part of a 
group of artists. This is 
because the 
combination of 
componentOf and 
memberOf parthood 
relations is never 
transitive 
 AN APPLICATION OF THE RE-DESIGNED UML 363 
(offspring) iff the former is registered and legally recognized as such. 
Therefore, we explicit represent the Registration relators that connect 
parents to their offsprings.  
 The explicit representation of the relator universal allows for the 
unambiguous representation of the cardinality constraints associated to the 
relating universals. This is also the case for the records relation between the 
universals Performer Artist and Track. The multiplicity one-to-many from 
Track to Performer Artist leaves open several possible interpretations for 
the meaning of this relation. Does this multiplicity mean that a track like 
Georgia on my mind can have several recordings (e.g., one by Ray Charles, 
and another by Jerry Lee Lewis)? By explicitly representing the Recording 
relator, the model makes clear that what is meant by a track is the result of 
specific recording. However, several artists can participate in one single 
recording (e.g., both Clapton and B.B.King participate in the recording of 
Riding with the King). Thus, the track Georgia on my mind recorded by Ray 
Charles, and the one recorded by Jerry Lee Lewis are different tracks.  
The model of figure 8.22 duplicates the relation creator between artist 
and album, and artist and track. The intention is to allow for the 
representation of tracks that are not parts of albums (i.e., that only exist as 
digital tracks). This situation is modeled in figure 8.26 by having AlbumTrack 
as a restriction of the type Track, in which the restriction condition is to be a 
part of an Album. However, it is unclear in the original model whether 
these two relations have the same real-world semantics. One interpretation 
is that, in case a track is part of an album, then the creator of the track must 
be same as the creator of that album. Still in this interpretation, in the case 
that different artists participate in the recording of different tracks of the 
same album (a song collection) they would all be considered creators of that 
album. The problem is that this interpretation does not allow for the 
situation in which an artist participates in the recording of one of more 
tracks of a given album, but is not considered an author of that album. 
Take, for example, U2s Rattle & Hum. Although B.B.King participates in 
the recording of Angel of Harlem, he is not considered an author of that 
album. We therefore assume that the relation between an artist and an 
album is one of legal rights. This is model in figure 8.26 by an Authorship 
relator universal.          
In FOAF, the concept of an agent includes both living and deceased78 
persons. It has also an excessively informal concept of a Group, covering 
informal and ad-hoc groups, long-lived communities, organizational groups within a 
workplace, etc79. It also allows, for example, for the formation of groups 
                                                      
78 The FOAF ontology also allows for both real and imaginary characters. We excluded 
imaginary characters in this specification for the sake of simplicity.   
79 FOAF Vocabulary Specification (http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/). 
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containing only deceased persons. The concept of group in FOAF, hence, 
seems to include entities that range from collectives with extensional 
identity principles to social complexes (organizations). We assume here that 
organizations should be considered as agents, but that mere extensional 
collections should not. Thus, Agents can be parts of Groups and, in 
particular, organizations are constituted by Groups. However, Groups are 
not considered here to be agents.  
At first, it seems that the concepts of an agent in FOAF and in 
MoGATU BDI are equivalent. However, in MoGATU, an agent bears 
mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions. We assume here that 
only living persons and actual organizations can bear these mental states. 
We use the universal Active Agent to model the MoGATU concept of an 
agent. Active Agent is mixin subsuming both Living Person and Active 
Organization. Consequently, under these assumptions, a MoGATU agent is 
an anti-rigid universal. So, for instance, although Aristotle is a (FOAF) 
Agent, it cannot in the present world have mental states and, consequently, 
it is not an instance of Active Agent. We have an analogous situation for 
Organizations. For example, The Beatles cannot be considered a MoGATU 
agent in the present world.      
Mental states are existentially dependent entities. For example, a belief 
depends rigidly on a specific bearer active agent, i.e., a particular belief 
cannot exist without inhering one (and always the same) active agent. 
Mental states are therefore special types of intrinsic moments (modes) and 
are represented here as such.  
By objectifying intrinsic moments we can also represent their attributes 
and the relations they participate. For instance, every intention has an 
inhering priority quality, which is modeled in figure 8.26 via an attribute 
function that maps intentions to priority qualia in a priority level quality 
dimension. This quality dimension is a finite set of values ranging from level 
0 to level 10 and totally ordered under the higherThan and lowerThan 
relations.  
 The relations moreImportantThan, lessImportantThan and asImportantAs 
relations between intentions are formal relations derived from the 
individual priority levels of their relata. The first two relations are anti-
symmetric and transitive. The last one is an equivalence relation. As 
discussed in chapter 6, these meta-properties are derived from the meta-
properties of  the relations between qualia in the corresponding underlying 
quality dimension. 
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8.5 Final Considerations 
In chapter 2 of this thesis we have proposed a framework for language 
evaluation and design. This framework establishes a systematic way to 
evaluate the domain appropriateness of a modelling language by comparing 
a concrete representation of the universe of discourse referred by the 
language (represented in terms of a reference ontology) and a meta-model 
of this language. The goal is to reinforce the strongest possible 
homomorphism between these two entities. 
In this chapter, we provide an exemplification of this framework. As a 
representation of the selected general (meta-level) domain, we have the 
foundational cognitive ontology produced throughout chapters 4 to 7 of 
this thesis. As a selected language, we take the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) as a candidate language for conceptual modelling of structural 
aspects of application domains. The choice for UML is based on the fact 
that this language is currently a de facto standard, and because it represents 
an interesting case study due to the complexity of its metamodel. 
Furthermore, there is a growing interest in the adoption of UML as a 
language for conceptual modelling and ontology representation (Cranefield 
& Purvis, 1999; Baclawski et al., 2001; Kogut et al., 2002). A more explicit 
statement of interest on applying UML for this purpose is made by the 
OMG Ontology Metamodel Definition Request for Proposals (OMG, 
2003a): The familiarity of users with UML, the availability of UML tools, the 
existence of many domain models in UML, and the similarity of those models to 
ontologies suggest that UML could be a means towards more rapid development of 
ontologies. This approach continues the Object Management Group's gradual move to 
more complete semantic models as noted in the Model Driven Architecture paper. It 
would also create a link between the UML community and the emerging Semantic 
Web community, much as other metamodels and profiles have created links with the 
developer and middleware communities.   
As demonstrated in sections 8.1 to 8.3 of this chapter, the foundational 
ontology used suitably supports the redesign of the languages metamodel to 
obtain a conceptual cleaner, semantically unambiguous and ontologically 
well-founded version of UML.  
Although not discussed here, an extension of this foundational ontology 
that includes perdurants and intentional and social entities has been employed to 
provide a foundation for agent modelling concepts (Guizzardi & Wagner, 
2005b), and to analyze the ontological semantics of the some enterprise 
modeling languages and frameworks (Guizzardi & Wagner, 2005a), among 
them most notably the REA (Resource-Event-Agent) framework (Geert & 
McCarthy, 2002). Moreover, a preliminary version of the ontologically 
well-founded UML produced in this chapter has been used with interesting 
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results for analyzing conceptual models of genome sequence applications in 
(Guizzardi & Wagner, 2002). 
Finally, in order to show the usefulness of the redesigned version of 
UML produced, we employ it to tackle some semantically intetoperability 
problems highlighted by (Ríos, 2003), which can happen in the integration 
of lightweight ontologies. These problems happen exactly because of the 
inadequacy of the modelling language used (OWL) in making explicit the 
underlying ontological commitments of the conceptualizations involved. 
The conceptual modelling language proposed here was proven useful in 
addressing these problems. First, by precisely representing the (modal) 
meta-properties of the underlying concepts, it allows for an explicit account 
of their ontological commitments. Second, by providing solutions to 
classical and recurrent problems in conceptual modelling (e.g., 
representation of roles with multiple allowed types, the problem of 
transitivity of parthood relations, the problem of collapsing single-tuple and 
multiple-tuple multiplicity constraints in the representation of associations, 
among others), it allows for the production of conceptually clean and 
semantically unambiguous integrated models. 
This case study exemplifies the approach defended in this thesis for 
semantic interoperation of conceptual models (discussed in chapter 3). We 
defend that in a first phase of off-line meaning negotiation, an ontologically 
well-founded modelling language should be used. The main requirements 
of this language are domain and comprehensibility appropriateness. Once this 
meaning negotiation and semantic interoperation phase is complete, then a 
knowledge representation language can be used to express the results 
produced on this phase. The requirements of this second language instead 
are high computational efficiency and machine-understandability. 
 In the original scenario proposed by Ríos, the ontologies used are 
created for the purpose of the example, with the aim to represent 
stereotypical cases. However, in section 8.4, we demonstrate that real 
ontologies exist in current Semantic web efforts which are structurally 
similar to the ones proposed by Ríos, and which are used by practitioners in 
concrete semantic web applications. Moreover, we also show that there are 
concrete efforts to unify these separate lightweight ontologies in context-
aware applications (e.g., SOUPA) in a manner analogous to the one 
described in the scenario proposed by Ríos. 
 
 
  
Chapter 9 
9. Conclusions 
Life can only be understood backwards 
 but it must be lived forwards 
Soren Kierkegaard  
 
In this chapter we discuss some final conclusions about the work presented 
in this thesis. In each of the previous chapters, we have already presented a 
final considerations section including a detailed discussion of the benefits of 
the approach proposed in that chapter, as well as its main advantages when 
compared to related work in the literature. For this reason, in the 
remaining of this chapter we focus mainly on two topics, namely, the most 
important research contributions of this thesis (sections 9.1 to 9.12), and 
plans for future work (section 9.13). 
9.1 Language Evaluation and (Re)Design Framework 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we elaborate on the relation between a 
modeling language and a set of real-world phenomena that this language is 
supposed to represent. We focus on two aspects of this relation, namely, 
the domain appropriateness, i.e., the suitability of a language to model 
phenomena in a given domain, and its comprehensibility appropriateness, i.e., 
how easy is for a user of the language to recognize what that languages 
constructs mean in terms of domain concepts and, how easy is to 
understand, communicate and reason with the specifications produced in 
that language. We defend that both these properties can be systematically 
evaluated for a modeling language w.r.t. a given domain in reality by 
comparing a concrete representation of the worldview underlying this 
language (captured in a metamodel of the language), with an explicit and 
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formal representation of a conceptualization of that domain, or a reference 
ontology.  
We therefore propose a framework for language evaluation and 
(re)design which aims, in a methodological way, to approximate or to 
increase the level of homomorphism, between a metamodel of a language 
and a reference ontology. This framework comprises a number of 
properties (lucidity, soundness, laconicity, completeness) that must be reinforced 
for an isomorphism to take place between these two entities. 
The framework proposed combines two existing proposals in the 
literature:  
 
1. the one of Corin Gurr (Gurr, 1998, 1999), which focuses on the 
evaluation of individual representations;  
2. the one of Yair Wand and Ron Weber (Wand & Weber, 1989, 1990; 
Weber, 1997), which aims at the evaluation of representation systems. 
 
In addition, our framework extends these two proposals in several ways. 
Compared to them, our framework possesses the following advantages: 
 
 Gurr uses regular algebraic structures to model a domain 
conceptualization. We strongly defend the idea that the more we know 
about a domain the better we can evaluate and (re)design a language for 
domain and comprehensibility appropriateness. As we show in chapter 
2, there are important meta-properties of domain entities (e.g., rigidity, 
relational dependency) that are not captured by ontologically-neutral 
mathematical languages (such as algebras or standard set-theories), and 
that the failure to consider these meta-properties hinders the possibility 
of accounting for other important aspects in the design of visual 
modeling languages.  
 
 In Wand & Webers work, no attention at all is paid to pragmatic 
aspects of modeling languages. Here we show how the ontological meta-
properties of the domain concepts captured in a reference ontology can 
be exploited in the design of efficient visual pragmatics for visual 
modeling languages. 
 
 Wand & Webers work focuses solely on the design of general 
conceptual modeling languages. The framework and the principles 
proposed here instead can be applied to the design of conceptual 
modeling languages irrespective to which generalization level they 
belong, i.e., it can be applied both at the level of material domains and 
corresponding domain-specific modeling languages, and at the (meta) 
level of a domain-independent (meta) conceptualization that underpins 
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a general conceptual (ontology) modeling language. In fact, this 
ontology-based framework amounts to an important contribution to the 
area of domain-specific languages design methodologies (as 
acknowledged, for instance, in Girardi & Serra, 2004).  
 
 As in Wand & Webers proposal, the focus of our framework is on the 
level of systems of representations, i.e., on the evaluation of modeling 
languages, as opposed to a focus on individual diagrams produced using 
a language. Nevertheless, as it is shown in chapter 2, by considering 
desirable properties of the mapping of individual diagrams onto what 
they represent, we are able to account for desirable properties of the 
modeling languages used to produce these diagrams, extending in this 
aspect Wand & Webers work. 
 
Wand & Webers framework addresses solely the relation between 
ontological categories and the modeling primitives of a language. It pays no 
attention to the possible constraints governing the relation between these 
categories. Moreover, it does not consider the necessary mapping from 
these constraints to equivalent ones, to be established between the language 
constructs representing these ontological categories. For example, consider 
two ontological categories A and B, which are represented in a language 
metamodel by two constructs C and D. If there are constraints on the 
admissible relations between A and B, these constraints must be also 
represented in the language metamodel in terms of the possible relations 
between C and D. In chapter 3, we refine our framework, by establishing a 
formal relation between the set of valid models that can be produced in a 
domain modeling language, and the set of state of affairs which are deemed 
admissible by a conceptualization of that domain. To put it simply: let O be 
an ontology of a domain conceptualization C such that M is a valid model of 
O iff it represents a state of affairs deemed admissible by C. Now, let SL be 
the set of valid models of language L delimited by Ls metamodel MT; let 
SO be the set of valid models of ontology O. We can formally define how 
truthful L is to the domain conceptualization C, by comparing how close 
the sets SL and SO are. In an ideal situation, these sets coincide and MT and 
O are isomorphic. In other words, in this case, L admits as valid models all 
and only those that represent admissible state of affairs according to C. 
9.2 Ontological Foundations for Conceptual Modeling 
The language evaluation and design framework proposed here can be 
applied both at the level of material domains (e.g., genomics, archeology, 
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multimedia, fishery, law, etc.) and corresponding domain-specific modeling 
languages, and at the (meta) level of a domain-independent (meta) 
conceptualization that underpins a general conceptual (ontology) modeling 
language. Nevertheless, due to the objectives of this thesis, we have focused 
on the level of meta-conceptualizations and of general conceptual modeling 
languages.  
The domain appropriateness of a domain modeling language can be 
precisely defined in terms of the difference between the set of valid models 
of this language, and the set of intended models according to a given 
conceptualization of that domain. To put it baldly, an intended model 
according to a conceptualization C is a model that represents a state of 
affairs deemed admissible by C. Now, let C be a conceptualization of 
material domain in reality, such as genealogy. The possible state of affairs 
according to C would exclude, for instance, one in which a person is its 
own parent. As discussed in depth in chapter 3, the definition of which 
possible state of affairs comprises a material conceptualization C is far from 
arbitrary, but determined by the set of laws that constitute reality. So, we 
can define a meta-conceptualization C, which contains all material 
conceptualizations Ci that are truthful to reality, i.e., domain 
conceptualizations that admit only state of affairs that can actually exist in 
reality. By applying the same line of reasoning to this meta-level of 
abstraction we have that a suitable general conceptual (ontology) modeling 
language that can be used to create domain ontologies (or conceptual 
models of material domains) is one which valid models are exactly the 
intended models of the meta-conceptualization C.  
Defining a repertoire of real-world categories (meta-conceptualization 
C) that can be used to articulate domain conceptualizations of reality is the 
very business of the discipline of formal ontology in philosophy. Thus, this 
task can greatly benefit from the conceptual tools and theories that have 
been developed along the years in this area. A meta-ontology representing a 
meta-conceptualization C constructed using the theories developed by 
formal ontology in philosophy is named a foundational ontology.  
From an ontological  point of view, most conceptual modeling 
languages (e.g., UML, ER, LINGO, CCT, OWL) commit to a simplistic 
set-theoretical meta-conceptualization, and to an inadequate theory of 
universals (either class or predicate nominalism). These ontological choices can 
be warranted for the so-called lightweight ontology representation languages 
(e.g., the Semantic web languages), by arguing in favor of mathematical 
simplicity and convenience, or to justify practical performance trade-offs. 
However, as discussed in depth in chapter 6, there are many serious 
philosophical problems with these commitments, which make them 
unsuitable as a foundation for a general conceptual modeling language. 
 THEORY OF UNIVERSALS AND UNIVERSALS TAXONOMIC STRUCTURES 371 
One of the main contributions of this thesis is to construct a meta-
ontology which can be used as a foundation for conceptual modeling 
concepts and languages. As discussed in chapter 3, due to the objectives of 
conceptual modeling languages, this foundational ontology should be the 
result of a descriptive metaphysics effort. Thus, the conceptual modeling 
ontology proposed here considers not only results from metaphysics, but 
also from areas such as cognitive science and linguistics, with the main 
objective of capturing the ontological distinctions underlying natural 
language and human cognition.  
The foundational ontology proposed here is one of the few and one of 
the most comprehensives approaches for developing cognitive ontological 
foundations for conceptual modeling languages found in the literature. The 
benefits of such a choice have been demonstrated in the related work 
sections of chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis. 
The ontological foundations for conceptual modeling proposed here 
have been developed in four complementary parts, namely, classes and class 
hierarchies (chapter 4), part-whole relations (chapter 5), properties 
(chapter 6) and roles (chapter 7). In the following four subsections, we 
discuss the contributions of this thesis in each of these topics, respectively. 
9.3 Theory of Universals and Universals Taxonomic 
Structures 
In chapter 4, we present a well-founded theory of universals to address 
the topic of universals in conceptual (ontology) modeling. Universals are 
fundamental for conceptual modeling, being represented in all major 
conceptual modeling languages (e.g., OO classes, EER Entity types, OWL 
concepts, etc.), and in the practice of conceptual modeling, a set of 
concepts is often used to represent distinctions in different sorts of 
universals (Type, Role, State, Mixin, among others).  
However, there is still a deficiency of methodological support for 
helping the user of the language to decide how to model elements that 
denote universal properties in a given domain and, hence, modeling choices 
are often made in ad hoc manner. Likewise it is the judgment of what are 
the admissible relations between these concepts. In addition, as also 
discussed in chapter 4, there is still much debate in the conceptual 
modeling literature regarding the meaning of these categories. 
The theory of universals we propose is founded in a number of results 
in the literature of philosophy of language and descriptive metaphysics and 
supported by substantial empirical evidence from research in cognitive 
psychology. By using a number of formally defined meta-properties 
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(identity supply, identity carry, rigidity, relational dependency) we can 
generate a typology of universals, in which modeling concepts like types, 
roles, phases and mixins (among others) can be defined. Moreover, by 
considering the postulates proposed by this theory, we can formally define 
constraints on the possible relations to be established between these 
modeling concepts. 
This theory represents an important contribution to the theory of 
conceptual modeling. First, because it can be used to formally characterize 
these concepts which are ubiquitous in conceptual modeling, and to 
provide methodological guidelines for how to apply these modeling 
concepts in practice, e.g., by helping the user to choose the most suitable 
concept to model a given general term in the universe of discourse. In 
addition, the theory can serve as a well-founded basis to harmonize 
different conceptions of these entities found in the literature.  
Second, the theory can be used to evaluate the conceptual quality of 
type hierarchies (or concept taxonomies), and to solve recurrent modeling 
problems in the practice of conceptual modeling (as demonstrated in 
chapter 4). In particular, as discussed in section 9.7 below, by employing 
the categories and postulates of this theory we have been able to propose a 
design pattern capturing a solution to a recurrent and much discussed 
problem in role modeling. 
9.4 Two Systems of Modal Logic with Sortal 
Quantification 
In order to formally characterize the ontological distinctions and 
postulates proposed by the theory of universals aforementioned, we have 
presented two different (albeit complementary) extensions to traditional 
systems of quantified modal logics, namely, the languages L1 and L2 
discussed in chapter 4. Although far from complete, these languages are 
successful in formally characterizing in a simpler way the important 
distinction between sortals and general property universals (non-sortals) 
w.r.t. to the formers exclusive ability to supply a principle of persistence 
and transworld identity to its instances. By doing this, we can address the 
limitations of classical (unrestricted extensional) modal logics, which 
reduces ontologically very different categories to the same logical footing. 
In particular, in the case of L1 we have employed the notion of 
individual concept, as a possible ontological interpretation to the notion of 
object identifiers in conceptual modeling. Moreover, as demonstrated by 
(Heller et al., 2004), a language such as L1 can play an important role in 
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relating endurantistic and perdurantistic views of entities (views of an entity as 
an object and as a process, respectively).  
The language L1 is a system of intentional modal logic based on the first of 
the four systems proposed in (Gupta, 1980). However, it contains some 
important differences. In one sense, it can be seen as an extension of 
Guptas proposal by elaborating on different types of sortal universals. 
However, differently from Gupta, it assumes an absolute qualified view of 
identity (van Leeuwen, 1991), as opposed to a contingent view. Thus, in our 
approach, although all principle of identities are sortal supplied, if two 
objects are identical according to one principle, then they are necessarily 
identitical. For Gupta, conversely, two objects can be identical in a given 
world and diverse in other. The disadvantage of this contingent view of 
identity is that it denies the so-called Leibnizs Law, which is generally 
accepted as an axiom for the identity relation. As a result, it equates the 
identity relation with any equivalence relation. 
9.5 Theory of Conceptual Part-Whole Relations 
Part-whole relations are fundamental concepts both from a cognitive 
perspective, for the realization of many important cognitive tasks (Tversky, 
1989), and from an ontological perspective, serving as a foundational for 
the formalization of other entities that compose a foundational ontology.  
Parthood has been represented in practically all conceptual/object-
oriented modeling languages (e.g., OML, UML, EER, LINGO), and 
although it has not yet been adopted as a modeling primitive in the 
Semantic web languages, some authors have already pointed out its 
relevance for reasoning in description logics (e.g., Lambrix, 2000). 
Nonetheless, in conceptual modeling, the concepts of part and whole 
are often understood only superficially. Consequently, the representation of 
these concepts in conceptual modeling languages is based on the very 
minimal axiomatization that these notions require. Moreover, despite it 
being an active topic in the conceptual modeling literature, there is still 
much disagreement on what characterizes this relation and about the 
properties that part-whole relations should have from a conceptual point of 
view. 
In chapter 5 we propose an ontological well-founded theory of 
conceptual part-whole relations, which aims at providing precise formal 
characterizations and real-world semantics for these concepts. This theory 
is organized in a typology of parthood relations. The categories in this 
typology are generated in the following manner. First, we consider a 
number of theories of parts from formal ontology in philosophy 
(Mereologies). These formal theories provide an important starting point 
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for the understanding and axiomatization of the notion of part. However, 
despite their importance, these theories concentrate merely on a formal 
notion of part and, hence, they fall short in fully characterizing the relation 
of parthood from a conceptual point of view. Thus as an extension to the 
mereological core of our typology, on the basis of the literature on 
meronymic relations in linguistic and cognitive sciences, we recognize the 
existence of not one but four types of part-whole relations, based on the 
type on ontological entities they relate. As a second dimension to create 
categories in this typology, we consider a number of meta-properties that 
part-whole can possess. These meta-properties designate: (i) whether 
objects can share parts; (ii) whether an object only exists being part of a 
specific whole (or of a whole of certain kind); (iii) whether an object only 
exists having a specific object as part (or a part of a specific kind). All these 
meta-properties are formally characterized using a modal logics approach. 
The theory also shows that these two dimensions are not completely 
orthogonal, i.e., by selecting the type of a parthood relation based on the 
first dimension (i.e., based on the ontological category of its relata), a 
number of meta-properties on the second dimension are implied. In 
addition, each type of parthood selected in the first dimension determines a 
particular type of mereology (e.g., minimal, extensional) that should 
constitute the basic axioms of that specific relation. 
This typology contributes to the theory of conceptual modeling by 
providing ontological foundations and real-world semantics for this 
important construct of conceptual modeling languages. Moreover, it helps 
to precisely characterize the relation between some of the entities forming 
this typology and one of the most important modeling concepts in 
conceptual modeling, namely, the concept of roles (see chapter 7). In 
particular, we use the distinction between de re and de dicto modality in the 
literature of philosophical logic to characterize the different formal 
properties of the relations of specific dependent parthood from the whole to the 
part, depending whether the whole universal is rigid or anti-rigid. 
The explicit consideration of the modal meta-properties of part-whole 
relations together with those of the universals instantiated by their relata, 
constitute an important contribution not only to conceptual modeling, but 
also to the areas of software design and implementation. For example, 
inseparability and essentiality of parts in a part-whole relation constitute a 
sort of existential dependence relation, which imposes constraints on the 
relation between the life cycles of the relata. Understanding and making 
explicit these constraints is of fundamental importance not only for 
understanding and describing reality, but also, for example, for correctly 
specifying the relation between the life cycles of objects in object-oriented 
programming. 
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9.6 Contributions to the Problem of Transitivity in 
Conceptual Part-Whole Relations 
The problem of transitivity of part-whole relations is a much debated 
topic not only in conceptual modeling but also in the linguistic and 
cognitive science literatures.  
In many conceptual modeling languages (e.g., UML) part-whole 
relations are always considered transitive. However, as discussed in chapter 
5, examples of fallacious cases of transitivity among part-whole relations 
abound.  
In chapter 5, we discuss the relation between transitivity and the 
unifying relations characterizing the parts of a given whole. We conclude that 
if we consider a unique general sense of parthood, transitivity cannot be 
said to hold unrestricted, but only with respect to certain contexts. The 
delimitation of contexts, however, typically requires extensive knowledge of 
the domain being modeled.  
In order to provide methodological assistance to the conceptual 
modeler in this task, we build on the different types of part-whole relations 
comprising the typology discussed in section 9.5. We demonstrate in 
chapter 5 that, by selecting the type of a part-whole relation in the first 
dimension aforementioned (i.e., according to the ontology category of its 
relata), we can determine which combination of parthood relations is 
transitive. The four types of part-whole relations considered in this respect 
are: (a) subQuantityOf; (b) subCollectionOf; (c) memberOf; (d) componentOf. As 
we have demonstrated, the combinations (a) + (a), (b) + (b) and (c) + 
(b) are always transitive. Thus, chains such as (a) +  + (a), or (c) + (b) 
+  + (b) will always delineate contexts. The combinations (c) + (c), 
(d) + (c), in contrast, are never transitive. Since most individuals 
represented in conceptual models are functional complexes, most part-
whole relations represented are of the sort (d). This combination (d) + (d) 
is however itself non-transitive, and holds only in certain contexts. Other 
combinations such as (a) + (d), (b) + (d) are not possible. In these cases, 
the involved relations require relata of incompatible types. For instance, the 
combination x is a subQuantity of y, and y is a componentOf z is not possible 
since y cannot be both a quantity and a functional complex. 
The precise definition of these contexts for functional parthood 
relations is of great importance not only for problem-solving in conceptual 
modeling, but also for software design and implementation. As discussed in 
(Odell & Bock, 1998), the transitivity of parthood relations has a strong 
impact on the propagation of properties and method invocations in object-
oriented languages. For this reason, by building on the pioneering theory of 
transitivity of linguistic functional parthood relations proposed by (Vieu & 
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Aurnague, 2005), we propose a number of visual patterns that can be used 
to identify these contexts in conceptual class diagrams (chapter 7). 
9.7 The Role Modeling with Disjoint Admissible Types 
Design Pattern 
A known and much discussed problem in role modeling in the literature 
is the problem of specifying admissible types for Roles that can be filled by 
instances of disjoint types. This problem led (Steimann, 2000b), for 
example, to propose a complete separation of role and type hierarchies in 
conceptual models. As discussed in chapter 4, this solution implies a radical 
transformation to the metamodels of most of the current conceptual 
modeling languages. 
By employing the theory of universals discussed in section 9.3, we 
propose an ontological design pattern capturing a standard solution to this 
problem. The adequacy of this design pattern is demonstrated by several 
examples throughout the thesis.  
We believe that ontological design patterns such as this one, which 
captures standard solutions for recurrent conceptual modeling problems, 
represent an important contribution to the task of defining sound 
engineering tools and principles for the practice of conceptual modeling. 
9.8 A Foundation for Harmonizing Different Concepts 
of Roles in the Literature 
In (Wieringa et al., 1995), the authors offer an interesting alternative to 
the traditional notion of roles in conceptual and object-oriented modeling. 
They also propose a separation of role and type hierarchies, but for radically 
different reasons. Their main motivation is based on a philosophical 
problem known as The Counting Problem (Gupta, 1980). As we have shown 
in chapter 7, this problem is actually fallacious and, thus, the separation of 
role and type hierarchies cannot be argued for on this basis. Nonetheless, 
there is an important truth highlighted by their argument which is generally 
neglected in most conceptual modelling approaches, namely, that in 
different situations one might want to count role instances in different 
senses. 
The notion of role proposed by Wieringa et al. is one in which role 
individuals are entities that are existentially dependent of their players. 
Moreover, role universals are responsible for supplying principles of identity 
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for their instances, which are different from the ones supplied by the 
universals of their players. This view is also shared by (Loebe, 2003).  
By relying of the ontological categories of moments and qua individuals 
discussed in chapter 6, we manage to provide an ontological interpretation 
for the notion of roles proposed by Wieringa et al. and Loebe. Moreover, 
we manage to harmonize it with the more common view of roles taken in 
the literature (and, in particular, in the typology of section 9.3), and the 
one which more naturally represents the commonsense use of roles in 
ordinary language, namely, the conception of roles as relationally dependent 
and anti-rigid substantial universals. 
Finally, by explicitly representing roles as both substantial universals 
and qua individual universals, we can account in an unambiguous way for the 
alternative senses of counting role instances previously mentioned. 
9.9 An Aristotelian Ontology for Attributes, Weak 
Entities and Relationships 
In chapter 6, we present the core of the foundational ontology proposed 
here, organized in terms of the so-called Aristotelian ontological square 
comprising the category pairs Substantial-Substantial Universal, Moment-
Moment Universal. This ontology constitutes an important contribution to the 
theory of conceptual modeling, by enabling simple, unambiguous and 
ontologically interesting real-world semantics to be defined for the 
conceptual modeling categories of attributes, weak entities and relationships. 
From a metaphysical point of view, these categories allow for the 
construction of a parsimonious ontology, based on the primitive and 
formally defined notion of existential dependency. This has been possible since, 
(i) by using this existential dependency meta-property we can differentiate 
which particulars in the domain are substantials and which are moments; (ii) 
based on the multiplicity of entities a moment depends on, we can 
distinguish between qualities and relators; (iii) with qualities we can explain 
formal relations and weak entities, and with relators, material relations; (iv) 
finally, with moments we can explain the relation of exemplification, and with 
exemplification characterization.        
From a conceptual point of view, this ontology allows for the creation 
of a conceptual modeling language with great simplicity and preciseness of 
its constructs. For example, in the UML profile generated in chapter 8 all 
represented universals are either universals of independent entities 
(substantial universals), or universals which instances are existentially 
dependent of other instances (moment universals). In addition, all material 
associations can be reduced to primitive relations of existential dependence. 
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As a consequence, the user of this modeling language is guided in the 
choice of how to model the elements of the universe of discourse by a 
formally defined and, thus, unambiguous relation of existential dependence. 
As discussed in chapter 6, despite being ubiquitous in conceptual 
modeling languages, relationships are particularly problematic and 
ambiguous constructs. However, by employing (explicitly represented) 
relators, we can provide not only an ontologically well-founded 
interpretation for them, but also one that can accommodate more subtle 
linguistic distinctions. Additionally, from a conceptual point of view, we can 
produce models that are free of cardinality constraint ambiguities, i.e., 
models in which single-tuple and multiple-tuple cardinality constraints are 
explicitly differentiated and represented. Furthermore, with the notions of 
qualities and relators we can define qua individuals, and with the latter we 
have managed to provide a foundation and terminological clarification, 
which harmonizes two competing notions of roles present in the conceptual 
modeling literature (see section 9.8). Furthermore, the ontological category 
of relators shall play an important role in extending our ontology with: (i) 
an ontology of perdurants: relators are typically founded on individual processes 
or events and, as discussed in chapter 6, they can play an important role as a 
mechanism for consistency preservation between static and dynamic 
conceptual models; (ii) an ontology of social and intentional entities: many social 
bonds (e.g., commitments, claims) are types of relators (Guizzardi & 
Wagner, 2005a). Moreover, the notion of relators presented here is akin to 
the one of affordances in organizational semiotics (Stamper et al., 2000). 
9.10 Ontological Foundations for Attributes Values and 
Attribute Value Spaces 
Traditionally, in conceptual modeling, value domains are taken for 
granted. In general, in conceptual modeling languages, they are only 
superficially considered by taking primitive datatypes as representing 
familiar mathematical sets (e.g., natural, integer, real, Boolean) and the 
focus has been almost uniquely on mathematical specification techniques.  
In chapter 6, besides the entities that constitute the four-categorical 
ontology aforementioned, we explicitly take into account the conceptual 
measurement structures in which particular qualities are perceived (and 
conceived). By employing the theory of conceptual spaces, we can provide an 
ontological interpretation for the conceptual modeling notion of attribute 
values and attribute value domains.  
As discussed in chapter 6, many benefits arise from the use of conceptual 
spaces and related notions (e.g., quality domains and quality dimensions), as 
 AN ONTOLOGICALLY WELL-FOUNDED UML VERSION FOR CONCEPTUAL 
MODELING AND ONTOLOGY REPRESENTATION 379 
theoretical tools for conceptualizing attribute values and value domains. 
Firstly, quality domains and the constraints relating different quality 
dimensions captured in its structure can provide a sound basis for the 
conceptual modeling representations of the associated structured datatypes, 
constraining the possible values that their fields can assume. In other words, 
whatever constraints should be specified for a datatype, they must reflect 
the geometrical structure of the quality domain underlying this datatype.  
Moreover, as demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7, from the structure of a 
certain quality domain, one can derive meta-properties (e.g., reflexivity, 
asymmetry, transitivity) for the formal relations based on this domain. That 
is to say, explicitly represented characteristics of conceptual spaces can 
provide an ontological explanation for these meta-properties.   
Other approaches to ontology-based conceptual modeling in the 
literature (e.g., Evermann & Wand, 2001b) propose that the conceptual 
modeling representations of natural Kinds (a type of substance sortals) should 
be accompanied by a constraint specification, which restricts the possible 
values that the attributes of a substantial thing can assume, i.e., which 
delineates the lawful state space of that kind. As discussed in chapter 6, a 
conceptual space associated with a substance sortal is the cognitive 
counterpart of the lawful state space of that substance sortal. However, 
differently from the lawful state spaces, the conceptual spaces approach 
acknowledges that quality domains can themselves be multidimensional, 
exhibiting a constrained substructure that can occur in the definition of 
conceptual spaces associated with possibly different substantial universals. 
For this reason, we believe that the explicit representation of quality 
domains (associated with quality universals) as datatypes not only provides a 
further degree of structuring on lawful state spaces, but it also allows for a 
potential reuse of specifications of a subset of its constraints. 
Finally, the explicit account of conceptual spaces and their constituent 
domains and dimensions afford the conceptualization of alternative 
measurement structures for a given ontological entity. Furthermore, the 
possibility of defining transformations and projections between these 
explicitly represented structures facilitates the tasks of knowledge sharing 
and semantic interoperability. 
9.11 An Ontologically Well-Founded UML version for 
Conceptual Modeling and Ontology Representation 
The ontology constructed throughout chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis is 
aimed at providing ontological foundations for conceptual modeling 
concepts and real-world semantics for the related constructs. The choice of 
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concepts on which we focus in this ontology (types and their instances, type 
taxonomies, associations, attributes, attribute values and attribute value 
spaces, part-whole relations) was strongly influenced by their importance in 
the practice of conceptual modeling, but also by their generality as being 
represented in constructs of existing conceptual modeling languages.  
In chapter 8, we apply this foundational ontology as a reference for 
analyzing the ontological appropriateness of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) for the purpose of conceptual modelling and ontology 
representation. This effort is meant first as a case study of the language 
evaluation and (re)design framework proposed here. However, due to the 
following reasons, the ontologically well-founded re-designed version of 
UML proposed represents itself an important research contribution of this 
thesis: (i) the current status of UML as de facto standard modeling language; 
(ii) the growing interest in its adoption as a language for conceptual 
modelling and ontology representation; (iii) the current scarcity of 
foundational (as opposed to lightweight) conceptual modelling languages.    
We emphasize, however, that this foundational ontology is independent 
of particular modeling languages and, hence, it can in principle be used as a 
foundation for analyzing any structural conceptual modeling language (e.g., 
EER, OML, LINGO, OWL). For instance, in (Guizzardi & Wagner, 
2005a), an extension of the foundational ontology proposed here has been 
employed to analyze the ontological semantics of some enterprise modeling 
languages and frameworks (e.g., the REA framework) and, in (Wagner & 
Taveter, 2004), as the ontological foundation of the AORML agent-
modeling language.        
By using the evaluation and (re)design framework proposed here, we 
have managed to demonstrate cases in which each of the properties of a 
suitable representation mapping is lacking in the current UML meta-model 
when interpreted in terms of our reference ontology. In other words, as a 
conceptual modelling and ontology representation language, the UML 
meta-model can be shown to contain cases of construct incompleteness, 
overload, redundancy and excess. 
In order to remedy this situation, we have proposed a number of 
modifications to the UML meta-model, producing a conceptually cleaner, 
semantically unambiguous and ontologically well-founded version of the 
language. Moreover, since the constructs in the re-designed meta-model 
can be unambiguously identified by formally defined ontological meta-
properties, this approach provides the important additional benefit of 
methodologically supporting the user of the language in deciding how to 
model the elements of the universe of discourse.  
We believe that one should attempt to shield as much as possible the 
user of a conceptual modelling language from the complexity of the 
underlying ontological theory. Therefore, it is our strategy to (whenever 
 A CASE STUDY ON THE INTEGRATION AND ANALYSIS OF SEMANTIC WEB 
ONTOLOGIES 381 
possible) represent the ontological principles underlying a language in terms 
of syntactical constraints of this language. For example, since the postulate 4.2 
of our typology of universals (see section 9.3) is represented as a constraint 
in the redesigned UML meta-model, a users model in which a class 
regarded as anti-rigid (e.g., customer) is a subclass of one regarded as rigid 
(e.g., person) is a syntactically (grammatically) incorrect model. Therefore, even 
if a conceptual modeller is unlearned about the ontological foundations of a 
given language, he can still produce only ontologically correct models 
(intended models) just by being accurate in the use of that languages 
grammar.  
Finally, we emphasize that this strategy follows an analogous process 
occurring in human natural languages, since, according to (Chomsky, 
1986), the grammars of natural languages have the properties they do to 
reflect the properties of ontological categories underpinning human 
cognition. Thus, as exemplified in chapter 4, some natural language 
constructions are ungrammatical for ontological reasons (e.g., only general 
terms representing sortal universals can be combined with quantifiers and 
determiners). 
9.12 A Case Study on the Integration and Analysis of 
Semantic Web Ontologies 
In chapter 3, we discuss the two-level approach defended in this thesis 
for semantic interoperation of conceptual models. We defend that in a first 
phase of off-line meaning negotiation, an expressive and ontologically 
adequate modelling language should be used for comparing the candidate 
models and making explicit their underlying ontological commitments. 
Once this meaning negotiation and semantic interoperation phase is 
complete, then a computationally efficient representation language can be 
used to express the results of this phase.  
In chapter 8, we exemplify the first phase of this process by using the 
UML version proposed here to analyze and integrate several Semantic web 
lightweight ontologies. The scenario analyzed is on the integration of 
Semantic web ontologies in the scope of a context-aware service platform. 
This scenario was originally proposed in (Ríos, 2003) to illustrate the 
inadequacy of Semantic web languages in making explicit the underlying 
ontological commitments of the conceptualizations involved. Here, this 
scenario has been extended by considering real Semantic web models, 
which are structurally similar to the ones proposed by Ríos, and which are 
used by practitioners in concrete Semantic web applications.   
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As shown in chapter 8, through this case study, we have managed to 
demonstrate the adequacy of the language proposed and, consequently, of 
its underlying foundational ontology. In particular, this case study 
exemplifies the importance of the results achieved here to Semantic web-
related projects such as A-MUSE80 (Architecture Modelling Utility for 
Service Enabling) and AWARENESS81 (AWARE Mobile NEtwork and 
ServiceS). 
Finally, in chapter 2 we have illustrated the design of a domain-specific 
modelling language based on a domain ontology of geneology. In that 
chapter, this example is presented as an illustration of the language 
evaluation and (re)design framework proposed. However, as discussed 
there, the derivation of suitable syntactical and pragmatic constraints for the 
designed language depends on suitability of the domain ontology 
represented. Therefore, that example can now be seen also as an additional 
exemplification of the usefulness of the modelling language and the 
ontological concepts proposed here. 
9.13 Future Work 
In this thesis, we aim at developing ontological foundations for 
structural conceptual modeling concepts. As a result, the foundational 
ontology proposed is centered in the ontological category of endurants and 
endurant universals. In (Guizzardi & Wagner, 2004; 2005a; 2005b), we 
present an extension of this ontology as a component of a larger one named 
UFO (Unified Foundational Ontology).  
UFO is organized in three incrementally layered compliance sets:  
 
1. UFO-A: essentially the foundational ontology proposed here;  
2. UFO-B: defines, as an increment to UFO-A, terms related to 
perdurants;  
3. UFO-C: defines, as an increment to UFO-B, terms explicitly related to 
the spheres of intentional and social things, including linguistic things.  
 
This division reflects a certain stratification of our world. It also 
reflects different degrees of scientific consensus: there is more consensus 
about the ontology of endurants than about the ontology of perdurants, and 
there is more consensus about the ontology of perdurants than about the 
ontology of intentional and social things. 
                                                      
80 http://a-muse.freeband.nl/ 
81 http://awareness.freeband.nl/ 
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The usefulness of this extended ontology has been already 
demonstrated in analyzing agent related concepts (Guizzardi & Wagner, 
2004; 2005b) and enterprise modeling languages (Guizzardi & Wagner, 
2005a). Nevertheless, UFO-B and UFO-C are still in a preliminary stage of 
development and, thus, substantial work still needs to be done in 
understanding and formally characterizing the entities constituting these 
ontologies. 
As discussed in chapter 3, in domain engineering, ontology 
representation languages can play an important role, providing useful 
abstractions for representing domain models. However, once a domain 
model (domain ontology) is represented, there is still the problem of 
systematically deriving from it reusable artifacts (e.g., frameworks), which 
preserve the characteristics of the conceptualization expressed in that 
model. The same situation occurs in traditional software engineering, in 
which design and implementation specifications should also preserve the 
real-world semantics of the domain conceptualization (captured in a 
conceptual model of the domain). This problem is known as the impedance 
mismatch problem (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001a). 
In (Guizzardi & Falbo & Pereira Filho, 2001a,b; 2002) and (Falbo & 
Guizzardi & Duarte, 2002), we propose a systematic and semantics-
preserving approach for deriving object-oriented frameworks from domain 
ontologies expressed in LINGO. The derivation methodology proposed 
comprises a spectrum of techniques, namely, mapping directives, design 
patterns and formal translation rules. For example, in (Guizzardi & Falbo & 
Pereira Filho, 2002) a design pattern is proposed that guarantees the 
preservation of some ontological properties of part-whole relations 
(irreflexivity, asymmetry, transitivity and shareability) in object-oriented 
implementations.  
When evaluated in terms of the foundational ontology proposed here, 
LINGO can be shown to be seriously incomplete. A natural extension of 
the work aforementioned is the investigation of similar methodological 
mechanisms for deriving object-oriented implementations and frameworks 
that preserve the ontological properties of domain models expressed in the 
conceptual modeling language proposed here. 
There are also interesting possibilities for future work on the topic of 
domain-specific visual languages evaluation and (re)design. Firstly, a more 
systematic account is needed of the connection between ontological meta-
categories (and their meta-properties) and, systems of visual signs. An 
interesting approach to pursue this topic would be in the lines of the 
Algebraic Semiotics program proposed in (Goguen, 1999), since such an 
approach should consider a more comprehensive exploration of semiotic 
theory, but doing it in a precise way. However, differently from the latter, 
domain models should be suitably represented in terms of expressive 
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domain ontologies, in which ontological meta-properties of the elements of 
a conceptualization are explicitly represented, as opposed to focusing solely 
on abstract (algebraic and category-theoretical) domain specifications.  
The establishment of systematic connections between real-world 
semantic domains, meta-models, and visual systems of concrete syntaxes 
shall provide a solid basis for the construction of semantic aware (meta) 
modeling case tools for domain-specific visual language evaluation and 
(re)design. Additionally, with the development of systematic approaches for 
deriving frameworks from expressive domain ontologies (along the lines 
previously discussed) these tools can also support the creation of libraries of 
reusable domain artifacts, thus, bridging the gap between domain-specific 
conceptual modeling and design/implementation. One should refer to 
(Falbo et al., 2002b; Falbo et al., 2003) for an example of an ontology-
based semantic software engineering environment based on the frameworks 
derivation approach aforementioned.   
In this thesis, we have shown many conceptual modeling benefits 
resulting from the application of the theory of conceptual spaces in the 
foundation ontology proposed here. However, there are many other aspects 
of this theory, which were not explored in this work, but which shall be 
pursued in future investigations.   
For example, as briefly discussed in chapter 6, conceptual spaces can 
be used for the construction of Portions (Gerlst & Pribbenow, 1995), i.e., 
dynamically assembled collectives built by selecting certain parts of an 
integral object, according to certain internal properties of this object. 
Examples include: (a) the reddish parts of an object; (b) the tall animals in 
the group. The notion of contrast classes in the theory of conceptual spaces 
(Gardenfors 2000; 2004) can allow for interesting cases of non-monotomic 
reasoning in situations such as depicted in (b). For instance, although every 
squirrel is an animal, a tall squirrel is not a tall animal. As argued by (Gerlst 
& Pribbenow, 1995), Portions can play an important role in reasoning about 
physical objects. In particular, they can be useful in context-dependent 
reasoning, by supporting the construction of dynamically created aggregates 
depending on a given context (e.g., the crowded areas of a geographical 
location, the restored parts of a museum).  
Another aspect of this theory that could be useful in context-aware 
scenarios is the notion of context matrices, which can be used to emphasize 
certain quality dimensions of conceptual spaces in detriment of others 
depending on the circumstance. Take, for instance, a wayfinding service. In a 
day context, the best wayfinding landmark to be used by this service could be 
a façade with the most contrasting color. In contrast, in a night context, it 
can be simply the highest or widest landmark (Raubal, 2004).  
Finally, conceptual spaces provide a sound mechanism for accounting 
for relations such as resemblance, complementation, and opposition between 
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universals. As a consequence, one can also account for relations such as 
these between individuals instantiating those universals. Besides the 
theoretical importance of this mechanism for a theory of conceptual 
modeling (as discussed in chapter 6), it allows for the construction of 
conceptual models which can support approximate (inexact) reasoning 
applications (e.g., inexact service matching). This topic should also be explored 
in future research. 
Besides contributing to the development of a philosophically and 
cognitive principled theory of conceptual modeling, it is also a general 
objective of this thesis to work towards the development of sound practical 
tools for the disciplines of conceptual modeling and ontological 
engineering. We believe that the development of these tools constitutes an 
important step, contributing to the maturity of these disciplines as 
engineering disciplines. 
In this thesis, we have pursue this latter goal in several manners, for 
instance, by proposing a systematic evaluation and (re)design method, by 
providing methodological guidelines for helping the user in deciding how to 
model elements of given conceptualization, by proposing a modeling 
language in which ontological principles are incorporated as the languages 
syntax constraints, or by proposing formal languages in which these 
ontological principles are embedded in the languages semantic theory. 
Moreover, an important contribution of this thesis in this direction is the 
creation of an ontological design pattern that captures a situation-independent 
solution for a classical and recurrent problem in conceptual modeling. With 
the extension of the ontological theory proposed here to incorporate other 
aspects of reality (UFO-B and UFO-C), we shall continue to investigate the 
development of conceptual modeling engineering tools in all these 
directions. 
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Ontological Foundations For 
Structural Conceptual Models
Giancarlo Guizzardi
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute 
to the theory of Conceptual Modeling by 
proposing ontological foundations for structural 
conceptual models. 
Conceptual Modeling is a discipline of great 
importance to several areas in Computer Science. 
Its main objective is concerned with identifying, 
analyzing and describing the essential concepts 
and constraints of a universe of discourse, with 
the help of a (diagrammatic) modeling language 
that is based on a set of basic modeling concepts 
(forming a metamodel). 
In this thesis, we show how conceptual modeling 
languages can be evaluated and (re)designed 
with the purpose of improving their ontological 
adequacy. In simple terms, ontological adequacy 
is a measure of how close the models produced 
using a modeling language are to the situations 
in the reality they are supposed to represent. The 
thesis starts by proposing a systematic evaluation 
method for comparing a metamodel of the 
concepts underlying a language to a reference 
ontology of the corresponding domain in reality. 
The focus of this thesis is on general conceptual 
modeling languages (as opposed to domain 
specific ones). Hence, the proposed reference 
ontology is a foundational (or upper-level) 
ontology. Moreover, since, it focuses on structural 
modeling aspects (as opposed to dynamic ones), 
this foundational ontology is an ontology of 
objects, their properties and relations, their 
parts, the roles they play, and the types they 
instantiate. 
The proposed ontology was developed by 
adapting and extending a number of theories 
coming, primarily, from formal ontology in 
philosophy, but also from cognitive science 
and linguistics. Once developed, every sub-
theory of the ontology is used in the creation 
of methodological tools (e.g., modeling 
profiles, guidelines and design patterns). The 
expressiveness and relevance of these tools are 
shown throughout the thesis to solve some 
classical and recurrent conceptual modeling 
problems. 
Finally, the thesis demonstrates the applicability 
and usefulness of both the method and the 
proposed ontology by analyzing and extending 
a fragment of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) which deals with the construction of 
structural conceptual models. 
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